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One must obtain forgiveness for every essay in theology. In all senses. 
Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being 
The joy in the thought that before God a man is always in the wrong. 
Soren Kierkegaard, Gospel ofSuferings 
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Abstract 
This thesis attempts to explore a theological anthropology devised principally from a theological 
reading of the works of Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855). It is argued that Kierkegaard's writings testify 
to the modem fixation upon the 'self', whilst proposing a theological anthropology that constitutes an 
attempted recovery from the modem drive for self-possession via isolated introspection. It is the failure 
of the self to grasp itself through self-reflection that engenders the dialectics of `anxiety', `melancholy', 
and `despair' which potentially initiate the self s authentic self-becoming `before God'. Kierkegaard's 
works are thus read as negatively transcribing the failure of the modem self to authenticate itself whilst 
positively indicating towards a relational theological anthropology which re-situates authentic self- 
consciousness in relation to an Other. 
However, the decisive point for selfhood is that the `other' before whom one stands is the God 
who is ostensibly `Wholly Other': the God whom the self must initially experience its estrangement 
from. This alienation is expounded by Kierkegaard in terms of the `infinite qualitative difference' 
between humanity and God - an abyss which Kierkegaard identifies as sin. In attempting to anatomise 
this abyss which confronts the self, Kierkegaard's category is placed in dialogue with antecedent and 
subsequent interpretations of the `Wholly Other' and human-divine alterity as found in Luther, Hegel, 
Feuerbach, Karl Barth, Rudolf Otto, Mircea Eliade, Thomas Altizer, Emmanuel Levinas, and Jacques 
Derrida. 
Ultimately, it is argued that while sin postulates the infinite difference, the forgiveness of sin 
signifies the overcoming of the abyssal estrangement of the `Wholly Other', but not the abolition of the 
essential alterity (or mysterium) of the divine. Essentially, once the abyss of sin is transcended by the 
'self' affirming gift of forgiveness, the true meaning of the infinite difference and God's Holy 





Prologue: Gazing Into the Kierkegaardian Abyss 6 
Introduction: Theological Anthropology and the Abyss of the Postmodern 14 
Chapter One: The Inner Abyss 31 
Chapter Two: The Abyss of Melancholy 67 
Chapter Three: The Melancholy Theophany 90 
Chapter Four: The Allegory of Yisra'el 116 
Chapter Five: The Anatomy ofAnfecthung 147 
Chapter Six: The Gaze of the Abyss 171 




[B]ut what madness, when he who himself has lost the eternal wants to heal him who is at the 
extremity of sickness unto death. 
Soren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 25 
The title of this thesis inevitably pays homage to Robert Burton's epic The Anatomy of Melancholy, 
and is itself not without some of this book's sense of irony. The `Abyss' in question is specifically the 
`infinite qualitative abyss' between humanity and God in Kierkegaard's writings; but it also, more 
generally, evokes the `abyss' of meaning which haunts the postmodern. It is to this end that the title 
also reflects my gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Murray Rae, who, in response to one of my numerous 
abyssal moments of doubt, conveyed to me that theology discovers and fulfils one of its tasks in the 
activity of naming that which confronts us. As such, this thesis represents an attempt to name - or to 
anatomise - something which is too often veiled by darkness. Nothing more nor less. 
This thesis has been made possible by an award from The Arts and Humanities Research 
Board and a King's College Humanities Research Studentship. It would also have been a far more 
arduous undertaking had it not been for Research Fellowships at the Hong and Hong Kierkegaard 
Library at St. Olaf College, Minnesota in the summers of 2002 and 2004. I am always grateful for the 
welcome, support, and sustenance received and the particular generosity of Cynthia Lund and Prof. 
Gordon Marino. My gratitude must also go to those who have educated, motivated, aided, supported 
and inspired my thinking during recent years. I especially wish to thank Prof. Alan Torrance, Prof. 
Daphne Hampson, Susan Miller and Debbie Reynolds from the University of St. Andrews. I am also 
grateful for the King's College Research Institute in Systematic Theology and Prof. Colin Gunton 
whose inspiration is sadly missed. I am also indebted to Dr. Daniel Rynhold for indulging me in 
discussion of the interface with Jewish philosophy and to Dr. Christopher Hamilton for a final reading. 
Thanks are also due to the Soren Kierkegaard Society of the United Kingdom, particularly to Dr. Hugh 
Pyper, Dr. Steve Shakespeare, Dr. John Lippitt, and Prof. Roger Poole who is also sadly missed. 
Additionally, I would like to express my gratitude to Alexander Man, James Rankine, Prof. Robert 
Perkins, Leo Stan, Tamara Monet-Marx, and all my friends for each indulging me in various ways. 
This simply would not have happened without the support and love of my parents, Keith and Edith, and 
my brother, Jonathan. Was it worth it? 
Finally, I dedicate this work to Sarah, whose love has nurtured me for too brief a time. 
Without your support, enthusiasm, humour, compassion, and infinite grace and generosity of spirit I do 




Abbreviations for Works by Soren Kierkegaard (See bibliography for full details) 
AN Armed Neutrality and An Open Letter. 
AUC Kierkegaard's Attack Upon 'Christendom'. 
CA The Concept ofAnxiety. 
BA The Book on Adler. In Fear and Trembling and The Book on Adler. 
CD Christian Discourses and The Lillies of the Field and the Birds of the Air, and Three 
Discourses at the Communion on Fridays. 
CUP Concluding Unscientific Postscript. 
CI The Concept of Irony: With Constant Reference to Socrates. 
E! O I-II Either/Or, 2 vols. 
EUD Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses. 
FSE For Self-Examination. In For Self-Examination and Judge For Yourselves! and Three 
Discourses. 
FT Fear and Trembling. In Fear and Trembling and The Book on Adler. 
JFY Judge For Yourselves! In For Self-Examination and Judge For Yourselves! and Three 
Discourses. 
JP Soren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, 7 Volumes. (Follwed by volume number and entry 
number: e. g. JP 2: 1383. References to Alexander Dru's translation of The Journals of Seren 
Kierkegaard -A Selection cite Dru's reference number in brackets. ) 
Pap. Papirer. (Followed by reference to volume, section, and number in standard Danish edition: 
e. g. Pap. X' A 59) 
PF Philosophical Fragments. In Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus. 
PV The Point of View For My Work as an Author. 
PC Practice in Christianity. 
R Repetition. 
SUD The Sickness Unto Death. 
SLW Stages on Life's Way. 
TA Two Ages: The Age of Revolution and The Present Age (A Literary Review). 
UDVS Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits. 
WA Without Authority. 
WL Works of Love. 
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Prologue: Gazing Into the Kierkeeaardian Abyss 
Precisely because there is an absolute difference between God and man, man will 
express his own nature most adequately when he expresses this difference absolutely. 
' 
Any endeavour to articulate a Kierkegaardian theological anthropology will find itself gazing into an 
abyss. It is this Kierkegaardian motif which I shall broach before introducing the central issues of this 
thesis. The abyss which sooner or later one encounters in Kierkegaard cannot be subsumed under 
nothingness; it is not a void, though at times it may resemble one and may at all times threaten to 
become one. 2 This abyss may be spoken of as a nothingness, an absence; but it also designates a 
discernible space, albeit infinite, between humanity and God. For how could one anatomise 
nothingness? And why an anatomy? An anatomy involves a dissection [from Greek anatome - 
`dissection'], and a dissection requires a cutting apart [from Latin dissecare - `to cut into pieces']; 
hence the severance of the abyss is implied in its anatomisation - the infinite severance between God 
and humanity. This anatomy requires that one speak not only of divinity and humanity, but of the 
severance between them: divinity and humanity on two sides of a chasm. But this anatomy is no 
detached science. It is inescapably a self-examination, an "autopsy of faith. "3 
Although there is no singular unified concept of `the abyss' in Kierkegaard's writings, its 
recurrently enthralling image is one which Kierkegaard persistently evokes with stylistic flourish and 
existential pathos. Constantine Constantius, for example, writes of "the abyss of anxiety"4 - an axiom 
which recalls the vertigo of anxiety's gazing into the abyss in Vigilius Haufniensis's The Concept of 
Anxiety: "Anxiety maybe compared with dizziness. He whose eye happens to look down into the 
yawning abyss [svcelgende Dyb] becomes dizzy. "5 Despite this vertiginous horror, however, one who is 
"educated by anxiety" discovers what Haufniensis calls "Anxiety as Saving through Faith". Such a 
person, though they may sink in the abyss, in turn emerges "from the depth of the abyss [Afgrundens 
Dyb] lighter than all the troublesome and terrible things in life. "6 It is not the abyss which is dreadful in 
itself; more precisely it is in the relation of the individual to the abyss where anxiety is located. The 
dizziness of anxiety is essentially derived from the subject's gaze into the abyss. "But what is the 
reason [Grunden - `the ground'] for this? It is as much in his own eye as in the abyss [Afgrunden - 
'without ground'], for suppose he had not looked down. "7 
As the above references in The Concept ofAnxiety demonstrate, the English word "abyss" 
translates both the Danish Dyb and also the more psychological and pathologically horrifying Afgrund 
1 CUP, 369 
2 For an examination of the `void' as an experience of nothingness in modernity see George Pattison, 
Agnosis: Theology in the Void. 
3PF, 70 
4R, 155 
s CA, 61. See also John M. Hoberman, `Kierkegaard on Vertigo', ed. Robert L. Perkins, International 
Kierkegaard Commentary Volume 19: The Sickness Unto Death where Hoberman explores how the 
metaphor of vertigo is employed throughout Kierkegaard's writings "as a phenomenological rendering 
of several kinds of psychological (and, ultimately, religious) disorientation. What is more, it has 
analogues within the conceptual repertory of the authorship and is thereby conjoined by Kierkegaard 
with ideas that are of central importance to his thinking, such as freedom, guilt, anxiety, possibility, 
ambiguity, faith, and the limits of reason. "(185) 6 CA, 158 
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[literally `without ground'] in Kierkegaard's writings. While Dyb often denotes empty space or 
depth, 
Afgrund evokes the intangible and paradoxical presence of something exceeding mere 
`emptiness' 
[Tomhed]. As such, "abyss" can refer not only to spatial separation but also to that which 
is 
dramatically groundless, bottomless, fathomless, inscrutable [uudgrundelige] - 
hence Johannes 
Climacus's use of the word when describing how "humanly speaking, consequences 
built upon a 
paradox are built upon the abyss [Afgrund]". 
8 One may thus be tempted to suggest that Afgrund is used 
to denote groundlessness while Dyb denotes distance or severance. In the discourse entitled `The 
Joy of 
It: that One Suffers Only Once But Is Victorious Eternally', Kierkegaard explains how "just as there 
was a chasmic abyss [svicelgende Dyb] between the rich man in hell and Lazarus in Abraham's 
bosom, 
so also is there a chasmic difference [svicelgende Forskjel] between suffering and sin. "9 Yet, when a 
more psychological phenomena is to be described, the abyss is invoked as something horrifyingly 
without ground [Afgrund]. Hence, when implying the vanity of the maxim `Let us eat and drink, 
because tomorrow we shall die' (1 Corinthians 15: 32), Kierkegaard discerns: "This very remark echoes 
with the anxiety about the next day, the day of annihilation, the anxiety that insanely is supposed to 
signify joy although it is a shriek from the abyss [Afgrund]. s10 The abyss [Afgrund] designates not only 
the vacuity and implicit despair of decadent or hedonistic indulgence but also its inherent anxiety of 
non-being. 
However, one must be cautious against inferring too firm a formal distinction from what is 
also a stylistic choice of word - hence Haufniensis's emphatic combination of both terms 
in evoking 
"the depth of the abyss [Afgrundens Dyb]. "1 Kierkegaard writes in the discourse on `The Care of 
Loftiness', "The eminent pagan with his care belongs in the abyss [Afgrund]; he actually is not lofty 
but in the abyss [Afgrund]"12 And yet this image is also developed spatially, according to a sense of 
untraversable distance: "Over this abyss [Afgrund] [of paganism] no bird could fly; it would have to 
perish on the way. s13 One may recall the poetic elegiac lament of the aesthete A when describing the 
abyss of boredom: "My soul is like the dead sea, over which no bird can fly, when it has flown 
midway, then it sinks down to death and destruction. , 14 Indeed it is the image of the sea - expansive, 
deep, dark and boundlessly fluid - which perhaps provides the consummate motif for the anxious abyss 
of existence. "Ah, like the shipwrecked man who has saved himself by a plank, and thus, tossed by the 
waves, hovering over the abyss, between life and death, gazes fixedly at the land - so should a man be 
concerned for his salvation. " 15 Here one cannot help but invoke the abyss resounding in the famously 
evocative horror of what Kierkegaard identifies as "one of my favourite phrases, which is attributed to 
7CA, 61 
8PF, 98 
9 CD, 102-103 
lo `The Care of Self-Torment', CD, 77 
11 CA, 158. One may also speak of the adjective afgrundsdyb [abysmal]. 12 CD, 58 
13 CD, 59 
14 E/O I, 30 
15 `Now We Are Nearer Our Salvation... Than When We Became Believers', CD, 227 
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another author [Frater Taciturnus]"16: that is, to be out over 70,000 
fathoms of water. Indeed the abyss 
[Dyb] commonly refers to the deep. 
Kierkegaard's favored allegory encapsulates the anxious dual-nature of the human condition: 
"man is a synthesis of the temporal and of the eternal, every moment out upon 
`70,000 fathoms'. "17 
More specifically for Johannes Climacus, the phrase signifies "the martyrdom of 
believing against the 
understanding, the mortal danger of lying out on 70,000 fathoms of water, and only there 
fording 
God. "8 This suffering, which is the essential expression of the God-relationship, "is, to recall 
Frater 
Taciturnus's words, the 70,000 fathoms of water upon whose depths the religious person is 
continually. i19 It is Frater Taciturnus's `Letter to the Reader' in Stages On Life's Way which 
devises 
the term which so pleases Kierkegaard and his other pseudonymous conspirators: "Spiritual existence, 
especially the religious, is not easy; the believer continually lies out on the deep [Dybet], has 70,000 
fathoms of water beneath him. , 20 And yet, despite this anxious abyss [Dyb], hovering over the deep 
[Dybet], repentance is itself an infinite opening in the religious life which is the pathway to salvation, 
"for repentance has specifically created a boundless space [uendelig Plads], and as a consequence the 
religious contradiction: simultaneously to be out on 70,000 fathoms of water and yet be joyful. "21 
The `boundless space' of repentance begins to convey the sense in which sin induces a 
profound severance between humanity and God -a rupture which also procures a related 
internal 
fracture within the self. Fundamentally, in the task of becoming a self before God, the decisive abyss 
which theological anthropology is confronted by within the Kierkegaardian oeuvre is the 
insurmountable difference/distance between humanity and God described as sin. The god whom 
Johannes Climacus describes is decisively "absolutely different [absolut forsljelligt]"22 from any 
person who may wish to relate to it. "What, then, is the difference? " Johannes ponders, "Indeed, what 
else but sin, since the difference, the absolute difference, must have been caused by the individual 
himself. "23 While Johannes Climacus is fond of reminding us that between God and humanity "there 
exists an absolute differences24, it is also an insistence he has in common with his `higher' namesake 
Anti-Climacus: "God and man are two qualities separated by an infinite qualitative difference [uendelig 
Qualitets-Forskjel]. s25 Furthermore, at the risk of ostensibly homogenising Kierkegaard's authorship 
via this qualitative difference, it must be emphasised that this idea is not exclusive to the Climacean 
works. For example, in The Book On Adler Kierkegaard himself asserts how "between God and a 
human being there is an eternal essential qualitative difference [evig vicesentlig qualitativ Forskjel]"26. 
16 BA, 107-108. Kierkegaard applies this phrase to Adler: "He truly is shaken; he is in mortal danger... 
he is out over 70,000 fathoms of water. " By contrast, "[Bishop] Mynster has never been out on 70,000 
fathoms of water and learned out there; he has always clung to the established order and now has 
completely coalesced with it. " JP 5: 5961 / Pap. VIII' A 221 
'7JP5: 5792/Pap. VIB 18 
is CUP 1: 232 
19 CUP 1: 288 
20 SLW, 444 
21 SLW, 477 
22 PF, 46 
23 PF, 47 
24 CUP, 439 
2s SUD, 126 
26 BA, 181 
The difference is one which also asserts itself in Kierkegaard's Discourses: for instance, `The Gospel 
of Sufferings' relates how the Christian knows that, as far as suffering is concerned, between God and 
every person there is "an eternal difference [evig Forskjel]' . 
27 This difference is described by various 
permutations: absolute [absolut]; eternal [evig]; essential [wesentlig]; qualitative [qualitativ]; infinite 
[uendelig]. While each word in itself is far from synonymous with the others, there is a case to be made 
that these substitutions and embellishments represent more stylistic adjectival permutations than crucial 
deviations from the emphatic central idea. This is not to say that Johannes Climacus' understanding of 
the "absolute difference" is identical with Anti-Climacus' understanding of the "infinite qualitative 
difference" (indeed I intimate that the understanding of the former is not resolved to the same depth as 
the latter). 8 
However, to infer too much from the choice of one word over another is the constant 
temptation of the non-native speaker -a particular danger in the case of so poetic and stylistic a 
composer as Kierkegaard. So, for instance, there is an insistent string of these words in Kierkegaard's 
journals when describing "the law of the relations between God and man in the God-relationship": 
"There is an infinite, radical, qualitative difference [uendelig sva? lgende qualitativ Foslc el] between 
God and man. "29 Additionally here is an instance of another deeply evocative adjective for this 
difference: "radical" [svaelgende]. However, the translation of "radical" does not fully convey the 
evocation of this word which, one might say, is decidedly abyssal. As the Danish word slugt - which 
denotes a "gorge" - is close to the verb sluge "to swallow", so too can svalg denote "abyss" in a 
manner close to the verb svadge - also a verb for swallowing. Hence, it might be better to talk about 
"an infinite, swallowing/yawning, qualitative difference. " The benefit of suggesting this image is that it 
prompts the very anxiety inherent to relating to an Other and concomitantly to oneself across such a 
yawning abyss [et svicelgende dyb] - as is translated in the above reference from The Concept of 
Anxiety: "He whose eye happens to look down into the yawning abyss [svaelgende Dyb] becomes 
dizzy. , 30 Anti-Climacus also summons just this image when he writes how "As sinner, man is 
separated from God by the most chasmic qualitative abyss [Qualitetens meest svicelgende Dyb]"31 
In attempting to define one's existence before God one must come to terms with the abyssal 
distance which separates humanity from divinity. Any attempt to bring two things together between 
which there is such an abyssal difference entails a vertigo of the understanding in its attempt to cross 
the abyss: "We warn the person who stands on a ship which ploughs ahead with the speed of the storm 
that he should not look into the waves, for he will become dizzy; thus does the comparison between the 
infinite and the finite make a man dizzy. 02 It is across such a seemingly impossible abyss of sin that 
one must come to relate to God. It is not in attempting to possess myself, or to speculate after God, that 
27 UDVS, 287 
28 For example, the phrase "absolute [absolut] difference" is mostly confined to the writings of Johannes Climacus, whilst the rest of the authorship tends to favour a variation upon an "eternal [evig]" 
or "infinite [uendelig]" difference. 
29 JP2: 1383/Pap. X1A59 
30 CA, 61 
31 SUD, 122 
32 W, 180 
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I become known as a self; it is first of all through coming to terms with the infinite difference itself - 
that is, the apprehension of the abyss itself as the consciousness of sin. 
But one must be careful not to become lost in looking down for one will become dizzy; or, 
recalling Nietzsche's stylistically famous warning, "when you gaze long into an abyss, the abyss gazes 
also into you. s33 And yet, to a point, this is what Kierkegaard proposes must be done in much fear and 
trembling and spiritual trial. Nietzsche writes that "Man is a rope, tied between beast and overman 
[Übermensch] -a rope over an abyss [German Abgrund - again literally `without ground']. i34 The 
existential difference, according to Hoberman, is that "Nietzsche situates man over the abyss, while 
Kierkegaard situates the abyss within man. , 35 This is true in relation to the internal vertigo of anxiety; 
but where the God-relation is concerned Kierkegaard also inscribes the individual over 70,000 fathoms, 
or severed from God by an infinite chasmic abyss of sin: an internal abyss which nevertheless severs 
one from an other. Authentic self-consciousness is contingent upon consciousness of God, or self 
before God; but this is itself only possible through the consciousness of sin - the gaze of the abyss. But 
this penetrating gaze into the abyss, in which the abyss also penetrates the eye which looks into it, may 
become an entrapment of self-reflection which loses sight of the other (God) whom the abyss severs us 
from. Such guilt may come to signify "the demonic": what Vigilius Haufniensis calls "anxiety about 
the good" self-incarcerated in "inclosing reserve [Indesluttethed]go. 36 The task then is to break guilt out 
of its anxious self-communion with the abyss. But this hypnotic introversion is not easily ruptured 
since "Guilt has for the eye of the spirit the fascinating power of the serpent's glance. "37 Therefore the 
internal contemplation of the abyss of sin itself, the gaze of guilt, becomes a Narcissistic dizziness. 
"The continuity that inclosing reserve has can best be compared with the dizziness a spinning top must 
have, which constantly revolves upon its own pivot X38 One might call this the dizziness of the internal 
abyss - it is, in one sense, we ourselves who own this abyss between self and God since we are the 
cause of it, though, inevitably, the abyss will come to own us. But more of this in due course. The 
anxiety of this self-oriented inclosing reserve [Indesluttethed] must ultimately deliver its gaze towards 
the other. Sin must be authentically understood, not through guilt's introspective and serpentine self- 
fascination, but relationally, as the distance that separates the sinner from God. 
And still, the paradox - or unsurpassable chasm - is such that the self must become 
known to 
itself in relation to that which is infinitely differentiated from it. It is in this sense that Johannes 
Climacus initially calls the god "the unknown". The anxious and despairing task is one of becoming an 
authentic self before a God whose absolute otherness apparently defies any such relation. Yet how can 
I know myself in relation to that which is unknowable? "[I]f a human being is to come to know 
something about the unknown (the god) [del Ubekjendte (Gaden)], he must first come to know that it is 
33 Beyond Good and Evil, 89 34 `Thus Spoke Zarathustra: First Part, 4, The Portable Nietzsche, 126 35 `Kierkegaard on Vertigo', 202 36 CA, 123 
37 CA, 103 
38 CA, 130 
10 
different from him, absolutely different from him. 939 Yet how can one come to know anything about 
this God since "the understanding cannot even think the absolutely different'140 
This is the abyss of an apparently unassailable alterity and alienation which this theological 
anthropology must confront if it wishes to define itself before a God who is, at least initially, `Wholly 
Other'. "At this point we seem to stand at a paradox", Johannes Climacus insists, "Just to come to 
know that the god is the different, man needs the god and then comes to know that the god is infinitely 
different from him. "41 In other words, the alterity of the absolutely different is not something I can 
come to know of myself, even though I myself as sinner am the cause of this abyss of absolute 
difference. Consequently, the consciousness of sin, which is also the consciousness of human-Divine 
alterity conceived as alienation, cannot come via introspection but only as the gift of God. And it is in 
the consciousness of sin via divine revelation rather than introspection that one receives also the gift of 
forgiveness: the hand which reaches out across the impossible abyss. As Kierkegaard formulates "the 
law of the relations between God and man in the God-relationship": 
DIVISIO 
There is an infinite, radical, qualitative difference between God and man. 
This means, or the expression for this is: the human person achieves absolutely 
nothing; it is God who gives everything; it is he who brings about a person's faith, etc. 
This is grace, and this is Christianity's major premise. 42 
However, as shall be explored, the consciousness of the infinite qualitative difference is 
always at risk of subverting into a dreadful yawning abyss into which one's gaze may fall continually. 
The abyss of sin may itself induce the very despair Kierkegaard's writings strive to alleviate. Standing 
before God, the Wholly Other against Whom one had previously been defended by the distance of the 
abyss, may seem more like losing oneself in crushing annihilation than becoming oneself in relation. 
This is reflected by the warning in Kierkegaard's "SUBDIVISIO" to the above: "If the Divisio is 
everything, then God is so infinitely sublime [uendelig opheiet] that there is no intrinsic or actual 
relationship between God and the individual human being. 9A3 As shall be seen, when the infinite 
qualitative abyss is understood only in part or received in "offence", then God may seem so Wholly 
Other, so "absolutely different", so "infinitely sublime" as to appear as irremediably and essentially a 
God of despair. 
The abyss [Dyb] describes our severance and distance from God, but it is also, I suggest, an 
abyss [Afgrund] into which one may fall, in which one loses the ground [grund] on which one may 
stand before God. In the endeavour of the God-relationship, God can become so dreadful, so "infinitely 
sublime" to the mind's eye that, adopting Rudolf Otto's terms, the awe of the mysterium tremendum 
subverts into the awfulness of the mysterium horrendum. The danger is that God becomes so dreadfully 
and irreconcilably Wholly Other to the self that one becomes swallowed up by the horror of this 
infinite qualitative abyss. God becomes the God of a fantastic despair that cannot reconcile itself to the 
mysterium of divine forgiveness: God is thought of as irrevocably other. The gaze into the infinite 
39PF, 46 
40PF, 45 
41 PF, 46 
42 JP 2: 1383 / Pap. X' A 59 
11 
abyss of sin has become an intoxication in which standing as a self before God is thought of primarily 
in terms of the abyss itself. This fatal abyss is a form of what Anti-Climacus calls "the second 
severance. A4 
It is at this edge that the thesis reaches in its concluding chapter. The question of the self 
before God is one of receiving the revelation of the infinite qualitative difference between self as sinner 
and God as the Wholly Other in such a way as to come to terms with the grace by which one becomes a 
self in relation rather than annihilation. Such a task involves theological anthropology in a careful 
anatomising of the abyss: not simply in terms of a doctrine of sin, but a mutual interrogation of and by 
the infinite abyss which separates the sinner from God and which holds the paradoxical secret of our 
forgiveness. It is here that the gaze of the abyss hopes to see with `the eyes of faith. ' 
But before reaching this point, much remains in this anatomy. Chapter One initially considers the 
Kierkegaardian view of the failure of self-authentication as despair and the conviction of eternity's 
obligation to become a self `before God' in relation to the modern turn towards the `Know Thyself' d 
its virtually concomitant collapse into the `death of the self'. The relation between the `death of the 
self' nd `the death of God' is itself considered in relation to Kierkegaard's infinite qualitative 
difference. In considering God in Kierkegaard's writings as the Wholly Other, comparison is made 
with Jacques Derrida's reading of the wholly other as referring to the alterity of every other, and 
Rudolf Otto's view of the Wholly Other as mysterium. In doing so, I introduce the central argument that 
the difference of sin should be understood as `estrangement', and that `forgiveness' is itself the 
transfigured and authentic meaning of the infinite qualitative abyss between self and God. 
In Chapter Two, the theme of melancholy is established as a response to the modern loss of 
God and turn towards an unobtainable self. This tendency is traced through the displacement of 
metaphysics and cosmology to the retreat into interiority. The movement towards a modern religious 
melancholy is further sketched from the monastic tradition of acedia to the boredom of the modem 
aesthete. Through the anatomy of melancholy in Kierkegaard's writings, I propose a move from the 
aesthetic to the religious which directs melancholy towards a potentially curative awakening 
metamorphosis of spirit. 
The theme of melancholy continues in Chapter Three which begins with an examination of the 
economy of the ekstasis of the God-relationship and the grief of descent back into `the world'. Here a 
religious melancholy is characterised by a rise in the restless and antagonistic longing of spirit -a 
longing which the self is unable to fully consummate. This melancholy is epitomised by the desire to 
behold the Face of God, though to see God means death - an anguish particularly evident in Augustine 
and John of the Cross. The melancholy sense of the ostensible absence of God is translated into more 
modern concerns through consideration of Levinas's `enigma of the trace', Mark C. Taylor's 
`postmodern a/theology of erring', and the `Wholly Other' of Mircea Eliade and Rudolf Otto. I 
examine whether the Wholly Other, particularly as rehabilitated by Otto, effectively signifies a 
response to a deus otiosus and the melancholy of a modern horror vacui. Essentially, I argue that the 
43JP2: 1383/Pap. X'A59 44 SUD, 109 
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Wholly Other, as read in Kierkegaard, creates the space for the gift of the self - albeit a self which, in 
fear and trembling, must enter into a struggle with the mysterium tremendum. 
In Chapter Four - in many ways the nucleus of the argument - the thesis considers the image 
of Jacob's struggle with the stranger [Genesis 32] as an allegory for the Anfechtung of the infinite 
difference between self and God: an allegory which also evokes the reconciliation of this estrangement 
through the divine gift of a God who, by giving of Godself in the tangibility of struggle, negates 
Wholly Otherness whilst also creating the space for the self to become itself. This allegory is examined 
in relation to the estrangement of Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness, the antitheism of Proudhon, and the 
divine-human tension in Kierkegaard's category of `spiritual trial' [Anfcegtelse]. It is through 
Kierkegaard's notion of the stigmatic `thorn in the flesh' that I proceed to discuss the vertiginous 
anxiety of the God-relationship, the intoxication of the imagination and the analogy of the sublime -a 
category which, in the context of the self before God, I suggest is more appropriately supplanted by 
Otto's notion of the `numinous'. 
Chapter Five constitutes a more detailed anatomy of Kierkegaard's dialectic of Anfcvgtelse and 
its relation to the Lutheran tradition of Anfechtung. The essential difference between Kierkegaard and 
Luther at this point transpires as Kierkegaard's situating of the tension of Anfcegtelse between the 
individual and God, rather than the devil. Both thinkers are, however, unified in looking to the trial of 
Christ's God-forsakenness as the exemplar of the individual's struggle with Anfechtung. It is here, 
when Anfcvgtelse causes the love of God to come into doubt, that the struggle of prayer emerges as the 
means for the self to transcend the despair over human impossibility through faith in divine possibility. 
In the final chapter, I attempt to condense the previous anatomisation of the self's relation 
`before God' through an examination of the optical motif which suffuses the entire thesis. In this sense, 
the self before God is appraised in terms of 'the gaze': the `gaze of the abyss' by which the self beholds 
the chasmic infinite difference; the internalised `gaze of despair' by which the self, in `offense' against 
its perceived sinfulness, severs itself from any relation to the other; and ultimately, the downcast gaze 
which, in humility, beholds the God - whom 'none may see and live' - through the eyes of faith'. It is 
this gaze which penetrate the darkness of the abyss and with which the self comes to see itself reflected 
through the `divine mirror' as a forgiven self becoming itself before God. 
However, it is first of all incumbent that these questions are placed within the context in which 
they are asked. As such, in the Introduction, I attempt to establish some of the abysses and aporias 
which confront a contemporary theological anthropology: `the death of God'; the relation of divine and 
human suffering; deconstruction etc. My contention is that, in the darkness of the abyss of the 
postmodern, theology must suspend ontotheology and derive its orientation anthropocentrically - an 
inevitably melancholy expression of the infinite qualitative difference. 
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Introduction: Theological Anthronoloay and the Abyss of the Post/modern 
If we are honest, we must admit that it is no longer clear whether theology has a future. More 
precisely, it is no longer clear whether theology has a future that involves anything more than 
an impossible repetition of the pastas 
The Abyss of God/Metaphysics? 
Post/modernity has endured many new meanings for the abyss since Kierkegaard's infinite qualitative 
difference. Not least, as Grace M. Jantzen has observed, is "the imaginary of the abyss which haunts 
postmodernism": an abyss which for Nietzsche and the inheritors of his dark legacy is accompanied by 
a "shiver of horror... the dread of nihilism. 946 It is the abyss of collapsing metaphysical Truths in 
which, in Jantzen's words, "The bottomless pit swallows up foundations and grounds for certainty. "'7 
And it is in the night of Nietzsche's `death of God' that the abyss is most acutely sounded as the note of 
a vertiginous cry of anxiety in the face of metaphysical absence: 
What were we doing when we unchained the earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? 
Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? 
Is there still any up or down? Are we not staring as through an infinite nothing? 48 
According to Nietzsche, metaphysics begins in dreaming. As Plato conceptualises the dream-world as 
metaphysics, this world pales in comparison - as appearance, as removed from Truth. Immanence is 
lived in deluded longing for transcendence. "The true world - we have abolished", Nietzsche 
pronounces, "What world has remained? The apparent one perhaps? But no! With the true world we 
have also abolished the apparent one. "49 However, what Wessel Stoker calls "an aporia with regard to 
the ascription of meaningsS° prompts an anxiety for Nietzsche which is actually a precursor to 
Dionysiac joy. Ultimately in Nietzsche, amorfati transfigures the disorienting dark night of the 
nihilistic abyss into a celebration of reclaimed metaphysical absence. Philosophers and "free spirits" 
may now set sail upon this uninhibited ocean: "at last our ships may venture out again... the sea, our 
sea, lies open again; perhaps there has never yet been such an `open sea. `51 
Nietzsche is welcome to celebrate his venture into the abyss, but for many the closure of this 
opening is beginning around his death on August 25th 1899 - at the advent of the twentieth century. For 
many living through and after this century, such joy and faith in the Übermensch is impossible; the 
abyss takes on an incumbent and unprecedented darkness in the smoke of world war and Holocaust. 
45 Mark C. Taylor, `Postmodem Times', ed. Orrin F. Summerell, The Otherness of God, 174 46 Grace M. Jantzen, 'Eros and the Abyss: Reading Medieval Mystics in Postmodernity', Literature 
and Theology, Vol. 17, No. 3, September 2003,245 
47 'Eros and the Abyss: Reading Medieval Mystics in Postmodernity', 245 48 The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufman (New York: Vintage, 1974), 111.125, p. 181. Cited in Jantzen, 'Eros and the Abyss: Reading Medieval Mystics in Postmodernity', 256. 49 Nietzsche, `How the `True World Finally Became a Fable: The History of an Error', `Twilight of the Idols', The Portable Nietzsche, 486. For Heidegger, however, Nietzsche actually fails to emancipate himself from the western metaphysical tradition. In the `will-to-power' there remains, as John Peacocke explains, "the juxtaposition of the two components that represent the essential elements of all metaphysical thinking in the West: value and ground. " `Heidegger and the Problem of Onto-Theology', ed. Philip Blond, Post-Secular Philosophy, 185 50 Is the Quest for Meaning the Quest for God?, 2 
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Whilst the Nietzschean act of deicide may be read as ennobling man as slayer of God, the act of 
genocide signifies his self-inflicted degeneration. It is this event which stands as an historical and 
spiritual abyss -a lacuna of faith - between the death of God as Nietzsche and even 
Kierkegaard 
understood it and the death of God as an aporia for post-war thinking. It is in Auschwitz that 
Nietzsche's prophetic utterance "God is dead" is dreadfully actualised under a disfiguring black cloud 
-a cloud which renders human suffering and 
indignity incommensurable with the silence of a loving 
God whose love remains unrevealed. "Did not Nietzsche's saying about the death of God take on, in 
the extermination camps, the meaning of a quasi-empirical fact? " the Jewish philosopher Emmanuel 
Levinas contemplates. 2 One cannot know the full extent to which Levinas's experience of the 
concentration camp forged his thinking. "Have I the right to be when facing the other man's suffering? 
Such is the human question par excellence in Levinas's philosophy. 953 It is surely a question which 
takes on radical urgency in the face of this abyss which conceals the Face of God. But this mutilation 
of the human form in the extermination camps is mutually the defamation of all ideas of the 
Übermensch as well as of theodicy. For Levinas it is therefore the "face of the other" - as the stranger, 
the widow, the orphan - which awakens us from the introverted introspection of our metaphysical 
dreaming after the Face of God. 
Metaphysics, Levinas identifies in Totality and Infinity, is desire. "The true life is absent 
[from Arthur Rimbaud's A Season in Hell, "la vraie vie est absente"]. But we are in the world. 
Metaphysics arises and is maintained in this alibi. "54 We are turned away from our world to the world 
which is "absent", "elsewhere", "otherwise" 55 Metaphysics has become characterised by the nostalgic 
longing to return: the dubious belief in this life as exile, as unreal, as unholy. But Levinas re-directs the 
metaphysical desire away from a melancholic yearning for full presence, and towards the alterity of the 
other who will always remain elusive. Metaphysical desire must not seek its consummation in the 
possession of an object; but rather, in desiring the perpetually elusive "absolutely other", desire 
"understands [entend] the remoteness, the alterity, and the exteriority of the other. "56 Levinas therefore 
implores that "metaphysical desire does not long to return, for it is a desire for a land not of our birth, 
for a land foreign to every nature, which has not been our fatherland and to which we shall never 
betake ourselves. 9957 
The God-relation for Levinas is likewise not to be understood from the perspective of the 
alienation of the Unhappy Consciousness. Humanity does not struggle with an inscrutable `faceless' 
God since the divine is `revealed' in `the face of the other': "the infinite does not bum the eyes that are 
lifted up to him. "58 This God "is not numinous: the I who approaches him is neither annihilated on 
s' `The Gay Science: Book V, 343, The Portable Nietzsche, 448 
$2 `Useless Suffering', entre nous: Thinking-of-the-Other, 97 53 Catherine Chalier, `The Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and the Hebraic Tradition', ed. Adriaan T. Peperzak, Ethics as First Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas For Philosophy, Literature and Religion, 6 sa Totality and Infinity, 33 ss Totality and Infinity, 33 56 ibid. 
57 Totality and Infinity, 33-34 58 ibid., 77 
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contact nor transported outside of itself, but remains separated and 
keeps its as-for-me. "59 The epiphany 
of this God is in the primacy of the human face. "It is God that I can 
define through human relations 
and not the inverse... when I say something about God, it is always 
beginning from human relations. "60 
Levinas still talks of God as "the Transcendent, infinitely other, " but our existence 
is essentially a 
"social relation". Direct `face to face' comprehension of the divine is impossible; 
but Levinas is not 
concerned with the Kierkegaardian fear and trembling of an impossible standing 
before the Wholly 
Other. 61 God is not simply `wholly other', but "other than the other [autre qu'autrui]' . 
62 The 
invisibility and transcendence of God ultimately renders "a God unimaginable, but a God accessible 
in 
justice. "63 It is the face of the other which itself is "holy": "his appeal to me, is his truth"64 The 
decisive call to us is not from `beyond'. "the primordial expression, is the first word: `you shall not 
commit murder"'. 65 God is not revealed in numinous theophanies; rather, "His very epiphany consists 
in soliciting us by his destitution in the face of the Stranger, the widow, and the orphan. " 
And yet, as John Llewelyn wonders, "Having endorsed Nietzsche's proclamation of the death 
of the God of ontotheology, why is Levinas either unable or unwilling to eliminate the word `God' 
59 ibid. 
60 `Transcendence and Height', Basic Philosophical Writings, 29. Levinas's' terminology often appears 
quite fluid in this regard since, "He uses many words that traditionally were reserved for God to 
describe the human Other. Terms like `invisible, ' `absolute' and `absolution, ' `epiphany, ' `revelation, ' 
`separation, ' `liturgy, ' `height, ' and `highness' name the transcendent `character' of autrui and his or 
her proximity to God. " Adriaan T. Peperzak, `Transcendence', ed. Peperzak, Ethics as First 
Philosophy, 191 
61 In discussion following Levinas's presentation of `Transcendence et hauteur' to la Societe Francaise 
de Philosophie on January 27th 1962, Jean Wahl posed Levinas the question of the relation of his use of 
`wholly other' to Kierkegaard's `wholly other': "You employed the expression `wholly Other. ' This 
naturally evokes the name of Kierkegaard, and perhaps others. And the `wholly Other' for him is God. 
Is he wrong? Is the `wholly Other' found in experience, or is it rather only in and through the call of 
God that the `wholly Other' is revealed? " Levinas' response was both emphatic and unsatisfying: "It is 
difficult to say. I agree that these notions are connected, but ultimately my point of departure is 
absolutely non theological. I insist upon this. It is not theology that I am doing, but philosophy. " 
`Transcendence and Height', Basic Philosophical Writings, 29-30. Levinas is not concerned with the 
face of God which `none may see and live', and one suspects that this is what he disdains in reading 
Kierkegaard (see chapter 4). On the other hand, Westphal argues that Kierkegaard's numinous God 
may have more to recommend than Levinas realises: "Kierkegaard gives us a moral transcription of 
God as mysterium tremendum etfascinans. God is mysterium by remaining hidden even within the 
piety of hidden inwardness, tremendum by commanding the subordination of self-love to neighbor 
love, and fascinans by being the forgiving love that gives us both our sense of worth and our capacity 
to love others. Levinas's God is the mysterium tremendum [an ascription Levinas may have contested]; 
but there is the fascinans in the Good that gives no goods but only compels to goodness? " 
`Commanded Love and Divine Transcendence in Levinas and Kierkegaard', ed. Jeffrey Bloechl, The 
Face of the Other and the Trace of God: Essays on the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, 217. See also 
Peter Kemp's `Another Language for the Other: From Kierkegaard to Levinas', Philosophy and Social 
Criticism, Vol. 23, No. 6, pp. 5-28. Kemp concludes: "For the Jew Levinas, God remains the Judge of 
men and women; for the Christian Kierkegaard, God is in addition the Father who loves them. 
The face of the Wholly Other is different in Kierkegaard and in Levinas. " (24) 62 "... other otherwise, other with an alterity prior to the alten of the other autruc ty [ '], prior to the ethical 
bond with the other [autrui] and different from every neighbor, transcendent to the point of absence, to 
the point of a possible confusion with the stirring of the there is. " `God and Philosophy', Basic 
Philosophical Writings, 141 
63 Totality and Infinity, 291 64 Totality and Infinity, 291 65 ibid., 199 
66 ibid., 78. 
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from the lexicon in which he expounds what he himself describes as a humanism of the other man? "67 
In Totality and Infinity, while Levinas may capitalise `Transcendence' and `the Other', Theo de Boer 
suggests that the idea of God is so sparse and unelaborated that one might believe that `man' has 
effectively replaced `God' 68 And yet, de Boer concludes that Levinas' "is a philosophy of religion in 
the time of the suspicion of ideologies... It is an appropriate philosophy in the time of the death of 
God. s69 
In this time of the death of God, the time of its post-holocaust significance, is God best spoken 
of in terms of absence, or must all talk of God fall silent? Or else can one only legitimately speak in a 
human complaint to God which suggests, to use Susan Taubes's words, "that man in his conscious 
moral anguish is superior to an amoral universe"? 70 As Albert Camus pronounces, "When man submits 
God to moral judgement, he kills Him in his own heart. s71 Yet for Moltmann, "The only way past 
protest atheism is through a theology of the cross which understands God as the suffering God in the 
suffering of Christ and which cries out with the godforsaken God, `My God, why have you forsaken 
me? "972 Both theism and atheism, Moltmann points out, erroneously regard God and suffering as 
contradictory. The cross shatters that misconception. To this effect Moltmann makes crucial reference 
to one passage from Elie Weisel's account of the Holocaust, Night: 
The SS hanged two Jewish men and a youth in front of the whole camp. 
The men died quickly, but the death throes of the youth lasted for half an hour. 
`Where is God? Where is He? ' someone asked behind me. As the youth still hung 
in torment in the noose after a long time, I heard the man call again, `Where is God 
now? ' And I heard a voice in myself answer: `Where is he? He is here. He is hanging 
there on the gallows... '73 
For Moltmann this is the definitive "Christian answer to the question of this torment. To speak here of 
a God who could not suffer would make God a demon. To speak here of an absolute God would make 
God an annihilating nothingness. To speak here of an indifferent God would condemn men to 
indifference. s74 
However, it seems as if Moltmann has read this account against Wiesel's grain of intention. 75 
God's death on the gallows at Auschwitz surely attests more to an impotent despair than the salvific 
67 `Amen', ed. Adriaan T. Peperzak, Ethics as First Philosophy, 200. However, Philip Blond argues 
that Levinas's philosophy of `the Other' - by dividing Being from God - devalues the world through the denial of God's phenomenal presence. "Hence the Other leaves the phenomenal world very much 
as both modernity and atheism have described it. " `Emmanuel Levinas: God and Phenomenology', 
Post-Secular Philosophy, 220. 
68 `Theology and the Philosophy of Religion according to Levinas', Ethics as First Philosophy, 161 69 Ibid., 171 
70 `The Absent God', ed. Thomas J. J. Altizer, Toward A New Christianity: Readings in the Death of God Theology, 115 
71 The Rebel, 57 
72 The Crucified God, 227 
73 Cited in The Crucified God, 273-274. 74 ibid., 274 
'S I am indebted to Murray Rae for first drawing my attention to this treatment in his paper, `When Darkness Covers the Earth: A Theological Consideration of Human Suffering', given at the Research Institute in Systematic Theology, King's College, London on 15th October 2002. 
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solidarity of human-divine suffering. 76 Surely by this crucifixion God also has become smoke 
in the 
furnaces of Auschwitz. And this vaporous abyss [Abgrund] fails to yield to infiltration, resembling 
instead an inscrutable [unergründlich] cloud of dreadful unknowing. "Just as readers committed suicide 
in the nineteenth century, writers did in ours", Elie Wiesel bluntly announces, "They felt impotent. 
They realized that once you have penetrated the Kingdom of Night, you have reached the end. "77 And 
yet the night is impenetrable; writers realise, with guilt and inadequacy, that they have essentially said 
nothing. 78 Hence, for Wiesel, "what is called the literature of the Holocaust does not exist, cannot exist. 
It is a contradiction in terms, as is the philosophy, the theology, the psychology of the Holocaust. 
Auschwitz negates all systems, opposes all doctrines. 09 For poet Edmond Jabes also, the Holocaust is 
something in which language encounters its limit and its dismay. One may still speak of God in this 
desert of writing however, but `God' has become another word for a confrontation with absence. As 
Jabes declares, "What I mean by God in my work is something we come up against, an abyss, a void, 
something against which we are powerless. "80 This is an abyss which will not acquiesce to 
anatomisation. Even Moltmann concedes that "the experiences of Auschwitz and Hiroshima raise 
questions for which no answers are endurable, because the questions are fundamentally protests. "" The 
asking of them is often as far as one can venture into this particular abyss, formed as it is from the 
absence of the answer. 
Suffering Divinity 
But there is one consolation, one line of thought that can perhaps be said to have been closed for us - 
and it is this lacuna which reveals the abyss. This closure is the desertion of metaphysics - 
ontotheology82 - both as the way of thinking about God and as a way of deriving meaning from 
76 Echoing Elizabeth Schiissler-Fiorenza's indictment of the use of the Holocaust as a "mere 
theological metaphor", John T. Pawlikowski is anxious not to derive too much Christological meaning 
from the Holocaust. Pawlikowski astutely criticises Moltmann's "Christology of divine vulnerabilitY" 
since, whereas the cross was both voluntary and redemptive on the part of Christ, "The Holocaust was 
neither voluntary nor redemptive in any sense. " `Christology after the Holocaust', Theology Digest, 
Volume 47, Number 1, Spring 2000, p. 7. To employ the Holocaust as a signifier for a cosmological 
event, to mystify it with the significance of eternity, is to abstract it from some of its inherent absurdity. 
In Simone Weil's words, "Human misery would be intolerable if it were not diluted in time. We have 
to prevent it from being diluted in order that it should be intolerable. " Gravity and Grace, 14 " Elie Wiesel, `Art and Culture after the Holocaust', ed. Eva Fleischner, Auschwitz: Beginning of a 
New Era? Reflections on the Holocaust, 411 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid., 405 
80 In Paul Auster, `Book of the Dead: an Interview with Edmond Jabes', ed. Eric Gould, The Sin of the 
Book: Edmond Jabes, 19 
81 God in Creation: An Ecological Doctrine of Creation, 91 82 "The term `ontotheology' was first used by Kant in reference to the metaphysical deduction of God's 
existence with no appeal to experience. It has come into common parlance, however, through the work 
of Martin Heidegger, for whom the entire history of Western metaphysics, from Plato to Nietzsche, can be called `ontotheology', the mark of which is an inability to think the conditions of its own 
possibility. " Mary-Jane Rubenstein, `Unknow Thyself: Apophaticism, Deconstruction, and Theology After Ontotheology', Modern Theology 19: 3 July 2003,389. "In recent years, however, the word's 
sense has been expanded by both Heidegger and Derrida so that it now includes the metaphysics Kant 
called into question and aspects of the critical philosophy itself. " Kevin Hart, The Trespass of the Sign, 75 
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transcendence for the sufferings of immanence. Any `God' who emerges after the Holocaust seems 
to 
reflect the need to shed his metaphysical skin. The metaphysical beyond 
is that which crumbles once 
"the gods have flown". 83 Once this structure has subsided, can one speak of a 
divinity which reveals 
itself more through suffering than metaphysical seclusion? `My God, My God, why 
have you forsaken 
me? ' It is in this cry that, according to Carl Jung, Christ's "human nature attains 
divinity" since at this 
moment God "drinks to the dregs" the meaning of mortal suffering. 
84 Traditionally such an idea was 
incommensurable - an offence Kierkegaard would say - as Porphyry, student of 
Plotinus, exemplifies: 
"How can we admit that the divine became an embryo, and that after its birth, it was wrapped up 
in 
swaddling clothes, covered with blood, bile, and even worse things? "" 
Recently, however, it appears that the scandal of divine immanence is required to rectify the 
scandal of divine aseity; the madness of the cross is supplanted by an inversion of that initial offence. 
This is epitomised by a comment from Simone Weil, "Suffering: superiority of man over God. The 
Incarnation was necessary so that this superiority should not be scandalous. s86 Even Patripassionism - 
the suffering of the Father - is no longer deemed heretical, but a reconciliatory 
demand which the age 
places upon God. In this pathos of God, Moltmann writes, humanity "becomes the friend of God, feels 
sympathy with and for God. "87 Though, it must be conceded, it is not clear whether that sympathy can 
save us. 
In further contrast to the traditional Aristotelian `Unmoved Mover', Moltmann elsewhere 
proposes an understanding of the activity of creation in terms borrowed from the kabbalist Isaac 
Luria's doctrine of tzimtzum - literally `a holding in of the breath' which Moltmann 
describes as "self 
limitation". 88 By tzimtzum it is God's withdrawal into Godself that frees the space for something other 
than God to come into existence (creation): "the nihil for his creatio ex nihilo only comes into being 
because - and in as far as - the omnipotent and omnipresent God withdraws his presence and restricts 
his power. "89 Through this act of withdrawal the otherness between Creator and creation is crucially 
conceived as an activity of grace, not transcendence or oppression. God's contraction creates space for 
something other than God to appear. "The Creator is not an `unmoved mover' of the universe. On the 
contrary, creation is preceded by this self-movement on God's part, a movement which allows creation 
the space for its own being"90 In this sense, God's withdrawal is a gracious act of becoming other, or 
of allowing the other to come into existence. Alterity is a corollary of divine creation. Otherness is 
founded in love, as Moltman explains in positively linking the divine self-limitation of kabbalistic 
tzimtzum to the self-humiliation of a kenotic Christology: "God's creative love is grounded in his 
humble, self-humiliating love. This self-restricting love is the beginning of that self-emptying of God 
83 This is John Peacocke's phrase. `Heidegger and the Problem of Onto-Theology', 185 
84 Answer to Job, 74 
85 Against the Christians, frag. 77. Cited in Pierre Hadot, Plotinus, 23. 
86 Gravity and Grace, 72 87 The Crucified God, 272 
88 God in Creation, 86. Tzimtzum "means concentration and contraction, and signifies a withdrawing of 
oneself into oneself. Luria was taking up the ancient Jewish doctrine of the Shekinah, according to 
which the infinite God can so contract his presence that he dwells in the temple. But Luria applied it to 
God and creation. The existence of a world outside God is made possible by an inversion of God. " Ibid., 87 
89 Ibid., 86-87 
19 
which Philippians 2 sees as the divine mystery of the Messiah. Even in order to create heaven and 
earth, God emptied himself of his all-plenishing omnipotence, and as creator took upon 
himself the 
form of a servant $91 
Another recent participatory alternative to the `Unmoved Mover' - though one which blurs the alterity 
of creator-creation - is apparent in the renowned `Process' thought of Alfred 
North Whitehead. 
Dissolving traditional distinctions, Whitehead describes God immanent in the World and the World in 
God; God transcending the World and the World also transcending God. "It is as true to say that God 
creates the World, as that the World creates God. "92 God is always evolving as the World evolves: 
"Neither God, nor the World, reaches static completion. Both are in the grip of the ultimate 
metaphysical ground, the creative advance into novelty. Either, of them, God and the World, is the 
instrument of novelty for the other. X93 This reciprocity between heaven and earth depicts a divinity who 
"does not create the world, he saves it: or, more accurately, he is the poet of the world, with tender 
patience leading it by his vision of truth, beauty, and goodness. "94 This is God's appearance as - and 
here one may think of Moltmann's theology - as "the great companion - the 
fellow sufferer who 
understands. i9S 
Here we are presented with tangible alternatives to the vision of the remote Creator, captured 
in his own transcendence, against whom Byron depicts Cain's rebellion. 
But let him 
Sit on his vast and solitary throne, 
Creating worlds, to make eternity 
Less burthensome to his immense existence 
And unparticipated solitude; 
Let him crowd orb on orb: he is alone 
Indefinite, indissoluble tyrant; Byron, Cain: A Mystery 
And yet, whilst being arguably more responsive to the failure of theodicy, is such re-thinking indicative 
of Hans Schwarz's observation that "to make sense of God today, it appears that we must, so to speak, 
clip his wings"? 96 
90 Ibid., 87 
91 Ibid., 88 
92 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 410 
93 ibid., 411 
94 Process and Reality, 408. However, suffering continues to threaten such a view since any 
evolutionary-oriented theories which establish process as the salvific principle must contend with the 
chaos and entropy which threaten to disrupt the process itself. As the geneticist and evolutionary 
theorist Theodosius Dobzhansky explains: "If particular evolutionary histories were all directed, 
extinction would be inexplicable. A direction which leads to extinction is misdirection. " ('Teilhard de 
Chardin and the Orientation of Evolution: A Critical Essay', ed. Ewert H. Cousins, Process Theology: 
basic writings, 238) 
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Metamorphosis of God? 
The snake that cannot shed its skin perishes. 
Nietzsche, `The Dawn', 57397 
"The period post mortem Dei, " Paul Ramsey proposes, "divides into two distinct eras, roughly between 
the World Wars. Until that time, the death of God meant something anti-Christian; after it and until 
now [ 1961 ], the death of God means something entirely post-Christian. "98 To assert that the age is 
culturally post-Christian is to claim, as Vahanian does, that "Christianity has lost its relevance. "99 As 
such, modem non-religious man "will become himself only when he is totally demysticized", Mircea 
Eliade remarks, "He will not be truly free until he has killed the last god. s1°° Nevertheless, many have 
pointed and continue to point towards a return to God, or a return of God. However, a `return' is a 
misleading suggestion if one accepts Eliade's diagnosis that, far from any severance occurring, a 
relationship of dependence continues to define "nonreligious man". Though resentment of a religious 
heritage has caused religious mythology and ceremony to become repressed, they continue to be 
manifest at the unconscious level "even in the most desacralized of modem societies"101 Ultimately, 
despite his deicide and iconoclasms, "this nonreligious man descends from homo religiosus and, 
whether he likes it or not, he is also the work of religious man... nonreligious man has been formed by 
opposing his predecessor, by attempting to `empty' himself of all religion and all trans-human 
meaning... He cannot utterly abolish his past, since he is himself the product of his past s102 In light of 
this inability of nonreligious man to extract himself entirely from the side of homo religiosus, it would 
be more appropriate to call the recent tendency a conscious return, or a return to religious 
consciousness. There is a recently discernible intellectual disillusion with modernity's critique of 
religion -a disenchantment often related to postmodern suspicions of modernity itself. As John Caputo 
summarises this trend, "Religion has returned even among avant-garde intellectuals who have given it a 
new legitimacy by discrediting its discreditors, suspecting its suspectors, doubting its doubters, 
unmasking its unmaskers"1°3 
Don Cupitt identifies the end of metaphysical theology as "God's second death. s104 Now, 
Cupitt urges, "We need to be converted from our compulsive mourning for the dead God to action 
inspired by the dead Christ s105 The postmodern post-mortem of God continues to this day; only now, 
amongst all the talk of `decomposition' and `putrefaction' murmurs also emerge of `resurrection', 
`kenosis', or `metamorphosis'. Still an opaque suspicion resurfaces that, in Heidegger's cryptic 
posthumous words, "Now only a God can save us. " 
97 The Portable Nietzsche, 92 
98 Ramsey's Preface, xiii, to Gabriel Vahanian's, The Death of God 99 Vahanian, The Death of God, 139 100 The Sacred and the Profane, 203 101 Eliade, Ibid., 204 
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The only possibility remaining to us is that in thinking and in poetry there can 
be prepared a 
readiness for the appearing of the God, or for the absence of the God in a decline: that we 
decline in face of the absent God. 106 
In Macquarrie's eyes, while Heidegger's use of the word `God' remains more hypothetical than 
Christian, the all too tangible anxiety of Cold War and nuclear escalation underwrites his tone of 
anthropological pessimism and salvific exigency. 107 Such post-war anxiety is not atypical and conceals, 
one suspects, an implicit desire to re-think God so that God can now re-think us. In the gloom of the 
post-mortem dei, some strive to become salvatores dei. Only a God can save us, as Heidegger has 
alluded; but perhaps, as Nikos Kazantzakis suggests, the God who would save us must first be saved by 
us: "He cannot be saved unless we save him with our own struggles; nor can we be saved unless he is 
saved. "108 This salvific urgency is intensified for Kazantzakis by the fact that this endangering of God 
is occurring in a time of definite crisis: "We are living in a critical, violent moment of history; an entire 
world is crashing down, another has not yet been born. "109 
Kazantzakis's sentiments do not belong exclusively to him, but to the age in which shares. "Profound 
anxiety shakes the foundation of human being", Keiji Nishitani writes, "and the more foundational the 
supporting ground had been, the greater the void and the anxiety. "' 10 And what greater supporting 
ground [grund] could there be but God? What more anxious abyss [Afgrund] than the loss of God? 
Still, despite this nihilism of meaning, and also in some recognition of it, there are those who seek a 
path across the abyss: a path clear of the thorns of melancholy. On the more radical front, `death-of- 
God theologian' Thomas Altizer seeks to derive a twentieth century hope and Nietzschean joy from the 
kenotic death of God. Altizer, following Nietzsche, proclaims not only that `God is dead' but that `God 
must die' for humanity to surpass itself. Any position which looks back to the ashes of the divine 
crematoria and is paralysed, like Lot's wife, cannot acquit itself of a paralysing melancholy. It is the 
captivity of mourning that Altizer seeks to emancipate us from as we must come to "recognize our 
Angst as the `smell' of God's decomposition. For to know an alien and empty nothingness as the dead 
body of God is to be liberated from every uncanny and awesome sense of the mystery and power of 
chaos. " The divine putrefaction denotes the decay of "Deified nothingness" from whose empty tomb 
the kenotic transmutation of Christ emerges. For this prophet of Christian atheism, the resurrection 
dawn conveys the `good news' of God's "perpetual and forward-moving process of self-negation, pure 
negativity, or kenotic metamorphosis. "' 12 God negates his previous aseity and evacuates Heaven 
entirely by revealing his new name as Jesus Christ. ' 13 Not only are we rescued from metaphysical 
nostalgia, but God, saved from His metaphysical incarceration undertakes his metamorphosis beyond 
106 Heidegger in interview with Der Spiegel, 1966 - though published only posthumously in 1976. Cited in Macquarrie, Heidegger and Christianity, 105 107 Macquarrie, Heidegger and Christianity, 95. Also, as Richard Kearney states, "Heidegger is more interested in Being than in God; and the curious `saving God' he invokes in his final days is probably more re akin to the God of Apollo and the poets than to Yahweh or Jesus. " The God who May Be, 99 The Saviors of God, 105. 1°9 ibid., 113-114 
110 The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism, 4 111 Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, 96 112 The Gospel of Christian Atheism., 84 
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the solitude of his previous transcendence. We are delivered from our anxiety and despair: the 
`Unhappy Consciousness' has been our catharsis from the death of God. ' 14 The mourning is over. 
Rejoice in this darkness because it is not numinous, it is the embodiment of Christ. "5 
But for many, such a sublimation of despair remains impossible. Though that does not prevent 
many from breaking the silence - albeit conceding a confession like Arthur A. Cohen's that "I have 
promised only to cross the abyss. I have not promised to explain it. "' 16 Perhaps, humanly speaking, 
such a naming of the abyss is all that can be hoped for. After all, as Richard Rubenstein acknowledges, 
Christ is a resource of no avail to the Jew in responding to the `death of God'. ' 17 Unable to resort to the 
Christ who emerges for Moltmann as the cruciform figure at the heart of Auschwitz, Rubenstein halts 
at the abyss in silence before the "Holy Nothingness" (das Heilige Nichts). "The infinite God is not a 
thing; the infinite God is no-thing. "' 18 Yet "Holy Nothingness" does not equate to God's annihilation 
for Rubenstein; rather "God as the `Nothing' is not absence of being, but a superfluity of beings' 19 But 
still the inscrutability of the abyss resounds in these formulations. God as das Heilige Nichts has 
something of the tremendum about it. Rubenstein admits that he still cannot reconcile himself to loving 
this abyssal God: "I cannot. I am aware of His holiness. I am struck with wonder and terror before His 
Nothingness, but I cannot love him. I am afrighted before Him. Perhaps, in the end, all I have is 
silence. "120 As such, unable to extract himself from the abyss, Rubenstein confesses that "Unlike 
Altizer, I cannot rejoice in the death of God. If I am a death-of-God theologian, it is with a cry of 
agony. s121 
Such wounded candour casts an exacting light upon more expectant variations upon the `death of God'. 
"But if God dies, so must theology", Carl A. Raschke admonishes, "A `death of God theology' is an 
always was, an oxymoron, a tasteless jape, a tour de farce. The revelation of the farce is writing; and 
theology must write itself into the grave"122 And so, for Raschke, it is Deconstruction - "the dance of 
death upon the tomb of Gods123 - which represents theology's inheritance from the `death of God'. 
"Deconstruction shows that the logos of our latter-day `--ologies, ' including theology, has been nought 
but a ritualistic and compulsive defense against to kenon ('the void')... Deconstruction, which must be 
considered the interior drive of twentieth-century theology rather than an alien agenda, is in the final 
analysis the death of God put into writing". 124 If it is true that the embrace of the `death of God' 
represents an implicit resistance of the abyss then are we not consigned to a degree of intractable 
113 ibid., 86 
114 ibid., 119 
115 " ... greet even this darkness as a yet more comprehensive embodiment and fulfilment of the original 
'assion of Christ. " ibid., 110 16 The Tremendum, 108. Cited in Richard L. Rubenstein and John K. Roth, Approaches to Auschwitz: The Legacy of the Holocaust, 334. 117 Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, 251 118 After Auschwitz, 298 
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melancholy? "Deconstruction within theology writes the epitaph for the dead God", Raschke asserts, 
`But the death of God is not necessarily a cause for celebration. Theologians who might appropriate 
Nietzsche's `myth' for their own vanity or personal aggrandizement are like children who have 
discovered some black and treacherous abracadabra. "125 
This indictment is stinging but nonetheless astute in pointing to a potentially disingenuous 
salve against melancholy and apparent God-forsakenness in theological appropriation of the `death of 
God'. However, it is not certain that theology discovers its terminus in the deconstruction of God. 
"Deconstruction is the flailing of the spades of God's gravediggers", Raschke pronounces - suggesting 
that Deconstruction is the culmination of the `death of God' as well as the destiny of theology - "to 
refuse the ceremony of burial, however, is a more culpable form of hubris than to take the shovel in 
hand. For the stench of `divine decomposition, ' as Nietzsche phrased it, is everywhere. X126 Many would 
indeed put their hands to the spade or rather lay a flower upon the gravestone. But the tomb of the God 
of the philosophers? Or the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob? The name inscribed upon this tomb of 
the unknown God is increasingly opaque. After all, the divine name is, as I shall discuss below, one 
which cannot be captured in stone. 
Even since Kierkegaard, theology has had to contend with an abundance of eras which claim to 
deform, transform and transfigure its task. While this is nothing new, the rapidity of these overlapping 
aporias means that, in Peter Berger's words, "the theologian in our situation is haunted by a sense of 
vertigo. ""27 This is true in more than one sense of the word. These eras have rapidly succeeded one 
another, even overlapping in their eagerness to articulate fresh horizons: post-modernity, post- 
Christian, post-secular, `death of God', `death of self'. All find their vitality, in one way or another, in 
the decay of Christianity and the apparent absence of God and, as such, perhaps reveal more about the 
perception of the self's place, before God or otherwise, than the status of divine ontology itself. In the 
light of this modern vertigo, contemporary theology, Rubenstein suggests, "reveals less about God than 
it does about the kind of men we are. "128 As such, can the theology of this time speak only of God 
through a perception of divine absence - that is, as a deep wound of metaphysical longing in the human 
subject? Has theology become, as Rubenstein asserts, "largely an anthropological discipline"? 129 And 
how can this be reconciled with our dependence upon a God who is Wholly Other? 
Yet, lest one thinks that anthropology remains the stable orienting centre of the modem world, 
it must be understood that anthropology itself experiences its own vertiginous moments of crisis - the 
alleged `death of the self' nitiated by the `death of God'. 130 Bearing this in mind, is a contemporary 
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theological anthropology continually haunted by a nostalgic inquiry after the absent God and the 
inner 
ghost of subjectivity? Or is the time more amenable than ever for a Kierkegaardian theological 
anthropology in which "Man himself is the place where God W,? 
131 Ultimately, I shall suggest that the 
vertigo and dissolution of the self is a vital moment in the divine revealing of the self s condition 
in 
standing before God. This abyss [Afgrund] of selfhood is the un-grounding of the self that reaps the 
ground on which one stands in becoming a self before God. 
Theology and Anthropology: a Chasmic Difference? 
If the self is the question asked of oneself, can it be certain that all are essentially asking the same 
question? This question incorporates what might be named `the human condition' - an avowedly vague 
and elusive notion. Theological anthropology faces the uncertain task of speaking about and to a 
modern humanity that stands, in Maurice Friedman's fertile description, "between Job and 
Prometheus"132 There is much in this comparison, not least the sense in which it encapsulates the 
western mind's uneasy position between potentially incommensurable Hebraic and Greek conceptions 
of the relation between humanity and divinity. But in many ways this modern Promethean flame has 
become, in Kierkegaardian terms, "the cold fire in despair 133: the impossible self-devouring "will to be 
oneself' which can neither consume the self, nor transmute the self into itself. The endless 
introspection of the self which strives to reflect itself into existence is "Like Prometheus stealing fire 
from the gods", Anti- Climacus tells us, it steals from God the thought of its own being. 134 
It was Ludwig Feuerbach - the Promethean `fire-river' - who definitively claimed to redeem 
for modernity the thought of human existence from God. As Prometheus held the secret that was the 
undoing of Zeus, so Feuerbach unveils that "atheism... is the secret of religion itself. "' 35 Feuerbach's 
The Essence of Christianity - which he aptly contemplated calling Gnöthi Seauton ('Know thyself) - 
sought to collapse the distinction between God and humanity (a distinction which in Kierkegaard is an 
"infinite qualitative difference") by identifying that "The beginning, middle and end of religion is 
MAN. " 136 Feuerbach's notorious assertion that "the true sense of Theology is Anthropology"137 
sanctified the ground for identifying God as merely a useful myth: a projection of human transcendence 
and aspiration which needed to be reclaimed from its unhappily self-imposed alienation in order to 
exalt anthropology into theology. 
Arguably, however, anthropology's emergence out from under the shadow of theology has an 
even more primitive origin. Perhaps it begins not with the modem Prometheus but with the Biblical 
anthropological dilemma of Job. After all, as Friedman suggests, "It is not theology but anthropology, 
not the metaphysical problem of evil but the problem of man, which is the real starting point of the 
131 Valter Linström, `The Image of God', ed. Niels Thulstrup and M. Mikulovä Thulstrup, Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana Volume 5: Theological Concepts in Kierkegaard, 40 132 Problematic Rebel: Melville, Dostoievsky, Kafka, Camus, 4 133 SUD, 18 
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Book of Job. "138 In a sense, the Book of Job is the study of humanity in its perceived abandonment 
by 
God. Job's meditation upon humanity comes, Friedman argues, not from the Psalmist's sense of 
wonder, but under the rubric of despair. 139 He suggests that theology cannot reveal anthropology; that 
God is in no position to understand humanity. `Hast thou eyes of flesh? Or seest thou as man seest? 
' 
(Job 10: 4). It is almost with contempt, as Bruce Vawter claims, that Job addresses God as the "man 
watcher'- "in a parody of the concept of a God of providence. , 
140 As such, Dermot Cox sees Job as 
personifying the fact that "ultimately man can only be ennobled by the capriciousness of God. s141 Cox 
even goes so far as to identify a Promethean dignity in Job's despair: "Here indeed is Prometheus, but a 
more cerebral one than Aeschylus presents; chained to an intellectual rock of reason. And like 
Prometheus he hurls defiance at God". '42 
Yet, once Job has had his say, it is God who speaks the definitive last word. The Book of Job, 
although establishing the `problem of man' as its starting point, concludes with a Theophany. While the 
ability to criticise God is, Cox believes, "the ultimate privilege of [human] autonomy" '143 it is a 
judgement that must be assessed and tempered from the antithetical perspective. "There has to be one if 
the book is to be more than an existential cry in the dark-"144 Anthropology is finally subsumed under 
theology. Ultimately, Job concedes God's inscrutable sovereignty and confesses his own ignorance: 
`Therefore I have uttered that I understood not; things too wonderful for me which I knew not' (42: 3). 
Whereas for Feuerbach theology submits to the exaltation of anthropology, for Job anthropology 
repents itself back under the auspices of theology. 
Although the Book of Job appears to speak as an incision into the God-forsaken despair of 
modernity, as Jung has testified, one should refrain from bestowing upon Job a modern sense of `self. 
Feuerbach asserted that "Consciousness of God is self-consciousness, knowledge of God is self- 
knowledge. "las But in modernity, as Gabriel Vahanian diagnoses, "self-understanding is amputated 
from any necessity of a fundamental knowledge of God. It is easier to understand oneself without God 
than with God. "146 Though this problem is suggested in Job's despair, it is not an amputation that arises 
as the live possibility which it is for the modem subject, or even the postmodern subject - severed from 
God - suffering its own consequent dissolution. 
"Postmodernism opens with the sense of irrevocable loss and incurable fault", according to 
Mark C. Taylor, "This wound is inflicted by the overwhelming awareness of death -a death that 
`begins' with the death of God and `ends' with the death of our selves. We are in a time between times 
138 Problematic Rebel, 12. Dermot Cox, however, argues that it is the existence of God that actually 
radicalises the dilemma of human suffering: "suffering is not the problem; God is. Without a belief in a 
personal God human suffering is simply a part of life, concomitant to the human condition. " Man's Anger and God's Silence: The Book of Job, 11. 139 Friedman, Problematic Rebel, 12. `What is man that thou should magnify him? ' Job 7: 17; `What is 
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and a place which is no place. "47 This time and place is delineated by an emphatic narrative of 
death. 
However, the `death of God' and the `death of self', which often form an implicit backdrop to 
postmodern thought, actually seem to rely upon the sort of characteristically modern narrative which 
postmodernism seeks to deny or disclaim. This claim requires unravelling. 
The term modern, according to Jean-Francois Lyotard, designates "any science that 
legitimates itself with reference to a metadiscourse... making an explicit appeal to some grand 
narrative". 148 According to Lyotard, the initial traits of modernity are identifiable as early as Paul and 
Augustine - whose introduction of `eschatology' into a classical pagan tradition (which had 
functioned 
in terms of myth and then `telos') founded the world upon a narrative which underwrites existence 
from `beyond'. 1a9 In these terms, modernity could be diagnosed by the presence of a metaphysical 
explanation for life. 
For Lyotard even the secularised narratives of the Enlightenment, Romanticism, Marxism, or 
speculative dialectics, "deploy the same historicity as Christianity, because they conserve the 
, 150 Yet it seems one must regress further than Christianity for the genealogy eschatological principle. 
of this impulse. In modern grand narrative, "An immemorial past is always what turns out to be 
promised by way of an ultimate end. It is essential for the modern to project its legitimacy forward 
while founding it in a lost origin"151 As such, is Nietzsche not right that Plato, with his nostalgia for 
the `real world', is the arch-protagonist of metaphysical restoration? Is not Hegel, with his narrative of 
history as the genealogy of Geist, the definitive modern protagonist of recovery from alienation? 
Ultimately, Lyotard writes, "Eschatology calls for an archaeology. "' 52 The aspiration of the future lies 
in the past. "Eschatology", Lyotard writes, `recounts the experience of a subject affected by a lack, and 
prophesies that this experience will finish at the end of time with the remission of evil, the destruction 
of death, and the return to the Father's house, that is, to the full signifier. "153 
It should be noted that there is nothing incredulous about `narrative' in itself from Lyotard's 
postmodern position. Such narratives exist in abundance. Essentially, the multiplicity and variety of 
narratives which refuse to structure themselves is essential to the fluid complexion of postmodernity. 
"Today, life is fast", writes Lyotard, "It vaporises morals. Futility suits the postmodern, for words as 
well as things .,, 
154 But this does not prevent fables from being told - although the narratives of 
postmodernity do not submit all thought to a totalising eschatological/archaeological structure. But 
surely any thought which proclaims the `death of God', `the death of self', 'the collapse of 
metaphysics' or `the end of philosophy' risks subsuming all under just such a grand narrative structure. 
When thought claims that certain ideas have lost credibility and dispenses with them in the name of 
progress does it not submit the future to its own eschatology? For example, when Mark C. Taylor 
147 Erring: A Postmodern A/7heology, 6 148 "... such as the dialectics of Spirit [Hegel], the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the 
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asserts that "The disappearance of the transcendental signified closes the theological age of the sign 
and makes possible the free play of a/theological writing... The death of God, however, is the 
birth of 
the divine that is not only itself but is always at the same time other", 
155 is not the announcement of 
closure, death, and new birth not the language of irrevocable grand narrative? 
156 Even if the alleged 
`death of God' and `death of self' mancipates thinking for the possibility of uniqueness, openness, 
differance etc., it does so under a particular governing grand narrative which declares that certain ways 
of thinking have come to an end. In other words, even if such thought declares "Now, outdate me! s157 it 
proclaims deliverance from a prohibitive ground of finality and a pressure for progression. As such, it 
stands like a flaming sword in the path of retrospect and nostalgia and declares that one is free to move 
anywhere just so long as it is forward from that which has succumbed to "irrevocable" and "incurable" 
`end' or `death'. To look back is to become a paralysed pillar of salt: a melancholy relic of an archaic 
structure of thinking. 
With the postmodern erasure of the self we encounter a grand narrative which paradoxically 
proclaims the end of all grand narrative: a history of the self encompassing its own annihilation. 
Similarly, what Altizer calls the death of God "incarnate in modem consciousness"158 implies a history 
of God which exists primarily within a narrative of human thought. "But", Westphal rightly warns, "it 
would be dogmatic to assume that whatever is not available to us is simply not there. It would be to 
suppose that our present understanding is the touchstone of reality, an assumption - let us put this 
gently - more nearly Hegelian than postmodern. "' 59 This is the greatest danger: that God is submitted 
to a narrative determined by God's credibility to human thought. "Simplifying to the extreme, " writes 
Lyotard, "I define postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives"160 If Lyotard's simplified 
definition is accepted then must it be suggested that much apparently 'postmodern' talk of God 
actually depends upon the grand narrative of bringing a certain theological tradition to its end? 
Although this may be the grand narrative that brings a particular meta-narrative to an end, it still asserts 
an end and a beginning for thinking about God and may therefore be more appropriately designated 
modern than postmodern. 
If modernity, Marion suggests, is understood as the completion and termination of 
metaphysics, "then, `postmodernity' begins when, among other things, the metaphysical determination 
of God is called into question. "161 Yet surely this questioning of the metaphysical determination of God 
155 Erring, 106 
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atomization of the individual, actually reveals him to be more "arch-modem" than postmodern. "Thus despite its name Taylor's work represents not the beginning of a new era in theology, but rather the last 
racking gasps of modem-style thought. " `Distinguishing Modem and Postmodern Theologies', Modern Theology 5: 3 April 1989,212 
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imposes the grand narrative which brings metaphysics to an end. In order to open oneself to the fresh 
possibilities of God, one must establish oneself in the `death of God'. Although this grand narrative 
may be anti-metaphysical, it still seems to formulate itself firmly in modernity in order to proceed into 
postmodernity. 162 Could it not be more postmodern to refuse the certitude of the death of God and 
regard this lacuna as a space for openness to the divine? 
I am not asserting that postmodernism is always the unconfessed illusion of disguised 
modernity. Postmodern thought clearly exists under the parameters by which "One sets out to answer a 
modem problem but ends by calling into question the framework that made the question important s163 
But I am suspicious of postmodern claims to have irrevocably out-manoeuvred modernity; in one sense 
the paradox is that as soon as postmodernity claims to have irrevocably closed the door on modernity it 
instates itself into a modem grand narrative (though perhaps this is one inevitable concession). 
Postmodern, in Lyotard's definition, "signifies how writing, in the broadest sense of thought and 
action, is situated after it has succumbed to the contagion of modernity and has tried to cure itself of 
it "164 It is this sense of immunisation against the malaise of modernity that is most relevant to this 
thesis. Postmodernism must be able to co-exist with modernity; otherwise it becomes a grand narrative 
proclamation of the end of modernity. 165 
Again in Westphal's words, "To expose the futility and danger of putting God to work on 
philosophy's terms is one thing; to show that there is no God whose work is our highest task is quite 
another... so much contemporary postmodernism bandies the term `onto-theo-ology' about as if it 
signified a successful attempt to make the world safe for atheism, to separate the question of freedom 
from the questions of God and immortality, and to free time completely from eternity. "166 The 
essentially ontological claims of post-ontotheology about the existence or reality of God seem to me to 
risk a relapse into modernism. 167 The iconoclasm of ontotheology is a useful corrective against the 
causa sui `God of the philosophers'. It exposes how, as Alasdair Maclntyre surmises, "the God in 
whom the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries came to disbelieve had been invented only in the 
explore its import and consequences. " `Being, Subjectivity, Otherness: The Idols of God', ed. John D. 
Caputo, Mark Dooley, and Michael J. Scanlon, Questioning God, 343. 162 However, Mark C. Taylor claims, "There is an alternative postmodernism, a postmodernism that is 
not an extension of modernism but instead one that calls into question the very foundation of 
modernism and its extension in modernist postmodernism. This version of postmodernism is often labelled poststructuralism or deconstruction. " `Postmodern Times', ed. Summerell, The Otherness of God, 184 
163 Murphy and McClendon, `Distinguishing Modern and Postmodern Theologies', 199 164 Postmodern Fables, 96 
165 Graham Ward differentiates `postmodernism' - as a critical response to modernism - from 'postmodernity' -a "sociohistorical and economic period" in which "the incredulity toward 
metanarratives becomes a pervasive cultural skepticism" and "the worldview of modernity no longer becomes believable... I emphasize this because I understand postmodernism as always with us, whereas there are indications which suggest `postmodernity' as a particular cultural emphasis is over. " `Introduction, or, A Guide to Theological Thinking in Cyberspace', ed. Graham Ward, The Postmodern God, xxv 166 `Kierkegaard's Climacus -a Kind of Postmodernist', 63 167 Graham Ward also observes that for Lyotard himself "to see the modern being superseded by the postmodern would itself be a modem conception, allied as it is to notions of linear development and the new. " `Introduction, or, A Guide to Theological Thinking in Cyberspace', The Postmodern God, xxv 
29 
seventeenth century. "68 But this is not to say that post-ontotheological thought only represents 
philosophy undoing its intrusion upon theology. There are far more expansive reasons and 
implications 
for doubting the metaphysical understanding of God, and this returns us to the Holocaust. 
Is not the 
Holocaust, in the implicit absurdity it renders of historical and divine meta-narrative, the most violent 
and involuntary announcement of the postmodern aporia in the last century? 
169 "Through the 
Holocaust, history has lost its meaning. This cannot be said of any evil deed. s170 And it is an apparent 
meaninglessness which cannot be taken as solid ground. Hence, I prefer the anthropocentrism of 
Rubenstein's reluctance to formulate an ontological assertion around his most honest confession -a 
confession which directs the subject towards an inner abyss: 
I believe that radical theology errs in its assertion that God is dead. Such an assertion exceeds 
human knowledge... It is more precise to assert that we live in the time of the death of God 
than to declare `God is dead. ' The death of God is a cultural fact. We shall never know 
whether it is more than that. 171 
168 `The Debate about God: Victorian Relevance and Contemporary Irrelevance', Alasdair Maclntyre 
and Paul Ricoeur, The Religious Significance ofAtheism, 14 169 As with the modern, the dating and genealogy of the postmodern is varied and problematic. Graham 
Ward outlines some of the proposed incept dates, though he acknowledges that "All of these dates 
relate to cultural expressions independent of a theological conception of the created orders. " 
`Introduction, or, A Guide to Theological Thinking in Cyberspace', The Postmodern God, xxiii. Ward himself perceives that, where theological discourse is concerned, "the project of postmodernism" is 
announced with the overthrow of metaphysics and ontotheology "which is also the overthrow of 
secularity". (xxiv) For my part, I am not intending to argue that the Holocaust represents the 
theological announcement of postmodernism, but rather that, in reflecting in the Holocaust's aftermath, the aporia about metaphysics, upon which much postmodernism builds, must penetrate incisively and 
acutely beyond the postmodern conscience and into the conscience of the entirety of theological 
reflection. 
170 Gregory Baum, Christian Theology After Auschwitz, 16 171 A fter Auschwitz, 250 
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Chapter One: The Inner Abyss 
Kierkegaard and the Self-Fascination of Modernity 
[D]espair has inflamed something that cannot bum or be burned in the self. 
172 
Kierkegaard, as a distinctively modem thinker, extols the virtues of the project of selfhood; yet, in also 
operating as a virile critique of modernity, Kierkegaard's works transcribe the failure of the modem 
self. This should be taken in response to what David Gouwens identifies as the common erroneous 
tendency by which "Kierkegaard is charged with being the primary creator of a modem myth of the 
self as the `solitary individual', unmoored from history or tradition, a permutation of the Cartesian ego 
or the self-creating individual Romanticism, a myth that many see in need of radical deconstruction"173 
In fact, Kierkegaard exacts his own method for deconstructing the very self he is indicted with 
endorsing. A more sensitive reading clearly discloses that Kierkegaard's corpus, in Harvie Ferguson's 
apposite words, essentially "dramatizes the decomposition of the modem self. "174 There is such anxiety 
in Kierkegaard's "genesis of the self', George Pattison writes, that "the origin of the self and its fall 
virtually coincide. "175 If Kierkegaard's anatomy of the self can, on the other hand, be called nihilistic 
rather than Cartesian then it is only in the sense that it seeks to "demolish the ground which has become 
false, turning the being of the self into a question mark'- to borrow Nishitani Keiji's words. 176 "To 
disclose the nihility at the ground of the self is to live in sincerity, and within such sincerity the self 
becomes truly itself. " 77 But Kierkegaard's dialectic of selfhood also proposes an answer to the 
question mark of the self. Beyond the mere dramatisation of this degeneration, Kierkegaard's writings 
may tempt the reader towards undergoing what Johannes Climacus succinctly calls "the autopsy of 
faith. 9178 It is in this dissection by faith that the self is able to see itself [Greek: autos - self; optos - 
seen] - though it must see itself initially through the anatomy of its own disintegration. 
Hence, it would not be wholly inappropriate to designate a Kierkegaardian anatomy of 
selfhood as - at least initially - characteristically negative, apophatic, or even deconstructive. 
Kierkegaard, as N. H. Sege observes, "has no anthropology that may be taught by him and adopted by 
his disciples"179 That is because the person for Kierkegaard is not considered conceptually, but as 
existing through choice, subjectivity, freedom, inwardness. It is this focus upon the lived experience of 
selfhood which causes Kierkegaard to contemplate the very real experience of the disruption of the self 
as his anthropological starting point. This dissolution of the reflective self represents its deconstructed 
inauthenticity. Authentically, the self can only finally come to see itself through the eyes of an other. 
This failure and putrefaction of the self - described as a burrowing fire of despair - sanctifies the 
refining ground for the self to become itself before God in the movement of faith. Authentic 
inSUD, 19 
173 Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, 10 174 The Science of Pleasure: Cosmos and Psyche in the Bourgeois World View, 209 "S Agnosis: Theology in the Void, 54 176 The Self-overcoming of Nihilism, 7 177 Ibid. 
178 PF, 70 
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consciousness of self is inextricable from one's consciousness of God. And yet consciousness of 
God 
involves a consciousness of our infinite qualitative difference (sin) from the very God one 
is called to 
stand before. As such, this severance ensures that theology and anthropology, though entering 
ultimately indissoluble union, cannot undergo a Feuerbachian identity crisis. As Valter Lindström 
claims, "Kierkegaard's was both a `theological anthropology' and an `anthropological theology'. But 
he has performed this enterprise without losing the distance between the divine and the human and 
without losing the polarity between the divine ego and the human thou. ""' 
The `self is the isolating principle. When I am entangled in the world of `objects' and `others' the 
grasp upon my self is loosened. Anti-Climacus describes this as the inauthenticity of `the crowd': 
Surrounded by hordes of men, absorbed in all sorts of secular matters, more and more shrewd 
about the ways of the world - such a person forgets himself, forgets his name divinely 
understood, does not dare to believe in himself, finds it too hazardous to be himself and far 
easier and safer to be like the others, to become a copy, a number, a mass man. 181 
As such, the `self often begins its search for itself in solitude. Descartes himself began his meditation 
in solitude - and it is, after all, Descartes who is frequently admonished as the one who "gave man, the 
subject, an ontological warrant for his nascent obsession with himselfs182 It is in the Cartesian ego that, 
Paul Tillich alleges, "Man becomes pure consciousness, a naked epistemological subject; the world 
(including man's psychosomatic being) becomes an object of scientific inquiry and technical 
management s183 Solitude was also Montaigne's impulse; but, as Charles Taylor explains, "when he sat 
down to write and turned to himself, he experienced a terrifying inner instability. i184 Ultimately the 
`self is mystified as it grasps after itself through entering into its own labyrinth of introspection. It is in 
the loneliness of reflection that I am most conscious of the elusive hiddenness of my self. As Albert 
Camus confesses, "For ever I shall be a mystery to myself. s185 As I struggle to take hold of my self, "it 
is nothing but water slipping through my fingers". 186 This is reminiscent of David Hume's asserted 
dissatisfaction with the elusiveness of this alleged 'self'- "When I turn my reflection on myself, I never 
can perceive this self without some one or more perceptions; nor can I ever perceive any thing but the 
perceptions. 'Tis the composition of these, therefore, which forms the self. " 187 Hume, however, was 
never entirely content in this resolution. '" 
Nevertheless, obsessive and ineffectual introspection engendered a gathering cloud of modern 
suspicion regarding the integrity of the `self . Unlike the soul which 
had been ontologically and 
19 `Anthropology', ed. Niels Thulstrup and M. Mikulovä Thulstrup, Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana 
Volume 7: Kierkegaard and Human Values, 28 iso 'The Image of God', ed. Niels Thulstrup and M. Mikulovä Thulstrup, Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana 
Volume 5: Theological Concepts in Kierkegaard, 41 
181 SUD, 33-34 
182 Carl A. Raschke, `The Deconstruction of God', 20 183 The Courage To Be, 131 
184 Sources of the Self, 178 
iss The Myth of Sisyphus, 24 186 Ibid. 
187 `Appendix', A Treatise of Human Nature, 634 188 "For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess that this difficulty is too hard for 
my understanding. " Ibid., 636 
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religiously assured; the `self seems only to exist as it is perceived. Furthermore, it appears that the 
`self is ultimately the privileged reserve of the reflective, aristocratic and luxurious master - whilst 
any mere slave can be in possession of an immortal soul. Kierkegaard's works, on the other hand, 
assert the presence of eternity in the self and in doing so implore that each individual, equal before 
God, learns to become a self through obligation to the eternal. By doing so, Kierkegaard indicted the 
delusions of self-mastery inherent in reflective introspection in deference to the self conceived as the 
struggle for every human being before God. Every human being is allied under "the sickness unto 
death" (despair) and in consequent need of salvation from this universal dis-ease of selfhood. In this 
sense, Anti-Climacus scrutinised the phenomena of despair, and discerned in it something reminiscent 
of the Socratic proof for the immortality of the soul: 
Socrates demonstrated the immortality of the soul from the fact that sickness of the soul (sin) 
does not consume it as sickness of the body consumes the body. Thus, the eternal in a person 
can be demonstrated by the fact that despair cannot consume his self... If there were nothing 
eternal in a man, he could not despair at all; if despair could consume his self, then there 
would be no despair at all. '89 
A "cold fire" of despair enters the self and, by its "impotent self-consuming", affirms the indestructible 
presence of the eternal. 190 The torture of the self s inability to be itself and the impossibility in knowing 
itself paradoxically asserts the inviolable reality of the self. Yet its reality is felt as despair: "the 
sickness unto death, this tormenting contradiction, this sickness of the self, perpetually to be dying, to 
die and yet not die, to die death. s191 The fact that the self - sick unto death - is unable to realise its own 
death testifies to the tormenting eternity of the self. But, insofar as the self does not authentically will 
to become itself, despair is experienced as a kind of enduring internal hell-fire: despair cannot 
"consume the eternal, the self at the root of despair, whose worm does not die and whose fire is not 
quenched [Mark 9: 48]. 9492 
Here the self is victim to an omnivorous despair whose fire cannot devour the soul. Though a 
person despairing in this sickness unto death longs to be rid of the self, longs to die, "wants to tear his 
self away from the power that established it", 193 such self-slaughter is not possible. All despair is, at 
root, "in despair to will to be rid of oneself'. 194 But this is a revolt against eternity, and against oneself, 
which eternity will not allow. Even if one wishes to evade despair by refusing to become conscious of 
it, refusing to become conscious of the self, then eternity will reveal one's despair to oneself and "nail 
him to himself' so that he cannot escape himself. 195 This is indeed an evocative image for the self 
which in despair is crucified to itself. The self bears the invisible wound of this stigmata. Melancholy, 
anxiety and despair are the invisible and secret agitation of the self's distress at its failure to possess 
itself. By struggling to become a self, one experiences the opposition of the eternal which wishes one to 
become oneself, what might be called the anxious `over-againstness' (Anfcegtelse) of eternity's claim 
189 SUD, 20-21. Re. Plato, Republic, X, 609d: "Do injustice and other forms of evil by their persistent resence in it [the soul] destroy and weaken it, till they finally kill it and sever it from the body? " 190 SUD, 18 
191 SUD, 18 
192 SUD, 18 
193 SUD 
, 20 194 SuD, 20 
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upon the self. This despair is eternity's obligation upon the self: it is also the birth-pain of the 
metamorphosis of spirit. And yet, "Eternity is obliged to do this, because to have a self, to 
be a self, is 
the greatest concession, an infinite concession, given to man, but it is also eternity's claim upon 
him. "196 
Repentance is ultimately the path towards the alleviation of despair. "Despair Is Sin", and 
therefore as eternity reveals despair to oneself so one "has to learn what sin is by a revelation from 
God". 197 It is penitence alone that quenches the flames of despair. As Kierkegaard writes, "Sin in a man 
is like the Greek fire which is not extinguished with water - but in this case only with tears. "198 But talk 
of this metamorphosis would be premature. Anti-Climacus's assertion that "next to God there is 
nothing as eternal as a self '199 currently fords diminished sympathy in light of the deconstruction of the 
myth of modern selfhood. However, the Kierkegaardian anatomisation of the disintegration of the self 
in despair, prior to its reconstruction before God, appears more attuned to the recent climate of the 
death of the self . 
200 As such, one must first examine the genealogy of the disintegrating modern `self'. 
A Genealogy of the Self: From `Know Thyself to the `Death of the Self 
Paganism required: Know yourself. Christianity declares: No, that is provisional 
- know yourself - and look at yourself in the mirror of the Word in order to know 
yourself properly. No true self knowledge without God knowledge or before God. To stand 
before the mirror means to stand before God. 201 
Rather than being a primal authentic truth, "Man" is, as Michel Foucalt famously identifies, "only a 
recent invention, a figure not yet two centuries old... and he will disappear again as soon as that 
knowledge has discovered a new form. s202 Despite the canonical Socratic charge to `Know Thyself, it 
is considered naive by Foucalt to attribute the anthropological investigation with such a primitive 
history. Even Kierkegaard is to some extent apparently culpable of the belief that Socrates originated 
the notion of selfhood. "The expression `know thyself means: separate yourself from `the other'. 
Inasmuch as prior to Socrates this self did not exist s203 However, this allegedly Socratic self is 
specifically the sense of introspective `self known in isolated differentiation from `the other'. Socrates, 
as Kierkegaard saw him, "isolated" and "abandoned" the individual of his time with his dialectical 
195 SUD, 21 
196 SUD, 21 
197 SUD, 95. I am therefore reading Part One and Part Two of The Sickness Unto Death as coherent 
with one another, though this is a matter of some debate. See Arne Gran, `The Relation Between Part 
One and Part Two of The Sickness Unto Death', ed. Niels Jurgen Cappelern and Hermann Deuser, Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 1997, pp. 35-50. See also Kristen K. Deede, `The infinite qualitative difference: Sin, the self, and revelation in the thought of Soren Kierkegaard', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 53, No. 1, February 2003, pp. 25-48 198 JP 4: 4008 / Pap. VI A 30. The "Greek fire" refers to a material, used by the ancient Greek navy, 
which was combustible underwater (JP 4, p. 660 n. 306). 199 SUD, 53 
200 "Indeed, The Sickness Unto Death, as well as the entire earlier pseudonymous literature of Kierkegaard, can be seen as an `anatomy' of self-deception, as an escape from the self, a denial of the 
self. " Gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, 38 201 JP 4: 3902 / Pap. X4 A 412 202 The Order of Things, Preface xxiii 203 CI, 203 
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method. 204 And yet it is modernity that translates the Delphic oracle's recommendation 
for self- 
knowledge into inwardness and agency. 205 It is essentially in modernity that the solipsistic `self has 
come into its own: hence Kierkegaard's observation that it was "nevertheless reserved for a later age to 
immerse itself in this self-knowledge": 206 
Plato wrote of the "absurd phrase" of self-mastery in reference to the ordering of the higher 
and lower parts of the soul207 -a centring which Charles Taylor describes as a precondition 
for 
interiorisation. However, while it was necessary to its development, Platonic centring is not identifiable 
with modern interiorisation: "it took a further step to bring it about. "208 In modernity `Know Thyself 
becomes a task of solitary self-reflection. "In the Socratic view, " writes Johannes Climacus, "every 
human being is himself the midpoint, and the whole world focuses only on him because his self- 
knowledge is God-knowledge. "209 Anthropology and theology are so aligned in Socratic thought that, 
according to David Willows, it concludes itself with the "conviction that the epistemologist is 
divine. "210 Crucially, the `self as a distinct object amenable to scrutiny emerges with the evolution of 
anthropology from theology. The `self had been conceived as an object for God - now in modernity it 
becomes an object for itself. The `self is both subject and object: an absurd tension which, as Plato had 
already suggested, it is eventually unable to sustain. 
However, prior to the modem severance of anthropology and theology, it was, according to 
Charles Taylor, "Augustine who introduced the inwardness of radical reflexivity and bequeathed it to 
the Western tradition of thought s211 Indeed, Mark C. Taylor identifies that, while murmurs of Western 
subjectivity can be detected in Paul, the now obsolete "epoch of selfhood" was effectively inaugurated 
by Augustine's Confessions and collapses upon Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. 212 However, Richard 
Sorabji disputes Charles Taylor's notion that "we have to wait for Augustine to find the idea of an 
inner self where God resides". 213 Sorabji highlights Augustine's avowed debt to Neo-Platonism. The 
impulse towards inward discovery of God, Sorabji argues, echoes Plotinus as well as Paul. This can be 
seen in Plotinus's autobiographical account of the journey inward in which he recalls how "I become at 
one with the Divine, and I establish myself in it. "214 
204 ibid. 
205 "The Greeks were notoriously capable of formulating the injunction `gnöthi seauton' -'know 
thyself' but they didn't normally speak of the human agent as `ho autos', or use the term in a context 
which we would translate with the indefinite article. " Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, 113 206 CI2203. David Willows: "the Spirit of Socrates, with all its quest for divine knowledge via 
introspection, hovers over much of modernity with relentless optimism about the capacity of the human 
mind. " Divine Knowledge, 34 
207 "But `master of oneself is an absurd phrase. For if you're master of yourself you're presumably also 
subject to yourself, and so both master and subject. For there is only one person throughout. " The Republic 430 E 
208 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, 120 209 PF, 11 
210 Divine Knowledge, 5 
211 Sources of the Self, 131 212 Erring, 35 
213 Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 252 214 See Enneads IV 8,1,1-11. St. Ambrose, in his sermon `On Isaac or the Soul' compares this 
experience of Plotinus to Paul's ecstatic experience of 2 Corinthians 12: 1-4. See Pierre Hadot, Plotinus 
or The Simplicity of Vision, 25 n. 5 
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And yet Augustine postulated a decisive distance, or estrangement, between God and the soul 
-a distance not simply derived from embodiment but from debilitating concupiscence: 
the doctrine of 
sin. "The soul is present to itself, " Charles Taylor explains, "and yet it can utterly fail to know 
itself . 215 But perhaps the more decisive difference in terms of Augustinian and Plotinian selfhood 
is 
not the melancholy frustration of introspection, but the very form of the self's narrative. While 
Enneads 
IV 8,1,1-11 represents the only truly autobiographical account in Plotinus, what is a rarity 
for Plotinus 
becomes an entire narrative structure in Augustine's Confessions. By arguably inventing the literary 
from of the autobiography, Augustine indulges in a narrative that, in Denys Turner's words, "at once 
tells of a self and constructs the self it tells of.... We might say, `no self, no autobiography'... we 
might also say, and for the same reason, `no autobiography, no self. "'216 In other words, the self cannot 
be abstracted from the activity of its own narration: "this continuous `I' who writes the autobiography 
is also constructed by the autobiography it writes. s217 Hence, one might say that it is in confessional 
narrative transcription that the self attempts to become the object of its own self-reflection 
218 The self 
becomes articulated in terms of the narrative of its journey to God and to itself -a journey which 
reconciles its goals in one final destination. 219 
In Augustine we read the narrative not only of inward self-seeking, but also of the realisation 
of its potential for failure through self-enclosure and its subsequent breaking open in relation to God 
ZZ° 
Salvation and selfhood are intertwined, as Lyotard writes in his posthumous work on Augustine, 
"Augustine confesses his God and confesses himself not because he is converted: he becomes 
converted or tries to become converted while making confession. s221 It is apparently only when the 
`self becomes too sure of itself that it experiences its most fatal crisis. Descartes, despite his professed 
epistemological dependence upon God, ultimately constructs an autonomous ego dependent upon 
nothing but its own introspection. In contrast to Augustinian dependence, Charles Taylor explains, "for 
215 Sources of the Self, 134 216 The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism, 56 217 Ibid., 61 
218 Judith Perkins suggests that "The triumph of Christianity was, in part at least, a triumph of a 
particular representation of the self. " The Suffering Self Pain and Narrative Representation in the 
Early Christian Era, 11. Perkins importantly highlights how, rather than engendering purified 
detachment, early narrative forms contributed in places to a turn away from Stoicism and `self-mastery' 
and towards a suffering embodied self. "Narratives issuing from different cultural points - medicine, Christian martyr literature - brought into cultural consciousness a representation of the human self as a body in pain, a suffering body. " (173) 219 According to Mark C. Taylor even secularised modem searches for selfhood are not remote from 
this internalised narrative of `journey': "such secularized searches for self bear the mark of their 
common spiritual ancestor: biblical pilgrimage. Life continues to be understood as a journey whose 
way leads from sickness to health, salus, salvation. " Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard, 8 220 David Gouwens is correct, I believe, in arguing that Kierkegaard's "psychological terminology" is 
closer to "another tradition that predates the Idealist-existentialist tradition of immediate self-presence, 
and that is an Augustinian narrative understanding of the self. " Kierkegaard As Religious Thinker, 90. Equally Jorgen Pedersen writes, "Contrary to the idealistic consciousness of self, S. K. discovers anew 
what is permanently, in Augustinianism, a matter of chief concern, viz. the Christian cognition of the 
self which, by way of the individual conversion, exists before God, and which... is also cognition of God. " `Augustine and Augustinianism', ed. Howard A. Johnson and Niels Thulstrup, A Kierkegaard Critique, 93 
221 The Confession of St. Augustine, 49 
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Descartes the whole of the reflexive turn is to achieve a quite self-sufficient certainty. "222 Furthermore, 
"this new conception of inwardness, an inwardness of self-sufficiency, of autonomous powers of 
ordering by reason, also prepared the ground for modem unbelief. s223 This keystone for the `death of 
God' and consequent `death of self' an implication unforeseen by Descartes - was formed by a 
severance of anthropology from theology and the `other', and also to some degree by a reliance upon a 
subject-object thought paradigm implicit in the solipsism of the cogito ergo sum. The modem Cartesian 
'self' trives to sustain itself as both the subject and the object of its own self-knowledge - though 
introspection inevitably vanquishes itself by this very insufferable tension. 
For Don Cupitt the `self has become so irrecoverably dependent upon this subject-object 
structure that "The duality between subject and object goes, and the self therefore disappears. v9224 The 
`inner self, as Cupitt sees it, was regulated by an "outer-inner dualism" to the extent of establishing a 
personal metaphysical dualism of public/private, appearance/reality internalised within each 
individual. 225 Cupitt collapses what he detects as a Pauline metaphysical dualism in deference to 
emphasising the contemporary primacy of the "immanence" and "appearance" of the person: "A person 
has become merely a personality, a mask, and improvised role. Nowadays we are all parts, not soul"226 
Disavowed of the archaic metaphysical heritage of the soul, Cupitt's diagnosis seems to sit within the 
postmodern perspective in which, as Lyotard explains, "A self does not amount to much, but no self is 
an island; each exists in a fabric of relations that is now more complex and mobile than ever before. "227 
Inevitably, as Tillich explains, "A self which has become a matter of calculation and 
management has ceased to be a self. It has become a thing. You must participate in a self in order to 
know what it is. But by participating you change it s228 In the light of recent assertions about the `self 
one must ask whether any form of the idea of selfhood can survive the `death of the self'. It must be 
recognised that it is predominantly the `self as Cartesian res cogitans which has been indicted in 
deference to an increasingly `de-centred self 229 As such, Charles Taylor concedes that universal, 
metaphysical, or ontological descriptions of selfhood are no longer revealing; "this word [`self ] now 
describes an area of questioning. It designates the kind of being of which this question of identity can 
be asked . 9-230 But can the `self, in any form, endure its own dissolution at its own hands? As Stanley 
Corngold phrases it, "Can a self be itself and know that the act by which it is known `disowns' it?... If 
the self cannot be focused and cannot be centred, it is only this 'cannot'. 9t231 In other words, has the self 
become only the melancholy impossibility of self-possession: an elegiac question mark inscribed over a 
space of absence? 
222 Sources of the Self, 156 223 Ibid., 158 
224 Preface, The Time Being, 1 225 The Time Being, 22-24 
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In many ways, the question of the self resembles the riddle of the Sphinx: the question whose 
answer is 'Man'. 32 It is Oedipus who solves the Sphinx's murderous enigma, and yet it is Oedipus's 
tragedy to destroy everything by marrying his mother and killing his father because he does not know 
their, and therefore his own, true identity: "the one who knows what man is does not know who he 
is. "233 And so Oedipus destroys all that is given to him - destroys himself because, though he knows 
`man' he does not know `this man'. He is never free from the irony of the question. In Hegel's reading, 
the content of the Sphinx's riddle is "the human being, the free self-knowing spirit s234 Elsewhere 
Hegel writes, "The explanation of the symbol [of the sphinx] lies in the absolute meaning, in the spirit, 
just as the famous Greek inscription calls to man: Know thyself . s235 It is the translation of the 
Sphinx 
into Greek mythology which, for Hegel, signifies the transition from the obscurity of the Egyptian 
religion to the clarity of God known as Spirit [Geist] in Greek religion. And yet, in Despland's reading, 
the nemesis is upon Oedipus precisely because Oedipus solved the riddle without any appeal to the 
wisdom of the gods and consequently endeavoured to become the equal of his father. Essentially the 
nemesis of the riddle is unleashed because "Oedipus made himself isotheos, equal to god. 1236 The 
retribution of the question is the indecipherable repetition of the question which is put to `man'. To 
escape this, one must turn the riddle over, as Oedipus may have failed to do, to the other: "man is the 
question put to God, to which only God can give the answer. t237 
The enigma of selfhood is that in the attempt to answer to itself, the self must multiply and 
defer itself through the very act of perception or questioning: the self lies in its irreconcilable future. As 
Corngold writes, "The self becomes always the future project of the perceiving self... The self is a 
permanent fugitive, escaping itself into the future of unceasing self-reflection. s238 This task of 
`becoming oneself' situates its struggle in the gap between the `perceiving self and the `future self'. In 
this sense, one could describe sefihood as abyssal. One might say that between the question and answer 
of the riddle a gap has opened up inside myself, and I have fallen into it. Here the enigma of selfhood 
delivers us over to doubting. It is within this abyss in the self that Anti Climacus situates his anatomy 
of despair. As one commentator writes, "despair is an existential gap within oneself, the willful and 
errant doubling in one's personality, the failure to be oneself. "239 The cipher to this abyss is within the 
word itself: `despair' [Fortvivlelse]. Whereas the English word `despair' [from the Old French 
232 The Sphinx in Greek mythology being the creature who terrorised by posing riddles and killing all 
who were unable to solve them. The riddle which Oedipus famously solved was: `A being with four feet has two feet and three feet, and only one voice; but its feet vary, and when it has most it is 
weakest. ' Oedipus solved the riddle by identifying that being as Man, who crawls on all fours as an infant, then stands on his own two feet, and finally supports himself with a staff at old age. Upon Oedipus' answer the Sphinx killed itself. In other words, the Sphinx poses the murderous riddle, the answer to which is 'Man'. It is only when the riddle is solved that the question destroys itself and the one who answers is emancipated. 233 Michel Despland, `On Not Solving Riddles Alone', ed. Harold Coward and Toby Foshay, Derrida and Negative Theology, 150-151 234 `The Religions of Transition b. The Egyptian Religion', Lectures On the Philosophy of Religion: volume Il-Determinate Religion, 639 235 Aesthetics: Lectures On Fine Art Volume I, 361 236 'On Not Solving Riddles Alone', 152 237 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Act and Being, 98 238 Ibid., 8 
239 Gregory Beabout, `Existential Despair in Kierkegaard', Philosophy and Theology, Winter 1992,174 
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desperer] literally means `without hope' [French desespoir: de - `without'; espoir - `hope'], the 
Danish word Fortvivlelse has its root in the German Verzweifeln. Both Fortvivlelse and Verzweifeln 
share a mutual structure: the root of both words is the word for `doubt' [tvivl/zweffel], while the 
prefixes denote intensification [for-/ver-]; as such, Fortvivlelse and Verzweifeln both mean 
literally 
`intensified doubt'. However, Kierkegaard's use of the word suggests more than the cognitive activity 
of doubting. As Gregory Beabout explains, "The movement from doubt to despair, from tvivl to 
fortvivlelse, is not made by a quantitative increase in one's cognitive powers. Rather, despair is an 
existential act"240 While Fortvivlelse is etymologically centred around `doubt' [tvivl], in its existential 
intensification - especially where doubt of oneself is concerned - 
it clearly encompasses the Anglo- 
French sense of despair as `hopelessness'. In fact, as shall be examined, the most fatal aspect of 
Fortvivlelse is precisely that it relinquishes all hope in the possibility of salvation. 
However, it is in its relation to tvivl that Fortvivlelse connotes something which is lost in the 
translation of `despair'. As the German Zweifel and the English `doubt' are both indicative of `two' 
[zwei; `double'], the Danish tvivl, though not as etymologically explicit, is suggestive of the Danish to 
['two']. Once the anatomy of despair in The Sickness Unto Death is examined, the sense of doubling or 
splitting comes into focal prominence. The duality of the human being is diagnosed in the notoriously 
abstract and cryptic opening passage241 to Part One of the work in which Anti-Climacus describes that: 
"A human being is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom 
and necessity, in short a synthesis. A synthesis is a relation between two. Considered in this way, a 
human being is still not a self. 92242 Its despair could be compared with, though qualitatively different 
from, dizziness or vertigo 243 This formula has been expressed before, though in a more primal from, by 
Vigilius Haufniensis: "Man is a synthesis of the psychical and the physical; however, a synthesis is 
unthinkable if the two are not united in a third. This third is spirit s244 But this relation of spirit is one of 
240 'Existential Despair in Kierkegaard, 168. Beabout's article has been instrumental in elucidating the 
etymological relations of Fortvivlelse. However, Paul Tillich also draws attention to the equivalent 
German connection between `despair' and `doubt, whilst "the syllable ver- indicates a doubt without a 
possible answer. " Invoking Sartre, Tillich approximates it to the hopelessness in "the feeling of a 
situation from which there is `no exit'. " Systematic Theology, II, 86-87 "' Kierkegaard expressed his own concern over the often incongruous lyrical title of the work and its 
sometimes dry formulaic style (JP 5: 6136 / Pap. VIII' A 651). Much of the awkwardness of the work is 
concentrated in the apparently Hegelian terminology of the opening. Beabout claims that here 
"Kierkegaard is poking fun at the abstract jargon of the Hegelians. Yet, at the very same time that he is 
mocking obtuse Hegelian formulas, he is using the abstract style to set forth his view of the self, a view 
that is crucially different from Hegel's. " `Kierkegaard on the Self and Despair: An Interpretation of the 
Opening Passage of The Sickness Unto Death', Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Volume 62,1988,107. However, Jon Stewart draws attention to the historical detail that 
"Hegel's philosophy was no longer in vogue in 1849 when The Sickness Unto Death appeared. The heyday of Hegelianism in Denmark had already come and gone. This would seem to undermine the 
point of writing a book that covertly satirizes Hegel's philosophy. " Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel Reconsidered, 592. Although the book evidently recalls Hegel, there was a diminished polemical need to explicitly caricature Hegelianism. Consequently, where Hegel can be heard to speak in the work there is little need to point a finger of mockery. 242 SUD, 13 
243 "The possibility of dizziness lies in the synthesis of the psychical and the physical as a relation (but not as a relation that relates itself to itself, which is a qualification of spirit). " Pap. VIII= 170: 7 [Deleted from final draft] 
244 CA, 43 
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anxiety245 -a relation which Haufniensis later tells us 
is always "sympathetic and antipathetic", an 
ambivalent serpentine dance of seduction and revulsion. 
246 According to Anti-Climacus, the human 
being, as a synthesis of two apparently contrary sets of principles, has not yet become a self. 
"Spirit is 
the self. But what is the self? The self is a relation that relates itself to itself or is the relation's relating 
itself to itself in the relation. The self is not the relation [the synthesis] but is the relation's relating 
itself to itself . s247 The synthesis relates opposites, 
but it is only in the synthesis's relation of itself to 
itself- not only as a relation to the duality - that it becomes "the positive third, and this 
is the self 99248 
But how does the relation relate to itself and not merely to the duality? A self "must either 
have established itself or have been established by another. "249 The first option one might read as the 
cartography of the modem self striving to authenticate itself in the space of its self-reflection250 It is 
in 
the self established by another that a further movement of openness is posited in the relation to that 
other. If there is another then "this relation, the third, is yet again a relation and relates itself to that 
which established the entire relation. "251 Conceived visually: in the first option, the gaze of the 
relation's relating to itself falls back upon itself in the form of self-reflection; in the second, the gaze 
returns through the eyes of the other and as such is a further relation to another. "The human self is 
such a derived, established relation, a relation that relates itself to itself and in relating itself to itself 
relates itself to another. 02 Without this other, the gaze of the self is sophisticated Narcissism: nothing 
more than the mirror of paganism's `Know Thyself'. In Christian terms, Kierkegaard writes, "that is 
245 CA, 44 
246 CA, 103 
247 SUD, 13 
248 SUD, 13 
249 SUD, 13 
250 Beabout reads this formulation as indicative of "the ethical self', as exemplified by Judge William's 
exhortation to the young aesthete in Either/Or Volume II to "choose yourself' ('Kierkegaard on the 
Self and Despair', 109-111. I am not convinced of the extent to which Beabout asserts that the three 
forms of despair in the title of Part A ("in despair not to be conscious of having a self (not despair in 
the strict sense; in despair not to will to be oneself; in despair to will to be oneself') correspond to the 
three spheres of existence (aesthetic, ethical, religious) because I believe that these forms of despair 
arise in various guises across the spheres. This lack of clarity aside, there are good reasons why the 
Judge is a helpful illustration. Judge William encourages A to forsake melancholy and "choose 
despair... one cannot despair without choosing. " (E/O II, 177). For the Judge despair can only take one 
form and that is "in despair not to will to be oneself' - which A can surmount if he wills his life as despair. However, the Judge's notion that "one cannot despair without choosing" seems to deny the 
possibility of the unconsciously "in despair to will to be oneself': a choice which, from the ethical 
sphere, is not chosen as despair and only recognised as such in the religious. As such, the Judge does 
not relate the ethical self to the self before God, but rather "By the individual's intercourse with himself 
he impregnates himself and brings himself to birth. " (E/O II, 217). Therefore, Beabout concludes that 
"Judge Williams' fault is that he thought his willing to be a self was sufficient for an equilibrium of his 
personality. Sartre may be a perfect example of this kind of despair; he wants to be himself and at the 
same time deny that he is a creature. " (`Kierkegaard on the Self and Despair', 114). Beabout is 
consciously opposing Paul Dietrichson's over-identification of Judge William and Anti Climacus in 'Kierkegaard's Concept of the Self, Inquiry, Vol. III, spring 1965, pp. 1-32. Furthermore, I believe that Beabout's work raises important problems for George J. Stack's assertion that for Kierkegaard "the 
essence of man is to exist as a particular, individual person who is engaged in the persistent striving to 
realize his highest ethical potentialities". `Kierkegaard: The Self as Ethical Possibility', The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 3,52. See also Stack's `Kierkegaard and Ethical Existence', Ethics, Vol. 83, No. 2 (January 1973), pp. 108-125. However, one implication of the above reading is th 
251 
at, from the perspective of the religious, it renders Either/Or a fundamentally negative Neither/Nor. SUD, 13 
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provisional - know yourself - and look at yourself in the mirror of the 
Word in order to know yourself 
properly. No true self knowledge without God knowledge or before God. To stand before the mirror 
means to stand before God. s253 Or, in Anti-Climacus' words: "The formula that describes the state of 
the self when despair is completely rooted out is this: in relating itself to itself and in willing to 
be 
itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it X254 
It is this ontological dependence which identifies the self-reflective gaze as a form of "in despair to will 
to be oneself": something which only exists because there is actually another authentic way to become 
oneself, and that is in relation to the establishing power. "If a human self had established itself, then 
there could be only one form: not to will to be oneself, but there could not be the form: in despair to 
will to be oneself. "255 From the first perspective all willing to be oneself would be inherently authentic; 
only not willing to be oneself would constitute despair. However, the existence of this "second formula 
[in despair to will to be oneself is specifically the expression for the complete dependence of the 
relation (of the self), the expression for the inability of the self to arrive at or to be in equilibrium and 
rest by itself, but only, in relating itself to itself, by relating itself to that which has established the 
entire relation. "256 
If this is to be read as an expression of the modem self-reflective self's inability to 
authenticate itself, then one must also acknowledge that, instead of only advocating a postmodern 
erasure of the project of selfhood, Anti-Climacus is also attempting to re-situate the self relationally 
before God. 257 In this sense, the third which also reconciles the two expresses the possibility of 
grounding the self in the establishing power. Here is the ontological facet of despair as more than the 
feeling of despair: it becomes a misrelation. As a misrelation rather than mere emotion, despair can be 
5 It must be revealed by the other. Finally, something that one remains essentially unconscious of. 2 8 
252 SUD, 13-14 
253 JP 4: 3902 / Pap. X4 A 412. Martin Andic disputes this distinguishing of Christianity over paganism 
in terms of the former situating self -knowledge "before God". On the contrary, "Socrates, the pagan 
who so famously sought to know himself, did seek to know himself precisely before God. " `The 
Mirror', ed. Robert L. Perkins, International Kierkegaard Commentary, Volume 21: For Self- 
Examination and Judge for Yourself 1,355. While Andic is right to emphasise self-knowledge's 
contingency upon the eye of the other in Socratic ignorance, it is also important to affirm that the 
identity of the God before whom one stands is a crucial differentiating factor between Christianity and 
paganism: a difference elucidated in Johannes Climacus's Philosophical Fragments. 54 SUD, 14 
255 SUD, 14 
256 SUD, 14 
25' "In this strife, this holy war [for self-mastery], then, the self must wrestle itself to a standstill and, in doing so, discover its actual inability to be itself... For in this annihilation [of the self) we learn that, 
since we cannot bring about the unification of the self by our own efforts, the achievement of authentic 
selfhood depends utterly and solely on divine grace. The annihilation of the individual is his transfiguration in God. " Pattison, Kierkegaard: The Aesthetic and the Religious, 169 258 Haim Gordon rejects what he reads as Kierkegaard's "monism of despair" because he sees that, as 
an ontological assertion, it is incommensurable with such phenomena as the life of Socrates who he believes, by not exhibiting despair, "defies Kierkegaard's description of man's ontological state. " `A Rejection of Kierkegaard's Monism of Despair', ed. Robert Perkins, International Kierkegaard Commentary: The Sickness Unto Death, 241. Among others, Gordon also perceives contradictions of a monism of despair in Nietzsche, Dostoyevski, Berdyaev and also in the human experiences of "active love, creativity, and joy" (245). Although he acknowledges that Kierkegaard's is not the (English) dictionary definition of despair as hopelessness, Gordon fails to appreciate the etymological relation to 
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when "despair is completely rooted out" then "in relating itself to itself and in willing to 
be itself, the 
self rests transparently in the power that established it "259 And yet this relation, which Anti Climacus 
concludes is faith, is an activity of becoming rather than being. As shall hopefully become clearer, 
becoming transparent to oneself before God, to see oneself through the eyes of God - in the mirror of 
the Word - is a becoming whose being is ultimately eschatological. 
260 As such, the self - if one wishes 
to conceive it in this modem vocabulary - is in a sense a journey whose destination is always 
deferred 
rather than possessed. 
Ultimately for Anti-Climacus, the self becomes itself in the relation "before God": the relation 
relates itself to itself, not in its own eyes or the reflective mirror of Narcissus, but through the eyes of 
God or the mirror of the Word. But if `God is dead', then surely the `self is also abandoned to the 
impossibility of becoming itself, for it cannot do so alone. Without God the self has only its 
melancholy failure to become itself on which to meditate. If God is dead, then there is no "in despair to 
will to be oneself"; or else it is a despair without resolution - and surely this itself is either a new 
form 
of despair or else the abolition of this despair along with the God of despair. Perhaps there is only "in 
despair not to will to be oneself', as some kind of "bad faith" as atheistic existentialism may have 
understood it; or else this is no longer despair but only acceptance of the `death of selfhood'. In other 
words, perhaps the only real despair of postmodernity is "in despair to will to be oneself', insofar as it 
represents an inability to accept the irrevocable veracity of the `death of the self. 
Post-Mortem Dei: A Communal Grave 
The self is only the shadow which sin and error cast by stopping the light of God, 
and I take this shadow for a being. 
Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace, 35 
[O]ne who has gazed into the empty mirror can never regard God or self as he did 
before 261 
doubt which is explicit in despair's juxtaposition to faith. As such, Gordon falls into the error of 
conceiving Kierkegaardian despair primarily as something consciously emotional. This is a common 
vexation for English readers, as Beabout clarifies, unfamiliar with the connotations of Fortvivlelse. 
"The problem comes from understanding despair to be solely a feeling, that is, part of one's awareness. 
For Kierkegaard, it is possible to be in despair without being aware of it since it is possible to take up 
the task of being oneself without negative feelings... and even if it begins to surface, self-deceit makes it possible to ignore and repress the feeling. " `Existential Despair in Kierkegaard', 172. 259 SUD, 14 
260 "[Kierkegaard] describes the self both as something I am and as something I must become, both as a 
substance and as something to be achieved. " C. Stephen Evans, 'Kierkegaard's View of the Unconscious', ed. Martin Matu§tik and Merold Westphal, Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity, 83. I would 
add to this that the self also involves something that is given - hopefully this meaning shall become clear in due course. I agree with David Gouwens that "Kierkegaard does not find the uniqueness of the 
self to be either the Cartesian `ghost in the machine' or a given self discovered though introspection. This is because the self, for Kierkegaard, is acquired rather than given, formed rather than discovered". Kierkegaard As Religious Thinker, 57. However, the self involves something given by God insofar as it is61"an infinite concession, given to man, but it is also eternity's claim upon him. " (SUD, 21). Taylor, Deconstructing Theology, 103 
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To know oneself, Kierkegaard writes, is to see oneself in the divine mirror. But in this purported lacuna 
of the now vacant mirror of God the self sees only its self-reflection where once it had seen itself 
reflected through God. The 'self' merges into the new dawn of its autonomy, it defines itself without 
`God' and so it kills `God'. However, the necessary consequence of the disappearance of `God' "is the 
disappearance of the self that killed him. When the conceptual ground of self-interiority dies, the self- 
as-self interior must die as well' . 262 Subsequently alone and unable to posses itself as the object of its 
own subjectivity, the `self then dies - no longer able to transcend and re-posses itself from a higher 
vantage point. The innovative possibilities of the `self-creating self' have transpired as impossibilities. 
After Nietzsche's prophecy, writes Ralph Harper, "there ought to have been a new dawn, new horizons, 
an open sea. Man ought to feel cheerful; his logic ought to be gay. 9263 But such failure to produce a 
new truth and the inability or unwillingness of most people to face the dizzying anxiety of their own 
alleged freedom to create themselves initiated the human `self' into the terrible secret of its own 
annihilation. Unable to depend on anything beyond itself and incapable of sustaining its own vital 
creativity, the relatively recent phenomena of the autonomous `self faces its own dissolution. As Mark 
C. Taylor puts it, "the death of God finds its completion in the death of selfhood. "2M 
Accordingly, as Tillich sees it, "Twentieth century man has lost a meaningful world and a self 
which lives its own meanings out of a spiritual centre. s265 Modern humanity is thrown into an abyss, 
not simply of `God', but of the disorientation and dissolution of its own `self. In the post-mortem of 
`God' it transpires that whatever has killed `God' is contagious. "The decisive event which underlies 
the search for meaning and the despair of it in the twentieth century is the loss of God in the nineteenth 
century. "266 The `death of God' initiates "the crisis that comes when man no longer knows what it 
means to be human and becomes aware that he does not know this. s267 
We have been living in what Martin Buber called the period of the "eclipse of God". The 
divine light ceases to illuminate the world in which the melancholy modem subject finds itself. But an 
eclipse is an event which does not endure indefinitely: "the eclipse of the light of God is no extinction; 
even to-morrow that which has stepped in between may give way. "268 For Rubenstein, however, 
Buber's phrase attempts to moderate the modem sense of irrevocable profanity. It is a compromise 
which clings to an extinguished hope 269 Buber shrinks away from the `death of God' and cleaves to the 
hope that whatever shadow has come between us and divinity shall move aside. Buber clings to a 
thread which for Rubenstein is irremediably broken: "We stand in a cold, silent, unfeeling cosmos, 
unaided by any purposeful power beyond our resources. s270 
262 Mary-Jane Rubenstein, `Unknow Thyself: Apophaticism, Deconstruction, and Theology After Ontotheology', 393 
263 The Seventh Solitude, 4 
264 Deconstructing Theology, 89 265 The Courage To Be, 138 266 Tillich, The Courage To Be, 141 
Friedman, Problematic Rebel, 456 268 Martin Buber, `God and the Spirit of Man', The Eclipse of God, 129 269 After Auschwitz, 250 270 After Auschwitz [First edition], 153. Rubenstein, however, came to moderate his own opinion of cosmological desolation. See Rubenstein and Roth, Approaches to Auschwitz, 311 
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Yet, as suggested in the introduction, an ontological verdict inferred from God's silence 
is not 
open to us if, as Nicholas Wolterstorff suggests, "The silence of God is not an ontologically 
necessitated silence. It is not like the silence of the rocks and the hills, of which it is only 
metaphorically true that they speak ... The silence of the 
biblical God is the silence of a God who 
speaks . "271 But, if one withdraws 
from an ontological verdict of death, then what is to be made from 
this silence? Does God's silence not also impose silence upon us -a paralysis of speech about 
God? As 
Jean-Luc Marion asks, "To what silence are we summoned today? Death, preeminently, imposes 
silence; the emptiness of infinite spaces opposes its suffocating vacuity like an eternal silence; aphasia 
[loss of speech associated with sceptical silence] desertlike, grows with its silence. "272 Does this 
silence, which for Marion "threatens modernity more than any other", convey a sense of apophatic 
honour for the ineffable, 273 or does it rather express "contempt, renunciation, the avowal of impotence, " 
or even idolatry? 274 Much depends upon the nature of this deathly silence. Who or what is it that has 
become silent? While an ontological assertion evades us, it can be said that the `death of God' does 
speak with some veracity about the death of a particular understanding of God. For Marion, among 
others, the God who has died in the `death of God' is essentially an idol. This death should not cause us 
to become confused about the silence between us and God: "To remain silent does not suffice in order 
to escape idolatry, since preeminently, the characteristic of the idol is to remain silent, and hence to let 
men remain silent when they no longer have anything to say - not even blasphemies. " 
275 
Nietzsche succeeds in ushering in the `twilight of the idols'; but `the idol', as Marion explains, 
is that which "allows the divine to occur only in man's measure. X276 The idol is constructed on an apex 
of thought which thought has submitted to. `God' is the projection of our own desire for transcendence 
- unrealisable because hypostasised as the other who demands my incapacity. In this sense, Feuerbach 
also assaulted the idol of the imagination. For Marion, `God' as causa sui is the idol 277 As such, the 
`death of God' errs as much as it succeeds. It is iconoclasm which reaches its limit in recognising itself 
as such. The `death of God', as Marion observes, "presupposes a determination of God that formulates 
him in a precise concept; it implies then, at first, a grasp of the divine that is limited and for that reason 
intelligible. "278 As such, Marion rightly wishes to add quotation marks to the `God' who is indicted in 
the `death of God' . 
279 And still the implication is that one must supplement the `self with the 
equivalent cautious quotation marks. As Mary-Jane Rubenstein explains, "We have killed him [`God'] 
because we created him in the first place, because there was never any God to ground us as ourselves - 
271 Wolterstorff, `The Silence of the God Who Speaks', ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul K. Moser, Divine Hiddenness, 215-216 
272 God Without Being, 54 
273 Re. Pseudo-Dionysius' plea "to honour in respectful silence the hidden things which are beyond 
me. " The Celestial Hierarchy, XV, 9 274 God Without Being, 54 
275 Ibid., 107 
276lbid., 15 
277 Ibid., 35 
278 Ibid., 29 
279 "the `death of God' presupposes a concept equivalent to that which it apprehends under the name of 'God'. " Ibid. 
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only `God', which was nothing but the product of our thought. And so we are free... Except. Except we 
were the ones oppressing us; killing God, we've killed ourselves. "280 
The Death of the Idol and The Death of the Ego? 
[Y]ou may have killed God beneath the weight of all that you have said; but don't imagine 
that, with all that you are saying, you will make a man that will live longer than he 281 
It is worth remembering that in Nietzsche the `death of God' begins with the gaze of God. One is 
looked upon by a "strange God, a voyeuristic God (recalling the Sartrean stare). 282 It is `The Ugliest 
Man' who murdered `God' because he could neither bear the intrusion of `God"s witness to his shame, 
nor could he shake his resentment of `God"s pity for him: 
But he had to die: he saw with eyes that saw everything; he saw man's depths and ultimate 
grounds, all his concealed disgrace and ugliness. His pity knew no shame: he crawled into my 
dirtiest nooks. This most curious, overobtrusive, overpitying one had to die. He always saw 
me: on such a witness I wanted to have revenge or not live myself. The god who saw 
everything, even man - this god had to die! Man cannot bear it that such a witness live283 
The despair of the `Ugliest Man', the despair which descends into pathological Deicide, results from a 
conception of `God' as, in Haar's words, "the dysfunctional projection of a persecution complex and a 
delirium of self-accusation. `God' is only the hypostasis of a delirious bad conscience, magnified by 
the metaphysical dimension into a constant presence. "284 This `God' is indiscernible from an inner 
universe of secret guilt which incarnates itself as the morbid externalisation of self-indictment. There is 
a Narcissism of guilt apparent here. Indeed, Nietzsche's Zarathustra also discerned that "This fellow 
too loved himself, even as he despised himself . 285 As such, Haar continues, "God's murder, the 
hyperbole of aggression, is the desperate attempt by man, suffering from himself, to get rid of the cause 
of his suffering. %9286 But the crucial misinterpretation is the belief in the "delirious bad conscience" as 
the infliction which comes from the `Other', the `Master'. This conscience is ultimately self- 
interpretative: self-indictment projected onto the transcendent and incontestable height. 
The `self thus transforms itself into an object for an imagined other `subject'. This `God' is 
essentially the desire of the `self' to know itself as its own object except that, in this instance, the `self 
which fails to grasp itself projects itself in a movement of alienation in which it experiences itself as an 
essentially guilty object. And yet rebellion is inevitable insofar as this guilt itself becomes something 
alien: in Camus' words, "an attempt is made to get him to admit his guilt. He feels innocent. To tell, the 
truth, that is all he feels - his irreparable innocence. "287 He frees himself of `God', who was only ever 
his metaphysically established self-indictment at the impossibility of possessing himself. He becomes 
nothing more or less than the assassin of his own imagination. He identified sin as metaphysics and 
280 'Unknow Thyself, 410 
281 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 211 282 Michael Harr, `Nietzsche and the Metamorphosis of the Divine', Post-Secular Philosophy, 160 283 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: Fourth Part, The Portable Nietzsche, 378-379 284 `Nietzsche and the Metamorphosis of the Divine', 162 
86 45 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra: Fourth Part, The Portable Nietzsche, 379 
28 
287 
Nietzsche and the Metamorphosis of the Divine', 163 The Myth of Sisyphus, 53 
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atoned for it with the sacrifice of heteronomy. The `God' who originated in the desire of the 
`self' to 
know itself is murdered in the rebellion of the `self against its metaphysically self-established self- 
indictment. 
It is, as Tillich elucidates, precisely this `subject-object' paradigm in the divine-human 
encounter which causes the "God of theological theism" to be killed: 
God as a subject makes me into an object which is nothing more than an object. He deprives 
me of my subjectivity because he is all-powerful and all-knowing. I revolt and try to make 
him 
into an object, but the revolt fails and becomes desperate. God appears as the invincible tyrant, 
the being in contrast with whom all other things are without freedom and subjectivity... 
... This is the God Nietzsche said 
had to be killed because nobody can tolerate being 
made into a mere object of absolute knowledge and absolute control 
288 
In transcending the "God of theological theism", Tillich extols the "God above the God of theism" who 
encounters humanity beyond the subject-object structure 289 Despite his relation of God and 'being- 
itself', Tillich is not concerned with metaphysical speculation about God in Godself. 
290 It is in 
"participating in the power of being-itself' that the self "receives itself back"291 
Hence one may wish to assert with Paul Ricoeur that Nietzsche has only closed one possibility: "that of 
an ontotheology culminating in a moral God who would be the principle and foundation for an ethics of 
prohibition and condemnation"292 However, Merold Westphal differentiates the tradition of 
metaphysics -a thread running from Anaximander to Nietzsche - from "the tradition that stretches 
from Augustine to Kiekegaard. 9'293 As such, Westphal - like Ricoueur who regards the "school of 
suspicion" as a theological asset294 - believes that Christian theology can appropriate much from the 
atheism of modernity by regarding its critiques of religion as empathic with Biblical indictments of 
inauthentic religion. 295 Valuing Nietzsche, Feuerbach, Heidegger et al, Westphal makes a plea "for a 
religiously motivated hermeneutics of suspicion. s296 And Westphal is not alone in applauding 
philosophy's iconoclasm of (philosophy's) Unmoved Mover. Jürgen Moltmann, for example, identifies 
288 The Courage To Be, 178-179 
289 Ibid., 180 
290 "Like Kierkegaard, Tillich considers talk of the existence of God to be bad theological grammar. 
Rocks exist; plants exist; animals exist; human beings exist; but the God beyond God, transcending 
theism, does not exist. " Shrag, The SelfAfter Postmodernity, 13 6. Similarly, Shrag quotes Kierkegaard 
Johannes Climacus from Concluding Unscientific Postscript: "God does not think, he creates: God 
does not exist, he is eternal. " Cited in The Self After Postmodernity, 135. 29' The Courage To Be, 181 
292 `Religion, Atheism, and Faith', The Religious Significance ofAtheism, 68 293 Overcoming Ontotheology, 257. Westphal implores that: 
"We must think God as that mystery that exceeds the wisdom of the Greeks. 
We must think God as the voice that exceeds vision so as to establish a relation 
irreducible to comprehension. 
We must think God as the gift of love who exceeds not merely the images but also 
the concepts with which we aim at God. " (270) [italics original] Such a God "who comes `after' the overcoming of onto-theologically constituted metaphysics" Westphal identifies as the God of Augustine (273-284). 294 `Religion, Atheism, and Faith', The Religious Significance ofAtheism, 68 295 Suspicion and Faith, 10 296 ibid., 284 
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that "Aristotle's God cannot love... The `unmoved Mover' is a `loveless Beloved. s, 9297 This God can 
be 
loved for His moral beauty, but He is caught up within Himself, unable to love that which is not like 
"29$ Him: "he is the beloved who is in love with himself, a Narcissus in a metaphysical degree. 
Eventually, the "metaphysically established God, " Eberhard Ringel likewise explains, seems 
to have been "destroyed by his own perfection. , 299 This `God' is incarcerated in His own self- 
consummation. It is this `God' who has been rendered incoherent by the passio of modernity, `God"s 
perfect essence is contradicted by human existence. 300 The metaphysical deity, Ringet identifies, is 
elevated "over us"; death is "under us". Death and transcendence are mutually exclusive: "it would 
appear as if one has torn the being of God apart. The thought of God appears to have destroyed 
itself. s301 But the thought which has destroyed itself is the thought of `God' which has been identified 
as an idol of onto-theology. But can one justifiably evacuate onto-theology from the God of Abraham, 
Isaac, and Jacob? Perhaps the mysterious disclosure of the divine name holds the cipher to the onto- 
theological contamination of Christian theology whilst also pointing beyond the `death of God'. 
Receiving The Holy Name 
It is in the enigmatic call of Moses from the midst of the burning bush that God reveals the esoteric 
divine name as 'ehyeh asher 'ehyeh. This self-concealing, as much as self-revealing, disclosure has 
been simplified by the common variant English translation `I am that I am'. It is this which Altizer calls 
"a self-naming which is not only the beginning of divine or ultimate speech, but therein and thereby is 
the release and the embodiment of total actuality, an actuality which is itself the origin of a full and 
total releasement s302 Yet is it perhaps anathema to talk about this self-naming in terms of 
"embodiment of total actuality" or as "self-embodiment". 303 The I AM THAT I AM should certainly 
not be read as some divine correlative of the Cartesian cogito ergo sum -a correlation with some 
bearing upon the cross-contamination between the `death of God' and the `death of the self'. Even 
when Altizer writes about the I AM as "inevitably a loss of an original and total transcendence... a fall 
which is the self-emptying of pure transcendence", 304 is he not transcribing the 'ehyeh asher 'ehyeh 
within an alien metaphysical dualism of presence and absence? Surely one is involved in the activity of 
importing terms when one talks of God, as Mark C. Taylor does, as "the absolute self-identity that 
resounds in the `I AM THAT I AM. "9305 
297 Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God, 222 298 ibid. 
299 God as the Mystery of the World, 205 300 ibid. 
301 Ibid., 48 
302 `The Beginning and Ending of Revelation', ed. Robert P. Sharlemann, Theology At The End Of The 
Century: A Dialogue on the Postmodern, 76 303 Ibid., 77 
304 Ibid., 77 
305 Erring, 37. Taylor does to an extent qualify that "It would be a mistake, however, to hear these 
words merely as the representation of simple equality-with-self... When God is understood as the 
absolutely self-identical, which in-itself is complex, He is grasped as substance. Substance (substantia: 
sub, under + stare, to stand) is traditionally associated with the Greek ousia or essence. " 37 
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Nevertheless, one cannot simply vilify recent thought for smuggling Greek ontology into a 
Hebraic enigma. As Alfred Jäger points out: 
The famous passage `I am that I am' (Ex. 3: 14) has nothing to do with ontology. Instead, this 
mysterious self-identification expresses God's pledge of himself to the dangerous path to 
be 
followed by his people. The translation of this passage in the Septuagint, however, became the 
entree for Greek metaphysics into the understanding of the biblical text Egö eimi ho ön... 
Already the Septuagint, however, translates the unintelligible predicates of God el saddai with 
pantokratör, through which Hellenistic apprehensions of power penetrated the biblical 
understanding of God. 06 
The Hebrew 'ehyeh asher 'ehyeh is translated into the Latin as ego sum qui sum - which has been 
described as "the Thomist understanding of God as the one being whose very being it is to be (ipsum 
esse subsistens)"307 - even though, as Marion maintains, the "Hebrew verb hayah does not suffice to 
introduce a concept of 'Being'. 99308 This has not prevented many from introducing and inscribing such a 
concept into a Hellenised Christian understanding discomforted by such irresolvable ontological 
ambiguity. "In more contemporary idiom, " Kearney writes, "this verbal play [of the verb hayah] 
compels us to wonder if God is here reducing himself to a metaphysics of presence or rendering 
himself immune to it for good and all. "309 
It is ultimately questionable to what extent the 'ehyeh asher 'ehyeh can appropriately be called 
a "self-naming" at all. For example, when related to the Egyptian belief in magical and secret divine 
names of power, then Moses' request for the name of God calls to mind his impending altercation with 
the Egyptian magicians. 31° In this sense, does the divine response signify a name which exceeds the 
esoteric understanding, or a complete evasion of the magical paradigm itself? Either way, the response 
suggests a refusal to submit to the possessive of objectified conceptualisation. God exceeds that which 
can be named or comprehended in the name - as such, in Kabbalistic tradition, even mystical 
meditations upon the permutations of the Sacred Tetragrammaton are inexhaustible - and yet at the 
same time God's name expresses the substantiality of a historical relation to the material suffering of 
the people of Israel. 
Recently, Richard Kearney has offered a reading of Exodus 3 as "`I am who may be' - that is, 
as the possibility to be, which obviates the extremes of being and non-being. 011 In reaction to the onto- 
theological reading, Kearney proposes an "eschatological" God interpreted primarily in terms of 
"possibility. 312 While Kearney remains deliberately opaque about this eschatological possibility, his 
emphasis upon the freedom of God from the conceptual shackles of onto-theology is a pertinent 
contemporary response to the aporia of post-metaphysical theology rooted in the ancient text of 
Moses' theophany. Likewise Jean-Luc Marion, in his desire to speak of "God without being", suggests 
that "Being says nothing about God that God cannot immediately reject. Being, even and especially in 
306 `The Living God and the Endangered Reality of Life', The Otherness of God, 245 307 David Tracy, `Response to Adriaan Peperzak on Transcendence', ed. Peperzak, Ethics as First Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas For Philosophy, Literature and Religion, 195 308 God Without Being, 73 
309 The God Who May Be, 22 310 See Jean Greisch, `Divine Selfhood and the Postmodern Subject', Questioning God, 251. 311 The God Who May Be, 22 312 The God Who May Be, 1 
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Exod. 3: 14, says nothing about God, or says nothing determining about him. , 
313 As such, Marion, in 
his own way, exhibits a resistance to conceptual restraints upon God which debilitate divine 
inventiveness. God always exceeds my efforts to posses God. God is, for Marion, thinkable "only 
under the figure of the unthinkable, but of an unthinkable that exceeds as much what we cannot think 
as what we can s314 
The `unthinkableness' of God, for Marion, forces us to erase "the idolatrous quotation marks" 
around `God' in favour of "the very God that no mark of knowledge can demarcate. " In doing so, 
Marion substitutes the idol `God' in favour of the caution of the Gxd who "crosses out our thought 
because he saturates it; better, he enters into our thought only in obliging it to criticize itself . 99315 In 
other words - unlike the Jewish tradition of writing `G-d' which suggests absence or silence 
in the 
prohibition against speaking or writing the Holy name writing316 - Gxd conveys the erasure of our 
idolatrous thinking about God. Gxd gives himself as a gift to be thought but under Gxd's admonition of 
our thought. As such, in place of the `God' who we struggle with for `being-for-itself and ultimately 
put to death, we encounter the God who gives himself to be struggled with, as Jacob struggled at 
Peni'el, yet who ultimately exceeds what I can `get my hands on'. 
In exceeding as much what we cannot think as what we can think, God even surpasses our 
declarations of what is impossible. Kierkegaard will emphasise this for us through God's prevailing 
over what humanity believes is impossible regarding the forgiveness of sins. It is this sense of divine 
possibility in excess of what we say is impossible - even for God - that is the secret to the paradox of 
our forgiveness. God's revelation of'ehyeh asher 'ehyeh - as a promise of fidelity - expresses God's 
relational deliverance of a given people, and the metaphysical presence of the divine per se. But does 
this non-ontological reading indemnify the absolute against all metaphysical speculation or inquiry? Is 
this the point of severance between faith and philosophical theology? The Hebrew Bible, Howard 
Wettstein has argued, does not impart us with a doctrine of God: "The person closest to such things, 
after all, was Moses, and he never got a good look [Exodus 33: 23. I discuss this allegory in Chapter 
Three], even a straightforward statement of God's name . 
017 As such, Wettstein suggests, Neo-Platonic 
and Aristotelian philosophical theology signifies an incursion of Hellenistic thought, particularly from 
Philo and Maimonides, into the alien territory of biblical/rabbinic Judaism. In other words, Moses did 
not speak Greek, or more importantly, God certainly did not speak Greek to Moses. But more than 
linguistic primacy, the issue for Wettstein centres upon the abstractions of Greek philosophy against a 
Jewish tradition in which "The primary religious works speak of God impressionistically... Their 
imagery is strikingly anthropomorphic. "318 
313 God Without Being, 45 
314 Ibid., 46 
315 God Without Being, 46 
316 In the Hebraic tradition the holy name of God, or `Sacred Tetragrammaton', YHVH is also rendered 
unpronounceable. This is a silence which originates in a reverent prohibition against speaking the name 
of God -a prohibition which has become a necessity due to absence of vowel sounds. See Richard Elliot Friedman, The Hidden Face of God, 139 317 `Doctrine', Faith and Philosophy, Vol. 14, No. 4, October 1997,436. I am grateful to Dr. Daniel Rrhold for drawing my attention to this article. 31 Wettstein, `Doctrine', 423 
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There is a danger, however, that a recovery from onto-theology by virtue of a return to a pre- 
metaphysical Hebraic understanding may result in an inverse variation of what Moltmann calls the 
`God' of "anthropotheism" - as much the `God' of Feuerbach as the `God' of 
Aristotle - whereby "It is 
not God who created man in his image but man who creates God in his. "319 But that is only the case 
if 
anthropomorphic imagery pertaining to God is ontologised: taken as describing God in Godself. 
Perhaps it is more suitable to identify such imagery as motivated from an anthropocentrism: that is, a 
desire to speak of God in terms of the human-divine relationship without denying the inscrutable, 
though not in all senses unrevealable, mysterium of the biblical God. As such, when Moses asks for the 
divine name he is given a name which reveals what God is to Israel and conceals an elusive enigma as 
to what God is to Godself: a refusal to disclose which forms a powerful reminder that God exceeds 
humanity, lest one believe that God is only what God is to me. It is the loss of the mysterium in Exodus 
3: 14 in deference to the exclusively anthropocentric reading of the divine name as God's name for me 
which constitutes a further danger. "Everything that is incomprehensible does not cease to exist", 
writes Pasca1320 - the spirit of the enigma within the Holy Name. 
Surely in some agreement with this Pascalian sentiment, Kierkegaard is likewise rather 
mystified by the `I Am Who I am': "This is an analogy to the metaphysical point that the highest 
principles for all thought cannot be proved but only tautologically paraphrased: introverted infinity... 
in this case, then, anything other than tautology would be rubbish"321 But Kierkegaard does not seek 
salvation in metaphysics. Instead Kierkegaard is concerned with the self's relation to God, albeit a God 
the nature of whose absence has not been fully recognised by modernity, as shall be examined below. It 
is to Kierkegaard's apparently anthropocentric evaluation of the God-relationship that attention now 
turns. 
Kierkegaard's Infinite Qualitative Difference and the `Death of God' 
Kierkegaard would already have been familiar with some expression of the `hard saying' of the 'death 
of God'. Hegel had already identified the relation between loss of 'self and loss of 'God' in terms of 
the `Unhappy Consciousness'. The `Unhappy Consciousness', as it experiences "the conscious loss of 
itself and the alienation of its knowledge about itself', expresses its anguish in the "hard saying that 
`God is dead'. 99322 This is the expression of an "infinite grief' existing historically as "the feeling that 
`God Himself is dead, ' upon which the religion of more recent times rests; the same feeling that Pascal 
expressed in, so to speak, empirical form: 'la nature est telle qu'elle marque partout un Dieu perdu et 
dans l'homme et hors de l'homme. '[`Nature is such that it signifies everywhere a lost God both within 
and outside man' - Pensees, (441)]"323 This hard saying, first announced on Golgotha, was to become 
319 The Crucified God, 251 
320 pensees 230 (430b), p. 101 321 JP 4: 4898 / Pap. X4 A 480 
322 The Phenomenology of Spirit, VII, 752, p. 454-455. Kierkegaard may have been acquainted with the 
phrase from his own Lutheran tradition. The familiar Lutheran hymn declares the death of God with a 
sense of eventual triumph: `O great distress! / God himself lies dead. / On the cross he died, / and by doing so he has won for us the realm of heaven' (Johannes Rist, 1641). 323 Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, 190 
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the dark saying of the twentieth century. But for Hegel, in the nineteenth century, this saying signifies 
God's overcoming of the self-alienation posited in the split between Father and Son. It 
is as Spirit 
[Geist] that God comes back to himself in universal self-consciousness 
324 God himself has died. But 
effectively, as Schöndorf explains, "One could expand on this sentence and say he has 
died unto 
himself. The pure selfless abstract substance is negated so that it can become self. As substance 
in 
opposition to and opposite the subject, God no longer exists. "325 In mediation with creation, 
God 
effectively ceases to exist as the Wholly Other of the alienated Unhappy Consciousness. 
From the Hegelian perspective, Kierkegaard's avowal of the infinite qualitative difference 
between God and humanity consigns him to just this primal melancholy estrangement of the Unhappy 
Consciousness. 26 In a sense, Kierkegaard's writings embrace and transfigure this condemnation 
327 By 
erroneously claiming to have reconciled estrangement, Hegelianism actually re-enforces estrangement 
in its most unconscious form - hence Kierkegaard's writings encourage the recognition of, or will to, 
despair as essentially constituting a rise in the consciousness of Spirit. Hegelianism, by negating this 
estrangement, has contributed to the death of God - an implication Kierkegaard sees particularly as 
it is 
manifest in contemporary Danish Christendom. In contrast to the Hegelian reconciliation of Creator 
and creation, Kierkegaard's insistence upon the infinite qualitative difference between God and 
humanity serves to compound and emphasise the abyssal consciousness of the otherness of God and the 
estrangement of humanity. As such, while Christ, who for Danish Hegelianism - particularly 
represented by Kierkegaard's former theological tutor Hans Martensen328 - embodies the doctrine of 
mediation, he is represented by Johannes Climacus as the paradox: the living contradiction between 
divinity and humanity. 329 
324 Phenomenology of Spirit, § 779 f, p. 470 f 325 Harold Schöndorf, `The Othering (Becoming Other) and Reconciliation of God in Hegel's 
Phenomenology of Spirit', ed. Jon Stewart, The Phenomenology of Spirit Reader: Critical and 
Interpretive Essays, 395 
326 "Like Hegel's unhappy consciousness, Kierkegaard sees the absolute difference - the unbridgeable 
gulf - between man's particular, individual consciousness and the Absolute". David L. Rozema, `Hegel 
and Kierkegaard On Conceiving the Absolute', History of Philosophy Quarterly, Volume 9, Number 2, 
Aril 1992,215. 
32F From this perspective Kierkegaard and Hegel represent inversions of one another: "What Hegel 
regards as self-realization Kierkegaard sees as self-alienation, and what Hegel interprets as self- 
estrangement is for Kierkegaard self-fulfilment. Conversely, what Kierkegaard views as authentic 
selfhood Hegel believes to be inauthentic selfhood, and what Kierkegaard sees as inauthenticity is for 
Hegel authenticity. " Mark C. Taylor, Journeys to Selfhood, 14 328 See Jon Stewart, Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel Reconsidered, 341-355. Stewart's book identifies 
Kierkegaard's polemic as directed towards contemporary Danish Hegelians more so than Hegel himself. 
329 «Kierkegaard's Absolute is not Hegel's Absolute... unlike Hegel's Absolute, Kierkegaard's God is ineffable; incomprehensible; inconceivable... Why could there not be an `other' opposed to Reason itself- call it the `Paradox? "' Rozema, `Hegel and Kierkegaard On Conceiving the Absolute', 215-216. This being said, Rozema also questions the extent to which Hegel actually did regard the Absolute as a 
concept: "He often says that Reason is as much an action as an entity; as much a subject as an object; 
as much a method as a result. " (216). Likewise Daniel Berthold-Bond argues that "In may ways, Hegel is as opposed to `reason' as Kierkegaard is - to the sort of reason which sees itself in struggle against faith. In this sense, Kierkegaard is highly misleading when he plays on Hegel's `advocacy' of reason as though Hegel did not himself initiate a searching critique of reason. " `Lunar Musings? An Investigation 
of Hegel's and Kierkegaard's Portraits of Despair', Religious Studies 34,56. Contra Mark C. Taylor, Berthold-Bond suggests that "Hegel knows full well that no amount of logic can actually save the 
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Hegel's death of God, which proposes to overcome alienation through Spirit's becoming 
conscious of itself in history, implies the death of a God who is radically other to humanity - an 
otherness which Kierkegaard sees as an inviolable implication of human sinfulness 
330 It is, however, 
perhaps Kierkegaardian alienation more so than Hegelian reconciliation which best describes the 
progression of late nineteenth/early twentieth century western European history. `God is dead' has 
become a dark saying, an expression of humanity's distance from God - whether in Nietzsche's 
forsaking of God or more recently in God's apparent forsaking of humanity in the Holocaust. Of 
course, as Schöndorf observes, "Hegel probably did not count on the fact that the further history of the 
thought of the 'death of God' would lead rather in the direction of an unhappy consciousness instead of 
necessarily to a resurrection and reconciliation since to us today the night of the I=I seems more 
abysmal than we would sometimes like. 9031 
For now one must return to the nineteenth century and the anatomy of Kierkegaard's infinite 
qualitative abyss. The notion of the infinite qualitative difference clearly opposed the Hegelian doctrine 
of mediation, but the phrase also evokes broader contemporary connotations. As well as dissenting 
against Christendom's prostitution to the ideals of Danish Hegelianism, Kierkegaard also found himself 
in the midst of a definite theological crisis of historicity. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing famously identified 
that between "the accidental truths of history" and the "necessary truths of reason" there lay a 
personally uncrossable "broad ugly ditch! 9332 -a phrase with some bearing upon Kierkegaard's 
deliberately exaggerated infinite chasmic abyss. Hegel had also confessed in his diary something of the 
modern suspicion towards the contemporary relevance of a historically founded religion: 
In Swabia they say of something which had long since happened: it's so long 
ago that soon it won't be true anymore. Thus Christ died for our sins so long ago 
that soon it won't be true anymore 333 
This unassailable abyss intensified in 1835 when David Strauss published his demystifying Life of 
Jesus in which the `Jesus of history'/ `Christ of faith' debate reached a zenith. Notably Strauss's book 
along with the publication of Feuerbach's The Essence of Christianity generated significant intellectual 
unhappy consciousness, that such salvation rests with a decisive choice, a leap, which in a positive 
sense remains a beyond' for all logic. " (57) 330 Ultimately the difference is that whereas Kierkegaard's interest concerns the individual life of faith, 
"In Hegel the death of God is understood not only in the context of religious piety, as it had been 
earlier, but in the context of a philosophy of history... The religious intensity is transformed by Hegel into a moment of world history as the point at which spirit is estranged from itself. " Robert P. 
Scharlemann, `Introduction', Theology At The End Of The Century, 5 
331 'The Othering (Becoming Other) and Reconciliation of God in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit', 
400. On balance one must qualify that the death of God is not encountered as such an anxious abyss for 
all thinkers. Altizer, as Mark C. Taylor reads him, is effecting a recent Hegelian critique of the Kierkegaardian sense of God as Wholly Other apparent in twentieth century neo-orthodox theology. For Altizer, the God who is Wholly Other dies and "empties itself into the historical and cultural 
process in such a way that the absolute is totally present here and now. " (`Postmodem Times', The Otherness of God, 183). If Taylor is correct in detecting a Hegelian grand narrative in his theology then Altizer is effectively situated in a distinctly modern, as opposed to postmodern paradigm. Altizer can thus be read as presenting a desire to resurrect a more Hegelian optimism in order to exorcise the Unhappy Consciousness of the death of God. 332 See Rae, By Faith Transformed, 80-85. 333 Dokumente za Hegele Entwicklung, ed. J. Hoffmeister [Stuttgart: Fr. Frommann, 1936, p. 3581. Cited in Eberhard Jüngel, God as the Mystery of the World, 76. 
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disquiet in Denmark - an unease which involved certain 
doctoral candidates being refused examination 
after betraying an affinity to such precarious ideas. Indeed even the theologian Hans Martensen 
felt 
obliged to moderate his Hegelianism for fear of being identified in complicity with such allegedy un- 
Christian views. 34 
Yet Kierkegaard, as Arbaugh observes, "remarks that the freethinkers are less muddled in 
interpreting Christianity, than its orthodox defenders, and that they are at least honest in calling it myth 
and poetry, while the latter betray their own scepticism in their lives . 11335 In particular, Feuerbach 
(the 
`fire-brook'), despite his questionable personal weakness, "can serve for Christians as a purifying fire" 
[I1d Beek] 336 Although Kierkegaard's infinite qualitative difference between humanity and God can be 
read as reacting against the grain of Feuerbach's identification of theology and anthropology, his own 
relation to the earnestness of Feuerbach's project is less reactionary than that of the general intellectual 
establishment. While he is himself concerned not to be identified with Feuerbach et al, it is possible, 
Kierkegaard suggests, to receive "ab hoste consilium" [advice from the enemy] from one who may be a 
"malitieus damon" [evil daimon] 337 Although each assesses the phenomena of Christianity from 
differing perspectives and with divergent motives, Kierkegaard sees in Feuerbach someone likewise 
capable of slicing into religion and exposing an ingrained illusion. The fundamental distinction resides 
in the fact that what Feuerbach identifies as the illusion of Christianity is identified by Kierkegaard as 
the insidious delusion of Christendom. As such, Feuerbach's critique of Christianity, despite its 
essential qualitative conflation, can be translated as an expose of Christendom which itself serves as an 
ironic reminder of the need to insist upon the infinite qualitative difference between humanity and God. 
According to Kierkegaard, "Feuerbach is saying: No, wait a minute - if you are going to be allowed to 
go on living as you are living, then you also have to admit that you are not Christians... it is wrong of 
established Christendom to say that Feuerbach is attacking Christianity; it is not true, he is attacking the 
Christians by demonstrating that their lives do not correspond to the teachings of Christianity. 99338 
Consequently, as Arbaugh explains, "For Kierkegaard, for whom mere playing at Christianity is more 
spiritually dangerous than heresy or schism, and for whom hypocrisy is anathema, this expose by 
Feuerbach came as welcome support from an unexpected quarter. "339 
A similarly unexpected solidarity with Feuerbach is confessed more recently in the theology 
of Karl Barth - with his own insistence upon an avowedly Kierkegaardian infinite qualitative 
difference. This may come as some surprise since, with his insistence upon the primacy of divine 
revelation in direct contradiction of Feuerbach's anthropocentrism, Barth apparently "represents the 
complete antithesis in religious thought to Ludwig Feuerbach. s340 As H. Richard Niebuhr succinctly 
states, "The great disagreement is that Feuerbach can so believe in man and Barth cannot; this is to no 
334 See Jon Stewart, Kierkegaard's Relation To Hegel Reconsidered, 62 and 140. 335 George E. Arbaugh, `Kierkegaard and Feuerbach', Kierkegaardiana XI, 8-9. See JP 1: 546 / Pap. XI' A 70; JP 3: 3530 / Pap. X5 A 62. 336 Arbaugh, `Kierkegaard and Feuerbach', 9 337 JP VI: 6523 / Pap. X2 A 162 338 JP VI: 6523 / Pap. X2 A 162 339 Arbaugh, `Kierkegaard and Feuerbach', 9 340 H Richard Niebuhr, Foreword, The Essence of Christianity, vii 
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small extent the difference between the nineteenth century and the twentieth . 
041 Despite this 
theological and historical chasm, Feuerbach represents the dangers of taking anthropology as a starting 
point for religious thought. As a vilified embodiment of this orientation, Feuerbach can serve as a 
corrective for the very thought he expounds -a corrective which may derive further intensity from the 
anthropological disfigurations of the early twentieth century. Man is a starting point which it has 
become difficult to believe in. However, this should not obscure Barth's admiration for Feuerbach: a 
philosopher Barth regarded as intensely occupied with the problem of theology - "although his love 
was an unhappy one. "342 In fact, commenting upon Feuerbach's words, Barth observes that "`theology 
long ago became anthropology, ' ever since Protestantism itself, and especially Luther, emphatically 
shifted the interest from what God is in himself to what God is for man. Its course of development runs 
uninterruptedly in such a direction that man more and more renounces God and addresses himself. "343 
It is in Lutheranism itself that Christianity finds its path towards the internal monologue of theology's 
dissolution by anthropology. Feuerbach, Barth and Kierkegaard are in some agreement that the 
absolute difference between God and humanity has been compromised within Protestantism itself. As 
such, in testifying to the Protestant transition towards reflection upon the self, all three share the open 
secret of the dissolution of Christianity into modernity -a consumption which has occurred from 
within. 344 
While this tendency has been mutually discerned, Kierkegaard and Barth are emphatic that the 
movement which Feuerbach embraces must be resisted in the strongest terms. Hence the apparently 
mutual prominence of the infinite qualitative difference between humanity and God as `Wholly Other' 
in both Barth and Kierkegaard. Nevertheless, it was, Barth confesses, only around 1919 that 
Kierkegaard made a profound entry into his thought "at the critical juncture between the first and 
second editions of my Commentary on Romans, and from that time onwards he appeared in an 
important role in my literary utterances .,, 
345 Of all Barth's writings, Kierkegaard resonates most 
prominently through the invocations of `the Moment'346 and the individual'347 throughout this 
commentary. Greater than these, however, is a discernment of the Kierkegaardian abyss, as Barth 
reveals in the preface to the second edition of Der Römerbrief (1921): "If I have a `system', it is 
limited to a recognition of what Kierkegaard called the 'infinite qualitative distinction' between time 
and eternity, and to my regarding this as possessing negative as well as positive significance. "348 The 
341 Foreword, The Essence of Christianity, viii 342 Karl Barth, An Introductory Essay, The Essence of Christianity, x 343 An Introductory Essay, The Essence of Christianity, xix. Charles Taylor also relates how the 
particularly "Protestant culture of introspection becomes secularized as a form of confessional 
autobiography" which in turn contributes to the formation of the secular modem novel. Sources of the Self, 184 
344 "Protestantism has lived with the crisis longest and most intensely, lived with it, that is, as an internal rather than an external cataclysm. This is because Protestant thought has always been 
particularly open to the spirit of modernity. " Peter L. Berger, A Rumour ofAngels, 22 as 'A Thank You and a Bow. Kierkegaard's Reveille', Canadian Journal of Theology, Vol. XI (1965), No. 1,4 
346 See for example The Epistle to the Romans, 116; 497-499 347 "It is precisely we who proclaim the right of the individual, the eternal worth of each single one (Kierkegaard! ), by announcing that his soul is lost before God and, in him, is dissolved - and saved. " Ibid., 116 
348 The Epistle to the Romans, 10 
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revelation of this Kierkegaardian abyss is clearly an important moment in the initiation into faith: 
"In 
Jesus the communion of God begins with a rebuff, with the exposure of a vast chasm, with the clear 
revelation of a great stumbling-block. s349 
However, while Barth proceeds here to identify this stumbling-block as the Kierkegaardian 
offence of the infinite qualitative difference, it also begins to become clear that although Barth may 
begin with the Kierkegaardian abyss he is reticent to conclude with it. Barth describes himself as 
graduating decisively from what he called the "school of Kierkegaard". In his address in Copenhagen 
on April 19`' 1963 upon receiving the Sonning Prize for outstanding contributions to European culture, 
Barth takes the opportunity to account for his relation to "the Danish Lutheran". In this retrospective, 
the renaissance man who had embodied the spirit of authentic Christianity's critique of apostate 
Christendom came to be seen as implicated in the very modem anthropocentrism he intended to vilify. 
Barth increasingly sensed the uneasy absence of congregation and church in Kierkegaard's thought and 
thereby developed a deep suspicion of the "holy individualism (Heils-individualismus)"350 in which 
Kierkegaard apparently protracted the Lutheran renunciation of theology's `God in himself' in 
deference to the monologue of anthropology's self-address. Ultimately Barth concluded that he could 
not attack "man-centred Christainity as such, from a Kierkegaardian basis, because he himself had not 
attacked, but rather fortified it immensely. s351 Kierkegaard became nothing more or less than "a teacher 
into whose school every theologian must go once. Woe to him who has missed it! So long as he does 
not remain in or return to it! 9352 Barth warns how those who have failed to graduate from 
Kierkegaard's school are captivated by his abyss; it is as if his "infinite qualitative difference between 
God and man, with all its consequences, has eaten itself right into them. "353 Accordingly, Barth 
moderated the infinite qualitative difference in his own writings to the extent that, as Soe observes, it 
would be too stringent to claim that Barth's doctrine is taken directly from Kierkegaard since it "is 
demonstrably influenced both by Platonism and neo-Kantianism. s354 
Just as Niebuhr had historically distanced Barth from Feuerbach, so Barth's last word on the 
matter should perhaps be his summary that "Kierkegaard was bound more closely to the nineteenth 
century than we at the time wanted to believe. "355 This stands as some reproach to the so-called 
`Kierkegaard Renaissance' in the neo-orthodox, existential and dialectical theologies of the twentieth 
century which appear to suggest that, on the contrary, "Kierkegaard was, somehow, born before his 
time, a prophet of the crises of the twentieth century, particularly with regard to the mutual alienation 
of Church and State, the advent of what was called `mass society' and the consequent sense of isolation 
of the individual. "356 Finally Barth sees that, as a weapon against the malaise of the twentieth century, 
349 The Epistle to the Romans, 98 
350 'A Thank You and a Bow: Kierkegaard's Reveille', 6 351 `A Thank You and a Bow: Kierkegaard's Reveille', 6 352 'A Thank You and a Bow: Kierkegaard's Reveille', 7 353 Barth, 'Kierkegaard and the Theologians', Canadian Journal of Theology, Vol. XIII (1967), 64 354 N. H. Soe, `Karl Barth', ed. Niels Thulstrup and Marie Mikulovä Thulstrup, Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana Volume 8: the Legacy and Interpretation of Kierkegaard, 225 355 'A thank You and a Bow: Kierkegaard's Reveille', 6 356 George Pattison, Kierkegaard, Religion and the Nineteenth-Century Crisis of Culture, 177 However, Pattison asks the question, "Is the nineteenth century's ignoring of Kierkegaard perhaps yet another of the many myths that have bedevilled the reception of Kierkegaard? " (178). Habib Malik's 
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Kierkegaard cannot be fully transplanted from the battleground of the nineteenth. Bearing 
in mind 
Kierkegaard's relation to the cultural aporia of his time - Hegel, Feuerbach, Strauss et al - 
is it 
therefore anathema to assert that "Kierkegaard belonged more to the twentieth century than to the 
nineteenth"7357 Is it not rather more accurate to declare that theologians who appropriate such thought 
simply "deliver a nineteenth-century answer to a twentieth-century dilemma"? 
358 Or is Kierkegaard's 
anthropocentrism - dialectically tempered by his infinite qualitative abyss - more appropriate 
for a 
post-ontotheology? 
The death of God clearly comes to mean something subtly different for Hegel, Kierkegaard, and 
Nietzsche respectively. "Though anticipated in Hegel's speculative philosophy and Kierkegaard's 
attack on Christendom and proclaimed by Nietzsche's madman, " Mark C. Taylor claims, "the death of 
God is not concretely actualized until the emergence of the twentieth-century industrial state. " 
9 But 
prior to this emergence, Hegel's "hard saying" also resounded with a Feuerbachian accent: "the 
identification of divine and human natures means that God is human nature objectified; man's full 
appropriation of his own nature becomes the death of God. 99360 Man becomes his own object in the 
correlation of theology and anthropology and the Wholly Other vanishes. Once exposed as an illusion, 
God is ripe for a fatal iconoclasm. As nineteenth century Europe, trembling with revolution, builds the 
scaffolds of Regicide which hallowed the ground in which the grave of `God' has been dug, 
Kierkegaard's infinite qualitative difference between despairing humanity and the Wholly Other God 
appears to show him desperately enforcing an impassable gulf over which such an advancing atheism 
cannot cross. 361 Yet despite this apparently atheistic crisis in theology and philosophy, Kierkegaard was 
emphatic that "To kill God is what man cannot do, what he can do is to kill the thought of Him. "362 
Prior to Nietzsche's iconoclasm and the twentieth century post-mortem of `God', Kierkegaard had 
importantly already asserted an infinite qualitative difference between God and the "thought of God" - 
a difference which twentieth century inheritors of the so-called `death of God' have made a fertile one. 
Whilst Feuerbach proclaimed the identification of theology and anthropology, Kierkegaard 
emphatically and repeatedly asserted the infinite qualitative difference between humanity and divinity 
as defying the identification of God with the self. And yet, seeing the self s implicit dependence upon 
God, Kierkegaard warned that, "To murder God is the most horrible form of suicide. "363 For 
Kierkegaard, the self is dependent upon God to the extent that to "kill the thought of God" would be 
tantamount to obliterating the self 364 In this sense, he anticipated that the `death of God' was 
extensive book Receiving Soren Kierkegaard: the Early Impact and Transmission of His Thought also 
provides an important corrective to this impression. 57 George Pattison, Kierkegaard, Religion and the Nineteenth-Century Crisis of Culture, 177 58 Harvey Cox, The Secular City, 262. 359 Erring, 6 
360 Stephen Crites, In the Twilight of Christendom: Hegel vs. Kierkegaard on Faith and History, 56 361 cue major responsibility for this new atheism is for SK in the Hegellian philosophy, and the radical 
symptom was above all Feuerbach. " Cornelio Fabro, `Atheism', Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana Volume 
5,271 
362 `The Anxiety of Presumption', CD, 69 363 '. The Anxiety of Presumption', CD, 70 364 John Elrod is right to identify that: "For Kierkegaard, as for Feuerbach, the self and religion are so intimately related that an analysis of one is impossible apart from an analysis of the other. " `Feuerbach 
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synonymous with the suicidal `death of self . Once `God' 
has been killed, invigorated by the magnitude 
of his deed, homo hominis dens (`man is the god of man'). But, ultimately unable 
to sustain himself on 
his throne, this corrupts into the ignominy of homo hominis lupus ('man is a wolf to man 
). 365 
Yet does the infinite qualitative difference successfully immunise the thought of 
God against 
contamination by hard saying of the death of God? Or does Kierkegaard 
inadvertently testify to its 
inescapable veracity? According to Gabriel Vahanian, Kierkegaard's `infinite qualitative 
difference' 
and Nietzsche's `God is dead' both inevitably succumb to the same conclusion. 
Both are mutually 
resistant to immanentism; both imply that "no ladder leads from man to 
God... that there is no identity 
of substance between man and God, and, accordingly, that the problem of 
human existence is 
independent of the problem of God. "366 Though of course Kierkegaard strove precisely 
to return the 
problem of human existence to the problem of God, it can be argued that 
Kierkegaard fails to defy the 
cultural implications of the `death of God', and even that he implicates himself at the 
heart of the 
lacuna. "For Kierkegaard, Christianity is dead", Vahanian alleges, "so dead that Kierkegaard would not 
call himself a Christian. "367 
Yet this assumption seems to base itself on a conflation of `Christianity' and `Christendom' 
in 
Kierkegaard's thought - two ideas between which there is an absolute 
difference. "Christendom 
is... the betrayal of Christianity. "368 In fact as Kierkegaard states explicitly, "I believe it is an 
overstatement to say that Christianity in our time has been completely abolished. No, Christianity 
is 
still present and in its truth, but as a teaching, as doctrine. What has been abolished and forgotten, 
however (and this can be said without exaggeration), is existing as a Christian". 
369 Kierkegaard 
detected a more insidious and covert atheism in the inauthentic theatre of the Danish bourgeois Church. 
In a world where being born a Christian was synonymous with being born a Dane, Kierkegaard strove 
to reintroduce Christianity into Christendom. 370 Furthermore, Kierkegaard's reluctance in identifying 
himself as a Christian was not due so much to the decay of Christianity as the rigorous height at which 
he esteemed its authentic expression. His position was one to which he attached the military phrase 
"armed neutrality": "Naturally, it [the phrase "armed neutrality"] cannot mean that I want to leave 
undecided the question of whether or not I myself am a Christian, am pursuing it, fighting for it, 
praying about it, and hoping before God that I am that. What I have wanted to prevent and want to 
and Kierkegaard on the Self', Journal of Religion, Volume 56 (1976), 356. However, the crucial 
distinction is that while Feuerbach subsumes theology under the self, Kierkegaard perceives that the 
self can only become itself before God as initially Wholly Other. 365 Vahanian, The Death of God, 230-1 366 The Death of God, 210 367 Vahanian, The Death of God, 210 368 `The Fatherland', March 30,1855, AUC, 37 
369 Armed Neutrality and An Open Letter, 34. 370 Kierkegaard's modem problem, it should be noted, was not entirely a new problem. As Stephen 
Crites explains, the institutionalisation of Christianity has, from its Constantinian inception, always 
appeared incommensurable to some Christians. "It is, to be sure, no accident that this wedding of 
church to empire coincided almost exactly with the first strong impetus of the monastic movement: 
only when `the world' professed Christianity did large numbers of earnest Christians find it necessary 
to separate themselves off from it, and from the main body of the church as well. " In the Twilight of 
Christendom, 17. However, Kierkegaard's writings reveal a thoroughly Protestant suspicion towards 
the evasions implicit in the flight from world to monastery. He is interested in what it means to be a 
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prevent now is any sort of impression that I am a Christian to any extraordinary degree, a remarkable 
kind of Christian. 99371 
It is often supposed that Kierkegaard prompted a style of `modern theology' in response to the 
capitulation of Christendom, but one also founded, as Altizer claims, "more deeply in response to the 
advent of a reality that was wholly divorced from the world of faith, or, as Kierkegaard saw, a reality 
that was created by the negation of faith. s372 Altizer alleges that, "Kierkegaard knew the death of God 
only as an objective reality; indeed, it was `objectivity' that was created by the death of God... But in 
Kierkegaard's time the death of God had not yet become a subjective reality. "373 For Kierkegaard, the 
inner life of faith as subjectivity consolidated itself against a nineteenth century culture of increasing 
divine absence. Although facing extinction in the world, it was still possible for God to take refuge in 
the hearts of individuals. It is an inner life which derived significant invigorating dialectical tension 
from an understanding of God as `Wholly Other': a faith which testifies to the opposition of God to the 
world. It is precisely this enmity which Christendom had forgotten: "God is man's most redoubtable 
enemy, thy mortal enemy; He would that thou shouldst die, die unto the world, He hates precisely that 
wherein thou naturally hast thy life, to which thou dost cling with all thy joy in living. " 374 
According to Altizer, however, whilst `faith as subjectivity' was feasible in Kierkegaard's 
time, it is no longer credible in the recent climate of the full incarnation of God's death. Much of the 
tension of subjectivity has been dispelled. As Alasdair Maclntyre explains, the self-consciously 
polemical atheism of the nineteenth and early twentieth century has increasingly deferred to the figure 
of "the secularized unbeliever, who sees no point in actually denying the existence of God because he 
never saw any point in affirming it in the first place. 075 As such, much of the dialectical vitality of 
faith as subjectivity is extinguished as, in Altizer's terms, the `death of God' also becomes increasingly 
a subjective as well as objective reality. Consequently, Christendom has actually been demystified - 
though not quite as Kierkegaard would have envisaged. This separation of Christianity from `world' 
occurs more from the culminated process of secularisation which Kierkegaard discerned than from the 
kind of dialectical awakening from this process of decline that he himself sought to provoke. The 
secularism that in Kierkegaard's day was not conscious of itself as such, today sees little reason to 
question itself as such. But what becomes of Christianity now that Christendom has been abolished in 
the very secularism Kierkegaard urged it to resist? Perhaps surprisingly, as Harvey Cox explains, "the 
process of secularization in Europe has alleviated Kierkegaard's problem... More and more, `being a 
Christian' is a conscious choice rather than a matter of birth or inertia. The change can hardly be 
viewed as unfortunate"376 In other words, secularisation evacuates Christianity to the periphery where, 
at least in its most Kierkegaardian theology, it is most comfortable and incisive. Perhaps the twist in the 
Christian in modernity: the modem world must itself be recognised as a sufficient desert of temptation 
which must be confronted. 371 AN, 33 
372 Altizer, `Theology and the Death of God', Radical Theology and the Death of God, 
102-3 
373 Altizer, 'Theology and the Death of God', 104 374 `The Instant', No. 5, July 27,1855, AUC, 157 375 Alasdair Maclntyre, `The Debate About God', The Religious Significance of Atheism, 
15 
376 The Secular City, 104 
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tale is that Kierkegaard has been revealed as some kind of ironic prophet. Christendom has died, and so 
Christianity lives. 
While the `otherness' of Christianity alleviates to some extent Kierkegaard's problem of `becoming a 
Christian in Christendom', the subjective tension of the choice of `becoming a Christian in the world', 
of the dilemma between `spirit' and `spiritlessness', still persists since: "Every creature is at its best in 
its own element, can properly live in its own element, the fish cannot live on the land, nor the bird in 
the water - and to require spirit to live in the environment of spiritlessness means death". 377 The 
imagery employed here in `The Midnight Cry' is reminiscent of Johannes Climacus's descriptions of 
`spiritual trial' [Anfergtelse] in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. In this account, the infinite 
qualitative difference is perceived with such horror that the person before God is like a fish trapped on 
dry land, or a bird caught in a cage. 378 Such Lutheran Anfechtung is just what Cupitt has called the 
"spiritually crushing over-againstnessi379 of the Wholly Other God which for many constitutes 
sufficient reason to also embrace the `death of God' as subjectivity. 
However, I shall contend that this spiritually crushing view of God as Wholly Other should 
not finally be taken for the God who is spoken of in Kierkegaard's writings. In fact, Kierkegaard's 
writings, while taking the reader to the very brink of this abyss, precisely recoil from the vision of God 
as "infinitely sublime [uendelig opheiet]" - recalling the earlier important "SUBDIVSIO" of the God- 
relationship. Nevertheless, it has been alleged that to be in a Kierkegaardian relation to God inevitably 
means to be just such an irremediably Unhappy Consciousness, mutually alienated from the world as 
well as from the Wholly Other. As such, Sartre describes Kierkegaard as the "martyr of interiority"38° 
who, "whatever he did, acted within the limits of what Hegel had called the unhappy consciousness' . 3s1 
Indeed, Kierkegaard's writings do apparently give the reader many opportunities for concluding that 
faith as subjectivity entails nothing but an alienating and archaic `fear of the Lord'. Such, according to 
Friedman, is the exalted subjectivity of the Abrahamic `Knight of Faith' in Fear and Trembling - 
someone who by forsaking creation in order to follow the voice of the Wholly Other, also "bears 
witness to the `death of God"': 
Kierkegaard's `knight of faith' must choose between God and creation. He rejects society and 
culture for the lonely relationship of the `Single One' to God, thereby losing any check on the 
reality of the voice that addresses him. In its very affirmation of faith, as a result, Kierkegaard's concept of the `knight of faith' is a consequence and an expression of the `death 
of God': it entails the loss of faith in the universal order and in the society that purports to be founded on it; the rejection of creation - the world and society - as an obstacle to the relationship with God; and the paradoxical `leap of faith' that is necessary to attain any sort of contact with God 382 
37 `The Midnight Cry', April 9,1855, AUC, 65 378 CUP9 432 
379 Cupitt, Taking Leave of God, 8 380 Sie, 'Kierkegaard: The Singular Universal', ed. Harold Bloom, Modern Critical Views: Soren Kierkegaard, 75 [originally from Sartre's Existentialism and Marxism] 391 `Kierkegaard: The Singular 382 Friedman, Problematic Rebel, 457 
Universal', 77 
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Such is the vision of an arcane Kierkegaardian subjectivity which also alarmed Buber; what 
he called Kierkegaard's `religious doctrine of loneliness' . 383 The authentic God-relation, Buber 
counters, must not demand the self-alienation of the `Single One' through subjectivity's renunciation of 
the other: "Creation is not a hurdle on the road to God, it is the road itself. , 
384 But to read the Abraham 
of Johannes de Silentio as Hegel's Abrahamic `Unhappy Consciousness' is to overlook the exceptional 
singularity of Abraham in Fear and Trembling. The immensity of Abraham's temptation depends upon 
the esteem for the universal. Furthermore, if the universal was irrevocably renounced by the God 
relationship then Abraham would never have returned to it. The point is that God's command to 
sacrifice Isaac is a suspension of the ethical and not its irreversible nihilation. Abraham experiences a 
`repetition' in which the universal order is restored and transfigured. `By faith Abraham did not 
renounce his claim upon Isaac, but by faith he got Isaac. "385 Abraham returns to creation. If God is 
irremediably Wholly Other then one is irrevocably consigned to the Unhappy Consciousness: a 
permanently alienated fugitive even from the consummation of the God-relationship. The Unhappy 
Consciousness is a perpetual longing after absence. Here we are returned to the abyss in which faith 
can be nothing but despair. But, Silentio implores, `really this is not faith but the furthest possibility of 
faith which has a presentiment of its object at the extremest limit of the horizon, yet is separated from it 
by a yawning abyss within which despair carries on its game. 086 The irremediably estranged faith of 
the Unhappy Consciousness is surely implicitly impeached by Silentio's pronouncement that 
"Abraham believed, and believed for this life... Abraham's faith was not of this sorts387 
And yet there is undeniably something resembling the Unhappy Consciousness in this faith - 
something analogous to the religious melancholy which is discussed in the next chapter. Abraham, for 
this moment, does walk a higher path - though he does not for this reason disdain the universal in his 
passion for the estrangement of pursuing the absolute. The Knight of Faith "knows that it is beautiful to 
be born as the individual who has the universal as his home... But he knows also that higher than that 
there winds a solitary path, narrow and steep; he knows that it is terrible to be born outside the 
universal, to walk without meeting a single traveller. "388 There is another reason why the Knight of 
Faith must take a path which winds solitary, narrow, steep, and otherwise than the universal. This 
reason is that this is where God can be found, not because God has chosen transcendence, but because 
God has allowed Godself to be evacuated. This is a reason which again suggests the death of God. It is 
in this sense that Levinas calls Kierkegaard's God a "persecuted truths389: a God exiled by that thought 
which renders the divine incommensurable with human reason. In this sense, God's otherness is also 
inversely the result of God's evacuation from the world and it is as the hidden other, the crucified 
paradox, that God calls humanity to relation. As such, the 'death of God' is itself responsible for this 
God appearing as other than the world because the world regards a living God -a living God who asks 
383 `The Question to the Single One', ed. Daniel W. Conway with K. E. Gover, Soren Kierkegaard: 
Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers Volume III Philosophy of Religion, 41 [originally 
apeared in Buber's Between Man and Man] 34 Buber, `The Question to the Single One', 39 385 FT 40 
386 F., 15 
388 FT, 15. See Chapter Four below. 
388 FT, 66 
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such things of faith - to be anathema. As such, God calls the 
Knight of Faith out of the universal and 
into what Sylviane Agacinski identifies as an "aparte" - an aside with God. Therefore, Agacinski 
suggests, "The relation to God is a secret link... The relation to God that takes place in silence and 
darkness is the most difficult attachment. "390 And one senses that Kierkegaard and his pseudonymous 
conspirators would have it no other way than as d cult. But this secrecy is not first of all hermetic, 
mystical, or occult. It is not a secret for all but the initiate because it is a secret openly offered to every 
`single one'. It is the secret of the Wholly Other. The God who emerges from the tomb must, to an 
extent, appear in secret because the world will not believe in the resurrection of the one whom it has 
named among the dead. 
The Wholly Other: Alterity and Estrangement 
It is just this secrecy of the Abrahamic God-relationship that allures Jacques Derrida in his 
consideration of Fear and Trembling. "Abraham himself is in secret, cut off both from man and from 
God. "391 Here Derrida reproduces something apparently similar to the Hegelian alienation of the 
Hebraic consciousness: what he calls "the still Jewish experience of a secret, hidden, separate, absent, 
or mysterious God, the one who decides, without revealing his reasons, to demand of Abraham that 
most cruel, impossible, and untenable gesture: to offer his son Isaac as a sacrifice. All that goes on in 
secret. God keeps silent about his reasons"392 Derrida commences his discussion of Fear and 
Trembling with some reflections upon what he calls the "Mysterium tremendum. A frightful mystery, a 
secret to make you tremble. 9093 Derrida apparently describes the mysterium tremendum in initially 
voyeuristic terms: the shudder of the one who is looked at yet "doesn't see what is looking at me. "394 
His contemplation of the trembling before the mysterium tremendum is expressed in language which 
would not be out of place in a discussion of Anfechtung: "We fear and tremble because we are already 
in the hands of God... and under the gaze of God, whom we don't see and whose will we cannot 
kn0w"395 
These invocations of the mysterium tremendum are reminiscent of Rudolf Otto's definitive 
consideration of the `numinous' as mysterium tremendum etfascinans in his work The Idea of the Holy 
(Das Heilige). Yet there is little of Otto's fascinans apparent as Derrida reveals his essential concern to 
be the secret [le secret] as "the mysterium tremendum: the terrifying mystery, the dread, the fear and 
trembling of the Christian before the sacrificial gift", considered earlier in the work in relation to Jan 
Pato&a's Heretical Essays on the Philosophy of History. 396 Yet Derrida's invocation once again recalls 
389 4 Enigma and Phenomena', Basic Philosophical Writings, 71 39° Aparte: Conceptions and Deaths of Soren Kierkegaard, 92 391 `Whom to Give to (Knowing Not to Know)', The Gift of Death, 79 392 Ibid., 57-58 
393 Ibid., 53 
394 Ibid. 
395 Ibid., 56 
396 PatoKa is cited as talking about "a supreme, absolute and inaccessible being who holds us in his hand not by exterior but by interior force. " 'Secrets of European Philosophy', The Gift of Death, 6. Later Derrida adds, "The dissymetry of the gaze, this disproportion that relates me, and whatever 
concerns me to a gaze that I don't see and that remains secret from me although it commands me, is, according to Pato&a, what is identified in Christian mystery as the frightening, terrifying mystery, the 
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Otto's category of the mysterium tremendum insofar as Derrida's consideration proceeds to the `wholly 
other' [tout autre] -a term Otto also applies to the mysterium as "das Ganz andere". 
Derrida's 
attention, though, is not so much the numinous in its fascinans as the notion of the secrecy implicit in 
alterity itself. As such, the mysterium is here closer to what Otto identifies as the "purely natural" 
rather than the "religious sense". As Otto distinguishes: 
Taken, indeed, in its purely natural sense, `mysterium' would first mean merely a secret or a 
mystery in the sense of that which is alien to us, uncomprehended and unexplained... Taken 
in the religious sense, that which is `mysterious' is - to give it perhaps the most striking 
expression - the `wholly other' [das Ganz andere].... That which 
is beyond the sphere of the 
usual, the intelligible and the familiar, which therefore falls quite outside the limits of the 
`canny', and is contrasted with it, filling the mind with blank wonder and astonishment. 
397 
Derrida makes no reference to Otto, but by applying Otto's natural and religious sense of mysterium I 
think one can begin to discern between a Derridean and Kierkegaardian sense of the Wholly Other. If 
one reads Derrida as concerned with something closer to what Otto describes as the "natural" than the 
"religious" sense of the secret or mysterium then one begins to gather an idea of how Derrida 
eventually dissolves the absolute from his reading of Fear and Trembling. 
Although Derrida does at least initially speak of God as the absolute, it is telling that, for 
Derrida, God as "wholly other [tout autre]" resides in his secrecy, or rather in his withholding: "if he 
were to speak to us all the time without any secrets, he wouldn't be the other, we would share a type of 
homogeneity. "398 If God revealed all his secrets, God would cease to be God (wholly other): something 
which one might say is implicit in the secret concealing of the divine name. However, Derrida 
gradually reveals a "homogeneity" between God's "otherness" and the "otherness of every other". 
Insofar as I bind myself exclusively in duty to 'the other', Derrida explains, I am implicitly forsaking 
my duty to the infinite number of others who I am not binding myself to (even insofar as my gift to one 
denies the other) 399 "I can respond only to the one (or to the One), that is, to the other, by sacrificing 
the other to that one. "400 
It is the homogeneity of secrecy in Derrida's account which deliberately disturbs the 
Kierkegaardian understanding in which the absolute alone is Wholly Other and is secret in a manner 
which is like no other: what one might call the "religious sense" of the mysterium. In other words, as 
each is a secret to the other then, as Derrida often repeats: "every other (one) is every (bit) other [tout 
autre est tout autre]"401 Each of us retains an inaccessible alterity: an inviolable secret. Therefore 
Derrida suggests that: 
God, as the wholly other, is to be found everywhere there is something of the wholly other. 
And since each of us, everyone else, each other is infinitely other in its absolute singularity, 
mysterium tremendum. " (27). It is some of this sense of the mysterium tremendum as "the dissymmetry that exists between the divine regard that sees me, and myself, who doesn't see what is looking at me" that Derrida also discerns in Fear and Trembling ('Whom to Give to (Knowing Not to Know)', The Gi t of Death, 56). 39 The Idea of the Holy, 26 398 `Whom to Give to 
399 (Knowing Not to Know)', The Gift of Death, 57 Ibid., 68-69 
400 Ibid., 70 
401 Ibid., 68 
62 
inaccessible, solitary, transcendent, non-manifest, non-present to my ego... then what can be 
said about Abraham's relation to God can be said about my relation without relation to every 
other (one) as every (bit) other [tout autre comme tout autre), in particular to my neighbour or 
my loved one who are as inaccessible to me, as secret and transcendent as Jahweh. Every 
other (in the sense of each other) is every bit other (absolutely other) 
402 
The Kierkegaardian `infinite qualitative difference' is ultimately reduced to alterity. Every 
`other' is `wholly other'. The ramifications are, as John Caputo describes: "The name of God, of the 
biblical God of Abraham and Isaac, need not be God for us; it is enough for `God' to be the name of 
the absolutely other... God's mind is wholly other to Abraham, as is the mind of every other, my 
friends and my family, who are as transcendent to me as Yahweh. s403 From the Kierkegaardian 
perspective, God is `Wholly Other' than myself, a stranger to myself as I also become a stranger to 
myself, due to sin. In the Derridean linguistic orientation, as Caputo describes, "saying `God is wholly 
other' is a textual operation, a work of hyperbolic excess, that depends upon its textual, contextual 
base, a piece of hymnal, holy excess. "404 Once captivated in this web of linguistic play, the confession 
of God as `wholly other' becomes "stricto sensu, impossible. To say the least, God would then be 
wholly other than whatever is being said by saying that God is wholly other, wholly other even than 
God. ""' In other words, the `wholly other' multiplies itself by differentiation from even its own 
assertion of itself. It becomes the linguistic deferral of meaning in the name of an irreducible alterity. 
One might be forgiven for thinking that this entwines us in the linguistic web of a negative theology - 
though one in which, as such, the name of `God' even subordinates to the `wholly other'. 06 
In the light of this appropriation, the infinite qualitative difference - which for Johannes 
Climacus is sin - becomes merely an expression of alterity. As Westphal explains, for Johannes 
Climacus, "apart from sin God is not wholly other. God becomes wholly other only when the self- 
estrangement of fault renders God a stranger. "407 The Kierkegaardian infinite qualitative difference is 
not simply the alterity that is shared between every other, but the qualitative estrangement of sin. God 
has become a `stranger' and not merely an `other like every other'. The difference is not only a 
"qualitative difference [qualitativ Forskjel]", but an "absolute [absolut)"; "eternal [evig]"; "essential 
[vicesentlig]" and "infinite [uendelig]" "chasmic abyss [svczlgende Dyb]". It is a difference - an abyss - 
which induces anxiety, despair, fear and trembling. Westphal therefore describes the individual's 
apprehension of the `infinite qualitative difference' as a form of "ontological xenophobia" (the fear of 
estranged being). This dreadful estrangement can be overcome by the faith which reconciles humanity 
and God in "the courage to meet one who has become a stranger. s408 
402 Ibid. 78. Though note that Derrida still maintains "We are not Jahweh. " (79) However, he 
acknowledges that "This discourse disturbs Kierkegaard's discourse on one level while at the same 
time reinforcing its most extreme ramifications. " Ibid., 78. 403 'Instants, Secrets, and Singularities: Dealing Death in Kierkegaard and Derrida', ed. Martin J. Matugtik and Merold Westphal, Kierkegaard in PostlModernity, 222 404 John D. Caputo, `God is Wholly Other - Almost: 'Differance' and the Hyperbolic Alterity of God', The Otherness of God, 191 405 bid., 191 
406"On this account the Wholly Other will not manage to be the highest name of God, a divine hypernym. Instead, in an unholy reversal, God will be but one possible name for the Wholly Other. " Ibid. 
407 'Faith As The Overcoming of Ontological Xenophobia', The Otherness of God, 161 408 'Faith As The Overcoming of Ontological Xenophobia', 164 
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However, faith does not negate the human-divine difference entirely - as if one were to 
become identical with God in the act of believing. "Difference is a sin - or rather: the sin is to differ, 
" 
Sylviane Agacinski describes, "man is guilty of difference. , 409 But one could be misled into thinking 
that the only difference between God and humanity is sin. Westphal seems to say this when he says that 
"apart from sin God is not wholly other. " But if one reads God as `Wholly Other' as the name one uses 
for God as the stranger, then one can say that once God is no longer a stranger God can then be known 
by another name: a name that still retains alterity yet which reflects the overcoming of the 
estrangement of sin. Faith ultimately preserves alterity, both human and divine, in the face-to-face 
relation of becoming a self before God. Apart from sin God is not Wholly Other - that is a stranger - 
but God is still Other than myself. For example, God as a stranger, as an unknown, confronts the reader 
of Genesis 32 - as Jacob wrestles with the stranger who will not disclose his name. 
One might call this 
God the Wholly Other because one has no other name for the stranger. But by even revealing Godself 
to be Wholly Other there is some negation of this estrangement. In the form of the stranger of Genesis 
32, God is no longer inaccessible as the Wholly Other, but gives of Godself in the concession of the 
struggle. The faceless stranger who always lives in the infinite distance of the absolute is not the same 
as the stranger who crosses the chasmic abyss in order to emerge face-to-face. 
It is God who reveals the infinite distance, as Johannes Climacus explains, but it is a 
revelation which is also the beginning of reconciling the very difference which revelation impresses 
upon the individual. One may call this God "the unknown [det Ubekjendte]" and "must first come to 
know that it is different from him, absolutely different from him. "410 But the "absolutely different 
[absolut forskjelligt]", like the Wholly Other, is not the last name for God. It is an anthropocentrically 
derived name for God since sin, "the absolute difference, must have been caused by the individual 
himself 
. s41 
1 As such, the absolutely different, the Wholly Other, are names for God primarily through 
the consciousness of estrangement or sin. But sin cannot be the resting point for our talking of God. As 
Anti-Climacus explains: 
Sin is the one and only predication about a human being that in no way, either via negationis 
[by denial] or via eminentice [by idealisation], can be stated of God. To say of God (in the 
same sense as saying that he is not finite and consequently, via negationis, that he is infinite) 
that he is not a sinner is blasphemy. 412 
The consciousness of sin, the `infinite qualitative difference', informs us anthropocentrically about our 
estrangement from God. One speaks of God as `Wholly Other' than oneself - though it is God who has 
revealed this difference to the individual. "Of course we speak only of what God is in his relation to 
man. "413 Buber is right: we can do no other. However, this is not to say that it is we who have fathomed 
the relation. God as Wholly Other cannot solidify the self as the starting point for consciousness of 
409 Aparte, 84 
410PF, 46 
411 PF, 47 
412 SUD, 122. One may get the sense that there is a negative theology trying to break out in all this. David Law identifies that this particular passage suggests that "Kierkegaard had at least some knowledge of negative theology and was very occasionally prepared to employ it in his own works. " Kierkegaard as Negative Theologian, 26 413 Postscript, I and Thou, 167 
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God. Such a self has no such internal solidity for Kierkegaard. What God is in relation to humanity 
(Wholly Other; absolutely different) has been revealed by God; but if one rests with these names then 
the revelation has not been fully received in faith. The abyss has not been understood until it is made 
known how it has been crossed, just as the infinite difference can only be revealed through a revelation 
which itself begins to overcome the very distance it inscribes. 
As the name of the Wholly Other arises in the consciousness of sin, so in the consciousness of 
the forgiveness of sins does another name suggest itself. Just as human sin predicates nothing of God, 
so God's response to sin demonstrates something which cannot be said of humanity. Anti-Climacus 
asserts that while God is so infinitely unlike me in my sinfulness, I am so infinitely unlike God in the 
forgiving of sins: 
As sinner, man is separated from God by the most chasmic qualitative abyss. 
In turn, of course, God is separated from man by the same chasmic qualitative 
abyss when he forgives sins. If by some kind of reverse adjustment the divine 
could be shifted over to the human, there is one way in which man could never 
in all eternity come to be like God: in forgiving sins 414 
Here is a correlative to Kierkegaard's earlier DIVISIO/SUBDIVISIO: sin is the infinite abyss which 
separates me from God; forgiveness is the same abyss viewed from the other side. The abyss can only 
be faithfully anatomised once both sides of the severance are made known - though we begin from the 
only side of the severance which accommodates us. 
I shall suggest, therefore, that the `Wholly Other' cannot be the last name for God, though it is 
a beginning. It is at the edge, hovering over the abyss, that one must begin. And yet there is always the 
danger of remaining here, of capitulating down into the abyss in which the Wholly Other becomes "so 
infinitely sublime [uendelig opheiet]" that the God-relationship appears nothing but intractable 
melancholy, despair, and the deepest anxiety. But the infinite chasmic abyss must be revealed, and so 
there must be a time in which one is not mistaken in calling God the `Wholly Other'. 
Throughout Kierkegaard's writings God is spoken of as "absolutely different [absolut 
forskjelligt]" but also more vaguely by Johannes Climacus as "the Unknown". More recently Martin J. 
Heinecken has described the general notion of `the Unknown' in a passage which, without making 
explicit reference to Johannes Climacus, is ostensibly reminiscent: "The unknown, which is really other 
than anything known, must come to man and disclose himself in such a way that this self-disclosure 
itself grants the condition and itself opens the eyes and illumines the understanding. "415 Heinecken 
proceeds to identify what is commonly referred to as `the Unknown', not with Kierkegaard, but with 
Otto's mysterium tremendum 416 However, it is further enticing to note that the description of God in 
Kierkegaard's writings as "completely other [ganske Andet]" finds an apparent correlative in Otto's 
naming of God as "the Wholly Other [das Ganz Andere]" who is also "alienum" 417 Yet, pursuing such 
terminological coincidences and affinities briefly, it is Otto's naming of "the Holy [Das Heilige]" 
which recalls the name for God in Kierkegaard's devotional writings as "the Holy One [den 
414 SUD, 122 
415 The Moment Before God, 116 416 The Moment Before God, 107 417 The Idea of the Holy, 26 
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Heilige]"418 -a name which suggests that `the Unknown' and the `Wholly Other' are not the final 
appellations within the God-relationship. 
Adapting these designations, I shall suggest that it would be more appropriate to speak of the 
Kierkegaardian God-relationship in terms, not of the `Wholly Other', but rather the `Holy Other' - 
albeit a name which is itself open to erasure. Yet the `Holy Other', instead of negating the `Wholly 
Other' actually encompasses and surpasses it insofar as `Holy' (deriving from the Old English hälig) 
encompasses `Whole' (from the Old English häl - meaning `healthy'). Furthermore, whilst denoting 
`completely', `Holy' also implies alterity. That which is `Holy' is relationally other. it is set apart from 
the profane in relation to God. 419 Despite recent attempts to conceive `Wholly Other' in terms of sheer 
alterity, I suggest that God as `Wholly Other' implies the `infinite qualitative difference' of divine- 
human estrangement. Yet when the self, becoming itself before God, perceives itself through the eyes 
of God as forgiven, the `Wholly Other' becomes the `Holy Other'. God as `Wholly Other' begins from 
myself and asserts sin. God as `Holy Other' is that which overcomes the estrangement of the `infinite 
qualitative difference' of sin and asserts a forgiveness which communicates a relation. It announces: 
`Be holy as I am Holy' (Leviticus 11: 44). 
However, this is not to say that human-divine alterity is annihilated in `oneness'. God's 
overcoming of the `infinite qualitative difference' does not represent mystical or ontological fusion, but 
an overcoming of estrangement 420 One must, as Westphal implores, meet the God `who has become a 
stranger'. The Holy Other, as such, is still the `Other', and as the `Other' - as mysterium - will always 
elude the self s possession or identification. And just as God remains the `Other' so Kierkegaard's 
writings are interested in how one becomes oneself before God, coram Deo, in the dreadful and loving 
epiphany of the face-to-face. This, as I shall propose, takes the individual through the dark night of 
melancholy, anxiety, Anfechtung, and despair. And it is in the depths of this night that the self 
discovers its annihilation and transmutation - the triumph of divine forgiveness over impossibility: the 
impossibility of knowing oneself, ingrained in the impossibility of knowing God, entangled in the 
impossibility of overcoming the infinite abyss (sin). The strenuous impossibility of the task is the 
metanoia which enables the self to see itself from the other side of a seemingly abyssal and endless 
night - through the eyes of the Holy Other. And so the self must initially come to terms with the 
estrangement of its Unhappy Consciousness: its sense of melancholy over the impossibility of knowing 
a God and a self that continue to elude the consummation of the understanding. 
The only legitimate tears are those cried over oneself. Praised be the one who can say: Myself - that is the only object I have found worthy enough - or wretched enough - to cry over. 42' 
418 E . g. UDVS, 285 419 See also Melissa Raphael, Rudolf Otto and the Idea of the Holy, 26 and 37. 420 As Law points out, "Kierkegaard rejects the idea of mystic union. There is no idea in Kierkegaard's works of the individual being absorbed into the Godhead... for Kierkegaard God is and will always remain beyond our grasp. " Kierkagaard as Negative Theologian, 214 . For this reason Law claims that Kierkegaard can be understood as a negative theologian who is actually "more apophatic than the negative theologians. " Ibid., 34. Yet the very fact that Kierkegaard denies the mystical union present in the apophatic tradition (defined by the possibility of cataphasis) would surely deny any identification of Kierkegaard as adhering to the neoplatonic tradition of negative theology. 421 JP 4: 3901 /Pap. X2A87 
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Chapter Two: The Abyss of Melancholy 
I was flung down into the abyss of melancholy... 422 
But even if the universe were to crush him, man would still be nobler than his slayer, because 
he knows that he is dying and the advantage the universe has over him. The universe knows 
nothing of this. - Pascal, Pensees 
423 
In the previous chapter it has been claimed that the emergence of the 'self' n modernity occurs against 
a backdrop of loss. The human subject consolidates its loss of metaphysical ground [grund] through 
withdrawal into introspection -a self-reflection collapsing into its own abyss [Afgrund]. Man, Foucault 
therefore wagers, is destined to be "erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea ., 
P424 And the 
sea itself is - at the risk of assimilating metaphors - ebbing like `the Sea of Faith': "Its melancholy, 
long, withdrawing roar / Retreating, to the breath / Of the night wind, down the vast edges drear / and 
naked shingles of the world. " 25 The notion is that whilst the melancholy of modernity originates in the 
apparent loss of God, its consummation is discovered in the apparent loss of self. The melancholy of 
the absence of God is both a symptom and a cause of the modern turn towards a selfhood which 
inevitably transpires as unobtainable. As Harvie Ferguson writes, "Melancholy sets in motion, through 
the deepening self-awareness implied in the failure of distraction to cure us of unhappiness, the 
specifically modem longing for authentic selfhood. s426 But this is a longing which melancholy alone is 
destined to be unable to fulfil. As such, I shall suggest that melancholy plays an important instructive 
role, for Kierkegaard especially, in the rise of self-consciousness; and also at the same time in 
inscribing the failure to authenticate the very self which promises the alleviation of melancholy. 
Melancholy, especially in its religious orientation, is thus diagnosed as a response to various forms of 
the modem abyss. But in coming to terms with the place of religious melancholy in modernity, it is 
important firstly to say something about a genealogy of melancholy itself. 
A Genealogy of Melancholy. Meaninglessness and The Longing For Meaning 
The tower of Babel never yielded such confusion of tongues, as the chaos of melancholy doth 
variety of symptoms 427 
Antonio: Because you would not seem to appear to th' world 
Puffed up with your preferment, you continue 
This out of fashion melancholy; leave it, leave it. 
- John Webster, The Duchess of Malfi (Act II, Scene I, 87-89) 
Melancholy's classical genealogy derives its formulation under the influence of Pythagorean 
pathology. Etymologically, melancholy [Greek melancholia: -melds, -änos, `black', chole, `bile'] was 
believed to derive from an excess of `black bile' (possibly secreted from the liver) which, due to a 
resulting physiological imbalance, cultivated a psychological condition of depression, dejection or 
422 The Journals of Seren Kierkegaard, ed. and trans. Alexander Dru (754) / Pap. VIII A 650 423 XV 200, p. 95 424 The Order of Things, 387 425 Matthew Arnold, `Dover Beach', II, 25-28. Cited in Taylor, Sources of the Self, 409 Melancholy and the Critique of Modernity: Soren Kierkegaard's Religious Psychology, 30 42' Robert Burton, The Anatomy ofMelancholy, Part I, Section 3, Member I, Subsection 3, p. 397 
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pensiveness. Harmonious levels of `black bile' were ideally maintained in equilibrium with the three 
other bodily fluids: yellow/red bile, blood and phlegm. Health was conceived in terms of the balance 
and composure of the four bodily fluids -a balance rudimentary to the medical theory of the second 
century Greek anatomist Galen of Pergamum. In the physiology of Galen's Prognosis the four bodily 
fluids (yellow bile, blood, phlegm, black bile) corresponded to the four elements (fire, earth, water, air) 
and the four Hippocratic qualities (hot, cold, moist, dry) 428 Under this structure, illness "was conceived 
as the excess of one humour (chymoi: juice or flavour) over the others"429 It was, Judith Perkins 
argues, Galen's direction towards the possibility of knowing the interior of the body - the mental self 
as well as the physical self - which "helped set the course for an inner-directed, reflexive `self 
. "430 As 
such, the diagnosis of melancholy plays a decisive role in the turn towards introspection and thus the 
formation of the modem subject. 
Abstracted from Hyppocratic medical theory, however, modem melancholy has become 
increasingly remote from its elemental associations as `earth' and physiological origins as `black bile'. 
In modem attempts to define melancholy, Ferguson writes, "two apparently unconnected formulations 
have become canonical; melancholy is both `sorrow without cause' and `loss of being,. 031 Yet, the 
elusiveness of material cause and definition of melancholy becomes an expression of the dissolution of 
meaning inherent to melancholy itself. In renunciation of any systematic pathology, any anatomist of 
modern melancholy is forced to rely upon a more confessional approach - but a confession itself 
suffused by the melancholy elusiveness of the WE W's rumination exemplifies the melancholic 
condition of the modern subject that "One ought to be a mystery, not only to others, but also to one's 
selfs432 
While classical physiological approach to melancholy has waned, melancholy's elemental 
associations have endured, at least analogously. Bound to the element of `earth', melancholy suggested 
being weighed down or pulled down to the ground by the gravity of an internalised burden. Despite the 
decline of an elemental perspective in pathology, the brooding sense of `earthiness', or heaviness 
persists in a more metaphorical nuance. Such an association abides in W's poetic description: 
My soul is so heavy that thought can no more sustain it, no wing beat lift it up 
into the ether. If it moves, it sweeps along the ground like the low flight of birds 
when a thunderstorm is approaching. Over my inmost being there broods a 
depression, an anxiety that presages an earthquake a33 
Despite the evident internalisation of melancholy's iconography, there remains an significant exterior 
relation in which melancholy apparently infects and transfigures external existence. In the aesthetics of 
Romanticism - of which `A' is a connoisseur - melancholy can emerge as "a quality of landscape" . 434 
Transfigured by the gaze of melancholy, such a space appears possessed by its own memory, as if 
428 See Judith Perkins, The Suffering Self, 152 429 Ferguson, Melancholy and the Critique of Modernity, 7 430 The Suffering Self, 150 431 Melancholy and the Critique of Modernity, `Introduction', xvi 432 E/O I, 21 
433 E/O I, 23 
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organically haunted by itself. In such a Romantic meditation, Kierkegaard describes his experience of 
the melancholic energy of a gravesite: "Upon entering the site of the burial mound, a certain 
melancholy mood comes over one, evoked by the strange mysteriousness, by the dark side that 
superstition carries with it. "aas Such Romantic and elegiac sites likewise evoke the sublime, according 
to Kant: "Tall oaks and lonely shadows in a sacred grove are sublime... Night is sublime, day is 
beautiful. Temperaments that possess a feeling for the sublime are drawn gradually, by the quiet 
stillness of a summer evening as the shimmering light of the stars breaks through the brown shadows of 
night and the lonely moon rises into view, into high feelings of friendship, of disdain for the world, of 
eternity. s436 And such a sense of the sublime is, Kant suggests, "sometimes accompanied with a certain 
dread, or melancholy' . 437 Indeed one who is moved towards melancholy "has above all a feeling for the 
sublime. "438 But - as with Kant's conclusions about the sublime439 - melancholy essentially resides 
within the subject and the subject's relation to that which it gazes upon. In this sense, "Melancholy is 
objectlesss440 - though in meditating upon itself and in failing to derive fulfilment in any object, 
melancholy becomes, as it were, its own unsettling object. Loss does not reside in the landscape itself, 
but in the self's sense of estrangement from the mysterious decadence of nature. Melancholy is, as 
George Pattison deduces, "the consciousness of absence, incompleteness or loss"" 
Max Pensy discerns that, "Like baroque dramatists, Kierkegaard's melancholy arises from the creative 
production of images of meaningless or dead nature, conjured up from the depths of alienated 
subjectivity in its desperate attempts to fill up and deny the abyssal vision of a meaningless 
existence. "442 Furthermore, this sense of alienated loss is not confined to the world of nature. The 
melancholic, in virtue of a sense of estrangement, is essentially an outsider - not only to creation, but to 
the culture upon which much modern disillusionment is focused. Pensy thus observes that "a 
melancholy world is only a world awaiting its own parody", 443 and as Colin Wilson explains, 
"Outsiders are a symptom of a dying culture... Society always begins to die from the head 
downward. "4" Kierkegaard himself lamented the fact that in his era "people do not seem to have a 
Socratic fear of being deceived", 45 and, as such, were deficient in the depth of disillusionment and 
suspicion that can initiate the search for true meaning. Since the sensed decadence of insensate 
existence is dissipated in `the crowd', melancholy inevitably becomes the lonely experience of `the 
434 George Pattison, Kierkegaard: The Aesthetic and the Religious, 52. "... as in Kierkegaard's description of Gurre Lake, a lake gradually being overgrown by rushes: `Here around Lake Gurre, there 
rests a quiet melancholy; the region lives, so to speak more in the past. ' (JP, 5095/I A 64). " aas Pap. IA 63 
436 Immanuel Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, 47 43' Ibid., 47 
438 Ibid., 64 
439 See Chapter Four below. 
440 Melancholy and the Critique of Modernity, 229 441 Kierkegaard: The Aesthetic and the Religious, 52 442 Max Pensy, Melancholy Dialectics: Walter Benjamin and the Play of Mourning Melancholy, 142 443 Melancholy Dialectics, 4 444 Religion and the Rebel, 132 445 TA, 10 
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solitary one'. "The present age", Kierkegaard declared, is "a sensible, reflecting age, devoid of passion, 
flaring up in superficial, short-lived enthusiasm and prudentially relaxing in indolence. ""6 
This melancholy perception of loss implies a certain decadent impression of historical 
decline. 
Yet Adorno argues that the "inner history of melancholy, just like that of subjectivity altogether, 
is 
conceived by Kierkegaard without any regard for external history. t9447 But this need not mean that 
external history is lost, but rather that it is captured in the internalised abyss of inwardness. 
"Inwardness is the historical prison of primordial human nature ... the movement of melancholy 
is one 
toward the deliverance of lost 'meaning'. " "g Furthermore, this nostalgia for lost meaning causes the 
daily life of the temporal to be incapacitated by inertia: "Time stands still, and I with if 9 '449 
Kierkegaard's melancholic `A' writes. The temporal becomes experienced as boredom abstracted from 
any meaningful transcendent history. This inertia may be symptomatic of the western "nostalgia for 
being, the double nostalgia for earth and for heaven, for creation and for the creator. s4so 
It is this nostalgia for transcendent meaning which manifests the dialectic of melancholy's 
most desolate and most resilient facets. It is in this sense that "Melancholy, paradoxically, is the 
disillusionment which prevents the complete triumph of disillusionment s451 At this point there is an 
implicit metaphysics of melancholy expressed as a sorrowing over `things as they appear', aggravated 
by a longing for `things as they should be'. This hope in transcendence is evident, for example, in the 
melancholy which characterised Leo Tolstoy's conversion: "I was afraid of life and strove against it, 
yet I still hoped for something from it s452 Such transcendental longing, however, need not imply an 
exclusively `religious' element in all melancholy. Although Tolstoy identifies his sickness as a 
446 TA, 68 
447 Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic, 59 448 Theodor Adorno, Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic, 60 449 E/O I, 20 
450 Harper, The Seventh Solitude, 112. For Platonism, this constituted the retrospective longing for the 
pre-existent ideal forms. But this consciousness evades the bitterest depths of melancholy, since 
'Recollection' - through rational exertion - is the universally available means of achieving salvation from metaphysical alienation. For Kierkegaard, however, `Recollection' is opposed by the possibility, 
or the impossibility of `Repetition'. Therefore Kierkegaard, according to Wolf Lepenies, "insisted on 
the special temporal reference of boredom and drew the connection between the concept of melancholy 
and his category of repetition. " Melancholy and Society, 88. Constantine Constantius describes how 
"Repetition and recollection are the same movement, only in opposite directions; for what is 
recollection has been, is repeated backwards, whereas repetition properly so called is recollected 
forwards. " (R, 33) `Repetition' is therefore modern philosophy's melancholy equivalent for the Greek 
concept of `recollection', except that `Repetition' `anticipates' itself rather than 'returns' to itself. 
Melancholically understood, `Repetition' is the inevitability of recurrence (hence boredom), or the disheartening failure of recreation (hence inconsistency and meaninglessness). For example, Constantine Constantius attempts to recreate a trip to Berlin whereby he lodges in the same place and 
visits the same theatre. Yet this attempt at `Repetition' rather reinforces the disappointing impossibility 
of `Repetition': the experience can never be the same. Here is one vital sense in which, without 
recourse to the Platonic resolution of 'recollection', "The melancholy of modern life is not the same as 
premodern melancholy... it cannot be overcome by rational, or at least deliberative, action because `reason' and `deliberation' are themselves suffused with its mournful indifference. " Ferguson, Melancholy and the Critique of Modernity, 231 451 Ferguson, Melancholy and the Critique of Modernity, `Introduction', xvii A Confession and Other Religious Writings, 30 
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"spiritual condition, "" it is worth drawing attention to William James's observation that there "was 
almost no theology in [Tolstoy's] conversion. "454 
Kierkegaard finally implored God to "resolve the fundamental misery of my being. 4" But 
with the `death of God' and the collapse of the metaphysical beyond, religiousness is no longer 
regarded as the inevitable cure for a disillusionment which may, in fact, remain beyond resolution. 
Religion has itself become a cause of intensified disillusionment for the modern individual who 
encounters the geometric displacement of previous centres of meaning. The premise that sorrow over 
existence constitutes proof that existence can, and will, be bettered has sunk in the iconoclasm of 
modernity. As such, Gouwen's definition, for example, of melancholy as "the unutterable sadness that 
arises as a person becomes aware of his or her need for the `eternal"', 456 only takes us part way towards 
an expansive modem definition of this malady. The guarantee of metaphysical comfort has itself 
vanished in the twilight and the escape to transcendence becomes merely a flight to the abyss. In many 
ways, the solitude of the self discovering itself through the withdrawal into God has been displaced by 
what Harper calls "the new self-conscious solitude of those who record the absence or silence of 
God... To be homeless and in exile is as old and sad as the hills; to be metaphysically homeless and to 
care is new. "457 It is to this path of `metaphysical homelessness', the loss of the created order and the 
related turn towards the inner abyss, that a modern consideration of religious melancholy now turns. It 
is here that it is hoped to reach a sense in which "Religion in modern western society is at once 
melancholic and the `cure' for religious melancholy. "458 
Divining the Signs: Inner Space and The Decline of Cosmology 
As messianic expectation, melancholia gives voice to the theological promise of the 
redemption of the world; as the most subtle form of this hope, melancholia fords its 
proper home in the esoteric, since theological truths properly exist only in enciphered 
and distorted form, a riddled text to which melancholia dedicates itself. 459 
Et mon esprit, toujours du vertige hante, 
Jalouse du neant l'insensibilite. 
- Ah! ne j amais sortir des Nombres at des Etres! 
- Charles Baudelaire, 
And my mind, always haunted by vertigo, 
Is jealous of the insensibility of the void. 
- Ah! I will never be free of Numbers 
and Beings! 
`Le Gouffre' 460 
Western Christianity has traditionally evoked a long affinity with the sense of "the traditional tristitia, 
the melancholy world-view of the homo religiosus" - as Erikson identifies in Luther. 461 In a terrifying 
453 A Confession and other Religious Writings, 31 454 The Varieties of Religious Experience, Lecture X, 246 n. 1 ass The Journals of Soren Kierkegaard, ed. Dru (754) / Pap. VIII A 650 ash Kierkegaard As Religious Thinker, 80 asp The Seventh Solitude, 5 
458 Ferguson, Melancholy and the Critique of Modernity, `Introduction', xvii 459 Max Pensy, Melancholy Dialectics, 146 460 Les Fleurs Du Mal, 114 
461 Erik Erikson, Young Man Luther, 37. Although "in his depressed moods he [Luther] displayed at times what we would call the clinical picture of melancholia" (Ibid., 37), Erikson observes that ultimately Luther "was not able in the long run to embrace the monastic life so natural to the traditional tristitia; that he mistrusted his sadness himself; and that he later abandoned this melancholic mood 
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world of devils, ghosts, succubus et incubus, Luther concluded that "All heaviness of mind and 
melancholy come of the devil' . 462 Struggling with his own anxiety - what he called "the devil's bath 
[balneum diaboli]" - Luther pronounced, "'Tis a fearful thing when Satan torments the sorrowful 
conscience with melancholy" 463 Indeed, not only supernatural but also astrological forces were 
implicated in Luther's appraisal of his own melancholy: "I, Martin Luther, was born under the most 
unfavorable of stars, probably under Saturn' : 464 But these astrological superstitions - which Luther 
differentiated from the demonstrable proofs of astronomy - were themselves to be identified as the 
orchestrations of the devil rather than the divine: "Astrology is framed by the devil... to believe in the 
stars, or to trust thereon, or to be affrighted thereat, is idolatry, and against the first commandment "465 
Despite such indictments, the language of astrology endured beyond the Reformation rhetoric 
of melancholy. "Renaissance theories of melancholy reinforced the astrological aspect of traditional 
medicine... Some even played down or excluded the planetary influences, but even those who did so 
often used the same terminology. "466 In Robert Burton's virtually canonical seventeenth century 
anthology The Anatomy of Melancholy, cosmological, or astrological, movements are identified as a 
cause: 
I hope, I may justly conclude with Cajetan... that heaven is God's instrument, by mediation 
of which He governs and disposeth these elementary bodies; or a great book, whose letters are 
a67 the stars (as one calls it), wherein are written many strange things for such as can read. 
`Sun, moon, and stars' revolve and contrive to orchestrate a cosmic engine of alienation. A symbolic 
universe conspires to torment the melancholic individual. Saturn presided over melancholy, Jupiter 
reigned overjoy. Even botanical superstition - expressing the danger of the organic contamination of 
madness - were customary concerns for a melancholy apothecary. 
However, the decline of such considerations plays an decisive role in a modern development of 
melancholy. As the widely accepted view of the structure of the universe altered so the place of the 
human subject endured the turbulence of a `Copernican revolution'. The Neoplatonic cosmic hierarchy 
fragmented, bowing out to a more dispersed and elliptical vision of a universe without humanity at its 
centre 468 There no longer existed the previous certitude about a centred universe in which the 
individual could legitimately discern the arcana of an astrological symbolism. Crucially for 
melancholy, Ferguson explains: 
The new image of the cosmos extended to human beings both a greater intimacy with, and a greater distance from, God. The earth moved, and 
altogether for mood swings between depression and elation, between self-accusation and the abuse of others. " (Ibid., 38) 
462 `Of Temptation and Tribulation', The Table Talk of Martin Luther, DCXXXIV, 270 463 `Of the Devil and His Works', The Table Talk of Martin Luther, DCXII, 262 464Quoted in Julia Kristeva, Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia, 119 465 `Of Astronomy and Astrology', The Table Talk of Martin Luther, DCCCXLIII, 343-344 Screech, Montaigne and Melancholy, 25. For example, Shakespeare: "We make guilty of our disasters the sun, the moon, and the stars; as if we were villains by necessity, fools by heavenly compulsion. " King Lear, Act I, Scene 2. 467 Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, Part I, Section 2, Member I, Subsection IV, p. 206 468 Ferguson, Melancholy and the Critique of Modernity, 14 
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was no more or less privileged than any other heavenly body; it was, 
therefore, as close to God as any other point in the universe. But neither 
God, nor any natural body, occupied any specific `place' in the cosmos. 
And because the cosmos was itself infinite, God could not be `located' as 
a kind of boundary around His creation. 469 
The earth, let loose from the chains of Heaven, revolving around one dying star among billions, itself 
becomes a displaced focus of melancholy meditation. Likewise the universe, no longer reflecting 
Divinity, relapses into the abyss from which it came. "`Space', as pure extension, had no moral or 
religious connotation. " 
And yet the recent cosmological discoveries of the last century have revealed the human 
subject to participant to an astonishing universe. The `process' of the universe has, to an extent, 
renewed theological attachment to cosmology. 471 While astronomy has delivered sublime visions of 
luminous galaxies and cosmic wonders, however, recent cosmology has also revealed the inherent 
entropy of the process of the universe; furthermore, the recognition of infinite cosmic expansion has 
left our galaxy, our world, increasingly displaced and negligible. It is at this point that cosmology takes 
a curiously postmodern twist. Decisively, Lyotard points out, science has bequeathed to us something 
of a cosmic death sentence: the calculable explosion of the sun and destruction of the earth -a clinical 
apocalypse detached from any portentous eschatological narrative. While too remote to cause the sort 
of intensified apocalyptic anxiety found in Luther, this prophecy does announce the termination of life 
without a meaningful eschatology. Therefore this `postmodern fable' cannot truly be called an 
`apocalyptic' narrative: "The narrative of the end of the Earth is not in itself fictional, it's really rather 
realistic. 9A72 It is here that the narratives of what Lyotard terms `postmodern fables' are differentiated 
from the grand narrative mythologies of longing and emancipation which typify the metaphysical 
appetite of modernity. The `postmodern fable', Lyotard argues, is essentially amoral and explanatory; it 
is neither remedial nor legitimising. It is not mythological in the true sense since it does not tell of 
Gods and sons of Gods; it does not bring the ethics of heaven to rest on the earth. 
But this is not to say that the postmodern is thereby absolved of melancholy. It is precisely the 
"lack of an eschatology" and the "contingency of the story it tells" which leaves "thought suffering for 
a lack of finality" in the wake of the `postmodern fable'. And as Lyotard observes, "This suffering is 
the postmodern state of thought... its crisis, its malaise, or its melancholia. i473 But this postmodern 
melancholia is not directed towards, or alleviated by, the modem dependence upon remedial Truth. 
Postmodem thought is continually aggrieved by a lack of eschatology, but this grief of postmodernity 
does not therefore requisition nostalgia as its cure. To long for the absent God - the deus otiosus - is to 
entrench longing in the past and to locate eschatological hope impossibly embedded in re-possessing its 
469 ibid., 16 
470 Ferguson, ibid., 16 
471 The mystical meditations of the catholic scientist-priest Teilhard de Chardin are an obvious example: "All around us, Christ is physically active in order to control all things. From the ultimate 
vibration of the atom to the loftiest mystical contemplation. " `My Universe', ed. Ewert H. Cousins, Process Theology, 254 
42 Lyotard, `A Postmodern Fable', Postmodern Fables, 84 473 gA Postmodem Fable', Postmodern Fables, 100 
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archaeology. 474 Postmodern melancholy, alternatively, testifies to a lack which is neither concluded 
in 
the resumption of the past nor the realisation of the future. As such, "every fable is melancholic, since 
it supplements reality. "475 By `supplementing', the fable attests to a lack in reality: but a lack which, 
by 
remaining an open wound, is not fulfilled by a beyond. 
This particular prediction, concerning the inevitable death of a remote star in an infinite 
universe, threatens to defy teleology and eschatology by brute cosmological fact. Consequently, "It 
could be said that the fable we heard is the most pessimistic discourse the postmodern can hold forth 
about itself. " Yet, for Lyotard, there is nothing recent or original about such a fable. Although it does 
not quite tell the story of the sky falling down, it does maintain our most recent melancholy anxiety. "It 
merely continues the discourses of Galileo, Darwin, Freud: man is not the centre of the world, he is not 
the first (but the last) among creatures, he is not the master of discourse: i476 Melancholy stands in for 
the now absented centre. The human subject, isolated from a solidified sense of its place in the 
universe, has turned towards an inner space in which the esotericism of the symbolic world is 
internalised. As Ferguson writes, "The Creator was removed to an infinitely remote point in space and 
time; and as this was no point at all He could be conceived in relation to Creation only as an eternally 
present but impotent deus absconditus: as the hidden god of an inner faith. And the very immediacy of 
this direct confrontation reduced the human person, once again, to wretchedness. "477 In the 
disintegration of the cartography of the self, the subject is condemned once more to vanity, boredom, 
solitary wandering beneath a black sun, in a now indeterminable desert. It is perhaps this image of 
boredom, or acedia, which most aptly describes the condition of the religious in melancholy's 
transition to the modern. 
In ancient days all paths led 
Somehow to God and His Name. 
We are not pious. We stay in the Profane 
And where God once stood, stands: Melancholy - Gershom Scholem478 
474 Ibid., 96 
ass Ibid., 101 
476 Ibid., 101. Here is an intractable melancholy without a final cure. Except that, Lyotard suggests, we 
need not necessarily succumb to such a malaise of mourning over the loss of this grand narrative. 
"Lamenting the 'loss of meaning' in postmodernity boils down to mourning the fact that knowledge is 
no longer principally narrative", Lyotard writes. "Such a reaction does not necessarily follow. " The 
Postmodern Condition, 26. Postmodern senses of loss need not seek emancipation in eschatological 
restoration. A multiplicity of narratives displaces the great longing for an essential Truth. In other 
words, "Most people have lost the nostalgia for the lost narrative" (Ibid., 41) and the concomitant 
melancholy which haunts it. Instead of paralysing ourselves with a melancholic nostalgia for archaic 
truths about the soul's relation to the divine, it is claimed that "we must learn to speak of God godlessly 
and of self selflessly. " Taylor, Deconstructing Theology, 89. God is dead, but we must no longer 
consume ourselves by our melancholy love for the absent one since such a melancholy nostalgia relates itself to a now disavowed metaphysical longing. But to forsake this nostalgia in the name of the 
postmodern may risk closing the world off to the insights of melancholy or the aspirational drive of disillusion. "Melancholy is the shadow permanently accompanying the forward rush of the age", George Pattison writes, "yet in fleeing this shadow it flees that which would give it the possibility of deeper insight into its own truths, limitations and possibilities. " Kierkegaard, Religion and the Nineteenth-Century Crisis of Culture, 21 477 Melancholy and the Critique of Modernity, 17 478 Cited in Pensy, Melancholy Dialectics, 1 
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From Acedia to the Boredom of Modernity 
Where does this black sun come from? Out of what eerie galaxy do its invisible, 
lethargic rays reach me, pinning me down to the ground, to my bed, compelling 
me to silence, to renunciation? - Julia Kristeva, Black Sun, 3 
The title of Kristeva's book, Black Sun, invokes a familiar traditional emblem for the lethargy of 
melancholy: that of the burning sun which blighted the spiritual ambitions of early desert monasticism. 
At midday the sun - the `noonday devil' - burns at its highest and induces apathy in the ascetic, 
tempting away from the religious vocation by thoughts of comfort and shelter. The sun burns angrily in 
its zenith and the shadows are at their shortest. As Ferguson describes, "A cold shadow falls over the 
hermit's soul even as the burning sun stands directly above him in the sky. The soul becomes both 
actually and metaphorically opaque, impenetrable to the activating radiance which was the nurturing 
medium of human physical and spiritual wellbeing. 479 This notion of acedia ('without care 9) 9 
480 was 
traditionally identified with the deadly sin of sloth -a dreadful obstacle on the path of spiritual 
exercise. Nowadays, Dicken observes, it is a scarcely mentioned malady - an omission which implies 
"a disquieting comment on the superficiality of our spiritual education. i48' 
Nevertheless, Frank Lake suggests that "under the term `akedia' or `accidie' [or acedia] 
clinical theologians of the past thought and wrote a great deal about what we now call depression. s482 
However, it would be misleading to assert that acedia is a synonymous malady with melancholy. Due 
to its voluntary and sinful nature, the indictment of acedia in monastic life is often stricter in tone than 
more sympathetic treatments of melancholy itself. John of the Cross, for example, regarded those of 
"melancholy temperament" [mal humor] as "objects of the deepest pity" even when their affliction 
lends itself to terrible delusions of demonic interaction. 483 Unlike melancholy, acedia was considered 
within the crucible of temptation rather than debilitating illness. According to John of the Cross, the 
melancholic who suffered under Satan's thrall required physiological, as well as spiritual, restitution. 484 
Such physical nurture was itself a consideration of what John saw as the 'natural accidie' of 
sleeplessness or dyspepsia; but it was "spiritual sloth [acidia espiritual]" which most grievously 
threatened "the way of perfection. "485 While a degree of disillusion with the vanity of the world is a 
requisite melancholy for the monastic, this virtue of detachment, or the freedom of apatheia, must not 
479 Ferguson, Melancholy and the Critique of Modernity, 10 480 "Classically it is defined as `spiritual sloth', but the nearest current son probably yn ym is the 
colloquialism `fed-upness'" E. W. Trueman Dicken, The Crucible of Love, 251 481 E. W. Trueman Dicken, The Crucible of Love, 251 482 Clinical Theology: A Theological and Psychiatric Basis to Clinical Pastoral Care, 111. See Chapter 2 `The Understanding of Depressed, Melancholy or Accidious Persons'. ass The Dark Night of the Soul, Book I, chapter iv, 6, p. 20 484 44 When melancholy is the occasion of these visitations of Satan, men in general cannot be delivered from them till their bodily health is improved, unless the dark night has overtaken the soul, gradually freeing it from all trouble. " Book I, chapter iv, 6, p. 20-21. There is an important distinction between the "dark nights" and melancholia, as Denys Turner explains: "for the one, melancholia, he assumes to have a physiological cause, the other, the spiritual condition, is brought about by God - or rather inevitably by the closeness of God to the soul. " The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism, 235. See further 'Chapter 10 - John of the Cross: the dark nights and depression'. 48 The Dark Night of the Soul, Book I, chapter vii, 2, p. 31 
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infect the whole of spiritual existence itself. When this occurs then inertia and "aridity" contaminates 
prayer -a dryness in which devotional activities become burdensome and even repugnant. 
However, since the late medieval period an increasing identification of acedia with the sin of sloth 
signifies a more material and naturalised rendering of a malaise which was earlier understood 
spiritually. Such a transition inevitably connotes acedia as much with laziness as with religious 
disillusion. For Raposa, this fixation upon one particular outward manifestation of an inner condition 
constitutes "an impoverishment of the earlier conception. "486 The radical dangers of acidia espiritual 
give way to the discomforts of `natural accidie'. For example, Lake quotes from a reference to the 
`wise words' of St. Seraphim: 
The counsel he gave to nuns in the convent he supervised is recorded. 
`He commanded us to fear above all things, and to flee as we should from 
fire, the chief of sins, accidie. ' `There is no worse sin, my mother, and 
nothing more terrifying or destructive, than the sin of accidie! ' said 
Father Seraphim. 48 
Yet, while accidie is identified as "the chief of sins", Father Seraphim encouraged his nuns to observe 
pragmatic preventatives such as ensuring "one always sleeps with bread under the pillow in case one 
awakes hungry and is visited with sorrow. s488 Accidie [or acedia], at least in this instance, is primarily 
a tangible malaise; the practical orientation of its treatment appears to differentiate it from the 
abstractions of a modern understanding of melancholy. This is also present in Father Evagrius of 
Pontus (c. 345-399) who, in numbering acedia among the "bad thoughts", gives the example of a monk 
struggling against inane distractions in the tedious exertion of reading his book in solitude 489 Evagrius, 
as Sorabji observes, was well aware that acedia often verges on "idleness (argia)" and in time "the 
concept and even the name of sloth came to replace that of depression. "490 
In the seventh century, Pope Gregory the Great, translating the 'eight bad thoughts (logismoi')' 
of Evagrius into the `seven cardinal sins (principalia vitia)', supplanted acedia with tristitia 491 But a 
further reason for this lapse in modem consideration of acedia is surely that, as part of the vocabulary 
of ascetic literature, its decline in technical terminology is related to the decline of the monastic way of 
life. As such, in the seventeenth century Burton refers to acedia more imprecisely as the "idleness" 
which reaches beyond the exclusively monastic setting -a cause of melancholy conceived outside of 
the ascetic rigours of the monastery as "an appendix to nobility. s492 Here one approaches a sense of the 
more modern incarnation of acedia as a spiritually indifferent and secularised malaise: a boredom 
which is found not in the monastery but in the modem city. Wolf Lepenies points out that Kierkegaard 
486 See Raposa, Boredom and the Religious Imagination, 12. While Aquinas saw acedia as 'sorrow for the divine good', Raposa identifies John Cassian as largely responsible for the more superficial rendering of Evagrius's initial teachings. As such, physical remedies (such as ascribed to Father Seraphim) became dominant. See further Ibid., 22-23. 487 Clinical Theology, 103-4 
488 ibid., 104 
489 See Richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 362 
490 Ibid., 369 
491 See Ibid., 370 
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"provided a surprisingly spatially related conclusion to his views on boredom. " Boredom, Lepenies 
suggests, inextricably encompasses "the sociological aspect "493 In Kierkegaard's time this boredom 
is 
the melancholy which accompanies the modern figure of the languid and urbane f äneur, as typified 
by 
Kierkegaard's depiction of `The Seducer' - as Steven Shakespeare describes - "the romantic poet, the 
ironist, the gentleman of leisure - roles made possible by cultural and social economic upheavals which 
had left their mark on the nascent bourgeoisie of the Danish capital. s494 These two apparently 
economically inverse lifestyles of asceticism and excess are thus both susceptible to a similar fate. Just 
as excessive fasting, solitude and meditation in the monastic life could lead to idleness, so too would 
the fläneur's life of leisure and recreation succumb to inevitable boredom. 
Essentially, it is when the condition persists "to the extent that the individual makes no effort 
to alleviate its495 that acedia becomes spiritually vacuous. In fact, in modernity, many sought to 
cultivate the boredom of the aristocrat. Aristotle had already influentially identified the classical 
relation between genius and melancholy; 4% and by the Renaissance France of Montaigne, for example, 
"Tristesse suggested noble sensitiveness; melancholy suggested genius - no wonder so many thought 
they were marked by it. No affectation was so widely cherished. "497 In fin de siecle Paris, Baudelaire 
likewise praised the scornful decadence of the Dandy who `does not speak to other people except to 
insult them': "Dandyism is a setting sun; like a diminishing star, it is proud, without warmth and full of 
melancholy. s498 
For Ferguson, "it is firstly as boredom, therefore, that melancholy makes its way into the 
modem world"; 499 and Kierkegaard furnishes us with an outstanding case study of modern boredom in 
the melancholy aesthete `A': 
I do not care for anything. I do not care to ride, for the exercise is too violent. 
I do not care to walk, walking is too strenuous. I do not care to lie down, 
for I should either have to remain lying, and I do not care to do that, 
or I should have to get up again, and I do not care to do that either. 
Summa summarum: I do not care at all 50° 
To lie in bed all day, in melancholy repose, is a solitary pleasure for the leisurely melancholic; as 
Burton writes, "A most incomparable delight it is so to melancholize, and build castles in the air. "501 
492 The Anatomy of Melancholy, Part I, Section 2, Member 2, Subsection 6, p. 244 493 Melancholy and Society, 88 494 Kierkegaard, Language and the Reality of God, 86 495 Raposa, Boredom and the Religious Imagination, 12 496 Problem XXX. 1 "Why is it that all those who are outstanding in philosophy, poetry or the arts are 
melancholic? " 
497 Screech, Montaigne and Melancholy, 23 498 `Le Dandy', `Critical Writings', Les Fleurs Du Mal et Oeuvres Choises, 192. Susan Blood writes (in 
reference to Sartre's critique in his Baudelaire): "Baudeliare's pretensions to originality, his cultivation 
of dandified manners, and his declarations of solitude all marked the painful suspicion that he was not 
unique after all. " Furthermore, "Baudelaire's bad faith stemmed from this predicament: he needed 
others in order to become himself, and could never fully acknowledge his dependency. His claim to 
authenticity actually deepened his bad faith; his authenticity was undermined by its very affirmation. " (Baudelaire and the Aesthetics of Bad Faith, 5). Interestingly, in the second part of Either/Or, `B' launches a similar criticism against the aesthete `A': "In fact you are nothing; you are merely a relation to others, and what you are you are by virtue of this relation. " (135) 499 Melancholy and the Critique of Modernity, 25 500 E/O I, 15 
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But for `A', boredom even insidiously contaminates itself. Idleness becomes restlessness; existence no 
longer accommodates languid repose. One is delivered over to the abyss. `Boredom, extinction, " as 
Vigilius Haufniensis contemplates, "is precisely a continuity in nothingness. "sot 
And how is this alleviated? Even "Curiosity", the contemplation of which may distract one 
from melancholy and boredom, "is vanity", according to Pascal's conclusions. 
503 Even the enquiry into 
the `self becomes merely another vain internal curiosity. Man does not and cannot know himself: 
Know then, proud man, what a paradox you are to yourself... Learn that man infinitely 
transcends man, hear from your master your true condition, which is unknown to you. 
Listen to God. 504 
And yet, being unable to resolve the issues of death, God and the 'self', Pascal laments, "men have 
decided, in order to be happy, not to think about such things'°sos But man is so essentially unhappy as 
to "be bored even if he had no cause for boredom... and he is so vain that, though he has a thousand 
and one basic reasons for being bored, the slightest thing, like pushing a ball with a billiard cue, will be 
enough to divert him. "506 
Essentially, the boredom of the modern subject does not necessarily initiate the religious. On 
the contrary, as Vigilius Haufniensis warns, "The demonic is the contentless, the boring. s507 Such is 
Baudelaire's confession as his melancholy leads him into a desert of apathy, away from the eyes of the 
divine: 
Thus, far from the sight of God, he leads me, 
Panting and crushed by fatigue, into the midst 
Of the plains of Boredom [ennui], extensive and deserted... 508 
Boredom, seeking increasingly more exotic distraction, sinks into decadence - yet a decadence which 
is itself not immunised against boredom. As `A' laments: 
Wine no longer makes my heart glad; a little of it makes me sad, much 
makes me melancholy... Vainly I seek to plunge myself into the boundless 
sea of joy; it cannot sustain me, or rather, I cannot sustain myself. 509 
And so boredom gives birth to despair. "Boredom is the shadow of doubt -a doubt that can grow and 
grow until one despairs of one's life. 510 Even a life sustained by intoxication - erected as a defence 
against boredom - succumbs to the infection of inertia. As Jean-Luc Marion describes: "Under the 
black sun of vanity, nothing matters... interest itself in no way interests man; he no longer feels 
interested in interest, since vanity renders indifferent every difference peculiar to the world and internal 
soi The Anatomy of Melancholy, Part I, Section 2, Member 2, subsection 6, p. 246 502 The Concept ofAnxiety, 133 503 Pensees, IV, 77, p. 50 504 Ibid., VII, 131, p. 64-65 505 Ibid., VIII, 133, p. 66 506 Ibid., VIII, 136, p. 70 507 CA, 132 
508 'La Destruction', Les Fleurs Du Mal, 84. The translation of ennui, as Raposa suggests, is best 
understood as a "boredom tinged with deep melancholy. " (Boredom and the Religious Imagination, 13) 509 E/O I33 
510 Diogns Allen, Three Outsiders: Pascal, Kierkegaard, Simone Weil, 65 
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to it. " 511 And so boredom reveals the abyss in which the eye of vertigo gazes upon nothing. In the 
words of `A': 
Boredom depends on the nothingness which pervades reality; it causes a dizziness like that 
produced by looking down into a yawning chasm, and this darkness is infinite-512 
Melancholy in the Aesthetic and the Religious 
And still Raposa suggests that "Boredom can serve as midwife for the birth of religious knowledge, it 
is the pallid half-darkness that sometimes lingers just before the dawning of religious insight sS13 For 
Kierkegaard, as for Pascal, this involves the realisation that only the divine can sever the `Gordian 
knot' of the self's existence and unburden melancholy from the weight and vertigo of the abyss. One 
may thus wish to differentiate between melancholy in the aesthetic and the religious spheres of 
existence. However, Kierkegaard himself makes no formal differentiation between an aesthetic 
melancholy and a religious melancholy. Despite this, Vincent A. McCarthy 'loosely' ventures such a 
distinction corresponding to the uses of the Danish words Tungsind and Melancholi in Either/Or -a 
work he suggests can be understood as "the `missing treatise' on melancholy in Kierkegaard's 
authorship. "514 McCarthy suggests that both words, commonly translated by the single English word 
`melancholy', signify two degrees of the one mood: "Melancholi being lighter, having a certain 
sweetness and the associations of passivity which the word also has in English; Tungsind being deeper, 
heavier, more intense, closer to brooding, and with an element of reflection present to it "515 
McCarthy is not alone in discerning a difference between these two words: as Mark C. Taylor 
explains, "Melancholi is more light-hearted and attractive, while Tungsind is a darker mood that 
involves brooding preoccupation. "516 But McCarthy makes more than a merely stylistic distinction 
between these terms. In contrast to the "aesthetic" Melancholi, McCarthy argues, Tungsind "is a 
reflective and more critical melancholy, "517 and as such is suggestive of a "religious melancholy". Yet, 
the distinction appears more blurred. As Taylor also notes, "The aesthetic stage on life's way ends in 
what Kierkegaard calls `melancholy' [Tungsind]. s518 Tungsind is for Taylor the climax of the aesthetic, 
rather than the religious. Yet, for McCarthy, Tungsind implies the evolution of aesthetic Melancholi 
from "the first moment of melancholy" into "the second moment" of the religious. Religious 
melancholy's dependence upon aesthetic melancholy is understood in terms of Tungsind's critical 
disillusionment with "the first moment' 'of through which it claims to have moved beyond 
the aesthetic. Therefore McCarthy describes religious melancholy as "the melancholy of a subject 
become reflective in the wake of the failure of all finite objects to satisfy an unquenchable longing. "si9 
511 Marion, God Without Being, 123 
s'2 E/O I, 239 
513 Michael L. Raposa, Boredom and the Religious Imagination, 2 514 McCarthy, The Phenomenology of Moods in Kierkegaard, 53 51' McCarthy, The Phenomenology of Moods in Kierkegaard, 56 516 Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard, 240, n. 110 sly `Kierkegacrd's Religious Psychology', ed. Joseph H. Smith, Kierkegaard's Truth, 254 518 Journeys to Se fhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard, 240 519 'Kierkegaard's Religious Psychology', 254 
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Yet the distinction appears too fluid to generate an interpretative consensus. For example, 
McCarthy's notion of Tungsind as an "intensified" Melancholi is convincingly critiqued by Abrahim 
Khan. According to Khan, there is insufficient evidence supporting an emphatic radical distinction 
between the two terms. The material "lends to an equally plausible hypothesis that `Tungsind' is a 
stylistically elegant variation of `Melancholi'. "520 Thus Khan emphatically rejects any assertion that 
`Melancholi' is the longing of aesthetes, poets and Romantics, while `Tungsind' represents a deeper, 
more profound development. Instead, `Melancholi' is a kind of irony, whilst `Tungsind' is actually 
allied to desire and imagination. 521 Whilst maintaining a difference between the two, Khan is most 
anxious to avoid the trap of intensifying one at the expense of the other; "there is a definite difference, " 
he asserts, "but it seems to be more a difference in kind rather than degree. 9,522 
The translation of Tungsind is evidently emotive in this issue. McCarthy translates 
Tung[`heavy']sind specifically as "heavy-spirited, "523 whilst Khan claims that sind more loosely 
denotes "mind/spirit". 524 Rendering sind precisely as `spirit' implicitly conveys religious, not to 
mention Hegelian, connotations. If, on the contrary, sind is read as `mind' or `temperament' then a 
different emphasis to Melancholi is conveyed, without necessarily implying an awakening of `spirit'. 
As such, McCarthy even acknowledges that `spirit' is already "gestating" in Melancholi. 525 
Furthermore, before enforcing too technically over-determined a reading of the word, it would be wise 
to note Croxhall's observation that Tungsind "is a very common word, often used to describe the 
character of Jutlanders, of whom Kierkegaard's father was one. Tungsind means brooding rumination, 
ceaseless introspection, perpetual cogitation, lack of decision, and listlessness, rather than just 
`listlessness'. X526 As such, it is not necessarily an expedient trait. The suggestion that Tungsind denotes 
an awakening of 'spirit' drawing close to the religious would also seem to conflict with Anti- 
Climacus's words in Practice in Christianity: "Christianity is not at all closer to heavy-mindedness 
[Tungsind] than to light-mindedness; they are both equally worldliness, equally far away, and both 
have just as much need of conversion. sS27 As such, Tungsind is not necessarily closer to the religious 
than a `light-mindedness' ('light-spiritedness' would not sound correct here). This is again present in 
Kierkegaard's discourse on `The Gospel of Sufferings' where the question of bearing the burden of 
forgiveness of sins is discussed. To bear sins with "heavy-mindedness" is to refuse forgiveness for that 
which one believes is too heavy a burden to be displaced; to bear sins with "light-mindedness" is to 
take the forgiveness of sins too lightly - as if forgiveness itself is to be easily forgotten. "Every 
520 Khan, 'Melancholy, Irony, and Kierkegaard', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 17,1985, p. 68 521 "Tungsind is aligned with the constant longing to eternalize, or freeze, a peak sensual experience, 
whereas Melancholi is in conformity with irony from a personal standpoint. They are essentially two different conditions of melancholy. " `Melancholy, Irony, and Kierkegaard', 78 522 `Melancholy, Irony, and Kierkegaard', 80 523 'Kierkegaard's Religious Psychology', 254 524 'Melancholy, Irony, and Kierkegaard', 75 525 'Melancholy and Religious Melancholy in Kierkegaard', Kierkegaardiana X, 162 526 Kierkegaard Commentary, p. xv, n. 2. Also cited in Grimsley, Seren Kierkegaard and French Literature, 166 n. 2. 527 Practice in Christianity, 154 
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extreme, of heavy-mindedness or of light-mindedness [Tungsindeghedens eller Letsinddighedens], 
is 
promptly a sign that faith is not really present "528 
Without subscribing to a formal identification of religious melancholy as Tungsind and 
aesthetic melancholy as Melancholi, however, it is still possible to affirm that melancholy 
directed 
towards the religious can be differentiated in places from a melancholy which orients itself around the 
aesthetic. It is through the religious that melancholy is sublimated. Once melancholy becomes 
conscious of a religious longing, it becomes transfigured by that longing and is restless until it finds 
fulfilment. This breaking through of the negative energy of melancholy towards the longing for the 
God-relationship may best be clarified by an examination of the sketches of melancholy which are 
found in Kierkegaard's authorship. 
There is a difference between melancholy [Tungsind] and melancholy [Tungsind]. There is a 
melancholy which in the case of poets, artists, thinkers, is a crisis, and on the part of women 
may be an erotic crisis. So the melancholy of this lay figure of mine [Quidam] is a crisis 
anticipatory of the religious experience 529 
528 UDVS, 246. A. S. Aldworth and W. S. Ferne translate as "heavy-hearted or light-hearted". Gospel 
of Sufferings, 45. However, despite these juxtapositions, it should not be assumed that heavy- 
mindedness and light-mindedness are mutually exclusive. For example, in the discourse `Against 
Cowardliness' Kierkegaard writes, "Silence and light-mindedness [Letsind] can indeed conceal a 
heavy-mindedness [Tungsind] that gloomily loves the good. " EUD, 373-374 
529 `Epistle to the Reader', SLW, 390. I have here been using Walter Lowrie's translation since the 
Hong and Hong rendering of Tungsind as "depression" (SLW, 429) is misleading. McCarthy also notes 
this since `depression' in the twentieth century is contaminated by specifically clinical and Freudian 
meanings. Furthermore, "The Danish twentieth-century term that corresponds to our use of 
'depression' is simply the Danish cognate `depression. "' 'Mourning and Melancholia in 'Quidam's 
Diary", International Kierkegaard Commentary Volume 11: Stages on Life's Way, ed. Robert L. 
Perkins, 155 n. l 1. However, McCarthy's own alternative advocating of the "archaic" word 
"melancholia" potentially suffers from a similarly technical twentieth century connotation. 
Melancholia becomes, as Abrahim Khan explains, "a technical term or name for a functional mental 
disease characterized by gloomy thoughts, delusion, and depression. After Freud's 1917 study 
`Mourning and Melancholia, ' Karl Abraham's 1924 study on melancholia and obsessional neurosis, 
and Sandor Rado's 1926 paper on the problem of melancholia, the latter term gained admittance to the 
lexicography of clinical psychiatry as a synonym for psychotic depression. " 'Melancholy: An Elusive 
Element of Depression? ', The Journal of Medical Humanities 15: 2 (1994), 114. It has been remarked 
that "Kierkegaard was the first to transfer psychology from the physiological laboratory to a truly 
personal context... Through his writings and self-analysis, Kierkegaard preceded Freud, Jung, and 
Rogers on subjects such as the unconscious, introversion, and self, ideal-self conflict. " Charles Carr, 
`Kierkegaard: On Guilt', Journal of Psychology and Theology, Volume 1: 3 (1973), 16. And yet Khan 
elsewhere denies an identification between Kierkegaard's Melancoli and Freud's Melancholia since, 
unlike Kierkegaard, "Freud's enquiry is about an illness, a condition not necessarily and deliberately 
willed... [Kierkegaard's] is decisively different from Freud's concern in that the experience of 
nothingness issues from having adopted irony as a personal standpoint or orientation in life. " 'Melancholy, Irony, and Kierkegaard', International Journal for Philosophy ofReligion 17 (1985), 72. Furthermore, as Khan also argues, in Kierkegaard, "being melancholy is a feature of our humanity and is hardly an indication of illness or psychological abnormality. " `Melancholy: An Elusive Dimension 
of Depression? ', 114. There is thus a potentially confusing slippage of Kierkegaard's and the technical term when, for example, in Bruce Kirmmse's translation of Kresten Nordentoft's Kierkegaard's Psykologi (Copenhagen: G. E. C. GAD, 1972) / Kierkegaard's Psychology (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1978) the more specialised "melancholia" is used throughout to translate both Melancoli and Tungsind. 
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Kierkegaard The Religious Genius and Modernity's Anatomist of Religious Melancholy 
La melancholie, toujours inseparable du sentiment du beau. 
- Baudelaire 
How wonderfully melancholy and religion can blend together. 
- Kierkegaard"° 
Kierkegaard at times reads as both modernity's greatest anatomist of melancholy and the most virile 
and ironic critic of both melancholy and modernity. Against the grain of secular humanism's optimistic 
procession from the Renaissance and contemporary neo-Stoicism, Pascal asserted that "Man's 
greatness comes from knowing that he is wretched "S31 Likewise, with more affinity to the self- 
conscious despair of Pascal than the neo-Stoical resilience of Montaigne, Kierkegaard affirmed the 
value of humanity's consciousness of its own deficiency. 532 Human greatness comes from knowing the 
abyss. Kierkegaard's writings anatomise an inner conflict between the aesthetic and the religious which 
constitutes the dialectical melancholy of the modem self. Although Kierkegaard never devoted a 
conceptual publication to melancholy - as he did with anxiety and despair - his writing exhibits some 
personal application of melancholy's tradition: "What in a certain sense is called `spleen' and what the 
mystics knew by the designation `the and moments, ' the Middle Ages knew as acedia" 
533 It is to this 
tristitia that Kierkegaard relates his father invoking "A quiet despair. "534 Under this phrase 
Kierkegaard recounts a genealogy of hereditary melancholy: a father labouring under a secret 
melancholy; a silent confidante, his son Soren, "upon whom the whole of that melancholy descended in 
inheritance. 99535 
It is Kierkegaard's propensity for apparently autobiographical confessions of the eternal night 
brooding within that has attracted much morbid and salacious speculation about the hidden etymology 
gnawing at the core of his `thorn in the flesh'. But despite the silence at the heart of this wound, Camus 
confidently pronounces how Kierkegaard "is careful not to quiet its pain. i536 As for St. Paul, 
Kierkegaard's secret thorn is a passion which dares only to speak its name obliquely; and yet, 
530 The Journals of Seren Kierkegaard, ed. Dru (905) / Pap. X' A 285 531 Pensees, VI 114 (397), p. 59 532 Despite the differences between Pascal's seventeenth century France in the grip of scientific 
rationalism and Kierkegaard's nineteenth century Denmark in the sways of Romantic Idealism, both 
Pascal and Kierkegaard can be seen in reaction against certain out-workings of the Renaissance 
tradition. As Denzil Patrick explains, both "challenged the whole anthropology of the Renaissance, 
with its enthronement of self-sufficient reason, its affirmation that man is the measure of all things. " 
Pascal and Kierkegaard, Vol II, 316 533 JP 1: 739 / Pap. II A 484 
534 JP 1: 740 / Pap. II A 485. It is important to note that while Kierkegaard uses "despair", the diagnosis 
is closer at this point to a more general "melancholy" than what he later formulates as "despair. " "It is 
not yet the formulation of an exact theological concept, which was to emerge later on when he began distinguishing between dread [anxiety] and desperation [despair], but only the 'nuclear embryo' - as it were - from which these notions derive. " Cornelio Fabro, 'Desperation. ' Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana 
Volume 7,132. 
535 The Journals of Soren Kierkegaard, ed. Dru (600) / Pap. VII A 126. A similar portrait is fictionalised 
under "Quiet Despair" in Stages On Life's Way, 199-200: "Poor child, you are in a quiet despair... And the father believed that he was responsible for his son's depression, and the son believed that it was he 
who caused his father's sorrow - but never a word was exchanged about this. " SLW, 200 536 Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, 30 
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according to Sartre, all are agreed in diagnosing "a sexual anomaly as its kernel. 11537 That 
is unless, as 
Rikard Magnussen speculates, one looks no further than Kierkegaard's hunchback to unlock its 
secret 538 But all such conjecture should be moderated by Vigilius Haufniensis's observation that "Not 
everyone who is stoop-shouldered is an Atlas, nor did he become such by supporting a world. 99539 It 
is 
such speculative sculpting that forms the statue of Kierkegaard as the "angelic or demonic spirit 
in a 
sickly, hunchbacked body". 54° Hence Camus's dandified portrait of a melancholic Kierkegaard: "That 
face both tender and sneering, those pirouettes followed by a cry from the heart"sal Here Kierkegaard is 
portrayed awakening his own suffering "in the desperate joy of a man crucified and happy to be so, s542 
prolonging his passion in the hope that it would eventually reconcile him to the anomaly of his own 
existence. 
This is an invariably unbalanced description of "the melancholy Dane in whom Hamlet was 
mastered by Christ" S43 One cannot be certain where the root of this thorn grows, but what is revealed is 
into which dark night Kierkegaard believed it led him and by whose light his path was illuminated. 
Kierkegaard's transfigured understanding of his thorn in the flesh is more theologically availing than 
its conjectured psychopathology: 
From an early age I have suffered from a thorn in my flesh to which the 
consciousness of sin and guilt has attached itself; I have felt myself to be 
different. This suffering, this difference I have understood as my relation 
to God 544 
There is a sense in which Kierkegaard regarded this melancholy as inherited from his earthly father, 
545 
yet it also derived from the relation to his Father in Heaven - "the agony with which God laid the reins 
537 `Kierkegaard: The Singular Universal', 89 
538 As alleged in Rikard Magnussen's, Seren Kierkegaard set udefra [seen from outside] and Det 
saerlige Kors [The Special Cross]. Although he was certainly "round-shouldered", it is hard to see how 
Kierkegaard could have kept such a deformed hunchback a secret when his enemies were so keen to 
satirise his spindly legs and uneven trousers. See T. H. Croxall, Kierkegaard Commentary, p. xvi n. 2. 
As Ronald Grimsley suggests, "a further weakness of this theory is that it does not account for the close 
link established by Kierkegaard himself between his secret and his relations with his father. " 
`Appendix: The Problem of Kierkegaard's Melancholy', Soren Kierkegaard and French Literature, 
160. See this Appendix for a concise overview of scholarly commentaries upon the secret etymology of 
the thorn in the flesh. Roger Poole is likewise dubious about Magnussen's claim in his discussion of 
the physicality of Kierkegaard's 'thorn in the flesh' in `The Text of the Body' the sixth chapter of 
Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication. 
539 CA, 7. However, it is interesting to consider Reidar Thomte's reference to Kierkegaard's discussion 
of the `genius' Talleyrand (CA, 102). Talleyrand was a noble born with a clubfoot and intended for a 
life in the church, which he rejected. Thomte states that "Kierkegaard suggests that Talleyrand's deformity might have been a divine sign, and that if he had disdained the temporal and immediate and had turned instead to himself and the divine, a religious genius might have emerged. " CA, 247 n. 47. 540 Theodor Haecker, Kierkegaard the Cripple, 25 541 The Myth of Sisyphus, 30 542 ibid. 
543 The phrase comes from P. T. Forsyth's The Work of Christ and composes the title for H. V. Martin's Kierkegaard: The Melancholy Dane. 
544 The Journals of Seren Kierkegaard, ed. Dru (1288) / Pap. X5 A 89 545 "Merciful God, my father too was terribly unjust to me in his melancholy J- an old man who put the weight of his melancholy upon a child. " The Journals of Seren Kierkegaard, ed. Dru (681) / Pap. VIII A 177 
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upon me. "546 Although this melancholy `threw him for a time into sin and debauchery, 9547 
Kierkegaard 
sought to transubstantiate his existence into spirit as he came to incrementally understand God's will 
for himself. Kierkegaard notes how "Empedocles supposed that there were two kinds of insanity - the 
one had its basis in physical illness, the other in the purification of the soul. s548 It is surely in this 
second basis that melancholy can derive a spiritually formative meaning. As such, "it is a fortunate, 
indeed it is an estimable blessing to be as melancholy as I was. Had I been a happy nature - and had 
then experienced what I did experience as an author; I believe it would have sent a man mad ., 
049 The 
crucible of melancholy constituted the birth pains of a spiritual metamorphosis. As such, there is a 
conviction in Kierkegaard that, "There is a melancholy in me which is partly, or so at least, I believe, 
related to something good in me". 550 
It is not, however, the secret of Kierkegaard's personal melancholia or depression which I 
wish to excavate. Although he confesses his illness, Kierkegaard is reticent to publish directly about the 
secret of his existence, preferring instead to communicate indirectly through a dramatis personae of 
pseudonyms in order to reveal, conceal and critique his own melancholy and the melancholy of the age. 
"In between my melancholy and myself lay a whole world of the imagination. That is, in part, what I 
rid myself of in the pseudonyms... my melancholy has kept me away from myself, while I discovered 
and practically lived through a whole world of my imagination. "55' Kierkegaard's melancholy enforced 
an abyss within the self within which his virile imagination spun its web. As such, while Kierkegaard 
privately confesses how "I was flung down into the abyss melancholy", SSZ his pseudonym Quidam 
recounts how he rises by virtue of his aesthetic sensibilities - "my lightness in dancing over 
abysses" 553 The aesthetic may thus constitute an evasion of melancholy's depths - albeit an evasion 
which is inevitably destined to succumb to the nothingness of the abyss. What sublimates this malaise 
is the recognition that the latent longing of melancholy can intimate that, in Kierkegaard's words, 
"Something is stirring within me which points to a metamorphosis. " The task then is not to "procure an 
abortion" but rather to "think out the idea of my melancholy together with God here and now. That is 
how I must get rid of my melancholy and bring Christianity closer to me. " It is not the 'lightness' 
which evades melancholy by `dancing over the abyss'; but "the need of approaching nearer to myself 
in a deeper sense, by approaching nearer to God in the understanding of myself. "554 
546 The Journals of Seren Kierkegaard, ed. Dru (600) / Pap. VII A 126 547 The Journals of Seren Kierkegaard, ed. Dru (754) / Pap. VIII A 650 548 Kierkegaard refers to Heinrich Ritter, Geschichte der Philosophie alter Zeit [Hamburg: 1836 (ASKB 735-738)] which contains the quotation from Caelius Aurelianus's De morbis chronicis (The Time of Death): "Empedoclem sequentes alium (sc. furorem) dicunt ex animi purgamento fieri, alium 
alientione mentis ex corporis causa sive inigitate. " JP 4: 3896 / Pap. VIII' A 47 549 The Journals of Seren Kierkegaard, ed. Dru (1041) / Pap. X2 A 411 550 The Journals of Seren Kierkegaard, ed. Dru (1288) / Pap. X5 A 89 551 The Journals of Seren Kierkegaard, ed. Dru (641) / Pap. VIII A 27. Likewise pseudonym Quidam 
asks, "What is my sickness? Melancholy. Where is the seat of this sickness? In the power of imagination, and possibility is its nutriment. " SLW, 356 552 The Journals of Soren Kierkegaard, ed. Dru (754) / Pap. VIII A 650 553 SLW 211 
554 The Journals of Seren Kierkegaard, ed. Dru (694) / Pap. VIII' A 250 
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Before God the mystery of the self is resolved and no secret of melancholy can be concealed. But 
melancholy's apparent lightness of being - in which one seemingly dances across the abyss - risks the 
loss of self through the nihilistic perpetuation of self-abstraction. Consider Kierkegaard's perturbing 
thought experiment in a Journal entry of 1849: 
Question: Whether It Would Be Psychologically Correct, whether It Is Even 
Psychologically Conceivable. 
A basically melancholic individual who otherwise had never been 
tormented or tempted by the thought of suicide. 
He takes a walk one day in a beautiful wooded area. It has just been 
raining; everything smells fresh and fragrant; it occurs to him that he never or 
only rarely had felt so indescribably, so ineffably good. 
As he walks along the thought comes to him en passant: what if you 
took your life - and he does it. 
Here there is no pre-meditation about such a step, no sequence of events 
or violent agitation. The thought comes to him something like this: see, there is a 
delightful little flower; he commits the deed in about the same state of mind as 
that in which one bends down and picks a little flower; therefore death in this case 
would be a kind of well-being carried to a higher power. 
Is such a thing conceivable? 5" 
Melancholy's association with weight and heaviness has been established, but here is an instance of 
what Kierkegaard calls "an extreme example of being loosely attached to life. "ssb The `self becomes 
insubstantial, a virtually translucent, dream-like veneer between oneself and the world: "Melancholy's 
point of contact with insanity is, as in so many other respects, that one himself becomes an object. 
What is peculiar and unusual is the most idyllic objectivity, idyllically to mistake oneself for a little 
flower. s557 This `insanity' connotes the loss of being. "Depression is the hidden face of Narcissus, " 
Kristeva writes, "the face that is to bear him away into death, but of which he is unaware while he 
admires himself in a mirage. "558 Like Narcissus, metamorphosised into an object by his own self- 
reflection, Kierkegaard's melancholy individual is transformed into a flower. He has misplaced himself 
and either believes himself to be a flower, or else picks a flower unaware that in doing so he has 
plucked himself out of existence. 
Furthermore, the aesthete is continually adept at dissembling the secret of his melancholy 
before `the others', as confessed in `Quidam's Diary': 
At any time of day I can put off my melancholy, or rather put on my disguise, for 
melancholy merely waits for me till I am alone. If there is anybody present, whoever 
it may be, I am never quite what I am. 559 
It is only in solitude that melancholy can unveil itself. It is here that melancholy, unrelieved by 
distraction, meditates upon itself. "Just as a woman who is unhappy at home spends a lot of time 
looking out the window, so the soul of the melancholy person keeps on the lookout for diversions. 
555 JP 3: 2692 / Pap. X' A 642 
556 Ibid. 
557 Ibid. 
558 Black Sun, 5 
559 'Guilty/Not Guilty? ', SLW, 189 
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Another form of melancholy is the kind which keeps its eyes shut in order to have darkness all 
around .,, 
560 This self-beguiling and erotic brooding can be discerned in Quidam's poetic sighs: 
Then shall I have peace, for the remembrance of melancholy is blessed and 
softened and is as happy as the weeping willow when it is swayed by the 
evening breeze. 561 
Melancholy becomes, as Kierkegaard aptly phrases it, my "one intimate confidante. " This internal 
relationship can bear the ornamentation of the erotic: "she beckons to me, calls me aside, even though 
physically I remain on the spot. It is the most faithful mistress I have known - no wonder, then, that I 
must be prepared to follow at any moment. "562 But this suggestion of being called aside by an other 
dissembles melancholy's inherent narcissism. As Ronald Grimsely observes, "melancholy itself may be 
a subtle form of enjoyment and reveal the complacent egoism of a man who refuses to abandon a secret 
form of self-indulgence. "563 This auto-eroticism, by which the melancholic lives on intimate terms with 
melancholy, compounds melancholy's conviction of the solitude of genius. Montaigne stoically 
advocated reflective retreat into one's `private room', but his temperance was suspicious of long term 
withdrawal into solitude-564 Baudelaire saw the poet as `the albatross', captured and mocked by the 
crew of a ship, derided as a comic and invalid figure: "Exiled on the earth in the midst of derision / His 
giant wings keep him from walking. 565 Kierkegaard, `the wild goose', `the storm-petrel', recognised 
his own genius as a determinate in a melancholy which he interpreted as "the high price at which 
Almighty God sold me an intellectual power which has found no equal among its contemporaries. "566 
And yet, as Gouwens observes, "Neither is Kierkegaard, for all his interest in what it is to be a `genius', 
partial to the aristocratic Romantic notion that genius is necessary for self-knowledge. In contrast to 
this, he is stubbornly egalitarian in claiming that this self-reflection is a skill or capacity open to any 
person. " 567 The lack of contemporary intellectual solidarity certainly confirmed his melancholy, yet, 
regretfully for his own sensitivity, Kierkegaard confesses how he was not protected by an inflated 
confidence in his genius. "That does not puff me up, " he declares, "for I am already ground to dust'"568 
Once his cruel lampooning in The Corsair had made Kierkegaard a figure of disdain - even for the 
`common man' with whom he fancied he had some affinity - he was now truly solitary, "God's clown 
56° JP 3: 2688 / Pap. VIII' A 239 
561 SLW, 250 
562 JP 5: 5496 / Pap. III A 114. `A' also says in `Diapsalmata': "My melancholy is the most faithful 
mistress I have ever known; what wonder, then, that I love in return. " (E/O I, 16) 563 Soren Kierkegaard and French Literature, 45 564 See M. A. Screech, Montaigne and Melancholy, p. 68-69. "This calm withdrawal into self was the 
mark of the equable, sanguine [blood presiding over the other humours, healthy] melancholic. Its 
greatest contrast is with the solitary wildness of the man suffering from melancholy adust [burnt, dried 
out]. " (69) 
565 'L"Albatros', Les Fleurs Du Mal, 24 566 The Journals of Seren Kierkegaard, ed. Dru (600) / Pap. VII A 126 567 Kierkegaard As Religious Thinker, 57 n. 4. Thomas V. Gilmartin contrasts Kierkegaard with the 
psychological approach of William James: "Unlike Kierkegaard who thought it was harmfully 
misleading to consider some people religious geniuses, James held that some do have a gift for religion as others have it for poetry or philosophy. " Soul-Sickness: A Comparison of William James and Soren Kierkegaard, Th. D. Dissertation, Berkely, California, 1974, p. 88 568 The Journals of Seren Kierkegaard, ed. Dru (600) / Pap. VII A 126 
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among men, the scourge of God . 9s569 
The superiority and conceit of genius was little sanctuary for a 
man who called his brilliance a cause of "daily humiliation" for him. Hence Kierkegaard 
has been 
called "A man of superb intellect, and great spiritual strength, but a lopsided, tragic figure. 
*470 
Genius itself succumbed to a melancholy which, Kierkegaard postulated, "must have its deeper roots in 
a disproportion between soul and body; for (and that is what is extraordinary) it has no relation to my 
mind" In fact, Kierkegaard believed that due to this physical and psychical tension his mind was 
endowed with "a tensile strength which is rare. 9571 As such, melancholy potentially signifies a disorder 
which is profoundly more spiritual than mental. Eventually, the genius, for Kierkegaard, must become 
religious - though the expression of the religious demands its own solitude: 
With the years, it is true, this pain diminishes more and more; for as more and 
more one becomes spirit, it causes no pain that one is not like the others. Spirit 
569 Jurgen Bukdahl, Soren Kierkegaard and the Common Man, 101 
570 Colin Wilson, Religion and the Rebel, 241. Ralph Harper concludes that, "He asked to be judged as 
a wild goose, by his indifference to the world. But he was one of the most thin-skinned men ever to 
have lived, and was abnormally not `indifferent' to the world. " (The Seventh Solitude: Metaphysical 
Homelessness in Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky and Nietzsche, 9). Furthermore, Harper alleges, Kierkegaard 
became "so imprisoned in his melancholy, `my castle', that he could not believe in human love as a 
solution. He who tried to become 'contemporaneous' with Christ could not believe he could become 
contemporaneous with Regine Olsen. " (ibid., 24. ) However, I believe that Harper is unfair to conclude 
that "almost everything Kierkegaard wrote was spoiled by his exasperation with the time in which he 
lived... not nearly so obsessed by his inherited sense of sin as he himself thought, Kierkegaard let 
himself be bogged down in an unedifying bickering with the Copenhagen bourgeoisie. " (ibid., 27) On 
the contrary, as Stephen N. Dunning observes, Kierkegaard regulated his social facade with competent 
self-mastery. Kierkegaard's remoteness dissembles his true nature: "Withdrawnness, then, is deceptive 
external behavior intended to conceal the fact of inner melancholy. It is not itself the internal state of 
melancholy but the external appearance contrived to contradict and conceal that internal state. " 
(Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Inwardness: A Structural Analysis of the Theory of Stages, 126). In support 
of the view that Kierkegaard's withdrawnness constitutes only a secondary expression of his 
melancholy I cite the following: "What people regard as selfishness and lack of participation may 
sometimes be melancholy... Sometimes it can almost be thoughtfulness of others, in order not to let 
them feel how unhappy he is. " (JP 3: 2690 / Pap. IX A 366) Especially when reading the bitter 
polemics of his later life, one could easily glean the impression that Kierkegaard, ultimately, could 
never forgive himself for his loneliness. Absorbed by the abyssal depths of his melancholy Kierkegaard 
arguably crafted his internal landscape into a hell on earth. However, I think Harper's suspicion does 
great disservice to Kierkegaard's own desire to overcome his melancholy and transform his suffering 
into joy, through the religious. Even Camus acknowledges that "Kierkegaard wants to be cured. To be 
cured is his frenzied wish and it runs throughout his whole journal. " (The Myth of Sisyphus, 41) I 
concur with Arbaugh and Arbaugh that Kierkegaard "treats Christian suffering as a distinct category, 
sharply distinguished from all other kinds of suffering. " (Kierkegaard's Authorship, 192) Cultivating 
aesthetic suffering for its own sake, although something he at times had a propensity for, is sharply 
criticised by Kierkegaard. As Martin J. Heinecken observes, "One thing that concerned Kierkegaard 
was that his melancholy should not be equated with the suffering of the Christian. "( The Moment 
Before God, 292) On the religious level his melancholy was transfigured by another possibility: that of 
the metamorphosis of spirit. "This melancholy [pertaining to his broken engagement] was really the 
causa secunda, the human time-cause of compulsion and selection, necessity and freedom, whereas the 
prima causa or primary cause was God Himself, His will in the shape of Kierkegaard's inner call to an 
extraordinary task. " (Haecker, Kierkegaard the Cripple, 45) s" The Journals of Seren Kierkegaard, ed. Dru (600) / Pap. VII A 126. The mutual desire of soul and body for severance from one another may be seen to produce melancholy's sense of `looseness' or `lightness' of being. This is tempered by another traditional view of the relation between madness and 
genius deriving from "the ancient belief that both madmen and geniuses have souls and bodies more 
closely knit together than other men do. " Screech, Montaine and Melancholy, 37 
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is precisely this: not to be like others. 572 
Kierkegaard elsewhere calls this specifically "the negative definition of spirit s573 This is the 
estrangement of spirit: its severance from all that is not spirit. "Of all anguish, the greatest is this - to 
have the task of being spirit and then to have to live among men. "574 This homelessness is the negative 
side of submitting to the metamorphosis of spirit: a transmutation which incurs its own Unhappy 
Consciousness - as in the religious melancholy of Abraham mentioned in Chapter One. 
And yet it is the disillusion of melancholy which can inspire the longing to become spirit. As 
Kierkegaard's `B' (Judge William) prescribes to the melancholic aesthete `A': "the men whose souls 
are acquainted with no melancholy are those whose souls have no presentiment for metamorphosis. "sus 
But this melancholy must be directed towards this transformation - towards the Wholly Other - and 
must not remain locked up in internalised self-infatuation. A laments how "Life has become a bitter 
drink to me, and yet I must take it like medicine, slowly, drop by drop. 99576 And yet, admonishing A, 
Judge William is critically aware of how such lyricism can conceal a fashionable pretence which 
obscures the gravity of melancholy: "In our age it has become something great to be melancholy... but 
a man becomes melancholy by his own fault 9577 Poetic embellishment and distraction can constitute 
evasions of the brooding energy of spirit which struggles within melancholy. When spirit refuses "the 
satiety of pleasure" which intoxication offers to it, then it "gathers like a dark cloud... and it becomes 
an anguishing dread which ceases not even in the moment of pleasure. , 578 Just as Vigilius Haufniensis 
wrote that one must `renounce anxiety without anxiety", 579 so one must finally conquer melancholy 
with a renunciation of melancholy's erotic self-fascination or distraction. Hence Judge William extols 
A to recognise his melancholy as a form of despair: 
Behold, my young friend, this life of yours is despair. Hide this if you will from others, from 
yourself you cannot hide it, it is despair. And yet in another sense this life is not despair. You 
are too frivolous to despair, and you are too melancholy not to come in touch with despair. 58° 
Melancholy then is a precedent of despair for `A' which can also function as an evasion of true despair. 
As such, by following Judge William's counsel to `choose despair', 581 `A' would consciously and 
freely submit to the possibility of a spiritual metamorphosis. Within its gloomy tomb melancholy bears 
the presentiment of its own resurrection, for "Only spirit can relieve it, for it is a spiritual ailment. "582 
And yet, as the following chapter shall examine, the longing struggle of spirit's relation to the Wholly 
572 `The Instant', No. 10. Published after Kierkegaard's death but written before his admittance to hospital, October 2,1855, AUC, 286 
373 PVC 81 
574 J, 4: 4325 /PapIXA38 
575 E/O Ht 160 
576 E/O I, 20 
S'7E/O II, p. 157 578 E/O 11 157 
579 CA, 117 
580 E/O 11,173 
581 E/O II, 177 
582 E/O II, 160. B' precedes this statement with a refutation of the material nature of melancholy: "for you hardly assume like many physicians that melancholy is an ailment of the body - and for all that, strangely enough, the physician cannot relieve it. " 
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Other is accompanied by its own persistent danger of falling back down into a deeper abyss of 
melancholy. 
I must dare to believe that I can be saved by Christ from the power of melancholy 
583 in which I have lived. 
583 The Journals of Soren Kierkegaard, ed. Dru (936) / Pap. X' A 510 
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Chapter Three: The Melancholy Theophany 
If there were no eternal consciousness in a man, if at the foundation of all there lay only a 
wildly seething power which writhing with obscure passions produced everything that is great 
and everything that is insignificant, if a bottomless void [bundles Tomhed] never satiated lay 
hidden beneath all - what would life be but despair? 
584 
The Longing of Spirit 
Religious melancholy attests to an inexhaustible yet apparently unfulfilled longing of spirit. "Spirit is 
restlessness; Christianity is the most profound restlessness of existence - so it is in the New 
Testament "585 However, the recognition of spirit's restless longing does not amount to the fulfilment 
of a longing that may remain continually defied. Spirit longs for God but it strives in the world of 
spiritlessness. This restless agitation does not resolve itself in a fluent transmutation of the individual 
into spirit. "Flesh and blood or the sensate - and spirit are opposites... From what do flesh and blood 
shrink from most of all? From dying. Consequently spirit is to will to die, to die to the world. "sah As 
flesh and blood resist their transubstantiation, so spirit's restlessness is manifest through conflict. 
Kierkegaard thus claims that "God is man's most redoubtable enemy, thy mortal enemy; He would that 
. thou shouldst 
die, die unto the world"587 
Such, in Kierkegaard, is the melancholy love relationship between two qualities so infinitely 
different as humanity and divinity. Religious melancholy is the longing for God: it is the wound of a 
longing that has not yet attained to God - as such, its tension is analogous to an erotic longing or a 
love-melancholy. "Melancholy... is a sign that we have not been abandoned by God. "588 Yet its 
endurance may also point to the fact that we have not yet entirely left the aesthetic. In its melancholy 
the `self longs for God, though this melancholy darkens the perception of that which it longs for. Yet 
the severity of this enmity may subvert the course of the God-relationship. Consider the embellished 
antagonism described by Kierkegaard's melancholic W. 
There is still another proof for the existence of God, one which has hitherto been 
overlooked. It is propounded by a servant in Aristophene's The Knights: 
Demosthenes: Shrines? Shrines? Why surely you don't believe 
in the gods. 
Nicias: I do. 
Demosthenes: But what's your argument? Where's your proof? 
Nicias: Because I feel they persecute me and hate me, in spite of 
everything I try to please `em. 
Demosthenes: Well, well. That's true; you're right about that. 589 
This persecution complex also finds expression in the confession of `A' that "I feel as if I were a piece 
in a game of chess, when my opponent says of it: That piece cannot be moved. sS90 `A' articulates the 
584 FT, 11 
585 JP 4: 4361 /Pap. X12 A 317 
586 JP 4: 4354 /Pap. XP A 558 
587 `The Instant', No. 5, July 27,1855, AUC, 157 588 Ferguson, Melancholy and the Critique of Modernity, 26-27 589 E/O I, 29 
590 E/O I, 17 
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familiar immobility of melancholy; yet, in contrast to the sterile inertia of acedia, he defines his 
anxious paralysis in relation to a definite, though unseen, Wholly Other. 
Religious melancholy suggests the rise in the erotic longing of spirit, but spirit, as Kierkegaard 
tirelessly insists, is combative towards that which is other than itself. The melancholy longing is 
essentially antagonistic. The vacuity of modem spiritlessness can exacerbate melancholy while also 
serving to render the longings of spirit conspicuously frustrated. But, as Berger warns in regard to 
modernity's inhibition of religious desires, "rheologically, there are few ideas less helpful than the one 
that religious belief relates to religious need as orgasm does to lust. "591 In fact, for Kierkegaard, 
authentic Christianity does not serve its purpose in the satisfaction of useful needs. While he often 
describes the God-relation in erotic terms, the achievement of that relation is not to be understood 
simply as the sexualised consummation, and gratification, of religious longing. Spirit may represent 
restlessness, but it does not constitute a metaphysical itch in need of scratching. Kierkegaardian 
insistence on the antagonism of the infinite qualitative difference sees to it that there is no equation 
between wish and fulfilment in the authentic God-relationship. 
Religious melancholy can indeed represent the stirring of spirit's longing, but it is a longing 
that does not have its gratification transpire in the very arousal of its need. In the agitation of spirit 
there is an incitement of opposition: the adversity between God and humanity, between spirit and 
spiritlessness. There is, however, a sense in which the erotic tension of religious longing is indefinitely 
preserved in this denial of consummation. Yet it is this very denial which asserts that Christianity is not 
the self-gratification of religious need, but a long arduous transmutation into spirit whose fulfilment is 
ultimately eschatological. The individual must first learn that to long for God and to possess God are 
not identical. Such religious aspiration and frustration is expressed by the ambivalent language of 
ekstasis and descent: the language of transitory theophany which reveals the sacred and the consequent 
melancholy fall back into the profane. 
Ekstasis and Descent: Unfulfilled Longing and the Weight/Wait of Melancholy 
Whither hast thou hidden thyself, And hast left me, 0 Beloved, 
to my sighing? 
Thou didst flee like the hart, having wounded me: I went 
out after thee, calling, and thou wert gone. 
- John of the Cross, 'Spiritual Canticle', `Stanza the First'592 
We have gone weighed down from beneath; the vision is frustrated. 
- Plotinus, Enneads, VI, 9: 4 
Religious melancholy is, as McCarthy articulates, "longing for the Beloved, not as the young and the 
romantics understood it but rather as did the Christian mystics"593 Despite the meditation upon 
modernity's inhibition of religiousness, the frustrated erotic aspirations of religious longing are, as 
McCarthy suggests, not a uniquely modem experience. Burton's seventeenth century anthology The 
591 A Rumour ofAngels: Modern Society and the Rediscovery of the Supernatural, 40 592 The Complete Works of Saint John of the Cross, Vol. II, 31 593 'Kierkegaard's Religious Psychology', 238 
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Anatomy of Melancholy, for example, notably locates Religious Melancholy close to love-melancholy 
in a discussion which commences with a consideration of the allure and enticement of divine beauty. 
While a similar interaction of seduction and frustrated longing seems to affiliate the two, the `Beloved' 
of Religious Melancholy is an ultimately unobtainable vision who overwhelms the sight of any 
prospective lover. Exodus 33 above all exemplifies this frustration for Burton since Moses, "when he 
desired to see God in His glory, was answered that he might not endure it, no man could see His face 
and live"594 Albeit with neoplatonic heritage lurking behind his words, Augustine expresses the 
restless desire for God with a similar evocation of the paradoxical longing: "Hide not Thy face from 
me. Even if I die, let me see Thy face lest I die. "595 The absence of the face of the Beloved means a 
living death; the vision of the face is annihilation. The Beloved, and consequently the kingdom of the 
Beloved, must remain ultimately absent. "Where, beyond Heaven and earth, could I go that there my 
God might come to me - he who said, `I fill heaven and earth'? "596 As Augustine describes, "Thou 
didst lift me up, that I might see that there was something to be seen, though I was not fit to see it. "597 
Just as Moses was permitted only to see the back of God (posteriora del), the Augustinian theophany is 
qualified by a revelation of God's distance from the unworthy soul, and is therefore also a 
concealment. 
Prior to his conversion, Augustine exhibits the characteristic disillusionment of the restless 
melancholic. He confesses his depressive experience initiated after the death of his beloved friend: 
My native place was a torture room to me and my father's house a strange 
unhappiness... I became a hard riddle to myself, and I asked my soul why 
she was so downcast and why this disquieted me sorely... Nothing but tears 
were sweet to me and they took my friend's place in my heart's desire. 598 
This confession is a useful reminder of the characteristic substance of melancholy. Augustine expresses 
the exemplary sensations of spatial alienation ("my native place was a torture room to me... "); 
inscrutability of the self ("I became a hard riddle to myself... "); and the solace found in his own grief 
("nothing but tears were sweet to me... "). Although the death of his friend provided a specific catalyst 
for his dis-ease, Augustine's sorrow relentlessly contaminates and renders insensate his entire material 
and temporal world. Augustine's absent friend is supplanted by the grief which "took my friend's place 
in my heart's desire. " Melancholy typically becomes the focus of its own meditation. 
Thus I fretted, sighed, wept, tormented myself, and took neither rest nor counsel, 
for I was dragging around my torn and bloody soul. It was impatient of my 
dragging it around, and yet I could not find a place to lay it down. Not in pleasant 
groves, nor in sport or song, nor in fragrant bowers, nor in magnificent banquetings, 
nor in the pleasures of the bed or the couch; not even in books or poetry did it find 599 
594 The Anatomy of Melancholy, Pt. 3, Sec. 4, Mem. I, Subs. I, p. 315 595 Confessions, Book I, 5 
596 Augustine, Confessions, Book I, 3 597 Confessions, Book VII, 137 
598 Confessions, Book IV, 61. Parallel the impact on Montaigne of the loss of his own dear friend, La Boetie (see Screech, Montaigne and Melancholy, 22). 599 Confessions, 63 
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Augustine discovers that even the pleasures that previously yielded him joy have lost their savour. 
Distraction loses its power to captivate; even expressions of meaning (books or poetry) have become 
drained of pathos. Augustine's Sisyphean melancholy diffuses a pollutant discomfort throughout 
his 
life. Thus Augustine expresses the feeling of weight so prominent in melancholy: "when my soul 
left 
off weeping, a heavy burden of misery weighed me down. s600 
As with Tolstoy in the nineteenth century, this exhaustion of his earthly lusts directed 
Augustine's melancholy towards eminently spiritual conclusions. He could thus be seen as embodying 
McCarthy's assertion that "Religious melancholy is the moment of crisis when the separation of the 
finite from the Infinite reaches a point of unendurable severity. "601 Severance has pronounced itself 
with such intensity for Augustine that the longing for transcendence overwhelms the weight of 
melancholy despondency. Attracted by eternity and sated by Plotinus, Augustine describes his 
epiphany in the language of ecstatic ascension: "I awoke in Thee, and beheld Thee as the Infinite, but 
not in the way I had thought - and this vision was not derived from the flesh. 
M2 This metaphysical 
language of ekstasis (literally `standing outside oneself) implies the transcendence of the vanity of the 
mundane through the ascension towards the beyond. However, the transience of the consummation of 
religious longing may fuel rather than extinguish the anxious flame of melancholy. Burton acclaims 
how, "Ecstasis is a taste of future happiness, by which we are united unto God'; `a divine melancholy, 
a spiritual wing', as Bonaventure terms it, to lift us up to heaven. 9,603 Yet the gnawing question 
remains, as Plotinus ponders, "How, does it happen, therefore, that the soul does not abide there? s6°4 
The melancholy soul has found its salvation in union with God: it has resolved the metaphysical riddle 
of its existence and transcended the isolation of its homelessness. "The soul then has another life, s605 as 
Plotinus writes. But this reinvigoration provides only transient sanctuary from a life of metaphysical 
exile. The melancholy question asserts itself, as Hadot asks, "how is it that we come back down? How 
can presence become absence? How can the flame of love be snuffed out? "606 
Within the Plotinian framework, the reason for this reversion of presence to absence resides in 
our corporeality. Augustine similarly declares, "I was transported to Thee by Thy beauty, and then 
presently tom away from Thee by my own weight, sinking with grief into these lower things. This 
weight was carnal habit. "607 The soul is encumbered by a melancholic gravity that cannot dissociate 
from its bondage to the things of this world. And so the soul is in tension between two memories: the 
instinctual recollection of the habitual flesh and the blessed recollection of ekstasis. And so the 
aspiration of melancholic disillusionment is frustrated by its own heaviness, or `earthiness' and this 
constitutes the perpetual frustration of its desire for deliverance from its own gravity. Augustine 
600 ibid. 
601 'Kierkegaard's Religious Psychology', 257 
602 Confessions, Book VII, 140. Despite the neoplatonic affinity, Denys Turner notes that while for Plotinus the soul journeys in solitude (the flight of `the alone to the alone'), for Augustine the soul is divinely guided. "Augustine is passively `opened out' and it is God who does it. Both the steps on the ladder and the means of ascent differ. " The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism, 78 603 The Anatomy ofMelancholy, Pt. 3, Sec. 4, Mem. I, Subs. 2, (343) 604 Enneads, VI, 9: 10 
605 Enneads, VI, 9: 9 
606 Pierre Hadot, Plotinus, or The Simplicity of Vision, 64 607 Confessions, Book VII, 141-42 
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describes the dualism thus: "eternity attracts us from above, and the pleasure of earthly delight pulls us 
down from below, the soul does not will one or the other with all its force. X608 Ekstasis may be 
succeeded by a melancholic sense of spiritual abandonment, aridity, desolation. Hence Burton warns 
that ekstasis may become, "a mere dotage, madness, a cause and symptom of Religious 
Melancholy. s60`' 
This eternal longing - this "metaphysical wound" - is inflamed as it aches 
for Divine healing. 
As such it is "a wound which is never entirely healed (thus the enduring melancholy in the religious 
man) , 610 -a diagnosis reminiscent of John of the Cross's description of the soul as "a living wound of 
desire: 611 For John, the ignited love for God constitutes "a living flame, within the soul, it is ever 
sending forth its arrow-wounds, like most tender sparks of delicate love. "612 The Beloved God remains 
perpetually hidden: as secret (escondido) 613 In her frustration the soul proclaims her melancholy 
longing: "her love's anxiety, reproaching Him for His absence, the more so because, being wounded by 
her love, for the which she has abandoned all things, yea even herself, she has still to suffer the absence 
of her Beloved and is not yet loosed from her mortal flesh that she may be able to have fruition of Him 
in the glory of eternity"614 
This anxious inability to derive release from longing after absence has understandably been 
called an "Eros-induced suffering. "615 It is in this desert of absence that the soul may descend into a 
spiritual acedia (acidia espiritual): a desiccated disillusionment in which even prayer refuses to yield 
its savour 616 Prayer succumbs to `aridity', as Teresa of Jesus likewise explores in The Mansion of the 
Interior Castle. Dryness and boredom infect prayer life, in "the pain of privation felt in and prayer by 
contrast with the brief spells of union it has known. To the soul which has experienced union, God 
seems at all other times hopelessly far removed from it. "617 As John of the Cross puts it, one who has 
fallen from prayer becomes morose, "like a babe weaned from the breast, which he found so sweet "618 
In significant affinity with John of the Cross and Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius (Denys the 
Areopagite) likewise seeks the face of God, "but under the condition imposed by Exodus: `no one may 
608 
Ibid., Book VIII, 168 
609 The Anatomy ofMelancholy, Pt. 3, Sec. 4, Mem. I, Subs. 2, (343). However, Plotinus himself refutes 
any melancholic hatred of the body resulting from descent: "The sage will care for his earthly self and 
put up with it as long as he can, as a musician does with his lyre. " After death, "He will leave it lying 
next to him and keep on singing, now without an instrument. " Enneads, 1,4: 16. Cited in Hadot, 
Plotinus, 102. Hadot draws crucial attention to Porphyry's recount of Plotinus's advice to him when he 
was contemplating suicide. Porphyry recounts how Plotinus instructed him "that my desire did not 
come from a spiritual condition, but from some kind of melancholic illness, and he ordered me to go 
abroad. " Cited in Hadot, Plotinus, or The Simplicity of Vision, 92. 6'0 McCarthy "`Melancholy" and "Religious Melancholy" in Kierkegaard', Kierkegaardiana X, 162 611 Eugene A. Maio, St. John of the Cross: The Imagery of Eros, 10 612 `Living Flame of Love', Stanza I, 8, The Complete Works of Saint John of the Cross, Vol. 111,23 613"thou must ever hold Him as hidden, and serve Him after a hidden manner, as One that is hidden. " `Spiritual Canticle', `Stanza the First', 12, The Complete Works of Saint John of the Cross, Vol. Il, 200 61 `Spiritual Canticle', `Stanza the First', 1, The Complete Works of Saint John of the Cross, Vol. 11,31 615 Eugene A. Maio, St. John of the Cross: The Imagery of Eros, 227 616 The Dark Night of the Soul, Book I, ch. vii, 2, p. 31 617 E. W. Trueman Dicken, The Crucible of Love: A Study of the Mysticism of St. Teresa of Jesus and St. John of the Cross, 427 618 The Dark Night of the Soul, Book I, ch. v, 24 
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see me and live" . 619 Turner describes this in terms of the convergence of the Mosaic theophany 
in 
Exodus with the Platonic allegory of the cave (The Republic, Book 7): "In both the Allegory and in 
Exodus, there is an ascent toward a brilliant light, a light so excessive as to cause pain, distress and 
darkness... even, as in Exodus, death, but not the darkness of the absence of light, rather of its 
excess". 620 To see God is to die, and yet, tortuously, not to see God is also to die; as Augustine 
longs, 
`Even if I die, let me see Thy face lest I die. ' He pleads like Moses for the presence of God: to see the 
face which he had previously refused to look upon. Moses, who in his fear had hidden his face from the 
theophany of the burning bush (Exodus 3: 6), then desires to behold the glory (kavod) of God -a desire 
which God refuses to consummate since `shall no man see me, and live' (Exodus 33: 21). Instead God 
permits Moses only to see `my back parts; but my face shall not be seen' (Exodus 33: 23). 
The question for modernity is whether it is recently, in the `death of God', that humanity truly comes to 
know what it is to see the back of God (Posterfora dez), the God who has passed? Is our current 
melancholy burden hewn from a more immovable Sisyphean stone than the weight of mystical 
descent? Is ours a burden without ecstatic relief in a now disavowed metaphysical beyond? Is our 
religious melancholy no longer consoled by the metaphysical grand narrative that subsidises the 
dualism of ekstasis and descent, of presence and absence? This is not to say that Augustine's resolution 
of melancholy disillusion through the turn to God is no longer an option available to us; rather it is to 
suggest that the implied neoplatonic language of ekstasis and descent may no longer be appropriate to a 
description of a contemporary religious melancholy. 621 
Neither is this to say that religious longing itself vanishes with the beyond, or that 
transcendent longing vanishes along with transcendence. For many people, as Rubenstein comments, 
"Their experience of the death of God rests upon their loss of faith in the transcendent God of History, 
but not necessarily upon the loss of the sense of the sacred. "622 Perhaps religious melancholy endures 
less with recourse to ecstatic consolation, and more in terms of a re-orientated relation to absence. Or 
perhaps ecstatic melancholy is supplanted by another malaise in modernity. that of the desacralisation 
of the celestial and the terrestrial, the absence of the sacred - the Holy - in modem life. 
The Vanishing Theophanv? 
[D]oes he alone see God who sees God turn his face toward him, or does he not also see God 
who sees him turn his back, just as Moses continually saw nothing but the Lord's back? 
- Kierkegaard, `The LORD Gave, and the LORD Took Away; Blessed be the Name 
of the LORD', EUD, 121 
619 Turner The Darkness of God, 47 620 The Darkness of God, 17-18 621 Worthy of note, however, is Denys Turner's claim that the reading of neoplatonic metaphors of 
medieval mystical theology as relating primarily to metaphysical mystical `experience' is an invention 
of modem scholarship. Turner suggests that deconstructive postmodernism actually comes closer to 
reviving the authentic nature of medieval apophaticism than modem `experientialism'. See `Introduction', The Darkness of God 622 After Auschwitz, 294 
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The melancholy question can be understood as one of our incapacity to 
behold God. In Exodus 3 it is 
Moses's self-abasement which refuses to perceive the theophany of the burning bush, and the audacity 
of his gaze which in Exodus 33 is refused by the God who passes by. As Levinas writes, 
"The glorious 
theophany which makes so much humility possible will be missed because of the humility which 
lowers the eyes. Later, on the rock of Horeb, the prophet ventures to know, but glory 
is refused to the 
boldness that seeks it. s623 In other words, in what Levinas calls the "enigmas624 of the theophany at 
Horeb - an enigma which collapses the dichotomy of presence and absence - the glory of 
God is 
disclosed "As transcendence, a pure passage, it shows itself as past. It is a trace. "625 As Robins 
explains, "Moses sees God leaving, but what he sees is not a sign of departure. He sees a God who 
disappears in his appearance, a proximity in retreat, an extremity that is always already past. 
626 But 
Levinas does not interpret this disappearance of God as a reason for despair. His philosophy is not a 
melancholy nostalgia for a metaphysical homecoming. The metaphysical dualism of the 
presence/absence of a deus otiosus is not appropriate to the Judeo-Christian God. "The revealed God of 
our Judeo-Christian spirituality maintains all the infinity of his absence... He shows himself only by 
his trace, as is said in Exodus 33: '627 
This theophany - in its refusal of full disclosure - recalls the self-concealing revelation of 
the 
'ehyeh asher 'ehyeh. `Both in Exod. 3 and Exod. 33 God is a deus absconditus. "628 The biblical 
treatment of the hiddenness of God, it must be remembered, is an inquest into the averted face, the 
hesterpanim, and not the metaphysical question of divine presence or absence, not the ontological 
dilemma of God's existence 629 Furthermore, Levinas explicitly rejects divine hiddenness as a cause for 
melancholy or despair. We do not mourn a departed God who passes from presence to absence, 
existence to non-existence, or life to death. 
Likewise, according to Mark C. Taylor's `postmodern a/theology of erring', the metaphysical 
archaeology and eschatology of presence and absence are no longer tenable causes for lamentation and 
623 'Enigma and Phenomenon', Basic Philosophical Writings, 72 
Levinas relates his remarks on the humility of Moses to Treatise Berakhot 7a, referring to Exodus 3: 6. "The Holy One, blessed be He, spoke thus to Moses: When I wanted you did not want [to see my face], 
now that you want, I do not want. " The Babylonian Talmud, trans. Isadore Epstein (quoted in Jill Robins, Altered Reading: Levinas and Literature, 36) 624 « going back to the etymology of this Greek term [ainigma - obscure or equivocal word, a riddle], and contrasting it with the indiscreet and victorious appearing of a phenomenon. " `Enigma and Phenomenon', 70 
625 `Enigma and Phenomenon', 72. "The trace, as Levinas defines it, leaves a trace by effacing its traces. Such a trace is not the mark of an absence (which could be conceived in relation to a past or modified presence). Rather, it is the mark of the effacement of a mark. As it is the mark of the effacement of a mark that was already the mark of an absence, it is a double effacement, a double erasure, a re-mark and a re-tracing [un re-trait]. " Jill Robins, `Tracing Responsibility in Levinas's Ethical Thought', ed. Peperzak, Ethics as First Philosophy, 177 626 Jill Robins, Altered Reading, 35 627 
628 
Meng and Sense', Basic Philosophical Writings, 64 Jill Robins, 'Tracing Responsibility in Levinas's Ethical Thought', Ethics as First Philosophy, 180 629' The fool whom the Psalmist envisaged as saying `in his heart' that there is no God was not when he spoke Hebrew denying that God existed but was supposing that God was temporarily absent. And St. Anseim's mistranslation of the impious Hebrew fool into an atheistic medieval Latin fool was still only speculative; atheism, for Anselm, was a logical possibility which theism had to consider, but not a true live moral option which the theist had to fear as a serious rival. " Alasdair Maclntyre, `The Debate 
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nostalgia. As Taylor sees it, the traditionally theological view of history implies a primal fall from 
divine presence into an exilic period during which alienated humanity wanders through a desert of 
estrangement. In this essentially ontotheological paradigm, the fall from presence to absence is 
countered by an eschatological promise of metaphysical homecoming. This nostalgic hope determines 
the primal fall as "an aberration, a temporary aberration. This transitory detour has a definite purpose - 
its end is the end of exile and the return to/of presence. "630 On the contrary, like Levinas, Taylor 
suggests that absence itself is actually primal, and therefore not preceded by an original presence 
whose return constitutes the telos of history. "If lack is primal, then plenitude and the total presence it 
entails are never present or are `present' only as `absent. ' Accordingly, `exile' is `original' and is not 
subsequent to an antecedent `time' that was unstained by the agony of `loss' and untainted by the 
tension of `estrangement'. 9,63 1 Lack, as such, does not denote the deficient loss of a primal presence. It 
is not enmeshed in a metaphysical, or other-worldly, structure of archaeology and eschatology. "That 
which is, in other words, is not necessarily other than what ought to be. Apart from the reality of a pure 
"6 origin, there can be no fall that begins a period of exile. 32 
Without recourse to pre-lapsarian recollection or redemption, the wanderer is irremediably 
homeless and nameless; but the wanderer is decisively not despairing. Taylor's Postmodern `Erring' is 
not the exilic wandering of an Unhappy Consciousness since there is no ideal meta-narrative presence 
from which to be banished. Instead, erring describes the endless peregrinations of a "serpentine 
wandering" by virtue of "mazing grace" in the opening created by "the death of God, the loss of self 
and the end of history. s633 One is situated in "the midst of a labyrinth from which there is no exit", 634 
but, like Altizer, Taylor relieves this homelessness of the existential dis-ease of dread. Instead of a 
melancholy longing in the lacuna of presence, there is the playful acceptance of the superficiality of 
this interminable labyrinth. "In opposition to the history of ontotheology, a/theology insists on the 
irreducibility of the trace... From the viewpoint of a/theology, there never was a pure origin and never 
will be a perfect end... The ateleology and aneschatology of radical a/theology end all endgames by 
keeping opennness open and showing every mark to be incurable. 9635 
Taylor's mistrust of the teleological priority of presence over absence inevitably loses the infinite 
difference in which melancholy meditates and "subverts the opposition between the sacred and 
profane.. "636 But Mircea Eliade, for one, does not invite a desacralised world with such open arms. For 
Eliade, the God who has passed by is the God who has retreated: the deus otiosus. This apparent 
recession of God from presence to absence reveals to the modem human subject a melancholy vacuum 
of demystified space. Yet it remains possible for us to discern the profanity of modem life momentarily 
about God: Victorian Relevance and Contemporary Irrelevance', The Religious Significance of Atheism, 12-13 
630 Mark C. Taylor, Erring, 153 
631 Ibid., 154 
632 Ibid., 155 
633 Ibid., 150 
634 ibid., 168 
635 ibid. , 155 636 "e profanation of the sacred and the sacralization of the profane disclose that no-thing is truly sacred and thus nothing is simply profane. " Ibid., 169 
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broken by eruptions of the sacred, as quickening moments of hierophany [Greek heiros -'sacred']. 
It 
is these sacred transfigurations that Eliade juxtaposes against the spiritual acedia of profane modem 
existence. These erupting hierophanies presuppose a desert of sameness, of profanity, an absence of the 
sacred, in which to strike an absolute centre of wholly otherness. "[T]here is also revelation of an 
absolute reality, opposed to the normality of the vast surrounding expanse. The manifestation of the 
sacred ontologically founds the world. s637 
Eliade, by invoking the phrase ganz andere (wholly other) to describe these interruptions of 
the profane "homogeneity of space", 638 thereby affiliates `the sacred' with Rudolf Otto's notion of `the 
Holy' (Das Heilige) 639 Eliade affirms what Carl Olsen describes as a `theology of nostalgia' for a 
rustic cosmic Christianity exemplified by the agricultural appropriations of Christianity, as a 
sanctification of nature, in rural peasantry. 64° Whilst not necessarily ascribing to a Platonic pre-natal 
recollection of an ideal homeland, Eliade discerns homo religiosus as harbouring a primal "nostalgia 
for paradise as an ancient archetype hidden within the human mind trying to come forth. "" Likewise 
Otto can also be suspected of a nostalgia for a declining theophany of the Holy which is all but extinct 
in modem life. Hence Otto is often inclined towards reinvigorating the impression of the numinous 
from the archives of the Old Testament - as also discerned for example in "the genuinely numinous 
narrative of the theophany in the burning bush. i642 Despite suggestions of historicism and idealism, 
Eliade's nostalgia, in many ways similar to Otto's, articulates his vision "for a resacralization and 
remythologization of contemporary culture. X643 Such an impetus for reinvigoration suggests that the 
longing for the sacred partakes of a retrospective, even retrogressive, nostalgia. Must it therefore 
remain tied to an erotic structure of longing and consummation, of archaeology and eschatology, of 
discredited metaphysical desire? 
Is Otto also striving for a nostalgic return to ecstatic religion? After all, Otto exalts Plato for 
his non-rational pursuit of knowledge of God "by the `ideograms' of myth, by `enthusiasm' or 
inspiration, `eros' or love, `mania' or the divine frenzy. "644 Otto even describes the element of 
`fascination' by which mystery "captivates and transports... with a strange ravishment, rising often 
enough to the pitch of dizzy intoxication; it is the Dionysiac-element in the numen. "Ms Yet after the 
descent from beatific union, the snare of melancholy still awaits. The antecedent economy of ekstasis 
and descent describes the soul's intoxicated transportation by the mysterium tremendum and 
subsequent resumption of "its `profane', non-religious mood of everyday experience. " 646 The otherness 
of the experience postulates religious truth as wholly other than the mundane. "Mysticism continues to 
637 The Sacred and the Profane, 21 638 The Sacred and the Profane, 21 639 See `Introduction' to The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion 640 See Carl Olsen, The Theology and Philosophy ofEliade: A Search for the Centre, Chapter 4 
`Theology of Nostalgia' 641 Olsen, The Theology and Philosophy ofEliade, 59 642 Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 77 643 Olsen, The Theology and Philosophy ofEliade, 59 644 "No one has enunciated more definitively than this master-thinker that God transcends all reason, in the sense that He is beyond the powers of our conceiving, not merely beyond the powers of 
comprehension. " The Idea of the Holy, 98 645 The Idea of the Holy, 31 646 Ibid., 13 
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its extreme point this contrasting of the numinous object (the numen), as the `wholly other', with 
ordinary experience. "' However, once the soul is quickened by its glimpse behind the veil of the 
sacred, the world - the mundane `unreal' world whose gravity lulls it back - sinks even deeper into 
aridity and shadow. The true life is absent: M$ an inescapably melancholy assertion. 
When it comes to the prophetic rather than platonic experience, however, Otto disputes suggestions of 
a metaphysical beyond as an anthropocentrically projected attempt to transcend disillusion with the 
material world. Instead, Otto gives primacy to the reality of spirit in contrast to which the flesh attains 
its comparative infamy: "it is not because a `natural' pessimism first led man to regard himself and all 
things of the world as flesh, that the idea of ruach arose as an imaginary compensating counterpart. Just 
the opposite is true. It is when the intimation of ruach has been awakened that all the things of this 
world sink into flesh. "' In other words, religion is primal; the sacred does not originate in an attempt 
to transcend the profane. The beyond is not a dreamworld which initiates from my own unconscious; 
instead, profanity is overshadowed by the genuine awakening of the sacred as the consummation of 
reality. If this priority is correct then must one say that some form of disillusion results indirectly from 
the awakening of spirit; as opposed to a `natural' melancholy disillusionment which consequently 
projects a religious point from which to transcend itself? Melancholy is therefore the reaction of 
disillusionment to the unrealised reality of spirit, rather than spirit being the invention of melancholy's 
desire to escape itself. "Flesh is the shadow of ruach and can only appear when the latter has first been 
experienced. "650 There is no discernible shadow without the precedence of light. 
Kierkegaard also implies this priority in juxtaposing `spirit' to `spiritlessness'. Kierkegaard's 
opposition of spirit and spiritlessness is not principally a metaphysical dualism; it is one of tension and 
difference. The words themselves imply the priority of `spirit' over its absence, `spiritlessness'. The 
consciousness of spiritlessness, as has and will continue to be discussed, is an activity of the dialectical 
awakening of spirit: negatively conceived as melancholy, as despair. Similarly, Eliade's contrast of 
sacred and profane is a lament for the absence of the sacred within the profane. Eliade is emphatic that 
potentially "the cosmos in its entirety can become a hierophany. s651 A hierophany is not an ascension 
but a transfiguration in this world. For example, "The hierophany of a stone is pre-eminently an 
ontophany; above all, the stone is, it always remains itself, it does not change - and it strikes man by 
what it possesses of irreducibility and absoluteness and, in so doing, reveals to him by analogy the 
irreducibility and absoluteness of being"652 The sacred appears as Wholly Other than the profane, but 
also as that which the profane should be: the consummate ontology of the profane, its return to the 
centre of all existence. In a sense we could say that it is this world - spiritlessness - that is wholly other 
than the sacred. The sacralised world realises its genuine ontology in the hierophany which defies 
dualism. 
647 Ibid., 29 
648 Totality and Infinity, 33. 649 Rudolf Otto, `The Prophet's Experience of God', Religious Essays, 32 650 Ibid., 32 
651 The Sacred and the Profane, 12 
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The Wholly Other: Mysterium Tremendum 
The otherness of God has been asserted with renewed polemical vigour in modem western theology. 
Specifically it is within the modem response of dialectical neo-orthodoxy to liberal theology that the 
phrase `Wholly Other' forges its cutting edge. Otto has been credited with the introduction of the 
phrase `Wholly Other' (das Ganz Andere) into modem usage, 653 although Otto himself may in turn 
have assumed the term from Jakob Fries 654 Regardless of the ingenuity or etymology of the phrase, 
Otto undoubtedly "filled the term with a content much richer than did Fries, using it against any 
attempt to confine religion within the web of human reason. s611 At this time it is the voices of Otto and 
also Barth that wield the term with most theological purpose. Nevertheless, these thinkers cannot be 
completely united with one voice in the invocation of das Ganz Andere. Whilst Otto displays his 
Kantian and Friesian interests, Barth's development of the idea is avowedly indebted to Kierkegaard, 
as discussed in Chapter One. There is, however, often ominous resonance between the Kierkegaardian 
and Ottoman appreciation of God, especially in the description of the response to the divine presence. 
As such, Westphal identifies that "When Kierkegaard [Anti-Climacus in Practice in Christianity] 
speaks of the `shudder which is the first experience of worship, ' he is talking about what Otto calls the 
tremendum. "656 However, although he may have been a fruitful addition, Otto does not resource the 
Kierkegaardian corpus in his anthology of numinous descriptions. As Almond deduces, "Otto's use of 
it [the phrase `Wholly Other'] has overtones of Kierkegaard also, but I have found no evidence that 
Otto was at all familiar with Kierkegaard's works. "657 In fact, as Gooch points out, Otto even refers 
derisively to Kierkegaard as an "hysteric. "658 This comment suggests a particularly acid dismissal of 
the sort of dialectical and existentialist theology which elicits Otto critique that "Christ did not come to 
4 solve existential problems (Existenzprobleme)' or to save skeptics from their doubts... Whoever wants 
to get rid of world-ängste would do better to consult his physician. P9659 
Having suffered derision from the young students of the then fashionable Barthianism and 
Bultmann, 60 Otto appears intent on trivialising these theological movements - even though Barth 
652 The Sacred and the Profane, 155 653 Todd A. Gooch, The Numinous and Modernity: An Interpretation of Rudolf Otto's Philosophy of 
Religion, 2 
654 Philip fond, citing Paul Seifert's Die Religionsphilosophie bei Rudolf Otto, suggests this. Rudolf Otto: An Introduction to His Philosophical Theology, 68 655 Almond, Rudolf Otto: An Introduction to His Philosophical Theology, 68 656 Merold Westphal, God, Guilt, and Death, 38 657 Rudolf Otto, 154 n. 39 658 The Numinous and Modernity, 136. In a letter to Jakob Wilhelm Hauer (20th May, 1928) Otto also dismisses Heidegger's existentialist philosophy after reading Sein und Zeit as "a kind of mental illness (Geisteskrankheit)". Cited in The Numinous and Modernity, 211 n. 42. Melissa Raphael notes that "the assimilation of the Ottonian concept of holiness into existentialist 
philosophies is foreign to Otto's thought. At the end of his life, Otto utterly derided the equation of the `Holy' and `Being'. He did not consider 'being' holy in itself. " Rudolf Otto and the Concept of Holiness, 83 
659 `Sittengesetz und Gotteswille', cited in Gooch, The Numinous and Modernity, 136 Bultmann, who had been a friend of Otto's at Breslau, wrote in a letter to Barth how "Otto and I grew so far apart that our students, too, were aware of the antithesis between his work and mine. " Geoffrey W. Bromily, trans. and ed., Karl Barth - Rudolf Bultmann Letters: 1922-1966: Edited by 
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himself had responded favourably to the publication of Das Heilige in 1917 in a 
letter to Eduard 
Thurneysen. But, as Lynn Poland explains, "What Barth finds to praise in Otto's work is, 
unsurprisingly, what they have in common: the notion of a transcendent that is `wholly other, 
' beyond 
reason, but also beyond all human labor, a source of value securely placed `across the border' 
from a 
civilization perceived to be in crisis"661 Yet, despite a common appreciation for Luther's esteem of the 
non-rational knowledge of God, Otto may have been reticent to be enlisted as an ally of Barth's 
doctrine of das Ganz Andere. John Harvey, the English translator of The Idea of the Holy, writes how 
Otto "always held that the doctrine of the school of Karl Barth with its unmitigated assertion of the 
Ganz Andere, the `wholly otherness of God', was a one-sided aberration. "662 In turn Barth, in 
his 
Church Dogmatics, grew wary of identifying das Heilige of Otto with the `Holy One' of the Bible. 
3 
It is reasonable to suggest that Otto appears relatively unfamiliar with Kierkegaard and 
disinclined, by Barthian association, to familiarise himself. However, this must not cause us to 
overlook the possible affinities between their understanding of God. Essentially, despite the disparity, 
mistrust, and even misunderstanding between their thought, it is still possible to regard Barth and Otto 
- and even Kierkegaard - as respondents to what each in their own way perceived as a modern malaise. 
Whereas Kierkegaard's writings locate the infinite qualitative difference between God and humanity in 
the gulf of sin, Otto's Wholly Other is principally a reaction to the presence of the mysterium: 
"something which has no place in our scheme of reality but belongs to an infinitely different one, and 
which at the same time arouses an irrepressible interest in the mind. "664 This is not to say that 
Kierkegaard and Otto fundamentally diverge, or that these are not different expressions of a common 
idea. Rather, this variance conveys a sense that Otto's concern is to reawaken the numinous in the 
disenchanted modern understanding, rather than prompt subjective overcoming of existential 
estrangement. However, a mutual melancholy lament does resound in both the Kierkegaardian 
individual `Unhappy Consciousness' and what Otto perceived as the prevailing devolution of the 
supernatural in modem life. In order to function as a `cure' for rupture, the Holy must be rehabilitated, 
not simply in existentialist subjectivity, but in a reawakened modem consciousness. The disillusion of 
modernity is no longer inevitably inclined towards the religious as a means of resolving melancholy, 
since the religious has itself become a cause of disillusionment. Modem life on the whole is not 
conducive to the reception of the Holy, and so Otto discerned that humanity's recognition of the 
numinous was endangered and in drastic need of reawakening. "For Otto, " as Gooch describes, "the 
disillusioned (entnaivisierte) culture of the twentieth century is an obstacle to the recognition of the 
Bernd Jaspet (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981), 162. Cited in Michael Lattke, `Rudolf Bultmann on Rudolf Otto', Harvard Theological Review, 78 (1985), 353. 661 'The Idea of the Holy and the History of the Sublime', Journal of Religion, 72 (1992), 184 662 `Obituary for Rudolf Otto', The Friend, March 19,1937,258 (quoted in Almond, Rudolf Otto, 4) 663 "The holy God of Scripture is certainly not `the holy' of R. Otto, that numinous element which, in its aspect as tremendum, is in itself and as such the divine. " Church Dogmatics Il. 1, p. 3 60. "Whatever `the holy' of Rudolf Otto may be, it certainly cannot be understood as the Word of God, for it is the 
numinous and the numinous is the irrational, and the irrational can no longer be differentiated from an 
absolutized natural force. " Church Dogmatics I. 1, p. 135. This seems a particularly unjust criticism insofar as Otto himself speaks rather of the "non-rational" and "supra-rational" and even criticises Luther for implying that the rational is less essential than the non-rational. The Idea of the Holy, 102 
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holy... Thus, the numinous origin of religion invoked by Otto on the pages of Das Heilige is one that 
remains ultimately irretrievable for the modern religious subject. "mss 
Otto diagnosed modernity essentially in terms of the evacuation of the supernatural from the 
prevailing intellectual worldview. As Gooch explains, "Within the order of natural scientific 
knowledge, this exclusion is reflected in the demystification (Entgötterung) of nature in the wake of 
Copernican astronomy and Newtonian physics, and in the transition from metaphysics to critical 
philosophy inaugurated by Kant. " By asserting God as Wholly Other, Otto brings the prevailing 
world-view into collision with something which infinitely differentiates itself from it. Reawakening the 
numinous consciousness will not constitute a reconciliation with our deeper selves but an abrasive 
encounter with Absolute Otherness - with mysterium. As such, Otto seeks to evoke the uncanny 
complexion of the Holy as something mysterious and exoticised by retreading the now re-hallowed 
ground of "a wonderfully defamiliarized Bible. "667 By transcribing the mysterium tremendum et 
fascinans, Otto's reminder of the core of religion is expressed in a form which invokes an infinite 
qualitative difference between humanity and the Holy. As such, it "inevitably reproduces the 
estrangement that it is intended to overcome. "mag 
Yet this estrangement is not an abyssal alienation in need of existential reconciliation. The 
processes of rationalisation and demystification of religion do not serve to refine and perfect, but rather 
to undermine the core of religion. "Religion will have its mysteries as mysteries intact", insists Otto, 
"A religious mystery is not something obscure for the time, capable, like the mysteries of chemistry, of 
ultimate solution; nor is it an `arcanum', mysterious only for the lower orders, the `profane', and 
convertible for the adepts into Gnosis"669 The resolution of mystery does not cause religion to evolve 
but to dissolve from the centre. Mystery - the heartbeat of religion - is preserved in inscrutability, in 
de-familiarity, as "an absolute ineffable. "670 Thus Otto's rehabilitation of an antiquated religious 
heritage of the numinous, in riposte to the impiety of the age, serves to reacquaint the reader with the 
mystery from which they have become estranged. In this sense, naturalism and immanence actually 
signify alienation from the true nature of the sacred. We must overcome our estrangement from 
estrangement. Mysterium is primal and irreducible in the alterity of the Holy. This recalls, I suggest, as 
a mutual meeting point for Otto and Kierkegaard, Westphal's plea for overcoming "ontological 
xenophobia, the fear of meeting a stranger, even if the stranger should be God. 7' "6 
6647he Idea of the Holy, 29 665 Gooch, The Numinous and Modernity, 24 
The Numinous and Modernity, 187. Gooch bases this assessment on Otto's manuscript `Fortsetzung', an apparent continuation of his 1927 lectures on Glaubenslehre. 667 Poland's phrase. `The Idea of the Holy and the History of the Sublime', 185 668 Gooch, The Numinous and Modernity, 213 669 Otto, The Philosophy of Religion: Based on Kant and Fries, 124-125 670 Ibid. 
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The Wholly Other: A Melancholy Doctrine? 
... [A]ll men are strangers 
in the world. And that God too, in exile, dwells as a stranger in His 
own creation. 672 
"If commentators on the contemporary situation of religion agree about anything, " Peter Berger 
surmises, "it is that the supernatural has departed from the modem world. This departure may be stated 
in such dramatic formulations as `God is dead' or `the post-Christian era'. Or it may be undramatically 
assumed as a global and probably irreversible trend. "673 Nevertheless, despite the pervading modern 
anxiety and vacuity, and perhaps in a significant sense due to this lacuna of the religious, Otto's 
attempt to rehabilitate the Holy into modem understanding appeared to resonate with a latent human 
longing. In a world in which the absence of God gaped wide open like a wound, it is understandable 
that the most amenable possibility seemed to be the God whose absence is incorporated, even 
explained or sanctified, in an understanding of the divine as Wholly Other. The unanticipated 
popularity of Otto's study suggested a possibility for rediscovering a sense for mystery in an age of loss 
and Divine extraction. Otto rendered the Holy retrievable, though uncompromisingly and essentially 
mysterious, by exploiting a sense of distance between modernity and the primal experience of the 
sacred that arouses a submerged longing which is itself infinitely unconsummated in the ultimate 
preservation of the inscrutability of the mysterium. 
But is the reception of Otto's thought - in resonance with a modern deficiency - therefore 
inescapably historical? Friedrich Feigel, for one, accounted for the success of Das Heilige precisely on 
the historical contingency of a world war which he described specifically as "the manifestation of the 
unholy. " According to Feigel, "with the intensity and passion of the defeat, which received its vigor 
from the horror vacui, the emaciated soul of the German people turned toward the `holy'. "674 In other 
words, the Holy embodies the diversion of the transcendent in the face of immanent despair. Otto 
presents the uncanny as mysterious distraction from all too immanent desolation. The other-worldly 
relief of some rediscovered form of mystified ekstasis is evoked in what Gooch calls the "de- 
familiarized world of ecstatic religious transport. "675 
Yet, despite the conspicuous historical crisis of the time, Gooch convincingly argues that 
Feigel's critique fails to account for the appeal of Otto's work beyond post-war Germany, both 
geographically and historically. Instead Gooch reads Das Heilige as a continuation of Otto's pre-war 
theological venture676 and astutely describes the work as "the expression of a melancholic form of 
religious subjectivity. "677 This does not refer to Otto's own melancholic temperament, 678 but to "the 
671 `Overcoming Ontological Xenophobia, 156 
672 Elie Wiesel, `Rebbe Barukh of Medzebozh', Four Hasidic Masters and Their Struggle against 
Melancholy, 45 
673 A Rumor ofAngels, 13 
674 `Das Heilige': Kritische Abhandlung über Rudolf Otto's gleichnamiges Buch (Haarlem: Bohn, 1929), 1. Cited in Gooch, The Numinous and Modernity, 133. 675 The Numinous and Modernity, 133 6761bid., 134-135 
677 Ibid., 215 
678 In Men, Religion, and Melancholia: James, Otto, Jung, and Erikson, Donald Capps has examined Otto as a victim of "religious melancholia" (Capps uses the terms `melancholy' and `melancholia' interchangeably, arguing that "melancholy is depression in contemporary culture" Ibid., 3). 
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sense of loss of religious immediacy built into Otto's writing". 679 In this sense, Otto's work nourishes 
itself upon a melancholic longing implicit in modem loss of the Holy. "Melancholy, " as Gooch 
therefore describes, "is characterized by a sense of yearning for a state of being that has been 
irrevocably lost or remains otherwise unobtainable, and is conceived as `wholly other' than, and 
therefore absent from, the present in which the melancholic subject is located. "680 
However, it may well be that this melancholy loss is itself irretrievably historical. Like 
Kierkegaard, Otto was a man of his time clearly affected by the theological aporias of his age. An 
essential concern for Otto was the evolutionary optimism of Darwinism and its implicit threat to render 
religion superfluous. Such faith in natural science gave rise to the possibility of "the assumption that 
religion was simply a leftover from a more primitive stage of man's development s681 Contrastingly 
Otto wished to assert that religion was primal, but not therefore primitive and dispensable. Instead Otto 
emphasises the qualitative and inviolable otherness of the sacred in order to preserve its primacy at a 
time when it is under the greatest threat of submersion. 682 Otto's insistence upon God as Wholly Other, 
and the irreducible mystery of the uncanny, preserves the Holy in a space independent of and 
For Capps, Religious melancholia - unlike melancholia per se - is diagnosed as always traceable to 
early childhood trauma (Ibid., 10) due to which "religion serves as a stand-in for the mother, or for the 
son's relationship to his mother" (Ibid., 3). As such, religion for the sufferer bears the scars 
characteristic of this ambivalent mother-son relationship. Capps writes, "To experience separation from 
one's mother is one thing; sadness and longing will surely result. But to experience the withdrawal of 
her love in an especially cruel or unfeeling manner is another. Severe melancholia is the predictable 
outcome" (Ibid., 9). With the loss of the `object' there is invariably a loss of `self. Religious 
redemption thus occurs as a means of `self-restoration. Yet, the `God' of this religion adopts the 
analogous ambivalent characteristics of the lost `object'. As a form of mysterium tremendum et 
fascinans, the `God-relationship' is tainted with feelings of inscrutability, hatred, fear, resentment and 
awe: "The lost object - the mother who has nothing but love for her son - is internalized, and this 
object now becomes the focus of his ambivalent feelings of love and hate. He loves the perfect mother, 
the mother of his fondest and most beautiful visions, but he also hates her, because she has betrayed 
and forsaken him" (Ibid., 16). The mysterium tremendum evident in Luther and Otto's theologies 
betray this sense of thrilling fear in the presence of a God who is both transcendent and perfect. The 
once familiar giver of love suddenly becomes untouchable, concealed, `Wholly Other'. The mother 
becomes `uncanny' and, since the son cannot bear the `full presence' of seeing her naked, withdraws 
into hiddenness. None may bear this full presence without annihilation; and yet the 'deep rage' of 
resentment towards this withdrawal in the sufferer convicts him of an inescapable guilt. As such, "To a 
significant degree, melancholia provides an explanation for why theologians like Luther and Otto 
insisted that `sin' is not essentially moral but ontological" (Ibid., 206). However, I believe that Capp's 
speculative consideration is culpable of conjectured over-reliance upon the possible nature of Otto's 
upbringing as being typical of nineteenth century Germany (Ibid, 93-101). Capp's chapter on Otto 
includes material on 'the thrill of fear that accompanies being beaten'. This insight is particularly 
overly dependent upon what Gooch notes is the "sparse evidence" (The Numinous and Modernity, 18) 
of a contemporary child-rearing manual. If these factors are indeed to account for Otto's understanding 
of the mysterium tremendum an account must also be given for the Biblical and theological precedence informing Otto's thinking. 
679 Gooch, The Numinous and Modernity, 215 680 Ibid., 215-216 
681 Robert Minney, `The Development of Otto's Thought 1889-1917: From Luther's View of the Holy Saint to The Holy', Religious Studies, 26 (1990), 511 6F2 Gregory D. Alles therefore sees Otto's self-appointed task as "a development of a science of 
religion as an apologetics of religion" which "made it possible for Otto partially to realize his 
childhood aspirations: to immunize religion... against the septic investigations of history and the 
natural sciences". `Toward a Genealogy of the Holy: Rudolf Otto and the Apologetics of Religion', Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Volume 69, Issue 2 (June 2001), 338 
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impervious to anthropological and scientific appropriation. 683 Like Kierkegaard's infinite qualitative 
difference, the significance of the uncanny inhibits any violating Feuerbachian intimacy between 
theology and anthropology. Any transubstantiation of the gods into humans marks a fatal compromise, 
rather than perfection, of the religious impulse via a dilution of the uncanny. Hence Otto is partially 
retrogressive in his assessment of the sacred, as is apparent in his evaluation of ancient religion. Otto 
significantly takes issue with Xenophanes's pre-Feuerbachian suggestion that `if the oxen could paint, 
they would paint their gods as oxen'. For Otto, this position's failure to account for the genealogy of 
religion endorses his own genealogy of religion in terms of the uncanny: 
If the oxen strove to see their gods as oxen, humans would appear on the contrary to have had 
quite the opposite ambition, portraying their gods as half or whole cows, calves, horses, 
crocodiles, elephants, birds, fish, as marvellous hybrids, hermaphrodites and hideous beings, 
as weird confused forms 684 
This should not be taken as Otto commending idolatry, but rather that he perceived the instinctive 
portrayal of primal religious imagination more honestly in the uncanny mutations of otherness than in 
the transmission and projection of sublimated human form. 
Awed by the sublime and numinous effects of the Sphinx at Gizeh, set "throbbing in the soul 
almost like a mechanical reflex", 685 Otto thus perceived in this dreadful monument a more authentic 
expression of religious feeling than in the more `refined' deities of Greek civilisation. Hegel, on the 
contrary, appraised the Sphinx as exemplifying the progressive transition from primitive Egyptian to 
classical Greek religion. Hegel endorsed the Greek inheritance and reinterpretation of the Egyptian 
Sphinx from uncanny mystery to Oedipal anthropomorphism as an evolution of Spirit: "It is Greece 
that makes the transition to God being known as spirit inasmuch as it knows in him essentially the 
moment of humanity. s686 Through metamorphosis into the human figure, Gooch explains, "what had 
remained enveloped in the darkness of an Egyptian night, sealed in the hermetic indecipherability of 
the hieroglyph, now steps forth into the clear light of day. "687 
However, Otto reads this domestication as a profound adulteration of religious intuition which 
initiated a discernible historical decline in religious vitality. "Where the goddesses and gods become 
all-too noble and all-too charming and all-too human-like, belief in them was not at its highpoint, as 
one would have to assume according to the doctrine of antropomorphism. "688 This demystification 
signifies the decadence of religion under the apparently civilising constraints of anthropomorphism. 
Thus, while being also a historian of the numinous, Otto defies Hegel's evolutionary historical 
religious optimism since what Hegel regarded as "a pivotal moment in the evolution of religion is taken 
683 Similarly L. Philip Barnes regards Otto's assessment of religious experience as non-conceptual, in distinction to conceptual, knowledge as a defensive strategy, "an apologetic device to safeguard the 
autonomy of religion and protect religious truth claims from rational criticism. " `Rudolf Otto and the Limits of Religious Description', Religious Studies 30 (1994), 222 684 Das Gefühl des Überweltlichen, 215. Cited in Gooch, The Numinous and Modernity, 116. 685 The Idea of the Holy, 68 686 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: Vol. II Determinate Religion, Appendixes, Excerpts by David Friedrich Strauss from a transcript of the Lectures of 1831,747 687 The Numinous and Modernity, 117 688 Das Gefühl des Überweltlichen, 213. Cited in Gooch, The Numinous and Modernity, 116. 
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by Otto to be an indication of its waning influence as a vital force in Greek culture. "689 This taming of 
disenchanted deities then re-opens space for a renewed "re-appropriation of the strange and exotic 
deities of Egypt and the far East, in whom the presence of the Wholly Other was more palpable, and 
whose power of attraction was for that reason more compelling than the domesticated inhabitants of 
Olympus. s690 
The Wholly Other: a Deus Otiosus? 
Despite resonating with a modem deprivation - even despite the assimilation of the term 
`numinous' 
into the wider intellectual vocabulary - it would be false to suggest that Otto entirely succeeded 
in 
rehabilitating the awareness of the Holy within the post-war mindset. Even the polemical reactions of 
the Neo-orthodox era to the post-war crisis constituted merely "an interruption rather than a reversal of 
the secularizing trend. s691 As Berger describes, this "anthropology of desperation" was soon subsumed 
by the secular optimism of the 1960S. 692 Altizer, for example, in prescribing that Kierkegaardian Angst 
must be outgrown in correspondence with the exorcism of the numinous, identifies the Wholly 
Otherness of God with the death of God: 
Only an alien or empty form of God could be wholly other than man and the world, for the 
God whose very reality and power crushes the spirit of man is a God who is estranged from 
his own identity as Redeemer... thus an impassable gulf appears between man and God at 
precisely that point when God cease to exist and to act in his redemptive form. 693 
Does the Wholly Other ultimately serve to enforce an unredemptive abyss within Godself, and 
consequently an impassable distance of alienation between God and humanity? Is this not also the God 
who must die in order for humanity to be free? 
Recent trends towards adoption of an anti-realist stance toward the existence of God frees us to reform 
or reject our so-called numinous responses accordingly. The numinous experience itself has thus been 
reinterpreted independently of any objective Wholly Other reality of the mysterium tremendum. The 
result of this is that Otto's insistence upon the numinous as something fundamentally "objective and 
outside the self', 694 is weakened once the experience of the mysterium tremendum is "accounted for 
independently of religious experience. s69S Otto's strongly realist foundation for the "otherness of 
689 Gooch, The Numinous and Modernity, 117 690 Gooch, The Numinous and Modernity, 116 691 Berger, A Rumor ofAngels, 24 692 Ibid., 68. Harvey Cox diagnoses that "Both philosophical existentialism and Paul Tillich's theology 
are expressions of the mourning period which began with the death of the God of metaphysical theism 
and Western Christian civilization, but the wake is now over. That is why existentialist theologies and 
philosophies do not partake of the spirit of the emerging age but symbolize rather the passing of the 
old. " The Secular City, 93 
693 The Gospel of Christian Atheism, 87. Altizer elsewhere asserts `The Otherness of God as an Image 
of Satan', The Otherness of God, 206-215 694 The Idea of the Holy, 11 695 Campbell, `Lecture XVIII: The Objective Validity of Religion', On Selfhood and Godhood, 377. Campbell's example is the possibility of the experience of mysterium tremendum simulated by a dream (376). 
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religious experiences61 is compromised once we assert that the numinous need not 
have its foundation 
in an objective Divine reality. 697 
Otto would undoubtedly resist any such `naturalisation' or anthropocentrism since his account 
of the "feeling of dependence that characterizes numinous experience differs radically from any natural 
feeling of dependence. It is a difference of quality, not quantity. "698 The wholly otherness of numinous 
experience, which Otto describes is "as little as possible qualified by other forms of consciousness", 
699 
implies a qualitative purity which has itself been called into question. Furthermore, Otto's 
understanding of `creature feeling' as a response to the objective reality of the numinous may itself be 
dependent upon certain human contingencies which he has failed to recognise. 
700 
Moreover, other anthropological appropriations of the numinous suggest that the awe of the 
tremendum may not be so Wholly Other after all. Recent times bear abundant witness to the horrifying 
aspects of the numinous demystified and incarnated in the atrocities inflicted by humanity upon itself. 
As such, rather than trembling before the awfulness of the mysterium tremendum, we have come to be 
struck with its counter in our own self-abasement before our own tremendum. Thus, Arthur A. Cohen 
writes, identifying the Holocaust as: 
[T]he human tremendum, the enormity of an infinitized man, who no longer seems to fear 
death or, perhaps more to the point, fears it so completely, denies death so mightily, that the 
696 Berger, A Rumor ofAngels, 14 
697 Lorne Dawson contests Otto's inference of an objective numinous reality from a numinous 
experience: "Otto unacceptably seeks to secure tautologically the foundational character of a root 
religious feeling through assuming that the unusual character of the object inferred from the feeling is 
synonymous with its supernatural status. " Instead the sensation is derivable from a "something natural 
(though unusual). " `Otto and Freud on the Uncanny and Beyond', Journal of the American Academy of 
Religion, 57: 2 (1989), 289 
698 Alles, `Toward a Geneaology of the Holy: Rudolf Otto and the Apologetics of Religion', 325 
Alles, however, disputes Otto's claim for a quantitative difference since "Otto claims that numinous 
and ordinary experiences are at one and the same time analogous to one another and yet totally 
different, claims that are simply contradictory. " (326) 699 The Idea of the Holy, 8 700 According to Melissa Raphael, for example, Otto does not sufficiently appreciate the extent to 
which his "androcentric - indeed monosexual - structure of numinous experience" is predicated upon 
patriarchal religious norms ('Feminism, Constructivism and Numinous Experience', Religious Studies 
30 (1994), 519). As such, Otto's characterisation of `creature feeling' as the "self abasement into 
nothingness before an overpowering, absolute might of some kind" (The Idea of the Holy, 10) further 
consolidates woman as more profane than man. For Raphael, women experience a greater enforced 
`creature feeling' than men since "the Jewish and Christian traditions usually render them creatures at 
least three times over. Firstly, women are, like men, creatures of God. Secondly, they are creatures of 
men -... in Genesis 2 Eve emerges from Adam's rib. And thirdly, women are socialized as creatures of 
male-controlled ideologies of femininity" ('Feminism, Constructivism and Numinous Experience', 
518). In such a structure of dependence, women are three times abased in `creature consciousness'. 
Therefore, "women's being is derivative in ways that male being is not - especially when God's 
personality is characterized as male. By Otto's logic then, women must feel themselves multiply 
profaned since creaturehood defines profanity" ('Feminism, Constructivism and Numinous 
Experience', 518). But, for Otto, profanity is specifically and uniquely contrasted with Holiness: it is 
not equated with, and does not thereby endorse, dependence itself. Otto's concern for the creature feeling before the mysterium tremendum is of a quality that is not replicated in any other relation - though it may no doubt be analogously counterfeited. Raphael's feminist critique considers the Wholly Other as a male projection, thereby relocating the numinous from objective reality to the patriarchy of 
male religious anthropology. If the qualitative uniqueness and objective reality of Otto's numinous is 
accepted then there are no degrees of separation by which we can say that "his model of divine reality 
would be less 'wholly other' to men than to the majority of women" ('Feminism, Constructivism and Numinous Experience', 519). 
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only patent of his refutation and denial is to build a mountain of corpses to the divinity of the 
dead, to placate death by the magic of endless murder. 
70' 
The tremendum of the Holocaust forms thus a caesura, an untranscendable abyss, which embodies evil 
in "a perfected figuration of the demonic. "702 Although humanity, in its freedom, is ultimately 
responsible for the tremendum, there is a dark point of contact between the dread and fascination of the 
divine and the demonic. The tremendum implies the possibility of the presence of evil in the mysterium 
tremendum. The tremendum resembles "a dead volcano, terrifying in its aspect but silent, monstrous in 
its gaping, raw in the entrails, a visible reminder of fire and magma, but now a quiet, immovable 
presence, yawning over the lives of man. s703 
But what becomes of the Wholly Other in this trembling of anthropology before the dreadful 
mausoleum of the death camps, "the monument of the orgiastic celebration of death"? 
704 Are we 
severed from the conciliatory meaning of a Wholly Other reality? The absurdity of Auschwitz, as 
Stoker suggests, "has no interpretation in the metaphysical view of meaning. s70S Perhaps the Holocaust 
evokes not simply a human tremendum but also a deeply consolidated melancholy apprehension of the 
absent Holy itself. Perhaps the two do not exclude, but accord with each other. Is it the absence of the 
Holy in the presence of the tremendum which itself becomes the ineffable, the inscrutable, the 
elicitation of horror? "Contemporary theology cannot, and perhaps should not, come to terms with the 
Holocaust and other twentieth-century enormities in which the numinous has evoked less the majesty 
of God than the mystery of his averted face. 006 
Despite the analogous language, however, our own self-defiled `creature consciousness' 
before the tremendum of Auschwitz does not seem to equate with the self-abased `creature- 
consciousness' in which, for Otto, "The numen, overpoweringly experienced, becomes the all in all"707 
In the human tremendum the numen no longer appears to reduce us to nothing since humanity 
experiences its own infernal demonic magnitude in place of the absent Holy. Yet Otto seems to 
acknowledge that the contemplation of man can itself analogously arouse "the numinous in its aspects 
of mystery, awfulness, majesty, augustness, and `energy'; nay, even the aspect of fascination is dimly 
felt in it. s708 This is what Otto reads in his rendering of the song in Sophocles's Antigone: "Much there 
that is monstrous [ungeheuer]; but nought is more monstrous [ungeheuer] than man. "709 Otto affiliates 
"the monstrous" [Ungeheuer] with "the uncanny" [das Unheimliche]; but Harvey's English translation 
of ungeheuer as "weird" compromises the dreadful force of Otto's choice of word. More than being an 
expression of sheer wonder, "monstrous" [Ungeheuer] denotes something `scary' [geheuer] and can 
also suggest immensity, dread, and atrocity [Ungeheuerlichkeit]. As such it seems to resemble 
something closer to what is meant by the demonic magnitude of the human tremendum. 
7 01 The Tremendum [New York: Crossroad, 1981], 19. Cited in Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, 191-192. 702 
703 
Cohen, The Tremendum. Cited in Dan Cohn-Sherbok, God and the Holocaust, 71. 
7Cohen, The Tremendum. Cited in Dan Cohn-Sherbok, God and the Holocaust, 76-77. 0 all Cohn-Sherbok, God and the Holocaust, 69 706 Is the Quest for Meaning the Quest for God?, 85 
707 
RaPhae1, Rudolf Otto and the Concept of Holiness, 207 The Idea of the Holy, 92 709 Ibid, 40 
Ibid., 40 
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In evoking a numinous awe of itself through the terrible potency of genocide, in attempting to 
become as God, humanity becomes essentially atheistic. The human tremendum ultimately negates the 
mysterium tremendum. The experience of `self-abasement' and dependence is alienated from that upon 
which it is dependent. And yet, where the human tremendum is concerned, there is no self-annihilation 
before the absolute; but rather a self-annihilation before humanity's own monumental dread of itself. 
And so does the human tremendum not suggest that we are now more than ever in need of the 
Holy as it appears at its most acutely absent? Or does the tremendum itself imply the violence of the 
undeniable demonic in God? Much has been heard about love and longing in relation to God. But can 
the mysterium tremendum ultimately only satisfy a relationship of `fascination' and `dread' towards the 
God who is manifest as a `consuming fire'? Raphael, for one, challenges the impersonal nature of the 
numinous in these terms: 
An `I/Thou' relationship with God of the type made famous by Martin Buber is utterly 
rejected by Otto as being absurdly importunate and deficient in reverence. If the seraphim of 
Isaiah 6 would not venture such an address, then, a fortiori, creatures must be screened off 
from direct personal confrontation with divine holiness lest they be annihilated. 710 
Is the alienating alterity of the Wholly Other therefore maintained in the fear and trembling before the 
mysterium tremendum? "It has its wild and demonic forms" as Otto himself warns, "and can sink to an 
almost grisly horror and shuddering"711 In light of the way that the alterity of the Wholly Other can 
seem to be preserved by fear, it is understandable how in Nietzsche the fearful and trembling human 
object of the mysterium tremendum revolts in an act of murder. Altizer endorses this emancipation 
from the `fear of the Lord': "Once God has ceased to exist in human experience as the omnipotent and 
numinous Lord, there perishes with him every moral imperative addressed to man from a beyond, and 
humanity ceases to be imprisoned by an obedience to an external will or authority. , 712 Such `numinous 
dread' seems at times to resemble something more akin to a `daemonic dread. 9713 "When awe 
overwhelms reverence, " as Raphael warns, "all that seems to remain is Kierkegaardian `fear and 
trembling': submission to the intoxicating terror of absolute divine might. "714 Yet is this a fair 
reduction of Kierkegaard's perception of God? Is such an element indigenous to Kierkegaard's 
understanding of the Wholly Other? Is this an adequate assessment of what Kierkegaard means by `fear 
and trembling'? To some extent one may be forgiven for thinking so. But in calling this extreme 
conception "intoxicating", Raphael has employed a term which is a word employed by Kierkegaard as 
a word of caution and not an endorsement. 
710 Rudolf Otto and the Concept of Holiness, 92. However, Raphael earlier writes: 'The awesome 
power of the Ottonian numen may forbid intimacy between the believer and the object of faith, but 
there is little despair in Ottoman theology, which is, after all, founded upon the possibility that God's 
call to holiness -Tor I am the Lord your God; consecrate yourselves therefore, and be holy, for I am holy (Lev. 11: 44)' - can be answered. Without turning God into a superhuman and humans into gods, Otto reunites God and humanity by his spiritual ontology, according to which the human senses are 
open to the numinous" (18) 71 The Idea of the Holy, 13 "Z The Gospel of Christian Atheism, 127 713 "Specially noticeable is the emit of Yahweh (`fear of God'), which Yahweh can pour forth, dispatching almost like a daemon, and which seizes upon a man with paralysing effect. " Otto, The Idea 
of the Holy, 14 
714 Rudolf Otto and the Concept of Holiness, 78 
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Kierkegaard's Intoxicating Fear and Trembling? 
I do not struggle with a faceless God... - Emmanuel Levinas715 
At the end of Fear and Trembling Johannes de Silentio concludes, "for God sees in secret and knows 
the distress and counts the tears and forgets nothing. ""' Here Derrida perceives a thinly veiled 
reference to Matthew 6: `thy Father which seeth in secret shall reward thee'. The verse occurs three 
times in Matthew 6: in relation to almsgiving (v. 4); prayer (v. 6); and fasting (v. 18). Whilst Derrida 
considers this in relation to economic justice, 717 he also significantly suggests the hidden voyeurism of 
the mysterium tremendum is never far away. "God sees me, he looks into me in secret, but I don't see 
him, I don't see him looking at me, even though he looks at me while facing me and not, like an 
analyst, from behind my back. ""$ God watches me in secret, but it is a secrecy which is declared: God 
discloses the fact that God is watching and it is this which induces trembling. But God does not become 
visible to me by my initiation into this secret. God does not come out of hiding because God is not, like 
the analyst, watching `behind my back', or, recalling Sartre, `through the keyhole'. God remains 
invisible in the act of looking me in the face. 
Such omnipresent voyeurism seemingly seeks to preserve God as the Absolute Subject who 
transcends all my efforts to perceive Him as object. The secret, though disclosed, voyeurism of the 
mysterium tremendum captures me in narrowing anxiety, conscious of being watched from nowhere 
and everywhere. This terrorist is put to death in my struggle to become a subject freed from the 
inaccessible mystery who captures me as inescapably object. Thus Derrida's ethic implores, "We 
should stop thinking about God as someone, over there, way up there, transcendent, and, what is more 
- into the bargain, precisely - capable, more than any satellite orbiting in space, of seeing into the most 
secret of interior places. "719 Similarly Levinas's refusal to struggle with a faceless mysterium 
tremendum allows him to respond ethically to the visible face of the Other: "The presence of the face 
coming from beyond the world, but committing me to human fraternity, does not overwhelm me as a 
numinous essence arousing fear and trembling"720 
Whilst Levinas denounces captivity by the "invisible meshes"721 of the numinous, Johannes 
Climacus - in bleak contrast to the `immorality of our age' "in which individuals, as in a dream, 
fumble after a conception of God without feeling any terror threat' t722 - explains how the `absolute 
conception of God' inevitably cages one in on all sides: 
Neither the bird in its cage, nor the fish on the shore, nor the invalid on his sickbed, 
nor the prisoner in the narrowest cell, is so confined as he who is imprisoned in the conception 
of God; for just as God is omnipotent, so the imprisoning conception is also everywhere and 
in every moment. 723 
715 Totality and Infinity, 197 
716 FT, 107 
717 `Tout Autre Est Tout Autre', The Gift of Death, 95-98 78 Ibid., 91 
79 Ibid., 108 
720 Totality and Infinity, 215 721 Totality and Infinity, 77 722 CUP4484 
723 CUP, 432 
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While it has been argued that the Wholly Other is in many ways an inescapably melancholy notion, it 
must also be acknowledged that we have not entirely left behind the murky shores of melancholy's 
possible capitulation into insanity. Given the irremediable agitation before the `terror threat', "what 
wonder then that the Jews assumed that to see God was to die, and the pagans thought that the God- 
relationship was the precursor of madness! "724 Likewise, Judge William elsewhere comments that "he 
who beholds God must die. [But] This was merely a figurative expression, the adequate and true 
expression is that one loses one's reason. "725 The consistence of this strand in Kierkegaard's work is 
enforced in the words of Anti-Climacus: 
To exist before God may seem unendurable to a man because he cannot come 
back to himself, become himself. Such a fantasised religious person would say 
(to characterise him by means of some lines): `That a sparrow can live is comprehensible; 
it does not know that it exists before God. But to know that one exists before God, 
and then not instantly go mad or sink into nothingness! '726 
Yet it must not be overlooked how Anti-Climacus puts these words in the mouth of "a fantasised 
religious person". For this `fantasised' individual, existing before God seems ontologically 
unendurable: madness or annihilation present themselves as the only possibilities. But, crucially for 
Anti-Climacus, this self has become 'fantastic *727 and therefore "leads a fantasised existence in abstract 
infinitising or in abstract isolation, continually lacking its self, from which it moves further and further 
away. 028 
In other words, the religious individual has got `carried away' by a fantastic conception of 
what it means to exist before God, and it is this `fantasy' itself which must be tempered. The self "is 
the conscious synthesis of infinitude and finitude that relates itself to itself, whose task is to become 
itself, which can only be done through the relationship to God . "729 Although the relationship 
to God 
must be worked out in fear and trembling - since for Anti-Climacus "Fear and trembling signify that 
724 CUP, 433. In reference to the pagan notion of divine madness see Phaedrus cap-22. 725 SLW, 125 
726 SUD, 32. Similarly, at the end of Either/Or, Volume Two, we find in the `Ultimatum - The 
Edification Implied in the Thought That As Against God We Are Always in the Wrong - (by a parson 
in Jutland, a friend of `B'): "The sparrow falls to the ground - in a way it is in the right before God. The lily fades - in a way it is in the right before God. Only man is in the wrong, for to him alone is 
reserved that which to all other creatures was denied... to be in the wrong before God. " (286) 727 "The fantastic [Phantastiske], of course, is most closely related to the imagination [Phantasie], but 
the imagination in turn is related to feeling, knowing, and willing; therefore a person can have 
imaginary feeling, knowing, and willing. " (SUD, 30) However, the Danish word Anti-Climacus uses 
for `imagination' [Phantast] connotes some different nuances from the English word 'fantasy', which 
resounds with more immediately negative suggestions of reverie or delusion. See M. Jamie Ferreira, 
`Imagination and the Despair of Sin', Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 1997,16-34. 728 SUD, 32. Anti-Climacus considers that `Infinitude's Despair Is to Lack Finitude', by which the human wills itself to be infinite without the limit of the finite, or the concrete. "When feeling or knowing or willing has become fantastic" the self loses itself in abstraction or fantasy. (30-32) Although in the above instance imagination has become fantastic in its delusions about what existing before God is like, Ferreira is keen that imagination itself can also have a beneficial role to play in a Kierkegaardian definition of faith. While imagination may embellish itself in the fantastic desire to be infinite, "it takes imagination to hold the finitized and infinitized selves in tension with each other. " Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in Kierkegaardian Faith, 82 729 SUD, 29-30 
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we are in the process of becomings730- this fear and trembling must be careful not to `plunge one 
headlong into fantasy'. Emphatically, "To become oneself is to become concrete... Consequently, the 
progress of the becoming must be an infinite moving away from itself in the infinitizing of the self, and 
an infinite coming back to itself in the finitizing process. s731 Although "The God-relationship is an 
infmitizing" it still retains the individual's relation to the finite. The danger is that "in fantasy this 
infinitizing can so sweep a man off his feet that his state is simply an intoxication. "732 
This involves us in a dangerous game here. Although the common conception of God has for 
Johannes and Anti-Climacus lacked the authentic absolute difference and concomitant `terror threat', 
pushing one's understanding to the opposite extreme will likewise provoke an inauthentic and 
ultimately anthropomorphic fantasy. On the one hand we have the anthropological myth of 
Feuerbachian projection which asserts that the otherness of God "is only illusion, only imagination", 
733 
and on the other the anthropomorphic intoxication of fantasy. Our understanding of the Wholly Other, 
while evading Feuerbach, is still vulnerable to the distorted fetishism of the imagination. God's 
appearance as the forbidding and voyeuristic Father-projection may appear to be irreducibly Wholly 
Other in its transcendence, but is not so far from an unconscious anthropic projection - an illusion of 
the imagination and a potential sign that one has not left the melancholy aesthetic (recalling W's 
fantasised divine persecution complex with which this chapter began). Whilst 'fear and trembling' 
signify the authentic God relationship, one must be vigilant against the embellishing tendencies of the 
fantastic towards a crude 'daemonic dread'. Even `fear of the Lord' must be learned from God 
734 True 
numinous awe is found in the `Holy, holy, holy'. 35 
Self and Wholly Other 
For Otto, "There cannot even be a searching for God unless He has previously made Himself felt" 
736 
Yet the God who becomes apparent is `felt' initially in the alienated fear and trembling before that 
which is Wholly Other. So for Otto the primal experience of the numinous is fear: the awe and dread of 
the `tremendum'. This is as seen in the early depictions of the 'Wrath of Yahweh', "like stored-up 
electricity, discharging itself upon any one who comes too near. "737 However, this `numinous dread' is 
not the only word on Holiness. Let us emphasise that `fear of the Lord is the beginning of all wisdom'. 
Despite the inherent primal fear of ontological extinction, despite the fact that one imagines that one 
730 PIC, 88 
731 SUD, 30 
732 SUD, 32 
733 The Essence of Christianity, 127 734 "Not only is the saying of Luther that the natural man cannot fear God perfectly correct from the 
stand-point of psychology, but we ought to go further and add that the natural man is quite unable to 
shudder (graven) or feel horror in the real sense of the word. " The Idea of the Holy, 15 735 The Idea of the Holy, 17 736'7he whole initiative in the birth of faith is attributable to divine action only. " `The Christian Idea 
of `Lostness' Compared With Moral Depravity', Religious Essays: A Supplement to `The Idea of the Holy', 21 
737 The Idea of the Holy, 18. This inevitably evokes the death of Uzzah from putting forth his hand to the Ark (2 Samuel 6: 6-7). 
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will sink into nothingness before God, one is decisively not annihilated. Love is the moderation of 
divine omnipotence, as Kierkegaard expresses: 
They speak of the omnipotence of God crushing a man. But it is not so; 
no man is so considerable that God would need omnipotence to crush him, 
since for omnipotence he is nothing. It is God's love which manifests itself 
as love even at the last instant by letting him be something for it. 738 
Even in the belief that one will be annihilated, one indirectly affirms the `I' which fears its annihilation. 
Hence when Kierkegaard writes of the fear and trembling of God's Mastery over him which he sensed 
"when He let me feel His omnipotence and my nothingness" he implicitly testifies to a residual `I' 
which feels its own `nothingness' 739 As such, omnipotence, intriguingly and apparently contradictorily, 
ensures human freedom. Human independence is the gift of divine omnipotence. Rightly considered, 
omnipotence does not necessitate dependence, since: 
[I]t must have the quality of so taking itself back in the very manifestation of its all- 
powerfulness that the results of this act of the omnipotent can be independent... Omnipotence 
alone can take itself back while giving, and this relationship is nothing else but the 
independence of the recipient. God's omnipotence is therefore his goodness. For goodness 
means to give absolutely, yet in such a way that by taking oneself back one makes the 
recipient independent... And this is what is inconceivable; omnipotence can not only bring 
forth the most imposing of all things, the world in its visible totality, but it can create the most 
delicate of all things, a creature independent of it. 74° 
Despite the fear of annihilation, divine omnipotence does not crush a person, but instead withdraws in 
the concessive gift of independence in freedom. Hence, in Anti-Climacus' words, "to have a self, to be 
a self, is the greatest concession, an infinite concession, given to a man, because it is also eternity's 
claim upon him. s741 This concession is also an obligation, and freedom thereby becomes anxious. But 
omnipotence demands that the individual becomes potent as a self - as a subject capable of relation - 
since "To be spirit is to be I. God desires to have Is, for God desires to be loved. , 742 Understood from 
this perspective, God as Wholly Other creates the space in which the self becomes solidified, not in 
isolation, but in the independence which freely relates back to God as other. 
According to Christian doctrine man is not to merge in God through a pantheistic fading away 
or in the divine ocean through the blotting out of all individual characteristics, but in an 
intensified consciousness `a person must render account for every careless word he has 
uttered, ' [Matt. 12: 36] and even though grace blots out sin, the union with God still takes 
place in the personality clarified through the whole process. 43 
Nevertheless, does this circuitous affirmation of self conflict with the self-depreciation which Otto sees 
as an authentic response to the potency of the numinous? Furthermore, although "numinous experience 
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741 SUD, 21 
742 JP 4: 4350 / Pap. XI' A 487 
113 
has both subjective and objective aspects". 744 it is not the human subject which 
is at the heart of Otto's 
writing. 745 In predilection to the modem `self, Otto refers to `creature-consciousness' or 
'creature- 
feeling' as: "the emotion of a creature, abased and overwhelmed by its own nothingness 
in contrast to 
that which is supreme above all creatures. "746 It is in Abraham's words of intercession for Sodom that 
Otto fords this exemplified: `Behold now, I have taken upon me to speak unto the Lord, which am 
but 
dust and ashes' (Genesis 18: 27) 747 When Otto describes the `tremendum' as `tremenda majestas' 
('Overpoweringness') he explains, "in contrast to `the overpowering' of which we are conscious as an 
object over against the self, there is a feeling of one's own abasement, of being but `dust and ashes' and 
nothingness"748 That is to say, there is an overshadowing of the 'self' hich defines the self's 
estimation in relation to the `majestas'. One becomes conscious of the self in the confrontation with the 
`tremendum'; but this knowledge manifests itself, in mysticism for example, as "self-depreciation... 
the estimation of the self, of the personal `I', as something not perfectly or essentially real, or even as 
mere nullity, a self-depreciation which comes to demand its own fulfilment in practice in rejecting the 
delusion of selfhood, and so makes for the annihilation of selfs749 Indirectly, this experience implies a 
rise in authentic creature consciousness insofar as it illuminates the `delusion of selfhood'. However, 
this self-consciousness originates in the revelation from the Other, and thus it is not "merely a category 
of self-valuation, in the sense of self-depreciation. "750 In other words, self-consciousness in self- 
depreciation remains contingent upon Divine revelation. One does not need to ascribe to a modem 
sense of `self to identify some sense of self-consciousness implicit in this self-abasement. Self- 
consciousness in response to the primacy of Divine revelation is not identical with asserting the 
primacy of the `self as the starting point for speculation about God. 751 
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Otto's `creature-feeling' in response to the numinous is, like Kierkegaard's `self before God', 
irreducibly relational. The self-negation which Kierkegaard writes of is often the annihilation of the 
delusion of selfhood which is symptomatic of so much despair. Yet, while Otto fixates upon the `awe' 
of the creature before the potency of the numinous, Kierkegaard is concerned with just how the 'I' will 
respond to the consciousness of its self-delusion in the freedom which omnipotence has granted to 
it. 
In the fear of God's omnipotence it is as if something is 'held back' by God in creating the space for 
the 'I' to experience itself in nothingness. The fear of annihilation is sensed but never actualised. There 
is even a self-assertive hubris in the belief that one endures the whole weight of the divine omnipotence 
of the mysterium tremendum. Indeed it is for Kierkegaard testament to God's omnipotence that God is 
not one who "rises in his might to crush the refractory spirits", but instead "sits quite still and sees 
everything, without altering a feature as if He did not exist... the infinitely powerful, the eternally 
unchangeable... He knows with Himself that He is eternally unchangeable. Anyone not eternally sure 
of Himself could not keep so still, but would rise up in strength. Only one who is eternally immutable 
can be in this manner so still. "752 
Nonetheless, there is a dreadful warning and threat to this freedom of the self. The alliance of 
Divine immutability with Divine hiddenness seems to imply an eschatological deferral of intervention, 
even the deferral of Divine wrath or vengeance. 'Work out your own salvation in fear and trembling' 
(Philippians 2: 12). Or, as Derrida writes, "We fear and tremble before the inaccessible secret of a God 
who decides for us although we remain responsible... God is himself absent, hidden and silent, 
separate, secret, at the moment he has to be obeyed. t9753 God may hide but one cannot hide from God, 
cannot escape God's hand in the end, even in death. Indeed, the fact that God does not annihilate the 
one who comes into God's presence actually preserves one in inescapable fear and trembling. As 
Kierkegaard notes, "Precisely because thou art immortal thou shalt not be able to slip out of God's 
hand, hide thyself in a grave and pretend that it does not matter; and the scale according to which thou 
shalt be judged is that thou art immortal"7S4 This claim of eternity upon one asserts itself in the 
hostility between the self and God -a hostility that is not concluded in annihilation. It is this that is 
called the antagonism of Anfechtung: the inescapable freedom; the anxiety of relating to God; the 
combustible friction of spirit and spiritlessness; the struggle with the Wholly Other. This struggle is the 
heavy price that Kierkegaard values the God-relation at, and it is this that shall be discussed in the next 
chapter under the allegory of Jacob's struggle with the stranger. 
[W]ith the demise of the `God of the philosophers, ' the other side of God, the shadow side, 
the enigmatic attacking stranger of night, has emerged to unsettle and struggle with man. Man, 
in turn, must contend with both his bereavement over the death of the comforting God and the 
onslaughts of this `negative' side of God. 755 
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Chapter Four: The A11eaory of Yisra'el 
Each man acquires the stature of the enemy with whom he wrestles. It pleased me, even if it 
meant my destruction, to wrestle with God. 756 
Everyone shall be remembered, but each was great in proportion to the greatness of that with 
which he strove. For he who strove with the world became great by overcoming the world, 
and he who strove with himself became great by overcoming himself, but he who strove with 
God became greater than all. So there was strife in the world, man against man, one against a 
thousand, but he who strove with God was greater than al1757 
The Conflict of Exile: The Unhappy Consciousness 
"The present age is the age of despair, " Kierkegaard proclaims, "the age of the wandering Jew (many 
reforming Jews)' . "8 It is this melancholic icon of the semitic exile, the Wandering Jew, Ahasverus, 
that haunts the modem western consciousness as a memorial figure of God-forsakenness, alienation, 
nihilism and estrangement. It is an evocation that resounds from the Adamic banishment, through the 
homelessness of Cain, to the medieval legends and Romantic literary myths of the Jew who spurned 
Christ and was cursed to wander the earth, a fugitive from redemption, until judgement day. "Even in 
pre-exilic times, " Susan Handelman explains, "the Jew is a wanderer and a nomad who finds his truth 
in wilderness and desert, who encounters the Other as absence and alienation, who struggles with God 
through language, dialogue, dispute, and questioning - from Abraham to Job. "7S9 But this 
is a narrative 
portrait which has elicited stem resistance. Proliferation of this particular depiction obscures the fact 
that the phenomena in question does not make its entrance until the occurrence of a typically modem 
change in scenery. Rather than being an inherent primal archetype, the counter-argument claims that 
the dramatis persona of the Wandering Jew is an irreducibly historical, indeed often disastrous, emblem 
of modem estrangement: 
Is it so difficult for the modern consciousness to admit that the idea of the divided self, of a 
spirit alienated from itself, is itself a recent artifact - that the image of the Jew as congenitally 
alien is not itself congenital but rather a historical contrivance, nourished conscientiously in 
the romantic notion of alienation by volunteer poets and philosophers of the nineteenth 
century... As Zionism was moved by the nationalism of that century, so the conception of the 
Jew as wanderer and alien was also nourished externally, by the same currents, at the same 
time; it is itself, in some good measure, alien. 760 
In other words, the narrative of Jewish wandering, from ancient Egypt to modem Europe, is 
motivated less by some innate racial anxiety than through response to extraneous pressures. That is not 
to deny that any spirit of exile permeates Jewish thought -a spirit evident in the Kabbalistic doctrine of 
tsimtsum, itself bearing some mark of the historical contingencies of diaspora. 761 Likewise, 
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Kierkegaard's appropriation of the Jewish exile betrays him as a connoisseur of his own intellectual 
times. As Pattison summarises, "the Wandering Jew symbolizes for Kierkegaard the despair of the 
present age, a despair rooted in its separation from its substantial ground of religion and manifesting 
itself in both political reform movements and philosophical nihilism. s762 One might say that the 
Wandering Jew of the nineteenth century is the illegitimate son of a tragic modern humanism. His 
wandering is, recalling Harper's phrase, a metaphysical homelessness. His despair is, in 
Kierkegaardian terms, an eternal sickness unto death without alleviation. "The Wandering Jew", 
Kierkegaard muses, "seems to have his prototype in the fig tree Christ commanded to wither away" . 
763 
He is a melancholy descendent of Cain in the modern semblance of 1'etranger. the wandering lonely 
son of a deus otiosus spurned by men and gods alike. 
Ahasverus, the Romantic incarnation of the Wandering Jew, has rendered his indelible mark 
upon modem culture, as his frequent literary curtain calls attest to. Among other appearances, as 
Pattison highlights, he is presented in nihilistic depiction as the protagonist of Moller's Ahasverus and 
features memorably in Shelley's 'Queen Mab' answering the question of the existence of God with the 
affirmative yet demonic response - not unlike `A"s melancholy proof derived from divine persecution: 
`ay, an almighty God / And vengeful as almightyt'7M The legend thrives on fantasy of an exilic curse 
of long life as apparent in C. R. Maturin's 1820 Melmoth the Wanderer, "something of the Wandering 
Jew, something of the vampire". 765 But perhaps the most stylistically revealing modern manoeuvre 
belongs to Edgar Quinet's Ahasverus in which the protagonist himself, consigned to wander until 
Judgement Day, eventually outlives God at the end of the world. In other words, the estranged and 
alienated consciousness has ironically outlasted his own damnation by surviving the death of his own 
judge. The Romantic hubris is evident in this effectively Nietzschean irony: man is living under the 
living curse of a death sentence, but at least he has outlived the God who is the protagonist of his 
suffering. 
Kierkegaard, with typically Romantic melancholy, mused that his own tragically Mosaic 
mission might itself be under the curse "that, like the Wandering Jew in a beautiful legend, I should 
lead the pilgrims to the promised land and not enter myself, that I should guide men to the truth of 
Christianity and that as my punishment for going astray in my younger days I myself would not enter 
in but would venture only to be an omen of an incomparable future"766 It is undoubtedly a morbidly 
beautiful allegory and one which attests to the two threads of the aesthetic and the religious which 
weave the tapestry of a Kierkegaardian spirituality; but one may also struggle to reconcile it to the 
same Kierkegaard who appears to have discovered some deliverance through faith from the melancholy 
arrows of his past. Nevertheless, it is significant that Kierkegaard is willing to inscribe even himself 
place and homeless at a particularly dark hour in Israel's history. " Richard L. Rubenstein and John K. 
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under this icon of the modem condition. As Pattison relates, "Kierkegaard's concern with the 
Wandering Jew is not directed towards delineating the Other, the One-who-we-are-not, but as 
articulating a condition that belongs to the inner destiny of all who have drunk from the bitter waters of 
modernity. 067 The melancholic motif is further reminiscent of a particularly Romantic meditation by 
the young aesthete `A' under the title `The Unhappiest Man. The phrase itself recalls Hegel's 
considerations of the `Unhappy Consciousness', but in this poetic reflection it derives from the 
mysterious adornment on a gravestone in England. `A', in this address, considers the meaning of the 
legend in light of the apparently ironic supposition that the tomb itself is empty. Could it mean that 
there is no such person as The Unhappiest Man? Is this tombstone essentially a monument to a secret 
truth? "Then we could also explain why the tomb was empty, " he conjectures, "in order to signify, 
namely, that the unhappiest man was the one who could not die, could not slip down into a grave. "769 
As such, The Unhappiest Man is one who is consigned to wander perpetually in his longing to rest in 
the grave that awaits and yet remains continually elusive to him. As Anti-Climacus surveys, "the 
torment of this despair is precisely this inability to die... to be sick unto death is to be unable to die. "770 
And so we are returned stylistically to the despair of the present age, the despair of the age of the 
Wandering Jew, the withering fig tree: "the sickness unto death, this tormenting contradiction, this 
sickness of the self, perpetually to be dying, to die and yet not die, to die death °771 
Yet `A' also has Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness in his sights: 
In each of Hegel's systematic writings there is a section which treats of the unhappy 
consciousness. One approaches the reading of such enquiries with an inner restlessness, with a 
trembling of the heart, with a fear lest one learn too much or too little... Ah, happy is he who 
has nothing more to do with it than to write a paragraph on the subject, happier still, he who 
can write the next. The unhappy person is one who has his ideal, the content of his life, the 
fullness of his consciousness, the essence of his being, in some manner outside of himself. He 
is always absent, never present to himself. "' 
And so Hegel, in his happy aptitude for writing systematically about the Unhappy Consciousness, 
reveals himself as immunised against the very alienation he is attempting to inscribe. And so it is not 
actually to Hegel's enquiries that one must look for the Unhappiest Man. It is not Hegel's un-alienated 
depictions of alienation which generate the most anxiety in Kierkegaard's authorship; rather it is a 
particular figure who elicits the greatest fear and trembling. It is not Ahasverus but another wandering 
Jew whom Kierkegaard's poet (Johannes de Silentio) humbly eulogises. "Venerable Father 
Abraham! s773 And yet it is reflection upon this estranged figure that causes Silentio, in his own 
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estrangement from this sublimely inscrutable figure, to confess "when I have to think of Abraham, 
I am 
as though annihilated. "774 
For Hegel, the Hebraic consciousness is the epitome of the alienated Unhappy 
Consciousness;... and it is Abraham who typifies this above all others. According to Mark C. Taylor, 
both Hegel's and Silentio's considerations of Abraham are determined by a discernible horror. Hegel's 
approach evokes a "horror that arises from the encounter with the terrible tension of estrangement. "776 
However, whilst Hegel systematically determines the melancholy restlessness of the Unhappy 
Consciousness, Silentio's horror approaches Abraham with the unspeakable fear and trembling of the 
"horror religiosus, as Israel approached Mount Sinai. "777 Otto, on the other hand, discerns in the 
Abrahamic creature consciousness - `I which am but dust and ashes' - something more than 
Hegel's 
abashed and alienated consciousness; instead he sees a consciousness which is profoundly "far more 
than, and something other than, merely a feeling of dependence. 778 To what extent therefore can 
Abraham, the "knight of faith" and not the "tragic hero" of despair (not an Ahasverus), be regarded as 
an emblem of the estrangement of the Unhappy Consciousness? 
"Abraham is an eternal prototype [Forbillede] of the religious man", writes Kierkegaard. "Just 
as he had to leave the land of his fathers for a strange land, so the religious man must willingly leave, 
that is, forsake a whole generation of his contemporaries even though he remains among them, but 
isolated, alien to them. To be an alien, to be in exile, is precisely the characteristic suffering of the 
religious man. "779 Throughout his writings Kierkegaard works out this estrangement in the particularly 
modern terms of the sometimes isolationist polemic of authentic Christianity. Spirit is precisely this 
estrangement from the others. Nevertheless, by invoking Abraham as the forefather of an alienated 
faith, Kierkegaard is sounding surprisingly, indeed ironically, harmonious with Hegel. Abraham, for 
Hegel, is an individual struggling against an entire creation which he encounters only in a relationship 
of opposition: 
The whole world Abraham regarded as simply his opposite; if he did not take it 
to be a nullity, he looked on it as sustained by the God who was alien to it. 
Nothing in nature was supposed to have any part in God; everything was simply 
under God's mastery. Abraham, as the opposite of the whole world, could have no 
higher being than that of the other term in the opposition, and thus he likewise was 
supported by God... 
Mastery was the only possible relationship in which Abraham could stand 
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to the infinite world opposed to him; but he was unable himself to make this mastery 
actual, and it therefore remained ceded to his Ideal [God]. 780 
Hegel identifies Abraham, living in alienated opposition to the world and the other, as the 
personification of the Hebraic Unhappy Consciousness: "He was a stranger on earth, a stranger to the 
soil and to men alike. "781 It was only "through God alone that Abraham came into mediate relation with 
the world", 782 a world which existed solely in opposition to him. This dreadful solitude situates 
Abraham as an alienated member of creation, who, by virtue of his (estranged) membership of the 
created order, also fords himself, in Mark C. Taylor's words, "opposed to the wholly other God upon 
whom he was absolutely dependent s783 As such, Abraham only discovers his God, his absolute, 
outside of himself. Abraham, "is enthralled to a Lord who is so radically different from himself that he 
cannot understand him at all. "784 Consequently his is an Unhappy Consciousness since it is 
"fundamentally an unhappy consciousness which projects onto a transcendental and always distant God 
the fundamental identity of certainty and truth, of the Concept and Being. "785 
Likewise, Johannes de Silentio acknowledges that creation is permeated with enmity - "there 
was strife in the world, man against man, one against a thousands786 - and furthermore Abraham also 
comes into conflict with the God who, for Hegel, was his only support. In Silentio's portrait, the image 
of Abraham on Moriah, before God with knife in hand ready to sacrifice Isaac, is a dreadful memorial 
to faith. Yet the terrible site of Mount Moriah is a monument to a greater conflict than the strife 
between a Hegelian Unhappy Consciousness and the estranged creation that opposes it. This faith 
derives its vigour from a higher struggle. It is the passion of Abrahamic faith - "the holy, pure and 
humble expression of the divine madness which the pagans admired"787 - which "disdains the dreadful 
conflict with the rage of the elements and with the powers of creation in order to strive with God". 788 
Although Hegel saw that God "subjugated the world to him, gave him as much of the world as 
he needed, and put him in security against the rest", 789 Abraham, in Silentio's depiction, struggles with 
the God who is the actual telos of his faith and the origin of his promise. "Abraham was God's elect, 
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and it was the Lord who imposed the trial. "790 However, the resolution of this particular conflict is 
wrought in contradistinction to the mastery which determines Abraham's relation to creation: "So there 
was strife upon earth: there was one who overcame all by his power, and there was one who overcame 
God by his impotence. "791 What is meant by saying that Abraham - who conspicuously "did not 
challenge heaven with his prayers"792 as he did when God threatened the destruction of Sodom and 
Gomorrah [Genesis 18] -'overcomes' God by his silence? 
The nature of the victory is dependent upon the nature of the trial Silentio is describing. 
Perhaps it is closer to the `overcoming' Luther attributes to another "knight of faith". In his sermons on 
the story of the Canaanite Woman, Luther surmises that "she is no simpleton in matters of faith; she is 
rather a Knight of Faith who wins the victory over God himself. "793 Abraham's faith in God, which for 
Hegel estranges him from an ever distant transcendent and unrealisable longing, is a faith which is 
actually manifest in immanence. "Abraham believed, and believed for this life", Silentio implores - 
and this is the key to his `repetition' of Isaac. "Yea, if his faith had been only for a future life, he surely 
would have cast everything away in order to hasten out of this world to which he did not belong. 99794 
Such a faith founded upon the estrangement of eschatological deferral would surely see Abraham 
hurrying to give up Isaac, himself, everything without anxiety, in order to hasten to the alienation- 
transcending ekstasis of the other world. "But Abraham's faith was not of this sort, if there be such a 
faith; for really this is not faith but the furthest possibility of faith which has a presentiment of its object 
at the extremest limit of its horizon, yet is separated from it by a yawning abyss within which despair 
carries on its game. s795 
It is in this "yawning abyss" between a longing for transcendence and an unconsummated 
transcendental in which the Unhappy Consciousness endures the weight/wait of melancholy - in which 
"despair carries on its game. " " Yet the strangeness or mysterium of the Wholly Other need not be a 
persistent source of paralysing existential estrangement and horror. Indeed as shall be seen, faith, in 
Kierkegaard, is precisely the joyful and lived passion for the mystery of the absolute that can only, by 
definition, occur in the space of the apparent absence of God. This enigmatic struggle is resolved in a 
victory won by the Knight of Faith who is "great by reason of his power whose strength is 
impotence" . 796 
But Abraham himself struggles with the God who, as Derrida - can one say evoking Hegelian 
estrangement? - puts it , is absent, hidden and silent, separate, secret, at the moment he has to be 
obeyed. 097 Instead of wrestling `face-to-face' like Jacob, Abraham struggles with an absent God who 
apparently vacates the scene at the decisive moment of revelation. It is in this apparent lacuna of divine 
absence that Abraham's silence strives with God. That is why his striving with God is the victory of an 
absurd faith; that is why Abraham is "great by reason of his wisdom whose secret is foolishness, great 
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795 FT, 15 
796 FT, 12 
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by reason of his hope whose form is madness, great by reason of the love which is hatred of 
oneself. "798 As Kierkegaard explains elsewhere, it is definitive of faith that it exists in the absence of 
that which it believes in - "faith simply means: What I am seeking is not here, and 
for that very reason 
I believe it" .7 
But there are many other struggles with God to speak of; and some more indicative of 
insurrection than faith. And yet, in speaking of these conflicts, I wish to speak of a `face-to-face' with a 
stranger in the allegory of Jacob striving with God: one whose secret is also founded upon a "power 
whose strength is impotence", or a divinity manifest through the concession of omnipotence. But first 
we must speak of the tension between God and humanity that is the result of that Kierkegaardian 
infinite qualitative difference which asserts God as the Other, the Wholly Other, and which is both a 
battleground and an impassable abyss. 
The Primal Enmity? 
If I allow humanity to produce God, there is no conflict between God and man; if I allow man 
to disappear in God, there is again no conflict. 800 
Kierkegaard warns us that in a profound and unforgettable sense God is our "mortal enemy". 
801 In 
authentic Christianity "there is a life and death battle between God and man; God hates man just as 
man hates God. s802 In this sentiment Henri de Lubac has detected a surprising affinity with the 
antagonism between humanity and God in the antitheism of Kierkegaard's French contemporary 
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865). Despite the divergent uses for which Kierkegaard and the 
anarchist Proudhon employed the human-divine tension, de Lubac identifies both thinkers as anti- 
Hegelians mutually opposed to any Feuerbachian suppression of the qualitative abyss between 
humanity and God: an abyss that essentially materialises for both in the form of a battleground. 803 
Proudhon invokes the definitive biblical image of divine-human antagonism when he observes 
that humanity must forever strive against God "like Israel against Jehovah, until death. "804 Yet, for 
Proudhon, this mutual antagonism belies an implicit kinship in which humanity and divinity each 
partake dialectically of attributes in opposition. With regard to the eternal God and the temporal 
human, Proudhon reflects, "neither is more than the other; they are two incomplete realities, which 
have not the fullness of existence. "805 God is the contradiction of man and yet also "the complement of 
man" 806 But the divine and human do not thus serve to complete one another via a Feuerbachian 
reparation of an illusory schism. "If God and man are opposed to each other, they are by that very fact 
797 The Gift of Death, 57 
798 .ý 12 
800 UDVS, 218 
800 CI, 327 
801 `The Instant', No. 5, July 27,1855, AUC, 157 802JP4: 4711 /Pap. XI' A357 
803 Henri de Lubac, The Un-Marxian Socialist: A Study ofProudhon, 178 (a curiously titled translation 
of Proudhon et le Christianisme) 804 Philosophie de la misere, volume ii, 253. Cited in de Lubac, The Un-marxian Socialist, 179 805 Notebook (1846). Cited in The Un-Marxian Socialist, 178 n. 48 806 George Woodcock, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon: His Life and Work, 99 
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necessary to each other"807: that is, necessary in establishing the irresolvable antinomy of a primal 
antagonism that cannot be pacified by any Feuerbachian reconciliation of theology and anthropology. 
In other words, it is as definitional opposites that God and humanity remain mutually, antagonistically, 
and irreconcilably wholly other. 
Proudhon is thus striving for a higher dialectic which depends upon this conflict. "Every step 
forward is a victory in which we overcome the Divine. "808 Justice, Proudhon's fundamental concern, 
subordinates God to morality; but this is not simply Proudhon's resolution of the Euthyphro dilemma in 
favour of ethics. All moral progress is achieved in spite of the transcendental. God is actually 
denounced as well as subordinated by human justice; hence Proudhon's radical assertion that "God is 
evil" in Philosophie de la misere - "a phrase to startle and provoke the world .,, 
809 Along with "Property 
is Theft", this utterance indeed became a notorious and provocative statement, and one which even 
caused Kierkegaard to take notice of its scandal. 810 But Proudhon's dramatic flair engendered an 
understandable misreading of and response to his position - something which the excitable intensity of 
his choice of words only made inevitable. As such, a few years after his aggravating utterance, 
Proudhon found himself explaining himself to a priest-correspondent: "My criticism of the idea of God 
is similar to all the criticisms I have made of authority, property, etc.; it is a systematic negation, which 
is meant to come to a higher affirmation, equally systematic. 811 Anti-theism, Proudhon insisted, was 
not to be conflated with atheism; rather it served a higher dialectical purpose than the emotive despair 
implicit in denying the existence of God. "Atheism thinks it is intelligent and strong", Proudhon wrote 
disparagingly; in truth "it is stupid and timid. s812 Proudhon's struggle was rather to wrestle a concept of 
justice free from the transcendental in order to establish it in the immanence of the human 
consciousness. "The central achievement of the Revolution", both symbolically and ideologically, "was 
that it brought down justice from the sky to the earth. s813 
The question posed by anti-theism is a contesting of authority, not a question of Divine 
ontology. Proudhon confesses that "we cannot legitimately deny anything or affirm anything of the 
absolute; that is one of the reasons why I rule the divine concept out of morality. "814 This pseudo- 
negative theology is sufficient reason for Proudhon to evacuate God and morality from one another's 
domain. "If God is outside knowledge for us, he must remain outside practical matters... When 
religion, through its theology, its revelations and its cult, brings God out of the absolute, it drives man 
out of morality. "815 In some ways for Proudhon God is so irreconcilably Wholly Other to the point of 
abstraction from, or irrelevance to, the fabric of human ethical existence. As anti-theists, he proclaims, 
807 Letter to Guillaumin, Nov. 21' 1846. Cited in The Un-Marxian Socialist, 177-178 808 Proudhon, `On Providence', The System of Economic Contradictions, or, The Philosophy of Poverty [Philosophie de la misere]. Cited in Woodcock, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, 98 09 Woodcock, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, 99 810 JP 4: 4911 / Pap. XP A 516 811 To abbe X., Jan. 22°d 1849. Cited in de Lubac, The Un-marxian Socialist, 177 812 De la Justice dans la Revolution et dans L'Eglise, volume iii, 179. Cited in de Lubac, The Un- 
marxian Socialist, 265 
813 D. W. Brogan, Proudhon, 70 814 De la Justice dans la Revolution et dans L'Eglise, volume i, 448. Cited in de Lubac, The Un- 
marxian Socialist, 265 n. 1 815 De la Justice dans la Revolution et dans L'Eglise, volume iii, 302. Cited in de Lubac, The Un- marxian Socialist, 271 n. 28 
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"we exclude from our morality religious consideration of the absolute, and we reject from human 
government all intervention by the divinity. 1'816 Consequently the question of the existence of the 
absolute is a superfluous matter of supreme indifference, since the fight is not with the absolute itself 
but with the transcendental God of ecclesiastical Providence who preserves the unjust status quo of 
tyranny and poverty: in drastic terms, the God of evil. Essentially Proudhon: 
makes a distinction between the Divine as it is and the Divine as the theologians have 
portrayed it... The absolute as such is not the enemy of man; it is the idea of God formulated 
by the theologians as a being outside, above, and opposed to man, that must be attacked, for 
this idea is the fountain of the concept of authority, and hence the enemy of true justice 817 
In observing something of Proudhon's transition from youthful apologist of Christian faith to the brink 
of a modem anarchism it is also possible to discern an early eruption of the modem war against the 
transcendent God of metaphysics. It is a war in which, in Proudhon's terms, "God is inexhaustible, and 
our contest eternal. s818 There is something tangibly pragmatic, idealistic, and yet even provocatively 
mythical about the epic terms of Proudhon's struggle with God. He implores, "wage war on God 
himself, on God just the same as on the God-Humanity, on the God-Christ, wage war on all realized 
absolutes, on all the living and commanding gods, in the name of Justice and truth. "819 The opposition 
between humanity and divinity is eternally irresolvable since "God and man hold each other 
perpetually at bay and unceasingly run away from each other. 420 Here is the heart of "the insoluble 
antinomy between God and man in Proudhon's writing. 421 
Is it our eternal destiny to struggle with God, like Jacob at Peni'el - that arcane mythology that 
Proudhon appeals to? Or is it now the human task to finally wrestle ourselves free of this stranger? 
Proudhon is not the only modem thinker to appropriate this archaic image for his own times. It is an 
emblem which, through Roland Barthes 1971 poststructuralist interpretation of Genesis 32: 23-32, even 
renders itself upon the postmodem. 822 The allegory also occurs in Maurice Blanchot's virtually 
contemporary 'Etre Juif. In Blanchot's consideration, Jacob's struggle with the stranger enacts a 
portrayal of all human confrontation with the human as much as the divine `Other'. In Blanchot's 
words, the encounter with the human other is equally represented in this struggle since the human 
Other is "no less inaccessible, separate, and distant, than the Invisible Himself; [it] also confirms what 
is terrible about such a meeting whose outcome could only be agreement or death. Who sees God is in 
816 De la Justice dans la Revolution et dons L'Eglise, volume iii, 299. Cited in de Lubac, The Un- 
marxian Socialist, 271 
817 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, 205-206 
818 De la Justice dans la Revolution et dans L'Eglise, volume ii, 253. Cited in de Lubac, The Un- 
marxian Socialist 
819 De la Justice dans la Revolution et dans L'Eglise, volume iii, 181. Cited in de Lubac, The Un- 
marxian Socialist, 271n. 26 820 Philosophie de la misere, volume i, 391. Cited in de Lubac, The Un-marxian Socialist, 179 821 Woodcock, Pierre-Jospeh Proudhon, 205 
822 See Bartfies, `Wrestling with the Angel: Textual Analysis of Genesis 32: 32-32', ed. Graham Ward, The Postmodern God, 84-95. "Because of Barthes, Wrestling Jacob has become a main icon of 
poststructuralist critique, the text of his story one of the most versatile and necessary of critical sites. " Valentine Cunnigham, `Roland Barthes (1915-1980): Introduction', ed. Graham Ward, The Postmodern God, 74. 
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danger of dying. Who encounters the Other can relate himself to him by mortal violence or by the gift 
of the word"823 
But is this, as in Derrida, the equation or reduction of the Wholly Other to a mutual human 
alterity? 824 Again, is the struggle with God, the Wholly Other, qualitatively different from my 
encounter with the other? Here one may think of Hegel's dialectical struggle for self-consciousness 
with the other. To see God is to die; "each seeks the death of the other. "825 Indeed Levinas remarks 
that "In [Kierkegaardian] belief, existence is always trying to secure recognition for itself, just like 
consciousness in Hegel. It struggles for this recognition by seeking forgiveness and salvation. "826 But 
in defiant unbelief, as well as belief, consciousness seeks recognition for itself - albeit in the struggle to 
free itself from the gaze of a God who declares that consciousness must recognise itself through the 
eyes of a Wholly Other. Could such an analogous struggle for a consciousness emancipated from the 
gaze of the LORD be read in Hegel, as some have suggested? 827 
According to Hegel's dialectic of `Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: 
Lordship and Bondage', self-consciousness confronted by another self-consciousness strives to 
overcome what it perceives as the threat of "this otherness of itselfs828 But in Hegel this threat is 
reciprocal. A shared mutuality of self-consciousness threatens to disrupt the sovereign subjectivity of 
each `being-for-self'. And so the conflict begins with a gaze: "They recognize themselves as mutually 
823 'Etre Juif, L'Entretien infini, [Paris: Gallimard, 1969] 188. Cited in Susan Handelman, `Torments 
of an Ancient World: Edmond Jab6s and the Rabbinic Tradition', The Sin of the Book: Edmond Jabes, 
56 
824 Blanchot remained committed to his form of atheism. "[T]he name of God finds its way back into 
Blanchot's writing. It does so, however, not as evidence of a tardy abandonment of atheism, but on two 
conditions: first, that what it names without naming is not the God of Christianity but the God of the 
Talmud, and that the name of God, no sooner written, is immediately retracted and re-(de)named as 
that of an Other. " Leslie Hill, Blanchot: Extreme Contemporary, 83-184 
825 Phenomenology of Spirit, B, IV, 187, p. 113. 826 `Existence and Ethics', 30 827 Jean Hyppolite has commented that "God is the master and man is the slave. A form of alienation 
that reduces man to an existential nothingness results in a humiliation of man which, as Feuerbach 
noted, might have serious moral consequences. " Studies on Marx and Hegel, 133. Among others, Henri de Lubac suggests that the insurrection of the unhappy slave consciousness can be read as symbolising 
the insurrection of an aggressive will-to-deicide in atheist humanism by which God appears as "an 
antagonist, the enemy of his dignity". The Drama of Atheist Humanism, 23. Such readings in the light 
of modern humanistic atheism aside, J. B. Ballie's explanatory footnotes to his translation of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit suggest that the formula of `Lordship and Bondage' identifies the feudal hierarchy of medieval Catholicism specifically. However, John W. Burbidge has challenged this 
explicitly contingent reading, instead arguing that the `Unhappy Consciousness' cannot be historically 
or even religiously specified exclusively. Hence Burbridge's more expansive reading that "the 
experience of the unhappy consciousness is universal. It is a perennial possibility in human nature, 
reappearing in the lives of individuals even in our day. " "`Unhappy Consciousness" in Hegel: An Analysis of Medieval Catholicism? ', ed. Jon Stewart, The Phenomenology of Spirit Reader: Critical and Interpretive Essays, 205. It is also worth noting here David H. Hamlyn's contention that Hegel's master-slave dialectic is not, however, a work of social analysis as is often supposed: "it has no particular connection with any actual cases of human relationships. It is rather a metaphysical exposition of certain aspects of the concepts of a person and personal relationships as they arise from Hegel's view of the self and self-consciousness... It might be said that the master-slave relation presents a very special case. Why should we extrapolate from it to the conclusion that self-knowledge presupposes something about how one stands to others? " `Self-Knowledge', ed. Theodore Mischei, The Self Psychological and Philosophical Issues, 186-187 
Phenomenology of Spirit, B, IV, 180, p. 111 
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recognizing one another. 429 Hegel thus describes a struggle based upon a recognition of the reciprocity 
of the other: based on an antagonistic and recognised mutuality between the gaze of the self and the 
gaze of the other, and not what Derrida calls "this abyssal dissymmetry 830 between the gaze of the 
mysterium tremendum (the Wholly Other) and one's own. The threat of annihilation is mutual, and not 
founded upon the ontological oppression of the individual by the absolute: "they prove themselves and 
each other through a life-and-death struggle"831 
Yet it is through this struggle that the bondsman "has experienced the fear of death, the 
absolute Lord. "832 Hegel seemingly cannot avoid evoking the God of the Old Testament when he 
declares "fear of the lord is indeed the beginning of wisdom' . 833 But it is a struggle in which the initial 
threat of annihilation is mutual for each consciousness. In the struggle with God, however, the risk of 
annihilation is radically one-sided. The human-divine paradigm is a struggle that takes place over the 
abyss of an infinite qualitative difference. How can such a struggle across an abyss take place at all? 
How can one struggle with someone infinitely different, someone elusively Wholly Other, without 
some concession of the absoluteness of this otherness? For how, evoking the question at the heart of 
the struggle of Kazantzakis's writings, can flesh wrestle with spirit? 
Here one can return to the motif of Jacob's night struggle with his enigmatic antagonist. Does 
Jacob not discern the face of God at Peni'el - the face that none may see and live? Jacob wrestles all 
night with a figure who refuses to reveal his name. And yet Jacob, after receiving the blessing of the 
stranger, declares `I have seen God face to face and my life is preserved' (Genesis 32: 30). Jacob was 
indeed blessed (Gen. 32: 29) to have wrestled with God in the flesh, face-to-face, despite the threat of 
annihilation. Surely God as the Wholly Other cannot be grasped, and especially not in the scandalous 
tangibility of such a struggle, unless God has become so incarnated in the divine gift of Godself to be 
struggled with. While the threat of annihilation is not reciprocal, one sees a God who, taking in some 
enigmatic way the form of a man, actually partakes, to a degree, of this human mutuality. The 
possibility of the struggle relies, not upon the sublimation of flesh into spirit, but upon God allowing 
Godself to be struggled with; indeed, God's gift of Godself in the struggle. The corporeality of the 
stranger is the divine concession to Jacob: the gift of transubstantiation which makes apprehension 
possible. It is possible also to read in this allegory how the struggle with God does not necessarily 
entail knowing God in Godself, but to know oneself before God. As such, Jacob is asked for his name: 
his identity is questioned only for the stranger to rename him Israel ('struggling with God') 834 
Subsequently, the divine name refuses to reveal itself to desire (as the face does not disclose itself to 
Moses) but instead responds in a question which preserves the mysterium: 'Wherefore is it that thou 
dost ask after my name? ' (Gen. 32: 29). 
829 Phenomenology of Spirit, B, N, 184, p. 112 830 The Gift of Death, 28 831 Phenomenology of Spirit, B, N, 187, p. 113-114 832 Phenomenology of Spirit, B, N, 194, p. 117 833 Phenomenology of Spirit, B, IV, 195, p. 117-118 (Proverbs 1: 7; 9: 10; Psalm 111: 10) 834 To see God is to die, but, paradoxically, as Elliot Wolfson maintains, "one would do well to 
consider the etymology of the word `Israel' as `one who sees God'. " Through a Speculum That Shines, 50 
126 
For Hegel there is an implicit and reciprocal risking of one's life in the contest with the other. 835 
However, Jacob's struggle with God reveals the divine grace which preserves life: the perceived threat 
of annihilation which is never actualised, the omnipotence which is conceded. Surely this concession of 
omnipotence does not extend to the threat of divine annihilation; surely, in other words, Jacob could 
not have killed God? The allegory of this mysterious struggle forms an interesting focal point for the 
spiritual treatise of sixteenth century Spanish mystic Fray Juan de los Angeles, The Loving Struggle 
Between God and the Soul. Although no one can kill God, except in one's own heart Kierkegaard tells 
us, 836 Fray Juan de los Angeles reads in this enigmatic contest a divine concession in which God 
becomes vulnerable to being wounded by love. 837 
Another consequence of the struggle with God is that Jacob, through being subsequently 
reconciled to his brother Esau, is freed from the fear of the other. 838 As Juan de los Angeles recounts: 
And the angel said to him: Hereafter your name shall not be Jacob (which means fighter) but 
Israel (which means Prince of God), that you may lose your fear of Esau for it is with God 
that you have been wrestling, and he who has prevailed over God shall fear no man. 39 
One who fears God should fear no other. Yet, in the nineteenth century, Kierkegaard occupies a time 
when by his own admission - and this is something he strives to rehabilitate - the idea of God does not 
thrive on the same archaic fear that it once did. "Christianity was originally represented (by the 
preachers) in the fear of God; nowadays it is represented (by the preachers) in the fear of man' . 840 The 
antagonism is reversed - as in Proudhon's advocation of humanity's obligation to fight back, to 
become the protagonist of the eternal struggle. And yet Kierkegaard insists that "To kill God is what 
man cannot do, what he can do is to kill the thought of Him... so as to become oneself the master 
instead of the bondservant' 9 841 
Specifically Kierkegaard is writing in reference to the parable of the husbandmen who plotted 
"Let us kill the son, and then the vineyard will be ours"842; nevertheless is it possible to read the 
Hegelian dialectic between the lines? "Is not this also a way of desiring to add a cubit unto one's 
stature - by getting the proprietor killed, or the thought of him, so as to become oneself the master 
instead of the bondservant? s843 In such rebellious "presumption", as Kierkegaard reveals, one fails to 
identify the extent to which one is implicitly dependent upon "the token that God is the strongest, the 
token that he wills to have God against him. "844 Hence, this presumptuous consciousness continues to 
define itself through the recognition of the very other it strives to deny, thereby compounding itself 
deeper into the very dependent structure of consciousness it hopes to free itself from: "for it would be 
835 Phenomenology of Spirit, B, N, 187, p. 113 836 Kierkegaard, `The Anxiety of Presumption', CD, 69 837 The Loving Struggle, `Dedication', xviii 838 'I have seen thy face, as though I had seen the face of God, and thou wast pleased with me. ' Genesis 33: 10 
839 The Loving Struggle, 16 
840 JP 4: 4904 / Pap X5A40 
141 Kierkegaard, The Anxiety of Presumption', CD, 69. 842 CD, 69 
843 CD, 69. See also WL, 119: "men find this bondservice to be a burdensome imposition and are more or less openly intent upon deposing God in order to enthrone man. " 844 CD, 70 
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adding an immense cubit unto his stature if a man face to face with God were able to deny God' . 
845 In 
this insurrection, independence is not the received blessing of a divine concession, since "no blessing 
goes with stolen goods". 846 The self-abnegation of Jacob wrestling with God is nothing compared to the 
dependence of this presumption that wills to have God against him. "If the God-fearing man 'halts 
upon his thigh' [Genesis 32: 31 ] after having striven with God", Kierkegaard writes, "truly the 
unbeliever is inwardly annihilated. "847 
But here is the sort of implicit dependence which Proudhon himself identifies in the crude 
atheism which earns his rebuke. What most endangers God for Kierkegaard is modernity's indifference 
to the radical tensions of the God-relationship. In Kierkegaard's day the mysterium tremendum is a 
deus otiosus already declining in the apostasy of bourgeois Christendom and the hubris of 
Enlightenment reasoning. Consequently Levinas observes that "The Kierkegaardian God is revealed 
only to be persecuted and unrecognized, reveals himself only in the measure that he is hunted. "848 This 
God is the God endangered by atheism and exiled by human wisdom into appearing on the fringes of 
modernity only as `enigma', as `paradox', as a "persecuted truth". 849 Kierkegaard presents us with "a 
truth persecuted in the name of a universally evident truth, a meaning paling into meaning, a meaning 
thus already past and driven out' . 850 The Truth of the absolute is hunted into exile by the truth of the 
universal, emancipated from fear and bondage of the Lord. As Proudhon's defiant pledge declares: 
"Retreat God, for today, cured of your fear and become wise, I swear, with my hand stretched out 
towards the heavens, that you are nothing more than the executioner of my reason, the spectre of my 
conscience". 851 
In the anxious lacuna of such divine retreat, or exile, Kierkegaardian belief, as Levinas 
describes it, is consigned to exist as the inexpressible secret of an incommensurable subjectivity: 'This 
incommunicable burning, this 'thorn in the flesh', testified to subjectivity as a tension over itself 
[tension sur soi]. s852 In turn, the `thorn in the flesh' that is belief in a persecuted truth signifies a 
subjectivity itself exiled and persecuted by `the world'. Faith discovers a melancholy solidarity with the 
truth of a God who is likewise manifest in suffering exile. Here one recalls Elie Wiesel's description of 
the melancholy of Rebbe Barukh of Medzebozh whose "obsession was that all men are strangers in the 
world. And that God too, in exile, dwells as a stranger in His own creation. "853 Hence, Levinas writes, 
"Belief always exists in relationship with a suffering truth... the Relation with a Person who is both 
present and absent, with a humbled God who has suffered and died, and brought despair to those he has 
845 «[O]r it might even be so that perhaps it is God who stands in need of man (as the wisdom of this 
age has understood it - if such a thing can be understood)... in order to understand Himself. " CD, 70 846 CD, 70 
847 CD, 70 
848 `Enigma and Phenomena', Basic Philosophical Writings, 71 849 `Enigma and Phenomena', 71. "... the idea of a truth that manifests itself in its humility, like the still 
small voice in the biblical expression - the idea of a persecuted truth". 'A Man-God? ', entre nous, 55. This term is also employed by Levinas in his consideration of Kierkegaard in `Existenz and Ethik' (published in German in 1963 and reprinted in Nomspropres, 102-103. An English translation appears 
as `Existence and Ethics' in Kierkegaard: A Critical Reader, pp. 26-38). 850 'Enigma and Phenomena', 71 851 The System of Economic Contradictions, or, The Philosophy of Poverty. Cited in Woodcock, Pierre- Joseph Proudhon, 98 
852 `Existence and Ethics', Kierkegaard: A Critical Reader, 27 
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led to salvation. s854 However, the suffering truth does not simply endure banishment to the periphery 
by the universal truth of the spirit of modernity. Rather it is a truth which has freely chosen to submit to 
crucifixion, humiliation, death. Hence the relation to this truth is an imitatio christi: a following in the 
bloody tracks of the saviour, partaking of a degree of divinity's exile from the world. Yet this 
discipleship involves the pursuit of a mysterious paradoxical truth that continually eludes the 
consummation of the believer's understanding. Even the imitation of divine suffering involves "the 
crucifixion of one's understanding". 855 It is following one who is absent - "faith simply means: What I 
am seeking is not here, and for that very reason I believe it "856 Or as Levinas describes, "Belief stands 
in the midst of this conflict between presence and absence -a conflict which remains for ever 
irreconcilable, an open wound, unstaunchable bleeding. "857 This is part of faith's passionate inwardness 
- what Levinas identifies as the inevitable "isolation of the individual relationship with the 
being to 
which, for Kierkegaard, no other kind of relationship is possible: that is to say, with God. "858 It is this, 
for Levinas, which causes the passion of faith to exhibit a certain violence in the individual's severance 
from Others [Autrui] in pursuit of the lonely and crucifying quest for the elusive "crucified truth' . 
859 
Wounds From a Burning Arrow 
In an unsuspecting sense, Levinas is perhaps not so wrong to detect an inherent violence within 
Kierkegaardian subjectivity. Yet the violent severance of the suffering truth that "does not open us out 
853 Four Hasidic Masters, 44 
854 'Existence and Ethics', 29 
855 JP 4: 4375 / Pap. X1 A 478 
856 UDVS, 218 
857 'Existence and Ethics', 29 858 `Existence and Ethics', 29 
859 'Existence and Ethics', 30. There are certain problems with Levinas's impression of Kierkegaard, 
though a thorough discussion of the issues would cause a deviation from our path. Suffice it to say that 
his reading of Kierkegaard is dominated by the extent to which Levinas is particularly scandalised by 
Fear and Trembling. Its depiction of the akedah strikes him, in Mark Dooley's words, as "nothing less 
than a violent abomination, an act of unrestrained religious fanaticism. " The Politics of Exodus, 
`Introduction', xvii. According to Dooley's counter-claim, Levinas overlooks "the fact that 
Kierkegaard does not simply demand a `suspension of the ethical, ' but a `teleological suspension of the 
ethical. ' ... The aim of the teleological suspension of the ethical is to reinforce the fact that our ethical 
codes are ineluctably open to revision, since they are the formulations of existing individuals who are 
always in the process of becoming, forever subject to the vagaries of time and contingency. " Ibid., xvii- 
xviii. But, more fundamental than that, Levinas fails to place Fear and Trembling in its appropriate, 
indeed pseudonymous, context. It is this overshadowing of the entire corpus which allows Levinas to 
virtually universalise the teleological suspension of the ethical into a totalising Abrahamic- 
Kierkegaardian subjectivity. Yet on one level this is a contradiction of what Silentio perceives as the 
anomalous and inscrutable singularity of Abraham's near-sacrifice in which the ethical is regained. I 
suspect that what terrifies Levinas is the possible repetition of Abraham as a legitimised universal 
teleological suspension of the ethical in the violent fanaticism of a Kierkegaardian subjectivity. Indeed, 
as The Book On Adler suggests, a similar fear of subjective fanaticism troubled Kierkegaard himself. 
Levinas is altogether nervous of giving the sort of primacy he sees Kierkegaard giving to any private God-relation at the exclusion of the neighbour. But Merold Westphal argues that "this can hardly be an 
objection against Kierkegaard, who includes an essay on 1 John 4: 20 [in Works of Love] on the impossibility of loving God without first loving the neighbor, and who presents the God who is to be loved first precisely as the God who tells me I must love my neighbor. " `Commanded Love and Divine Transcendence in Levinas and Kierkegaard', ed. Jeffrey Bloechl, The Face of the Other and the Trace 
of God: Essays on the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, 215 
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to others, but to God in isolations86° does not tell the whole story of Kierkegaardian passion. Indeed, by 
believing in the persecuted truth, the individual must drink the bitter cup that is its share of Truth's 
exile from the world. Yet here Levinas has overlooked a further violence, a deeper etymology for the 
`thorn in the flesh' in Kierkegaard. The individual is further isolated by the residual enmity between 
self and God which cannot be done away with, which gnaws like a `thorn in the flesh' - the suffering 
of relating to something Wholly Other. The Truth which the isolated individual struggles to sustain a 
relation with is a Truth with which the individual is always in some conflict. Spirit may mean to be not 
of `the world', but there is no one in the whole world who is yet fully transfigured as spirit. God wages 
war against humanity insofar as spirit and spiritlessness are in constant antagonism. As such, to be 
human and to be in this world is to be in conflict, not only within oneself, but also with God. 
For Kierkegaard, to become spirit means finding oneself out of one's element in spiritlessness: 
"Every creature is at its best in its own element, can properly only live in its own element, the fish 
cannot live on the land, nor the bird in the water - and to require spirit to live in the environment of 
spiritlessness means death, means to die slowly in agony, so that death is a blessed relief. " 861 Evoking 
similarly Kierkegaardian imagery, Otto writes that "man is like a fish gasping on the sand, outside the 
natural element in which he should function and have his being, as long as he is outside God and 
faith. s862 Yet Kierkegaard is emphatic that, as far as the world is concerned, one's natural element is 
spiritlessness. To become spirit does not mean to be transported to the comfort of one's homeland, but 
to undergo transmutation in the crucible of spiritlessness: "Spirit is fire. From this comes the frequent 
expression: As gold is purified in fire, in the same way the Christian is purified. "863 
In describing such moments as `spiritual trial' [Anfcegtelse], 8' Kierkegaard is anxious to 
rehabilitate an old tension that has declined in a modem Christendom which has lost sight of the 
infinite qualitative difference, or the primal antagonism, between humanity and God. Hence 
860 'Existence and Ethics', 30 861 `The Midnight Cry', April 9,1855, AUC, 65 
862 `The Christian Idea of `Lostness' Compared With Moral Depravity', Religious Essays: A 
Supplement to 'The Idea of the Holy', 19 863 JP 4: 4355 / Pap. X12 A 41 
8M Hong's translation of Anfaegtelse by the term "spiritual trial" rightly evokes the inherent tension of 
spirit. However, Walter Lowrie writes in his completion of David Swenson's translation of Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, "Commonly I translate this word by `trial of temptation', but this does not quite 
serve to make it clear that what we are dealing with is the repellent temptation, not the enticement of 
pleasure. " (569 n. 8). As such he preserves Swenson's Anfechtung throughout. Though this is more of a 
cognate rather than a translation I think it is preferable since it preserves both the etymology of the 
word and the genealogy of the category. As Johannes Climacus notes, "Within the sphere of religious 
suffering there lies the special type of religious conflict the Germans call Anfechtung [Anfaegtelse], 
which category finds its determination only in this connection. " (CUP, 410). Although it denotes a `special type of religious conflict' the word is not always used so technically by Kierkegaard (especially in the journals), and appears under slightly different pseudonymous permutations (especially in Fear and Trembling). As Niels Thulstrup warns, "The different meanings in which SK 
uses the word trial [Anfcegtelse] show the difficulties of formulating a definition in which due concern 
can be paid to both the contents of the term and its range. " ('Trial, Test, Tribulation, Temptation', Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana Volume 16,116. See this work for a concise exploration of the uses of the term in Kierkegaard's corpus. ) Nevertheless, it is Kierkegaard's richest use of the word as appropriate to the God-relationship that we are most concerned with: "trial as a threat against Christian faith... often close to: offense. " (lbid., 115). These understandings "point in one specific direction, namely towards the original, etymological, and figurative sense of the word: attack, offensive struggle - and the difficulties which man enters in the state of trial. " (Ibid., 116-117) 
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Kierkegaard presents God as a Truth in exile hoping to reawaken others to the distance he senses 
between the modem world and God. "I am like a chaplain in a monastery, a spiritual adviser to the 
solitary", Kierkegaard laments, "Spiritual trial [Anfcegtelse] is literally never spoken of anymore. "865 
No wonder Kierkegaard, in the waning light of this particular deus otiosus, seems anxious to 
rehabilitate the fear and trembling of the mysterium tremendum for an age already beginning to be 
recipient of rumours of the death of God. Kierkegaard strives to reinvigorate a primal struggle - but 
one in which God, and not the violence of atheism or the will-to-deicide, is the prime antagonist: the 
stranger who confronts at Peni'el. 
In its literal sense Juan de los Angeles reads God's concession to Jacob as a submission which 
dispels fear; "But in its spiritual and mystical sense what transpires clearly to me is a struggle of a 
different kind, a more admirable struggle wherein man really and truly prevails over God, and man 
conquers God. "866 In adopting the allegory of Jacob's wrestling for benediction as its motif, 
Anfechtung/Anfivgtelse is revealed as an assault by God in which God wills us to fight back. But it is 
not by atheism, antitheism, or epic Hegelian struggle between self and other, that the authentic struggle 
with God is waged. 867 Instead, "Only to love is it given to struggle with God, and God in his love wants 
nothing more than to be loved in return! '. 868 These words recall Kierkegaard's emphasis upon the divine 
concession of freedom and identity: "God desires to have Is, for God desires to be loved. 99869 
It is Jacob's conflict with the angel, de Lubac explains, which embodies the human-divine 
encounter: "It is the condition of all greatness, and it may be the means - but here Proudhon would no 
longer follow us - of a purer submission. "870 It is in the self-offering of this struggle that God submits 
in apparent compromise of the divine nature, as de los Angeles renders `offensively' explicit: "God 
himself, the omnipotent, the impassible God is wounded in his heart by the gentle, blushing, loving 
gaze of the soul. s871 But in this war of love, this "purer submission", this wounding is mutual - as with 
John of the Cross, God's incandescent touches "like a fiery arrow strike and pierce the soul and leave it 
wholly cauterized with the fire of love. And these are properly called the wounds of love". 872 This 
"purer submission" suggests the ecstasy with which Teresa of Avila received the holy burning arrow 
plunged into her heart by an angel. It is the stigmatic passion of St. Francis "who, sensing God looking 
865 JP 6: 6459 / Pap. X1 A 586. Likewise Johannes Climacus iterates how `we scarcely ever hear a word 
about it', except when it is conflated with mere temptation [Fristelse]. CUP, 410. 
Louise Carroll Keeley writes, `Not speaking about it intensified the aloneness of the experience. Save for the experienced guides of the older devotional literature, one rarely met with any assistance. ' `Spiritual Trial in the Thought of Kierkegaard', ed. Robert Perkins, International Kierkegaard Commentary: Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 313 866 The Loving Struggle, 17 
867 Indeed, Kierkegaard notes the irony that "the tendon which God touched in wrestling with Jacob is 
generally called `tendo Achillis' by physicians [though the sciatic nerve may be more accurate], and thus it bears the name of paganism's most powerful and valiant hero; [but] paganism never came in 
such close contact with the divine that its physical strength suffered under it, and yet it must be said that Jacob was far more powerful. " JP 3: 3060 / Pap. II A 545 868 The Loving Struggle, 17 869 JP 4: 4350 / Pap. XP A 487 870 The Un-Martian Socialist, 275 871 The Loving Struggle, 28-29 $ix Spiritual Canticle', Stanza I, The Complete Works, Vol. II, 35 
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lovingly at him, was left wounded in his hands, his feet, his heart. s873 Evoking Teresa and Isaiah, John 
of the Cross describes such love as a living flame: "the soul will become conscious of an assault upon it 
made by a seraph armed with a dart of enkindled love, which will pierce the soul, as it were an 
enkindled coal. 99874 Such wounds of a struggle of love may also be described as thorns in the flesh. 
Thorns in the Flesh 
I knew a man in Christ above fourteen years ago, (whether in the body, I cannot tell; 
or whether out of the body I cannot tell: God knoweth; ) such a one caught up to the 
third heaven... how that he was caught up into paradise, and heard unspeakable words, 
which it is not lawful to utter. -2 Corinthians 12: 2... 4 
[I]f someone suddenly starts to think of the dangers of the lofty life the text speaks about, that 
one is overwhelmed with anxiety, just as when someone has held in his hand and played with 
a deadly weapon without knowing that it was deadly. - Kierkegaard875 
God's upbringing, as described by Kierkegaard, is of such severity that one is fated to an unrelieved 
thorn in the flesh which forces one "outside of the universally human" and into the salvific God- 
relationship. "' Though one may pray for relief, the thorn signifies the passion of the God-relationship 
itself: "If by having the thorn removed I would come to feel my communion with God less intensely, 
then let it remain. "877 Here Kierkegaard is close to Luther's identification: "The tribulation of faith was 
that thorn which St. Paul felt, and which pierced through flesh and spirit, through soul and body. 9878 Or 
as Johannes Climacus has it, "What evidence did the Apostle retain to assure him of the reality of his 
experience? A thorn in the flesh - that is, an experience of suffering"879 Here one encounters the full 
force of the idea that the God-relationship causes a deep wound - that entering into the service of the 
unconditioned means suffering. It is here that the threat of the mysterium horrendum is most acute 
since it is at this moment that the divine and demonic may bear the closest resemblance to one another. 
As Kierkegaard writes in a rather strange comment on Paul's thorn in the flesh: 
When an angel of darkness arrays himself in all his terror, convinced that if he just makes 
Paul look at him he will petrify him, when at the outset he jeers at Paul for not having the 
courage to do it, then the apostle looks at him, does not quickly shrink back in anxiety, does 
not strike him down in terror, does not reconnoiter with hesitant glances, but looks at him 
fixedly and steadfastly. The longer he looks the more clearly he perceives that it is an 
emissary of God who is visiting him, a friendly spirit who wishes him well. 880 
To become involved with God thus incorporates the danger of involving oneself with something 
infinitely other - with the other life. In daring to enter into the God-relationship one encounters 
Anfechtung: "the opposition of the absolute itself in the individual's attempt to relate himself to it 
873 The Loving Struggle, 103 874 `The Living Flame of Love', Stanza II, 8, The Complete Works, Vol. III, 44 875 The Thorn in the Flesh', EUD, 327-328 876JP4: 4654/PapX3A 182 877 JP 4: 4644 / Pap X2 A 246 878 The Table Talk of Martin Luther, DCXLIV, 273 879 CUP, 407 
880 `The Thorn in the Flesh', EUD, 342 
132 
absolutely. "88' Kierkegaard's warning must be heeded: "0, so strenuous is the true God-relationship 
that it is always characterized by a tendency toward madness. "882 
The melancholic, for Plato, was inclined towards frenzy and ecstasy, 883 but the biblical 
theophany contains something alien to this tradition. In Paul's famous vision, his `thorn in the flesh', 
the ascension is furtive and enigmatic. The secrecy of Paul's revelation resides in the fact that he heard 
things which were "unspeakable"; not unpronounceable, but "not lawful to utter. " Paul belongs more to 
the tradition of Hebraic prophet than Neoplatonic contemplative. 884 This recalls Elie Wiesel's account 
of the melancholy of The Holy Seer of Lublin (1745-1815); a sorrow he describes as "a black fire. "885 
"Other Masters were endowed with powers, but none with his vision", we are told, "In his early youth 
he prayed to God to take it away, he found it a burden, and depressing. He saw too much, too far. But 
his plea was not answered. "886 But perhaps more troubling than this figure is the uncertain fluidity 
between prophecy and melancholia exemplified by the Kabbalist Shabbatai Zevi (born 1626), the 
notorious `false messiah' of seventeenth century Europe. Despite cultivating a significant following, 
Zevi was finally more notorious for his defection to Islam than his esoteric theology - which itself gave 
mystifying expression to his depression in terms of a cosmic strife between the Messiah and the 
Serpent and eventually extended to a contrived mystical defence for the Messiah's apostasy. However, 
what is of most interest here is his relation to his prophet Nathan of Gaza, to whom, as Wolf Lepienes 
relates, Zevi first came as a patient collapsing beneath the immensity of his holy burden and suffering 
from the ecstasies and self-doubts of manic depression: 
In Nathan of Gaza's view, the most important dissonances arose from Sabbatai's 
vision of himself as the Savior, which he did not dare yield to for fear he was wrong; 
they also stemmed from Sabbatai's exaltations, which arose during his manic-depressive 
periods, and also from the apostasy of the Messiah. 887 
More pertinent to Kierkegaard's age, however, was the contemporary enigma of clergyman 
Adolph Peter Adler's claim to be the recipient of a direct revelation from Christ. Adler, apparently 
"under the direct outpouring of the Spirit", 888 professed to have been instructed to burn all his previous 
Hegelian works and receive the revealed truth about the origins of evil. On 12 June 1846 Adler 
published four books detailing his revelation. Kierkegaard purchased these volumes almost at once and 
881 Joel Robert Smith, The Dialectic of Selfhood in the Works of Seren Kierkegaard, Ph. D. dirs. Vanderbilt University, 69 
882 JP 4: 4672 / Pap X4 A 386 
883 Phaedrus, 244d 
884 The biblical prophet, inspired by the spirit of prophecy, often resembles a madman (shoteh) 
compelled by the spirit which comes close to madness (Ruach Shtus). "As the Talmud puts it: `Who is deemed a shoteh? One who goes out alone at night; who sleeps in the cemetery; who tears their 
clothes. ' Later the Talmud adds: `One who destroys all that is given to them' (Hagigah 3b). " Howard Cooper, `The Cracked Crucible: Judaism and mental health', ed. Dinesh Bhugra, Psychiatry and Religion: Context, Consensus and Controversies, 67. Cooper also points out that "the storyteller chooses a word for Saul's `raving' which is the same word used in different biblical contexts for `prophesying. "' (ibid., 66) 886 `The Holy Seer of Lublin', Four Hasidic Masters and Their Struggle against Melancholy, 89 Ibid., 72 
887 Melancholy and Society, 170 888 BA, 128 
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soon found himself writing his own response: The Book On Adler-889 But Kierkegaard withheld this 
manuscript, consigned amongst his papers only to be published after his death. In these retained pages 
he describes Adler as "a soul whirled about, flung aloft as a warning of dread, like the terrified bird 
which with anxious beating of its wings rushes out ahead of the storm which is about to follow, though 
as yet one hears only the hissing of it; and his thoughts are like the confused flocks of birds which flee 
helter-skelter before the storm. s890 
Is there something in these words which holds the clue to Kierkegaard's reluctance to publish? 
The possibility that Adler was insane, or "a deranged genius", had occurred to Kierkegaard, and his 
sensitivity to any potential ordeal of public ridicule would certainly warrant his reticence. But then why 
write the book at all? The fact is that, as George Steiner describes, Adler had called on Kierkegaard as 
some kind of forerunner - to play John the Baptist to Adler's role of emissary of God. But more than 
that, Steiner claims, "Adler's conviction that mundane, rationalistic, officious Christianity in Denmark 
must be electrified into authentic crisis, was exactly Kierkegaard's. The Magister's readiness to suffer 
ridicule and ostracism on behalf of his 'absurd', existentially enforced certitudes, must have struck a 
deep, unsettling chord in S. K. himselfs891 Indeed, the anxiety of Adler as "a soul whirled about, flung 
aloft as a warning of dread" like a bird rushing out to herald a storm is similar to a description 
Kierkegaard ascribed to himself: "There is a bird called the storm-petrel [Regnspaaer - Hong and 
Hong translate "rain-warner" (JP 5: 5842)], and that is what I am, when in a generation storms begin to 
gather, individuals of my type appear. "892 
In his failure to bring the enigma. of Adler into clear focus, Steiner suggests that Kierkegaard 
betrays his own anxieties to be the inherent focus of The [so-called] Book On Adler. In the stormy and 
vertiginous buffeting of Adler's soul dare one read Kierkegaard, the storm-petrel, trembling before the 
very storm he has come to announce? Is he, beneath the facade of af äneur, a wild and frightened 
wandering voice of the wilderness - wandering in and out of cafes and theatres! - trembling before his 
own call to return to God? It is interesting to note Steiner's appropriate discernment that "the image 
burning between the lines is that of Jacob wrestling with the Stranger. "893 For all his sacrifices and 
apostolic dread perhaps it is Kierkegaard who is struggling, to the point of madness or annihilation, to 
authenticate a calling - to derive the benediction of a naming from a divine stranger; to realise his own 
name "divinely understood. "9' 
An -telse and the Anxiety of the Sublime 
All those who have served the unconditioned have first received a blow that seemed to crush 
them, yet without slaying them... So it was with Paul when he was thrown to the ground, so 
also with Luther when the lightning struck and killed his friend, so also with Pascal when the 
horse ran away with him. 
889 See George Steiner's `Introduction', to Fear and Trembling and The Book On Adler, xviii (also 
reproduced as `The Wound of Negativity' in ed. Jonathan Me and Jane Chamberlain, Kierkegaard: A 
Critical Reader. 
890 BA, 169 
891 BA, `Introduction', xix 892 The Journals of Seren Kierkegaard, ed. Alexander Dru (542) / Pap. VI A 119 893 BA, `Introduction', xx 894 SUD, 34 
134 
This blow is like a sunstroke directly on the brain. It is the infinite concentrated 
intensively in one single blow and one single moment... 
Moreover no man can bring himself this close to the unconditioned, he cannot do it, 
and no man dares venture it since this blow, this sunstroke, is like the deadliest danger, 
something every man must shrink from as more horrible than death... 895 
One might well imagine how Jacob himself carries away from the benediction of his struggle an 
enduring wound - the shrunken sinew of his thigh (Genesis 32: 32): his own reminder of a `thorn in the 
flesh'. "As with Jacob and Paul, everyone who enters fully upon this relationship of Christian faith 
within the sphere of the paradoxical religiousness of Christianity must bear to some extent the marks of 
suffering, the stigmata of Christ", Martin writes, "Christian faith at its highest point involves 
Anfechtung, the trial of faith, the temptation from above. "896 Indeed Kierkegaard constantly alludes to 
his own `thorn in the flesh': "my limitation and my cross' 497 - an evocation Theodor Hacker discerns 
as ultimately relating to his comprehension of God's unconditioned will for his life. 898 In contemplating 
the changelessness of God, the terrifying thought implied for Kierkegaard is that "with this immutable 
will you must nevertheless some time, sooner or later, come into collision... this immutable will, which 
cannot but crush you if you come into hostile collision with it X899 Enmity is manifest in the inability to 
reconcile the human will and the Divine will without the much resisted submission of the former to the 
latter. Kierkegaard confesses his own acute anxiety over his relation to an apparently indeterminable, 
and yet unconditionally determined, divine destiny: 
From the very beginning I have been as it were under arrest and every instant have 
sensed the fact that it was not I that played the part of the master, but that another was 
Master... The dialectical factor in this is that whatever extraordinary gift may have been 
entrusted to me, it was entrusted as a precautionary measure with such elasticity that; 
if I were not to obey, it would strike me dead... Without God I am too strong for myself, 
and perhaps in the most agonising of all ways am broken. 900 
As for Adler, "He truly is shaken, he is in mortal danger, he lies (to employ an expression used by 
another author) over 70,000 fathoms of water'. 901Adler's "deranged genius", his anxiety which Steiner 
suggests resounds in Kierkegaard, is characterised in terms of "dizziness". 902 He has looked down into 
the abyss of 70,000 fathoms and felt its vertigo. "Anxiety may be compared with dizziness", as Vigilius 
Haufniensis concurs, "He whose eye happens to look down into the yawning abyss becomes dizzy. "903 
Or as Kierkegaard describes in The Book On Adler, "one becomes dizzy on looking down from a 
tower, for the glance plunging down fords no limit, no bound... The dizzy is the wide, the endless, the 
unlimited, the boundless; and dizziness itself is the boundlessness of the senses: ' As such, dizziness 
is the anxious reaction to gazing into the amorphous void. Or, dare we invoke the analogy, the sublime 
895 JP 4: 4903 / Pap. X5 A 17 896 The Wings of Faith, 101 897JP5: 5913/PapVIIA 126 898 See Kierkegaard The Cripple, 43-44 899 `The Unchangeableness of God', For Self-Examination and Judge For Yourselves! and Three Discourses, 232 
900 PV, 69-70 
901 BA, 246 
BA, 220 
903 CA, 61 
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abyss: 905 that which overwhelms and disturbs the senses which attempt to perceive it. The act of vision 
which causes the eye to tremble is that feeling of the sublime "found in a formless object", as Kant 
describes, aroused by "boundlessness' 
One might say that Adler's God-relationship, inebriated as it is by the delusion of direct 
revelation, has become vertiginous. The remedy for such vertigo is to seek deliverance from the infinite 
by attaching to the finite: `one may stop it by catching upon something with the eye... So also must he 
who, spiritually understood, suffers from dizziness try to limit himself. "907 Limitation is the 
countermeasure for such intoxication by the infinite in which, spiritually understood, one "has so 
wandered astray in the infinite that nothing finite can acquire for him substantial existence, that he can 
get no standard of measurement. This kind of dizziness consists rather in an excess of imagination' . 908 
And so it is that the dizziness of the `imagination' that Adler suffers from is close to what Anti- 
Climacus might describe as the sort of dangerous and unsustainable "infinitizing" discussed in the 
previous chapter. "The God-relationship is an infmitizing. But in fantasy this infinitizing can so sweep 
a man off his feet that his state is simply an intoxication. "909 Or, as Kierkegaard warns in The Book On 
Adler, "If fantasy is allowed to run wild, then from this comes about the pagan doctrine of luck and 
fate, or the unchristian doctrine of election by grace, conceived in the despairing sense. "910 In other 
words, it is the anxiety of predestination in which "it is unhappy to be shut out, rejected; and it is 
unhappy to be saved in that way. "911 In such fantasy the anxious thought of being astray over the abyss 
of election or damnation becomes a dreadful intoxication. Kierkegaard aptly describes how the 
disposition of a fearful anxiety, in Milbank's words, "mutates into the state of sin: the imagining God 
to be terrible. 912 
Does such `imagination' - which Paul Ricoeur calls "the crucible of every process of 
infinitizations913 - suggest the realm of the sublime: the gaze into the abyss which overwhelms the eye? 
The sublime's relation to imagination is apparent in a sublime anxiety, the fear of annihilation by the 
abyss, or by God: what Lynn Poland suitably calls "the imagination's fantasy of injury . 914 Before the 
scene of the sublime - an overwhelming vision which transports one beyond oneself - there is an 
905 See John Milbank, `The Sublime in Kierkegaard', ed. Philip Blond, Post-Secular Theology. Milbank 
explores the link, itself pre-Kierkegaardian, "between the psychology of anxiety and the aesthetics of 
sublimity. The mediating term between the two is `suspense'. The sublime sensation arises before an 
abyss, a gulf, an ultimate edge, an interval without apparent end; before this suspension we must 
remain, temporarily, `in suspense', and so (ontologically) `anxious'. " 153 n. 38 
Kant, `Analytic of the Sublime', Critique ofJudgement, 82. George Pattison also notes "the strong 
conceptual analogies between Kantian sublimity and Kierkegaardian anxiety. " `Sublimity and the Experience of Freedom in Kierkegaard', ed. James Giles, Kierkegaard and Freedom, 189. While 
acknowledging that Kierkegaard does not derive a concept of `the sublime' (whether referring to det Sublime or Opheietheden), Pattison also considers "Kierkegaardian sublimity" under what he calls "the 
anxious sublime" in `Kierkegaard and the Sublime', Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 1998, ed. Niels Jergen Cappelern and Hermann Deuser, 245-275 907 BA, 221. See also CA, 61. 908 BA, 221-222 
909 SUD, 32 
910 BA, 223 
911 BA, 223 
912 `The Sublime in Kierkegaard', 142 913 'Kierkegaard and Evil', ed. Harold Bloom, Modern Critical Views: Soren Kierkegaard, 56 
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interplay of vertigo and narrowness. The intoxication of the sublime, overwhelming in its almost 
vertiginous expanse, becomes anxiously [from Latin angere, to press tightly] oppressive. As Poland 
describes, "sublime transport turns on an encounter with some `opposition, ' or `difficulty'; one must 
first experience the limits of one's capacities, must first feel frozen in terror or astonishment, before the 
positive moment and movement of transport can occur. "915 Can this be equated with the opposition of 
Anfechtung: the limit of the absolute enforcing itself upon the individual? Hence the felt "fantasy of 
injury, an imagined terror' ; 916 
But this felt terror-threat of "imagining God to be terrible" is imagined but never actualised. 
Therefore Kant, in his treatment of the sublime, "insists on the imagination's position of security 
because he wants us to see that sublimity is not in the external object, but in our relation to it. "917 Or 
adapting Vigilius Haufniensis's terms, the dizziness of anxiety "is just as much in his own eye as in the 
abyss, for suppose he had not looked down. "918 But The Concept ofAnxiety does not deal with any 
tangible confrontation with the sublime. The abyss is a metaphor, an imaginative visualisation, for 
anxiety. Despite eliciting anxiety, the metaphorical abyss which confronts the soul is not the abyss 
which confronts us in the starry vault of heaven or the expanse of the ocean. In order to view such 
sights as sublime, Kant suggests that we suspend our scientific inquisition in deference to a purely 
aesthetic judgement. Hence one must not look up to the cosmos with the cartographic eye of astrology; 
but "must regard it, just as we see it, as a distant, all-embracing vault. "919 Likewise for the ocean to 
come into sublime focus one must not think of it in the technical terms of the oceanographer, but rather 
one must "regard it as poets do, merely by what strikes the eye - if it is at rest, as a clear mirror of 
water only bounded by the heaven; if it is restless, as an abyss threatening to overwhelm everything"920 
Insofar, then, as the sublime resides in the eye of the poet might one say that it resides essentially in 
that Kierkegaardian sphere of the aesthetic? 921 In the religious sphere would it be more appropriate to 
speak of the numinous? 
And yet, Otto wonders, might there not exist "a hidden kinship between the numinous and the 
sublime which is something more than mere analogy, and to which Kant's Critique ofJudgement bears 
distant witness"922 Perhaps we have here an overlapping of the aesthetic and the religious spheres? 
After all, Otto testifies to a sense of "dizzy intoxication" to the almost Dionysiac fascination and 
914 Lynn Poland, `The Idea of the Holy and the History of the Sublime', Journal of Religion 72 (1992), 
181 
915 Ibid., 178 
916 Ibid., 180 
917 Ibid., 180 
918 CA, 61 
919 Critique ofJudgement, 110 920 Critique ofJudgement, 111 921 George Pattison also wishes "to speak of `the anxious sublime', in an attempt to locate an impulse 
towards the religious within the aesthetic that is none the less appropriately experienced and interpreted 
as aesthetic. " `Kierkegaard and the Sublime', 248. Kierkegaard, moreover, describes modem 
understanding of the sublime as an "aesthetic accountancy" for transcendence. "[W]e are unable to form properly for ourselves an idea of God's sublimity. We always bog down in our aesthetic 
uantifying - the amazing, the tremendous, the very influential etc. " JP 1: 981 / Pap. X2 A 178 The Idea of the Holy, 65. Just as for Otto the Sphinx at Gizeh set the sublime "throbbing in the soul 
almost like a mechanical reflex" (68), so Kant also recounts how the pyramids of Egypt arouse the 
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transport of the numen. 923 The numinous, Otto tells us, exhibits the dual elements of mysterium 
tremendum etfascinans and "the sublime exhibits the same peculiar dual character as the numinous; it 
is at once daunting, and yet again singularly attracting, in its impress upon the mind. "924 Ultimately, 
"`the sublime', like `the numinous', is in Kantian language an idea or concept `that cannot be unfolded' 
or explicated (unauswickelbar). s925 
Surely the most revealing analogy resides in Kant's allusion to the sublimity of God. The 
sublime in nature, Kant maintains, initially resides in the excitation of fear. And yet one can regard 
something as fearful and still not be afraid of it. "Thus the virtuous man fears God without being afraid 
of him' . 926 In this sense, the fear of God is appreciated without one being overwhelmed by all its 
horror. Whoever flees from the object in nature which incites such dread is incapable of forming a 
judgement about the sublime since "it is impossible to find satisfaction in a terror that is seriously 
felt s927 Hence the joy of the sublime resides in the deliverance from the threat of extinction. The terror 
of annihilation and our comparative defencelessness elicited by the intimidation of vast overhanging 
rocks; brooding thunder clouds; raging volcanoes; turbulent hurricanes; ungovernable oceans; towering 
waterfalls all convey a sight "more attractive, the more fearful it is, provided only that we are in 
security. 928 And so it is that the sublime arouses in us a certain nobility by which our mind, through 
the judgement of reason, triumphs over nature: "we willingly call these objects sublime, because they 
raise the energies of the soul above their accustomed height and discover in us a faculty of resistance of 
a quite different kind, which gives us courage to measure ourselves against the apparent almightiness 
of nature"929 
And yet, Kant concedes, this self-estimation of the sublimity of our own nature is in apparent 
conflict with the "subjection, abasement, and a feeling of complete powerlessness" that is an 
appropriate response to the representation of God "in His wrath and yet in His sublimity, in the 
tempest, the storm, the earthquake, etc. "930 In fact, "it would be foolish and criminal to imagine a 
superiority of our minds over these works of His". 931 However, Kant expresses some reticence about 
such `dust and ashes' self-abasement in which he suspects a superstition for implicit favour-seeking 
sense of the sublime. See Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, 49 an d Critique of 
Judgement, 90. 
923 The Idea of the Holy, 30 924 Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 43. Such ambivalence is apparent in anxiety which, as Haufniensis 
explains, is a desire for what one fears; its relation is also "sympathetic and antipathetic". CA, 103. And this is most potently manifest in the dread and fascination of guilt: "life offers sufficient 
phenomena in which the individual in anxiety gazes almost desirously at guilt and yet fears it. Guilt has for the eye of the spirit the fascinating power of the serpent's glance. " CA, 103. Vincent McCarthy also 
notes the resemblance between this ambiguous language of an anxiety which may lead towards God 
and Otto's tremendum etfascinans, suggesting that "one may not be going too far in linking the 








and vulgar flattery. As such, the bowing and scraping of much "prostration, adoration with bent head, 
with contrite, anxious demeanor and voice... is far from being necessarily bound up with the idea of 
the sublimity of a religion and its object. "932 Fear of the LORD is not necessarily the beginning of 
wisdom since such fear and trembling before the irresistible will and might of God does not properly 
place one "in the frame of mind for admiring the divine greatness. For this a mood of calm 
contemplation and a quite free judgement are needed. 9033 Hence the Kantian insistence on the sublimity 
of our own nature resurfaces, albeit in the guise of moral humility: 
Only if he is conscious of an upright disposition pleasing to God do those operations of might 
serve to awaken in him the idea of the sublimity of this Being, for then he recognizes in 
himself a sublimity of disposition conformable to His will; and thus he is raised above the fear 
of such operations of nature, which he no longer regards as outbursts of His wrath. Even 
humility, in the shape of a stem judgment upon his own faults... is a sublime state of mind, 
consisting in a voluntary subjection of himself to the pain of remorse, in order that the causes 
of this may be removed. 934 
Moral humility, in other words, frees Kant from the fear and trembling of subjection in order to attain a 
sublime mind-set suitable for contemplating the sublimity of the divine. 35 Reading Otto, on the other 
hand, there is less of an impression of serene austerity in contemplating the sublimity of God and more 
emphasis upon an untranslatable infinite qualitative difference - an impassable abyss. Fear of the 
LORD is indeed the beginning of such wisdom. 
Starting from Kant's distinction between the sublime and the beautiful, Hegel proceeds to 
name the negative relation of sublimity expressed in the sacred art of Hebrew poetry - expressing the 
nullity, dependence, subsistence of the world in contrast to the mighty sovereignty of the creator God. 
Over against the divine dominion, the creature can only convey its own unworthiness and transience: 
"Therefore, further, man views himself in his unworthiness before God; his exaltation consist in fear of 
the Lord, in trembling before his wrath, and we find depicted in a penetrating and affecting way grief 
over nullity, and the cry of the soul to God in complaint, suffering, and lament from the depths of the 
heart. s936 While Hegel perceives in the Psalms such "classic examples of genuine sublimity set forth 
for all time", 937 Otto discerns the analogy between `the holy' and `the sublime' described "in an 
unsurpassable form in the sixth chapter of Isaiah, where there is sublimity alike in the lofty throne and 
the sovereign figure of God, the skirts of His raiment `filling the temple' and the solemn majesty of the 
attendant angels about Him. "938 But lingering in contemplation where Otto passes swiftly on, one may 
discern that there is something about this theophany in the temple that decisively departs from the 





935 Effectively, Kant's moral sublime constituted "the interiorization of absolute immensity" by which, 
as Sylviane Agacinski argues, "the fear was exorcized: the absolute was no longer external. " `We Are Not Sublime: Love and Sacrifice, Abraham and Ourselves', ed. Jonathan Me and Jane Chamberlain, Kierkegaard: A Critical Reader, 136 936 Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures On fine Art Volume 1,376 937 Aesthetics, 375 
938 Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 65 
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apparent in his spontaneous response to the vision of God upon a throne. Isaiah does not join 
his voice 
to the chorus of exaltation: `Holy, holy, holy, is the LORD of hosts' (v. 3). Instead of ecstatic or 
sublime transport, Isaiah responds with the spontaneous despair of unworthiness. `Woe is me for I am 
undone; because I am a man of unclean lips... for mine eyes have seen the King, the LORD of hosts' 
(Isaiah 6: 5) 939 Hence one may read the disproportion Isaiah feels as manifest between the so-called 
sublimity of the sovereign figure of God and the conviction that he Isaiah, a sinner of infinite 
difference from God, gazes upon this vision. It is this insistence upon disproportion, and not upon the 
sublimity of human disposition contemplating the divine sublimity, that attests to Isaiah 6 as a 
distinctly numinous theophany: one might say an unsurpassable description of Anfechtung. 
The numinous in Otto's schema is `Wholly Other': the untranslatable mysterium. Furthermore, the 
sublime as Kant maintains is as much in the imagination as dizziness, for Haufniensis, is in the eye. 
Sublimity, for Kant, resides in our mind and it is from here that contemplation of the divine takes its 
reference point. 
Only by supposing this idea in ourselves and in reference to it are we capable of attaining to 
the idea of the sublimity of that Being which produces respect in us, not merely by the might 
that it displays in nature, but rather by means of the faculty which resides in us of judging it 
fearlessly and of regarding our destination as sublime in respect of it 940 
Yet the numinous, as discussed, originates in something ultimately "objective and outside the self . 
94' 
It is this collision between self and Wholly Other that elicits a numinous dread in which the perceived 
threat of annihilation must have some basis in an external reality which is more than the internal 
"fantasy of injury". The prophet expresses for Otto "that feeling that man in his `profaneness' is not 
worthy to stand in the presence of the holy one, and that his own entire personal unworthiness might 
defile even holiness itself. s942 Isaiah articulates something more than a loss of identity, and that is not 
simply the unreality of the self, but a personal conviction of oneself as unworthy. The self is ultimately 
not lost or annihilated, but becomes conscious of itself in its recoiling despair before the holiness which 
makes the threat of extinction very apparent indeed: the Anfechtung of the infinite qualitative 
difference. This Anfecthung comes into clearer focus when differentiated from the imagined oppression 
of the sublime and the dread of the immensity of existence. 
939 H. V. Martin is reminded of this grieving of Isaiah by the lament in The Sickness unto Death, 32: 
"`That a sparrow can live before God is comprehensible; it does not know that it exists before God. But 
to know that one exists before God, and then not instantly go mad or sink into nothingness!.. However, 
in taking this to symbolise the sense of "transcendent holiness" which "overwhelms man to the extreme 
of inward suffering", Martin has overlooked the delusion of the infinitising imagination which Anti- 
Climacus warns against in this "fantasized religious person" (The Wings of Faith, 97-98). Nevertheless, 
despite suggesting this apparent rapport between Otto's exemplary Isaiah 6: 5 and Kierkegaard's sense 
of the "inward suffering... caused by the indirect relationship of faith to God", Martin is adamant that "Kierkegaard's conception of this suffering should not be confused with Otto's notion of religious awe, 
with its fascinating terror, in the presence of the Numinous. Christian suffering is existential suffering, the suffering of the soul that longs for some more direct relationship to God, some surer footing than faith. " The Wings of Faith, 98 Sao Critique ofJudgement, 104 941 The Idea of the Holy, 11 
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On May 12th 1839 Kierkegaard confessed that: 
All existence [Tilvaerelsen] makes me anxious, from the smallest fly to the mysteries of the 
Incarnation; the whole thing is inexplicable to me, I myself most of all; to me all existence is 
infected, I myself most of all. My distress is enormous, boundless; no one knows it except 
God in heaven, and he will not console me; no one can console me except God in heaven and 
he will not take compassion on me. - Young man, if you have gone astray, turn back to God, 
and from his upbringing you will take along with you a youthfulness strengthened for manly 
tasks. 943 
Kierkegaard's words are inevitably reminiscent of a Pascalian anxiety. Pascal speaks specifically of a 
dread of the infinite rooted in "man's loneliness in the macrocosm"9" - the felt nothingness of man 
before a universe capable of crushing him. In this sense, his oppression sometimes sounds like a kind 
of cosmological Anfechtung in the grasp of an onerous infinity. In contemplating the boundlessness of 
a fathomless universe he speaks of the immensity of space that infinitely transcends the imagination. 
Indeed, "it is the greatest perceptible mark of God's omnipotence that our imagination should lose 
itself in that thought"945 And yet, from turning man towards the immensity of the universe, Pascal 
declares that "I want to show him a new abyss. "946 And so Pascal redirects contemplation from the 
infinite to the infinitesimal: to "all the conceivable immensity of nature in this miniature atom. "941 
Unlike Kant's deliberately superficial `eye of the poet' which discerns the sublime, Pascal's meditation 
is consciously cosmological and scientific. And it is from this minute atomic perspective that the 
human body itself derives a newly discovered colossal sublimity. "Anyone who considers himself in 
this way will be terrified at himself, and, seeing his mass, as given him by nature, supporting him 
between two abysses of infinity and nothingness, will tremble at these marvels. "948 
Pascal's anxiety is the anxiety of a human being suspended "between two abysses of infinity 
and nothingness": two forces which transcend the dual extremes of human understanding and which 
cause him to dread. Pascal's experience of cosmological tremendum - whereby "The eternal silence of 
these infinite spaces fill me with dreads949 - is reciprocated by an anthropological horror. From this 
perspective, the human being has become a de-familiarised Tremendum; perhaps closer to what Otto 
discusses as "the uncanny" [das Unheimliche] or "the monstrous" [das Ungeheuer] - as in Sophocles's 
daunting observation, "Much there that is monstrous [ungeheuer]; but nought is more monstrous 
[ungeheuer] than man. , 950 The sublime anxiety is thereby internalised; in Pattison's words, "it is the 
inconceivability of my own existence that assails me from within the very heart of that existence 
itself. i9s1 
942 The Idea of 
9 
the Holy, 56 
943 JP 5: 5383 / Pap. II A 420 
45 
Harper, The Seventh Solitude, 27 
gas pensees 199 (72), p. 89 9°6 Ibid. 
947 Ibid., 90 
948 Ibid. 
949 Ibid., p. 95 950 The Idea of the Holy, 40. The resemblance between the monstrous and the sublime is apparent in Otto's observation that Goethe employs ungeheuer to denote "what is too vast for our faculty of space- perception, such as the immeasurable vault of the night sky. " The Idea of the Holy, 41 51 `Sublimity and the Experience of Freedom in Kierkegaard', 195 
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But Anfechtung, spiritually understood, is more than the mere dread of oneself or the dread of 
an impersonal but greater force weighing upon oneself. There is a difference between an Anfechtung 
(if 
this is not a miss-application of the word) in which one feels the weight of something greater in the 
aesthetic or cosmological sense, and the Anfechtung of the God-relationship. The struggle against the 
cosmos, against the sublime, against existence itself, is not the same struggle as the loving struggle 
with God. Hence Pascal testifies to a recognition of something within him which rationally transcends 
that which would extinguish him when he declares that "even if the universe were to crush him, man 
would still be nobler than his slayer, because he knows that he is dying and the advantage the universe 
has over him. The universe knows nothing of this. "952And yet the loving struggle of Anfechtung is 
marked by a more terrible anxiety, as Isaiah 6 attests to: the anxiety of sin which threatens one's 
spiritual as well as physical existence. 
Holy Hypochondria 
[A] person becomes momentarily anxious and afraid of ideality and himself - and of God, 
who seems to be so infinitely sublime that one does not dare think of him at all. It seems as if 
he must become disgusted and tired of listening to one's nonsense and nauseated with one's 
sins 953 
"To be sure, " Kierkegaard observes, "the blow of the unconditioned also takes the form of sin- 
consciousness; there is a concentration of sin or past sins in one single blow, in one single moment, and 
this falls on a man's conscience. 054 When this personal consciousness of sin is lacking in an 
individual, then, according to Anti-Climacus, "Christianity, terrifying, will rise up against him and 
transform itself into madness or horror until he either learns to give up Christianity or - ... by means of 
the anguish of a contrite conscience, all in proportion to his need - learns to enter into Christianity by 
the narrow way, through the consciousness of sin. "955 This narrow [trang] way is also the way of 
anxiety [Angst - deriving from the Latin angustiae - `narrows'] 
956 Yet, in such anxiety, repentance is 
in danger of falling into an irremediable grief. "Repentance has lost its mind, " as Vigilius Haufniensis 
describes, "and anxiety is potentiated into repentance. "9S7 Repentance despairs as anxiety condemns 
itself: "its condemnation is certain, and the augmented judgment is that the individual shall be dragged 
952 Pensees XV 200, p. 95. Hence Pattison writes, "When I judge a storm to be sublime, I am able to do 
so because I recognize, with Pascal, that even if it should destroy me physically, there is that in me 
which is of another order than mere physical force and which enables me to confront even actual 
danger as `marvellous! Sublime! "' `Kierkegaard and the Sublime', 253 953 JP 2: 2008 / Pap. IX A 316 
954 JP 4: 4903/ Pap. X5 A 17 
955 PIC, 68 
956 As Tillich observes in Systematic Theology, Vol. II, 39. Likewise Bonhoeffer notes the common 
root between Angst, Enge ('narrowness') and bange (`woeful'). (Act and Being, 168 translator's note) 
Similarly in Danish Angst associates with trang ('narrow') and traengsel ('narrowness', `tribulation', 
also suggesting `crowd'). See `Not That the Way is Narrow [trang], But That Narrowness [tr engsel] is 
the Way', Gospel of Sufferings, 97. "That we find the way narrow [trang], that tribulation [trcengsel] 
then is an encountering of opposition, it is an obstacle on the way; there is something to win through, but then the way does lead to bliss. " (Ibid., 107) 1 Thess 3: 3 `We are appointed to tribulations [traengsler]. ' However, as noted, Angst in the Kierkegaardian corpus also has a strongly vertiginous 
connotation. 
957 CA, 115 
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through life to the place of execution. In other words, repentance has gone crazy. "958 Bizarrely, 
however, this madness is also "the sign of a deeper nature. s959 This is the kind of "spiritual trial' 
[Anfa, gtelse] which has, lamentably, been disregarded by the spiritlessness of the modern age: 
In the old days, the road to perfection was narrow [trang] and solitary. The journey along it 
was always disturbed by aberrations, exposed to predatory attacks by sin, and pursued by the 
arrow of the past, which is as dangerous as that of the Scythian hordes0 
As such, this madness is a kind of "holy hypochondria [heilige Hypochondrie]"961 which, though it 
may fail in its scrupulous anxiety to diagnose the proportion of its guilt, at least recognises the perilous 
danger of the road to perfection. Yet the self-diagnosis of specious anxiety over sin threatens the 
individual with something like melancholy's capitulation into nihilism: that is "anxiety's moment of 
death. s962 As such, Vigilius Haufniensis prescribes, "The only thing that is truly able to disarm the 
sophistry of sin is faith, courage to believe that the state itself is a new sin, courage to renounce anxiety 
without anxiety, which only faith can do' : 63 
Such anxiety can engender the appearance of innumerable spiritual trials. Consequently 
Kierkegaard warns that one must be extremely careful in what is said to someone as vulnerable as a 
child lest a casual remark `occasion an anguished conscience in which innocent and fragile souls can 
easily be tempted to believe themselves guilty' . 9" Children, in Vigilius Haufniensis's assessment, are 
inherently more adventurously disposed towards anxiety965 and hence more susceptible to any anxiety 
which plays upon the imagination. In childish anxiety is found "the dreaming of the spirit", 9 but in 
such impressionable and vulnerable minds this dream may easily be transmuted into a nightmare. And 
yet it is surely not only childhood which, in the fragility of the conscience, is susceptible to that "flame 
of hell which ignites the tinder which is in every soul' . 967 Such an anxiety over God-forsakenness 
resides latently in each individual soul: 
Deep within every human being there still lives the anxiety over the possibility of being alone 
in the world, forgotten by God, overlooked among the millions and millions in this enormous 
household. 968 
It is tempting to discern a fetish for anxiety in Kierkegaard; to observe in Kierkegaard's melancholy a 
genealogy of morbid religious guilt rendered extravagant by his strict religious upbringing. 969 Yet 
958 CA, 116 
959 CA, 116 
960 CA, 117 
961 CA, 162*. Vigilius Haufniensis quotes this phrase from J. G. Hamman, Schriften (Berlin: 1821-43) 
Vol. VI, p. 194. 963 CA, 117 
CA, 117 
965 JP 1: 91 / Pap. II A 
CA, 42 
966 CA, 42 
967 JP 1: 91 / Pap. II A 968 JP 1: 100 / Pap. VIIP A 363. As John of the Cross likewise describes this sense of desolation: "the greatest affliction of the sorrowful soul in this state is the thought that God has abandoned it, of which it has no doubt; that He has cast it away into the darkness as an abominable thing. " The Dark Night of the Soul, Book II, chapter vi, 89 969 H. V. Martin makes such an observation in Kierkegaard: The Melancholy Dane, 16 
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Kierkegaard was also emphatic that self-indictment could betray a melancholy in which "the heart can 
abase itself, and yet never enough to satisfy it". 970 He ascribed to the spirit of 1 John 3: 10 `Though our 
heart condemn us, God is greater than our hearts': the assurance that although fear and trembling was 
an appropriate response to holiness, pathological or melancholy self-conviction is not decisive. Despite 
his own gloomy spiritual preoccupations, Kierkegaard stood in a prolific tradition of `physicians of the 
soul' who attempted to alleviate such errors of self-mortification. As he counsels: 
[W]hether it was a sickness of the soul which every night so darkened thy mind that at last 
with deathly anguish, brought near to madness by the apprehension of God's holiness, thou 
didst feel that thou must condemn thyself, whatever the dreadful thing was which weighed 
upon thy conscience that thy heart condemned thee - God is greater! 
971 
There is a prolific tradition of evidence exploring how such convictions induce or originate in 
melancholy and may well descend into madness 972 It has at times been believed that one's own self- 
indictment may conceal the real possibility of supernatural manipulation. The devil, Burton's Anatomy 
ofMelancholy suggests, can exploit the melancholic conscience: 
The devil that then told thee it was a light sin, or no sin at all, now aggravates 
on the other side, and telleth thee that it is a most irremissible offence, as he did 
by Cain and Judas, to bring them to despair. 973 
Tormented by his offence, Cain despairs that `My punishment is greater than I can bear' (Genesis 
4: 13), and devours himself in sorrow over his transgression. Such melancholic minds are transfixed by 
their brooding sins to the extent that, as Burton writes, "they account themselves Reprobates, quite 
forsaken of God, already damned, past all hope of grace, incapable of mercy, slaves of sin, and their 
offences so great, they cannot be forgiven. 99974 Such a self-interpretation is preserved in A Narrative of 
970 `Discourses at the Communion on Fridays', CD, 300 971 CD, 301 [My emphasis] 972 Such belief in one's own damnation risks becoming pathologically delusional once its conviction 
becomes unwavering. Foucault suggests that "too much moral rigor, too much anxiety about salvation 
and the life to come were often thought to bring on melancholia. " (Madness and Civilization, 204) It 
therefore seems intuitive to suggest that `sin' is a crucial factor in causes of mental illness. However, in 
balance it is interesting to note Maurice Lipsedge's summary of Kroll and Bacrach's study of madness 
in the middle ages [Kroll, J. and Bachrach, B., 'Sin and mental illness in the Middle Ages', 
Psychological Medicine 14 (1984), 507-14. ]. Sin itself was rarely regarded as causing madness 
(without a supernatural element): 
Sin was most commonly implicated as the cause of madness or epilepsy which were 
combined with possession, while possession alone was attributed to sin in only a single 
case. The commonest combination was madness/possession/sin. Madness without 
possession was rarely attributed to sin. ('Religion and Madness in History', ed. Dinesh 
Bhugra, Psychiatry and Religion: Context, Consensus and Controversies, 33) 973 The Anatomy of Melancholy, Pt. 3, Section 4, Member 2, Subsection 3,401 974 The Anatomy of Melancholy, Pt. 3, Section 4, Member I, Subsection 6,410. For example, Thielman 
draws particular attention to the testimony of the depressive William Cowper's (1731-1800) pre- 
occupation with negative ideas. Cowper confesses, "I saw plainly that God alone could deliver me, but 
was firmly persuaded that he would not and therefore omitted to ask it. " `Adelphi: An Account of the Conversion of W. C. Esquire'. Quoted in Samuel B. Thielman, `Reflections on the role of Religion in the History of Society' (ed. Harold G. Koenig, Handbook of Religion and Mental Health). The dreadful 
anxiety over one's salvation persists in the uncertainty of a dangerously abstract self-regard; as such desert fathers and medieval penitents wrote with a surprisingly pragmatic emphasis about combating the temptations of acedia and the various `bad thoughts'. See Richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, e. g. Chapter 23, 'From First Movements to the 
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God's Gracious Dealings with that Choice Christian Mrs. Hannah Allen (1683): a seventeenth century 
autobiographical pamphlet frankly recounting an Englishwoman's descent into a religiously oriented 
melancholia. 975 "My Sins are so great, that if all the Sins of all the Devils and the Damned in Hell, and 
all the Reprobates on Earth were comprehended in one man; mine are greater; there is no word comes 
so near the comprehension of the dreadfulness of my Condition; as that, I am the Monster of the 
Creation' . 976 To such a person God becomes the avenger, as David says (ultor a tergo Deus), or 
Nemesis as the poets call it. 977 For only God, in all the divinity of wrath, can deal with this reprobate 
who induces a dread more fearful than the ungeheuer of Sophocles -a self-confessed "Monster of the 
Creation. " 
In such fear of God we may detect echoes of a more primitive "daemonic dread", as Otto 
discerns in the account in Exodus 4: 24 of Yahweh who, meeting Moses by the way, sought to kill 
him. 978 Johannes Climacus also describes Anfagtelse as "the nemesis upon the strong moment in the 
absolute relationship. X979 But the retribution of this particular nemesis possesses a slightly different 
emphasis. It is the opposition of the absolute against the individual: specifically against the individual's 
attempt to relate to something Wholly Other. It is the strenuously high price for the God-relationship 
asserting itself - although not such way as to imply that the God-relationship should be abandoned. It is 
a testing of the absolute relationship by the absolute itself. As such, it is well illustrated by the 
tribulation of the will undergone in Christ's agony in Gethsemane. In reference to Christ's `sorrow unto 
death' before the mysterium tremendum, Otto appropriately relates the "strangely parallel" and 
"prophetically significant! 'accounts of "Yahweh who waylaid Moses by night, and of Jacob who 
Seven Cardinal Sins: Evagrius'. The problem being that assurance often does not seem sufficiently to 
substantiate itself in the melancholic mind, perhaps what is required is a substantiation of punishment, 
'the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul' (Micah 6: 7)? Foucault suggests the benefits of the 
penitential method: "If a man felt guilty, he was subject to real, often material punishment which 
occupied his mind and gave him an assurance that the transgression was redressed. " (Madness and 
Civilization, 205) Must metaphysical punishment and penance be transubstantiated into something 
tangible? Through the practice of penitence, pilgrimage and economic recompense the soul is able to 
provide tangible forms of repentance, and in return receive tangible assurance of forgiveness. Foucault 
suggests that "if, on the contrary, religion loosens its hold [on material penance] but maintains the ideal 
forms of remorse of conscience of spiritual mortification, it leads directly to madness. " (ibid., 205) 
However, physical penance can just as easily succumb to the fetishism of a melancholy form of bodily 
self-mortification. For example, Burton warns that, "melancholy for fear of God's judgement and hell fire, drives men to desperation... Solitariness, much fasting, divine meditations and contemplations of 
God's judgements, most part accompany this melancholy. " (The Anatomy of Melancholy, Section 4, 
Member I, Subsection 3,939). Both anxieties essentially dwell upon two misunderstandings of 
salvation. The first, by abstracted brooding over guilt, believes that the sinner's self-interpretation 
regarding its own damnation is definitive. The second, by mortifying itself in penance, believes it can 
achieve its own perdition by self-refinement. Robert Burton, writing as both physician and clergyman, 
stresses "these men must know, there is no sin so heinous, which is not pardonable in itself; no crime 
so great, but by God's mercy it may be forgiven. " (The Anatomy of Melancholy, Section 4, Member I, Subsection 6,951). 
975 In ed. Allan Ingram, Voices of Madness: Four Pamphlets, 1683-1796, p. 1-21 976 Voices of Madness, 13 977 The Anatomy of Melancholy, Pt. 3, Sec. 4, Mem. 2, Subs. 3,402-3. Burton even goes so far as to identify God as a cause of melancholy, "for the punishment of sin, and satisfaction of his justice, many examples and testimonies of holy Scriptures make evident unto us... He brought down their heart with heaviness. He stroke them with madness, blindness and astonishment of heart. " The Anatomy of Melancholy, 156 
978 Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 74 
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wrestles with God' . 980 Jacob struggled like Christ, "with the God of `Wrath' and `Fury', with the 
numen, which yet is itself `My Father'. "981 Both `had power with God... and prevailed'; or as 
Kierkegaard might put it, `were victorious in that God was victorious'. 
The night at Gethsemane and the night at Peni'el are united by a sense of what Otto calls "the 
shuddering secret of the numen. s982 The allegory of Yisra'el suggests to us the mysterious struggle of 
Anfechtung that is as much the `angefochtene Christus' just as it is "Jacob wrestling with God 
himself. , 983 In its authentic form it is not an instance for daemonic dread because it is essentially a 
struggle of love rather than of fear. Nor i's it a struggle to the death since it seeks neither annihilation of 
the self nor the death of God. Taken together, these two nights at Gethsemane and Peni'el remind us of 
a sacrifice made by God for the sake of humanity. It is Christ, as well as Jacob, who reveals what it 
means to struggle with God. It is with this in mind that a Kierkegaardian anatomy of Anfcegtelse shall 
be considered. 
979 CUP, 411. 
980 The Idea of the Holy, 88 
Ibid. 982Ibid. 
983 Neinecken, The Moment Before God, 320 
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Chapter Five: The Anatomy of Anfecthun2 
But this is rigorous upbringing - this going from inborn anxiety to faith. Anxiety is the most 
terrible kind of spiritual trial [Anfcrgtelse]. 84 
Anfechtung and Anfajztelse 
Reading Kierkegaard's works, it is difficult to escape the sense in which the God-relationship appears 
as "a death struggle", 985 described with such perplexing evocative horror as "to be over 70,000 fathoms 
and yet be joyful. '986 The vertiginous angst of the formless abyss is supplanted through the God- 
relationship by the narrowing anxiety of an inescapable conflict. As Johannes Climacus articulates, 
"confined within the absolute conception of God" the individual is captured like the bird imprisoned in 
a cage, or like the fish stranded on the shore which "lies out of its element on the dry ground - so the 
religious individual is confined; for absoluteness is not directly the element of a finite creature"987 
Reading these harrowing descriptions of Johannes Climacus's, often ironic, pre-Christian view of a 
radicalised Christianity, Daphne Hampson suggests that "it is clear that Kierkegaard was speaking of 
circumstances he well knew. s988 These illustrations of Anfcegtelse evoke an experience Luther himself 
described as Anfechtung [fa'gtelfecht - `fight'] 
989 As Hampson explains, "Anfechtung (literally being 
fought against) is the word used within the Lutheran tradition for the sense that one is 
undermined/caught/pinned down when confronted by God. "990 It is more oppressive than the inertia of 
acedia in which one encounters the aridity of the absence of God. Whilst acedia laments under the 
black sun of a Godless desert, Anfechtung is, recalling another of Kierkegaard's descriptions, a 
devastating and intensified sunstroke from the unconditioned. "The religious individual has lost the 
relativity of the immediate consciousness, its distraction, its time-wasting activity - precisely, its 
wastage of time; the absolute consciousness of God consumes him as the burning heat of the summer 
sun when it will not go down, as the burning heat of the summer sun when it will not abate. " 991 
However, Anfechtung is an idea that is not exclusive to the Lutheran tradition. Its roots can be 
traced from biblical precedence, as John of the Cross attests by invoking the Psalmist: "Thy fury is 
confirmed upon me; and all Thy waves Thou hast brought in upon me"992 Such is how John describes 
984 JP 2: 1401 / Pap. X2 A 493 
985 JP 4: 4725 / Pap. X12 A 67 
986 SLW, 430 
987 CUP, 432 
988 Christian Contradictions: The Structures ofLutheran and Catholic Thought, 256. 989 Whilst the Hong and Hong translation of "spiritual trial" alludes to the proportionate relation between Anfcegtelse and "spirit'- a relation lost in Dru's "tribulation" -I personally prefer Swenson/Lowrie's Anfechtung since it implies the oppressive aspect and the more technical Lutheran 
theological heritage behind the word. However, as I shall examine, Kierkegaard's use of the term is not 
always identifiable with Luther's. As such, although both the Danish and German words centre around the common root [fechtlfagte - `fight'] I am choosing to differentiate between Anfechtung and Anfa? gtelse to denote Luther and Kierkegaard respectively. Whilst Anfechtung is probably my preferred rendition I feel the need to attest to the differences as well as affinities between Luther and Kierkegaard in their use of the term. However, in quotations from the texts I have retained the relevant English translation. 
990 Christian Contradictions, 31 991 CUP, 433 
992 The Dark Night of the Soul, Book II, Chapter vi, 2, p. 89 
147 
the experience which is a deepening of `aridity', the intensified feeling of `desolation': "the state in 
which the soul feels not merely abandoned by God, but as if God were actively and menacingly hostile 
to it "993 Similarly Juan de los Angeles describes how the soul is initially wooed, baited, and enticed by 
God; "But once grabbed and caught in his net, he treats us with such rigorous severity, and in such way 
he deserts us, that the flesh rebels against the spirit and embarrass it into such plight that we doubt we 
will ever be God's friends again. "994 
Nevertheless, Kierkegaard's use of the term Anfcegtelse ostensibly bears most immediate 
relation to Luther's Anfechtung. 995 Kierkegaard conjures up the abyss to define the anxiety of the 
individual stranded tentatively between the unresolved archaeology and eschatology of one's salvation. 
"Ah, like the shipwrecked man who has saved himself by a plank, and thus, tossed by the waves, 
hovering over the abyss, between life and death, gazes fixedly at the land - so should a man be 
concerned for his salvation. "996 Such salvific anxiety reminds one of Luther - and Kierkegaard notes, 
"Luther says that as soon as Christ has come on board the storm immediately begins". 
997 One can 
discern a common malady gestating in the hearts of both men. Between Anfechtung and Anfagtelse 
there is even a descriptive abyssal affinity: "Where Luther likens it to hanging from a cross midway 
between heaven and earth, Kierkegaard compares it to being suspended over a depth of 70,000 
fathoms +'998 
While the vertiginous anxiety of the amorphous abyss is evoked, one of the most arresting 
impressions in the anatomy of Anfechtung is the sense of paralysis or captivity. "It is like the 
experience one has in a dream when one wants to run and yet with the utmost exertion is unable to 
993 E. W. Trueman Dicken, The Crucible of Love, 124 n. 13. For Ignatius of Loyola, for example, in 
"desolation", contrasted with the joyful "consolation" of the spiritual life, the soul "finds itself 
altogether slothful, tepid, sad, and as it were separated from its Creator and Lord. " 'Rules For the 
Discernment of Spirits', I, Rule IV, The Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius of Loyola, 186 
Yet desolation actually encompasses and surpasses aridity: it "consists in sadness, disquiet of mind, 
hope in earthly things or persons, love of lower and unworthy things, aridity, depression, and 
wandering of the mind after things of this world, all which proceed from the evil spirit. " The Spiritual 
Exercises of St. Ignatius of Loyola, Part II The Directory, Chapter XXVII, Paragraph 4,325. "4 The Loving Struggle, 134. Such descriptions, Otto identifies, point to the often subdued element of 
the tremendum in Christian mysticism: "a living factor in the Caligo and the altum Silentium, in the 
`Abyss', the `Night', the `Deserts' of the divine nature, into which the soul must descend, in the 
`agony', `abandonment', `barrenness', taedium, in which it must tarry, in the shuddering and shrinking 
from the loss and deprivation of self-hood and the `annihilation' of personal identity. " The Idea of the 
Holy, 109 
995 Luther is evidently not the only source of affinity for Kierkegaard's understanding of Anfaegtelse. 
Louise Carroll Keeley identifies Johann Arndt's True Christianity (especially Book II) among the `old 
devotional books' as another important source of solidarity. `Spiritual Trial in the Thought of 
Kierkegaard', ed. Robert Perkins, International Kierkegaard Commentary: Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript, 313. However, Arndt does not use the term Anfechtung in its technical differentiation from 
`temptation'. Nevertheless, True Christianity was undoubtedly an important book for Kierkegaard's 
devotional reading. See Pattison, Kierkegaard's Upbuilding Discourses, 58. Vigilius Ilaufniensis also 
notes that one can find a superfluity of material on the religious spiritual trial [Anfaegtelse) in Joseph 
von Gärres, Die christliche Mystik, though Haufniensis adds that "Gärres does not always know how to distinguish between the demonic and the spiritual trial. Therefore the work should be used with care. " CA, 143*. Kierkegaard also adds in a draft that "this work is so uncanny [unheimlich] that I have never dared read it carefully. " Pap. VB 63 996 `Now We Are Nearer Our Salvation... Than When We Became Believers', CD, 227 997 JP 4: 4372 / Pap. X1 A 22 
148 
move a muscle - this absolute frustration. The difference is that one is perfectly able to move about 
and one can do many things, and yet there is nothing one can do before God. " As the fish is stranded 
on the shore, and the bird is captured in the cage, or as one is shipwrecked or stranded over 70,000 
fathoms; so Luther, as Tillich highlights, "compares the horrified conscience, which tries to flee and 
cannot escape, with a goose which pursued by the wolf, does not use its wings, as ordinarily, but its 
feet and is caught s1°°° More radical than Versuchung (`temptation'), Luther's use of the word 
Anfechtung denotes "tempting attackss1001: "the trial of faith by various temptations". 1002 These attacks, 
Tillich observes, engender a profound Angst, "a feeling of being enclosed in a narrow place from which 
there is no escape. s1003 In Angst (deriving from the Latin angustiae - `narrows') the world constricts to 
such an extreme that in Luther's words, "There is no flight, no comfort within or without but all things 
accuse. "1004 
In Luther's eyes, Creator and creation are allied in their enmity against the sinner. In this 
sense, the infinite difference exists between humanity and creation, not Creator and creation. "For he 
who is an enemy to God has the whole creation against him. 111005 One becomes vulnerable to the 
innocuous mechanisms of the universe: in the changing wind, the driven leaf, Creation rises up in 
animated condemnation of the sinner. "At such a rustling a leaf becomes the Wrath of God, and the 
whole world on which a moment before we strutted in our pride, becomes too narrow for us. "' 006 Such 
a world harbours the risk of madness; recalling the melancholia of Hannah Allen, fearing "some 
horrible death", reading condemnation in thunderclaps overhead: "When I saw any black Clouds 
gather, or the Wind rise (as I went along) I presently concluded that some dreadful thing would fall out 
to show what an One I was. "°°7 As for Pascal the whole creation testifies to an absent God; so, almost 
pathologically one might say, for Luther the whole world can seem to testify to one's guilt. "God can 
make a wisp of straw as heavy as a hundred hundred-weight of corn, so do not despise those who have 
only small temptations'"loos Luther, in Tillich's words, "experienced the anxiety of guilt and the 
anxiety of fate. It is the uneasy conscience which produces innumerable irrational fears in daily life. 
The rustling of a dry leaf horrifies him who is plagued with guilt s1009 As the conscience drives him out 
of his mind in its denial of internal respite, so the world crowds him out of external comfort. Within or 
without: there is no escape from this haunting narrowing presence. "Guilt, death and the mundane press 
99$ Craig Hinkson, `Luther and Kierkegaard: Theologians of the Cross', International Journal of Sstematic Theology, Volume 3, Number 1, March 2001, p. 41. 9 Neinecken, The Moment Before God, 320 100° The Protestant Era, 163 
1001 Tillich, The Protestant Era, 162 1002 Rupp, The Righteousness of God, 235 1003 The Protestant Era, 162 
1004 W. A., 1.557.39. Cited in Rupp, The Righteousness of God, 109. 1005 Luther, WA., 10.1. ii. 27.14. Cited in Rupp, The Righteousness of God, 108. 1006 WA., 19.226.6. Cited in Ibid., 109. 'And upon them that are left alive of you I will send a faintness into their hearts in the lands of their enemies; and the sound of a shaken leaf shall chase them; and they shall flee, as fleeing from a sword; and they shall fall when none pursueth. ' (Lev. 26: 36) 1007 Voices of Madness, 10 1008 W. A., 45.397.2. Cited in Rupp, The Righteousness of God, 108. 1009 Tillich, The Courage To Be, 163 
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in upon man, making the world too `narrow' for him; no longer is he alone, for now everything speaks 
to him - as his accuser - yet he remains in this condition alone and defenceless. "1010 
The inhospitableness of the world is a reflection of one's estrangement from the God from 
Whom one is alienated, but from Whose gaze one cannot escape. Unable to master the world as one's 
object, this particularly Unhappy Consciousness becomes the object of a world which refuses to 
respond to its grasp. The dread of God-forsakenness is enmeshed in the congested tendrils of a 
sprawling creation. Just as for melancholy the organic world teems with the dangers of nightshade and 
the mandrake, so in Anfechtung accusation grows from every recess. `And now art thou cursed from 
the earth, ' God tells Cain, `a fugitive and a vagabond shalt thou be in the earth' (Genesis 4: 11,12). As 
Rupp describes, "the sinner is hemmed in with anxiety and fear, and his conscience is a prison to him. 
Cramped, cabined and confined in a kind of spiritual claustrophobia, the experience passes over into its 
opposite, the restless desire to flee to the ends of the earth, under the desperate certainty that there can 
be no escape from God. i1011 Such a sinner is like Jonah the prophet who flees but cannot escape. In his 
futile flight from the presence of the LORD, Jonah experiences the enmity of creation opposing him in 
the name of the Creator: the storm (1: 4), the whale (1: 17), the withering gourd (4: 7), and the east wind 
(4: 8) all serve to convict Jonah that he is subject to the machinations of God's world. 
In 1840 Kierkegaard paid a pilgrimage to the scene of the childhood transgression that his father had 
apparently confided to him. It is in his description of the Jutland heath - the alleged site of his father's 
cursing of God - that one discerns an especially melancholy Lutheran climate, what we might call the 
very landscape of Anfechtung in which one cannot escape naked exposure before God: 
The heath must be particularly adapted to developing vigorous spirits; here everything 
lies naked and unveiled before God, and here is no place for a lot of distractions, those 
many odd nooks and corners where the consciousness can hide, and from which earnestness 
often has a hard time recovering vagrant thoughts. Here consciousness must come to 
definite and precise conclusions about itself. Here on the heath one must truly say, 
"Whither shall I flee from thy presence? " [Psalm 139: 7] 1012 
But to what extent, beyond the stylistic, can Lutheran Anfechtung be translated as Kierkegaardian 
Anfcegtelse? In Kierkegaardian Anfcegtelse does one discover a modem understanding of a medieval 
idea? Or is Luther's Anfechtung a precursor for modem Angst? Rupp's suggestion that "We might call 
it [Anfechtung] an existential word since it concerns man as he grapples with himself and the universe" 
might imply so. "But", Rupp warns, "we must not be misled into supposing that this is mere 
subjectivism. " The crucial factor resides in the location of the human subject before God: "The whole 
meaning of `Anfechtung' for Luther lies in the thought that man has his existence 'Coram Deo, ' and 
that he is less the active intelligence imposing itself on the stuff of the universe around him, than the 
subject of an initiative and action from God who employs the whole of man's existence as a means of 
bringing men to awareness of their peril or need. *91013 As such, it is not equated with the dread of the 
1010 Bonhoeffer, Act and Being, 167-168 101 The Righteousness of God, 109 1012 JP 3: 2830 / Pap. III A 78 1013 The Righteousness of God, 106 
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modem subject as it experiences its loneliness and estrangement from an indifferent cosmos. Here we 
are returned to the difference between the numinous and the sublime. 
Neither is Anfechtung, although nourished by the anguished conscience, simply the 
ontological anxiety inherent within anthropological introspection. Although it denotes an impression of 
the self's opposition by an other, it is irreducibly theocentric in its orientation of the subject coram deo. 
The God before whom one finds it is dreadful to stand often appears in Luther as the voyeuristic 
Absolute Subject before Whom one is inescapably object. The anxious sinner, as Luther describes, "is 
put to sin and shame before God": 
... [T]his shame is now a thousand times greater, that a man must blush in the presence of 
God. For this means that there is no corner or hole in the whole of creation into which a man 
might creep, not even in hell, but he must let himself be exposed to the gaze of the whole 
creation, and stand in the open with all his shame, as a bad conscience feels when it is really 
struck... God takes all honour and comfort away and leaves only shame there, and this is his 
misery. '°'4 
Recalling Nietzsche, this can translate as the experience which precedes and incites Deicide. The desire 
for flight is thwarted by the inescapable omnipresence of the accusative gaze, and consequently the 
object retaliates in a murderous act of reclaimed subjectivity. Indeed Tillich, in his sermon on Psalm 
139 `The Escape From God', claims that the "Presence of God created the same feeling in Luther as it 
did Nietzsche. "'o's Such voyeurism recalls what Sartre identifies as `The Look' which induces my 
"shame before God; that is, the recognition of my being-as-object before a subject that can never 
become an object... I posit my being-an-object-for-God as more real than my For-itself; I exist 
alienated and I cause myself to learn from outside what I must be. This is the origin of fear before 
God. s1016 Thus Sartre's God, as Pattison defines, "is the one who looks at him - and, moreover, the one 
who looks at him when he does not want to be looked at s1017 Sartre has responded, understandably, to 
an invasive visual interrogation, as exemplified by a passage in Words: "I was busy covering up my 
crime when God suddenly saw me. I felt his gaze inside my head and on my hands... horribly visible, a 
living target. I was saved by indignation: I grew angry at such a crude lack of tact, and blasphemed... 
He never looked at me again. "1018 
But in my anxiety over violation by an ultimately alien other - the anxiety by which the 
rustling leaf whispers the dreadful secret of the wrath of God - have I slipped into the realm of the 
fantastic? Is this Other merely a fantastic projection of ontological anxiety and guilt? As Sartre might 
say to Luther in dispelling the terrified conscience tenderised by the mere rustling of a leaf: "perhaps 
the objects of the world which I took for eyes were not eyes; perhaps it was only the wind which shook 
the bush behind me". 1019 However, when modern atheism has not announced itself as such a live option 
1014 W. A., 19.216.27. Cited in Rupp, The Righteousness of God, 108. 1015 The Shaking o. 1ýthe Foundations [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948], 44. Cited in Cornelio 
Fabro, God in Exile, 1012 n. 21. 1016 Being and Nothingness, 290 1017 017 Kierkegaard's Upbuilding Discourses, 107 ions Words, 70-71. Pattison suggests "This anecdote helps to identify a key element in the meaning that God has for Sartre and thus provides an important clue to the meaning of his atheism. " Kierkegaard's 
1U1 
building Discourses, 107 
Being and Nothingness, 276 
151 
for Luther, the sinner is seen to respond with a spontaneous impulse to escape confinement through 
flight rather than the confrontation of atheism. However, from Kierkegaard's perspective, the `terror 
threat' can actually signify the authenticity of the God-relationship - in contradistinction to the 
appeasing Feuerbachian projection in which all such risk is exorcised. As Tillich also argues, "It is safe 
to say that a man who has never tried to flee God has never experienced the God Who is really God... 
For there is no reason to flee a god who is the perfect picture of everything that is good in man... Why 
try to escape from a reality of which we are a part? " 1020 As such, atheism, Tillich identifies, may 
signify the redirection of the same impulse to flee from the inescapable reality of God as Anfechtung. 
Yet, if fear and trembling is the only response the divine can evoke in a human subject then 
we are returned to the question of whether, with this understanding of God, we are not more legitimate 
in the retaliation of atheism than the self-annihilation of Anfechtung. Is it not inevitable that this God, 
depicted as some kind of invasive mysterium horrendum, should warrant the retaliation of Nietzschean 
rebellion? In such a scheme must the slave legitimately rise up against the Master: the object reclaim 
itself from the Subject? 
Mysterium Horrendum 
In Luther's depiction of God as the One before Whom none can stand and from Whom none can 
escape, one detects strong shades of what Otto later identifies as the numinous. As Otto himself claims, 
"Indeed I grew to understand the numinous and its difference from the rational in Luther's De Servo 
Arbitrio long before I identified it in the `gädosh' of the Old Testament and in the elements of 
`religious awe' in the history of religion in general. s1021 Yet Otto warns that Luther's numinous 
consciousness risks the dangerously unbalanced privileging of God's awesome non-rational character 
as representing, in Luther's words, `Deus ipse, ut est in sua natura et maiestate' ('God Himself, as He is 
in his own very nature and majesty'). 1022 Likewise, Tillich diagnoses the potentially deforming 
numinous horror implicit in Luther's notion of the `naked absolute': 
The demonic elements in Luther's doctrine of God, his occasional identification of the 
wrath of God with Satan, the half-divine-half-demonic picture he gives of God's acting 
in nature and history - all this constitutes the greatness and the danger of Luther's 
understanding of the holy. The experience he describes certainly is numinous, tremendous, 
and fascinating, but it is not safeguarded against demonic distortion and against the 
resurgence of the unclean within the holy. 1023 
1020 The Shaking of the Foundations, 38. Cited in Fabro, God in Exile, 1011. 1021 The Idea of the Holy, 103 1022 .c an assumption which would be in fact a dangerous and erroneous one; for no distinction of the 
non-rational and the rational aspects of God should imply that the latter is less essential than the former. " The Idea of the Holy, 102 1023 Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. 1,241 
Interestingly, Wessel Stoker criticises Tillich's own view of evil conquered within God for 
engendering God as a "split being": "If we see it this way, then in my opinion God is no longer the light in whom there is no darkness at all (1 John 1: 5)... The way in which Tillich sees evil in God as a 
conquered contradiction is a modern-day version of the old myth that answers the question of the origin 
of evil by a theogony, the story about a struggle among the gods -a struggle that Tillich believes is portrayed within God himself. " Is the Quest forMeaning the Quest for God?, 67... 68 
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The potential dualism of good and evil within the divine nature may betray a barely exorcised or 
suppressed remnant of a more primitive Satanic shadow revealed in the wrath of God. As Otto 
identifies the danger of the primal demonic implicit in the `ferocity' of the numinous: "It might be said 
that Lucifer is `fury', the öpp , hypostasized, the 
`mysterium tremendum' cut loose from the other 
elements and intensified to mysterium horrendum"1024 One may perceive something of the inherent 
danger of this perversion of the numinous into the demonic in the myth of Lucifer as a `fallen angel': a 
deviant mutation of the heavenly and the diabolical. As such, is there something covertly Satanic 
discernible in the God of Luther's Anfechtung? 
One must be aware of how there is a serious sense in Luther's writings, and indeed in his life and 
times, of the consistent and substantial threat of a supernatural Satanic reality. Indeed Luther's world 
"swarmed with devils and poltergeists. "1025 The young man's maternally inherited superstitions 
rendered him susceptible to what might now be regarded as vulgar belief in witchcraft and the 
supernatural. "Strange noises in the night, the wind in the forest, the odd behavior of a neighbor... all 
provoked the conviction that demonic forces went about the world like a roaring lion, seeking whom it 
might devour. "1026 Luther recounts how the devil is known to "thump about and haunt houses" and 
even relates with some satisfaction his own composure in response to a poltergeist incident in the 
monastery at Wittenberg. 1027 All in all it would be premature in Luther's time to retire the devil to the 
archives of psychology or mythology. "Luther's Devil is by no means disposed of in terms of 
superstition, catarrh, noises in the head and what are now fashionably described as `poltergeist' 
phenomena. 111028 In fact, rather than overcoming medieval belief in the devil, Luther's imminent 
eschatological conviction and urgency can be seen to have "intensified it and lent to it additional 
urgency: Christ and Satan wage a cosmic war for mastery over Church and world. "1029 Oberman even 
goes so far as to suggest that Luther's experience of the devil's power "affected him as intensely as 
Christ's" 1030 
Just as Luther ascribed the negative experience of melancholy to the devil so also does the 
suffering in Anfechtung conceal a Satanic origin. `Concealment' is certainly the correct term since in 
the afflictions of Anfechtung Satan works in secret - in hiddenness against the individual - turning the 
conscience against itself. As such, when in the horror of guilt one condemns oneself in the sleepless 
night of damnation, it is the devil who secretly labours in the occult internal labyrinth, subtly 
tenderising the conscience. In the Satanically cultivated anxiety of predestination the pre-apprehension 
of the fiery abyss looms large and terrible for the imagination. Consequently the task is to expose the 
concealed Satanic engine and therefore extricate the conscience from its mechanisms. This cognition - 
that the devil has deceived one into erroneous self-condemnation - allows one not only to resist Satan 
1024 The Idea of the Holy, 110 n. 2 1025 Maus, Martin Luther, 27 1026 Marius, Martin Luther, 27 
1027 See Oberman, Luther, 105 
1028 
1029 
Rupp, The Righteousness of God, 347 
Oberman, Luther, 104 
1030 Luther, 155 
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but also to discern the true meaning of the temptation as a trial, and the identity of the real antagonist 
against whom one must fight. 
Luther's writings on the sources of Anfechtung paint an opaque and potentially disturbing 
portrait of a Janus-faced God. Whilst it is true that for Luther the devil is the Accuser who opposes 
humanity, it is also true that in Anfechtung one also fights against God as well as this primal serpent. 
Whilst it is true that Satan is hidden in the conscience's melancholy self-condemnation, God is also 
hidden behind the demonic orchestrations of the devil. As such, Luther reveals how God implicitly 
grants to the devil power over human beings in two ways: "first, over the ungodly, when he will punish 
them by reason of their sins; secondly, over the just and godly, when he intends to try whether they will 
be constant in the faith, and remain in his obedience. Without God's will and our own consent, the 
devil cannot hurt us. "1131 Here is the God who declares, `I am the LORD, and there is none besides me. 
I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace and create evil: I the LORD do all these things' 
(Isaiah 45: 6-7). In order to avoid a cosmological dualism which would undermine divine omnipotence 
and compromise eschatological confidence, the devil must be ultimately conceived to be under the 
control - though not the coalition - of a sovereign God. Understood this way, the life of the 
devil is 
lived in the constant desire to afflict us - tempered only by the preservation of God's restraining 
protection of us. As such, God's loosening of the divine restraint upon Satan is not to be identified with 
explicit collaboration. "The power the devil exercises is not by God commanded, " Luther explains, 
"but God resists him not, suffering him to make tumults, yet no longer or further than he wills, for God 
has set him a mark, beyond which he neither can nor dare step. s1032 In the divine withdrawal which 
must of necessity predicate affliction, we have some sense of the hiddenness of God: what Luther 
identified as the Deus absconditus. It is here that Kierkegaard confesses a significant departure point 
between his view of Anfeegtelse and Luther's Anfechtung. 
Kierkegaard, the Devil and the Demonic 
That Christians must suffer does not come from the devil. The suffering comes from God - 
and right at this point begins the most extreme spiritual strenuousness in the Christian life. 1033 
Kierkegaard accuses Luther's ascription of Anfechtung to Satan of being "more childish than true"rosa: 
a castigation not so much motivated by Enlightenment condescension towards medieval superstition as 
the desire to appropriately situate the tension of Anfagtelse irreducibly between the individual and 
God. "No, it is spiritual trial [Anfagtelse] because it seems to the person himself as if the relationship 
were stretched too tightly, as if he were venturing too boldly in literally involving himself personally 
with God and Christ "lo35 Nevertheless, here Kierkegaard does actually concur with Luther's belief that 
Anfechtung is not a nemesis upon worldliness, but is instead elicited and intensified by the proximity of 
the God-relationship. Luther's devil avenges himself upon a life ventured in faith. "Here", according to 
Oberman, "is found a radical deviation from the medieval concept of the Devil, according to which the 
1031 `Of the Devil and His Works', DCXX, The Table Talk of Martin Luther, 265 1032 `Of the Devil and His Works', DCXIV, The Table Talk of Martin Luther, 263-264 1033 JP 2: 1447 / Pap. X12 A 130 
1034 JP 4: 4372 / Pap. X' A 22 
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evil one is drawn by the smell of sin, the sin of worldly concern. "036 Hence Johannes Climacus very 
Lutheranly describes Anfcegtelse as "the nemesis upon the strong moment in the absolute 
relationship. °37 Nevertheless, since the dialectical antagonism is not situated between God and the 
Devil but between God and the individual, the Kierkegaardian nemesis must be understood as 
explicitly divine rather than, as in Luther, apparently satanic and only implicitly from God. 
Kierkegaard sees that ascribing Anfechtung to Satan is essentially an omission of the real 
implication of the category: that it comes from above. However, Kierkegaard is cautious not to ascribe 
all antagonism to God. It takes two to start a fight: 
When I say that the interpretation that suffering connected with becoming a Christian 
comes from the devil is not a truly Christian interpretation but that suffering comes from the 
God-relationship itself, this must of course be understood with the addition that in one sense 
suffering also comes from the individual himself, from the fact that his subjectivity cannot 
immediately and completely surrender to God. '°38 
Still Kierkegaard perceives at least a partial truth in antiquated (from Enlightenment Christendom's 
stance) discussion of Anfeegtelse. What is lacking, however, is the sense of self-responsibility: 
In older and better devotional literature we read much about thoughts which try the spirit 
[anfagtende Tanker] and cause the individual to suffer, thought described as burning arrows 
and ascribed to the devil. But this is not a truly Christian interpretation; such thoughts come 
from the individual himself, although innocently. '039 
Kierkegaard is perhaps alluding here to Luther: "Satan ceases not to plague the Christians, and shoot at 
us his fiery darts". 1040 But, as noted, at least for John of the Cross, Teresa of Avila, and Juan de los 
Angeles, the flaming arrow is unleashed by God. And yet these anfcegtende Tanker are thoughts which, 
for Kierkegaard, may find their origin in the individual consciousness since such "thoughts that try the 
spirit [anfcegtende Tanker]" are "related to the imagination. "1041 Consequently, one can be deceived by 
the imagination concerning Anfcegtelse. One might therefore ascribe to the activity of the individual 
imagination Luther's anxiety's over the `rustling leaf which in fantasy's anxiety becomes the wrath of 
God. 1042 
1035 IP 4: 4372 / Pap. X' A 22 
1036 Oberman, Luther, 106 
1037 CUP, 411 
1038 JP 4: 4384 / Pap. X12 A 132. It should perhaps not be surprising that Kierkegaard, a Danish 
Lutheran situated historically in the "reaction of the philosophers of the Enlightenment against the 
superstitious, abominable use of the idea of the demonic in the Middle Ages and in orthodox 
Protestantism", (Tillich, The Protestant Era, `Author's Preface', xxxv) seemingly eclipses the role of 
the devil in his view of Anfcegtelse. However, Kierkegaard's own fascination with 'the demonic' - 
though a term more concerned with anthropology than demonology - actually restrains him from fully 
endorsing the contemporary neglect of the devil. As G. E. Arbaugh identifies, "Isis experience of 
temptation, rebellion and isolation coupled with insights from sources such as the legend of Faust, Shakespeare and the Bible lead him to recognize a devilish power largely lost sight of in later Protestantism, and a demonic will in man seldom taken seriously in philosophical ethics since Greek idealism. " G. E. Arbaugh, `The Devil', Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana Vol. S, 268 1039 JP 4: 4384 / Pap. XI2 A 132 
1040 `Of the Devil and His Works', The Table Talk ofMartin Luther, DCXI, 262 1041 JP 4: 4383 / Pap. XI2 A 33 
1042 However, Luther himself seems to have been aware of the embellishing tendencies of one's own imagination. As such, "Luther favors occasionally partaking of the Eucharist without confession, `that 
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However, while emphasising individual responsibility, Kierkegaard's ascription ofAnfagtelse 
to divine rather than satanic agency does not validate a dismissive exorcism of the power of the devil. It 
is a redirection which serves another purpose: specifically an insistence on divine sovereignty. 
When I raise objection in several places to the conception which everywhere introduces 
the devil as the source of suffering for the Christian, it is not my intention to explain away 
this power. Indeed, the New Testament itself also presents Christ as having been tempted 
[fristet] by the devil. 
No, my aim is to block the idea so easily smuggled in, the idea that God has a cause 
in the human sense - and simultaneously the criterion for being a Christian is readily reduced. 
... If the situation is such that 
God is a Majesty who is embattled with the devil, 
another Majesty, and wants to have Christians for this battle in order to make use of them 
in this battle, it is then impossible to maintain the ideal qualifications for being a Christian. 1043 
Kierkegaard is here desperate to avoid suggestion of any dualism that would compromise the absolute 
and unconditioned character of the divine. Once the devil is asserted as a cosmic protagonist with 
genuine potency, then God is thereby cast against an opposite with whom to struggle for eschatological 
destiny. In this cosmic dualism the Christian becomes a foot-soldier of God in the war against the devil. 
As such, the "ideal" qualifications for being a Christian are readily reduced to a conscription into 
eschatological warfare. God "needs" individuals insofar as a Majesty needs good servicemen. Rather, 
for Kierkegaard, humanity is in need of God -a divinity who does not have "a cause in the human 
sense" - who is not pitched in a desperate struggle with an opposite. Once the devil is asserted as a 
cosmic protagonist with genuine potency, then the radical ideal of being a Christian is compromised by 
the principal location of enmity between God and the devil. Instead, in the fear and trembling of 
Anfaegetelse, one cannot escape the understanding that the intrinsic antagonism exists in the infinite 
qualitative abyss between the individual and God. "It is clear that much of what Luther explained (an 
explanation which actually needs its own explanation) as the work of the devil - quite as if the devil 
were actually able to set limits upon God - may be explained by the discrepancy between God's 
infinite majesty and man. s1044 
The Face of God 
Nevertheless, in his anxious evasion of dualism, Kierkegaard could be seen to actually reveal more of a 
fundamental affinity with Luther than he acknowledges. 1°45 God's withdrawal and `unleashing' of 
Satan may appear to imply a tacit responsibility which inescapably implicates the Divine in the 
administration of affliction. Luther's ascription of Anfechtung to the devil often implies an occult 
ascription to God: the God who is secretly at work, without whose implicit permission Satan could not 
a man may learn to trust in the mercy of God' rather than in his own diligence. This is not despising the 
sacrament or tempting God, if it is done to `accustom a troubled conscience to trust God and not to tremble at the rustling of every falling leaf ." John T. McNeill, A History of the Cure of Souls, 167 1043 JP 4: 4384 / Pap. X12 133 1044 JP 4: 4949 / Pap. X4 A 487 1°45 "In the end, therefore, Luther saw God behind trial. We are directly tempted by the Devil, the 
world, and our own carnal selves; but it is part of God's training that we should be subject to trial, and therefore we should always be forced to prayer. In the petition, `Lead us not into temptation' we pray 
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wreak havoc against God's servant Job. 1046 One apparently fights with the Devil, but in fact "Luther 
urges the Christian on such occasions to fight against God himself- a bold exhortation that suggests 
that God himself is the source of Anfechtung. s1047 As such, Luther's demonology may obscure where 
his anatomy of Anfechtung is closer to Kierkegaard's own. This is the revealed secret truth of the 
conflict, as when Jacob realises the stature of the one he wrestles with: he realises the name of his 
assailant in the assailant's refusal to disclose that name, and so he names the place Peni'el. "Now the 
meaning of `Peni'el' is `face of God"', as Luther himself notes: 
But `face of God' is nothing else but knowledge of God. Nobody knows God except through 
faith in his word. The word and promises of God declare nothing but consolation and grace in 
Christ; therefore, whoever believes them sees God's mercy and goodness. This amounts to 
knowing God properly and this makes the heart joyful and blessed, as David says in Psalm 4 
[: 6-7]: `Raise up the light of your countenance over us thereby you bestow joy upon my 
heart. ' And Psalm 80 [: 3] says: `0 God , show us your face, then we shall be blessed. 
"048 
Luther's apparently ambivalent doctrine of God divulges that "Satan was finally God's Satan, doing in 
a perverse way God's will. It was almost to suggest that `Satan' was the name Luther gave to those 
powers and actions of God that take place outside of Christ, that God himself is divided. s1049 Although 
divine omnipotence prohibits any dualism between God and Satan, there is a dualism ostensibly 
residing in this doctrine of God himself - albeit a dualism which appears esoteric and fluctuating, not a 
static contrast of opposites. The apparent fluidity between the God of good and God of evil renders a 
critically disorienting identity crisis in Luther's understanding of the divine. As Hinkson writes, "the 
very ascription of Anfechtung to the devil is tantamount to an ascription to God, the devil being God's 
devil, or `mask'... If, in Anfechtung, God is our assailant, then perhaps it is not merely with his `mask' 
that we have to do; perhaps it is with God himself- i. e., the predestining God. "°5° Yet one may say 
that Kierkegaard causes the Lutheran mask to slip, not solely through Enlightenment sophistication, but 
from a desire to expose responsibility for the antagonism of the infinite qualitative difference between 
the individual and God. 
In the struggle with God one is not immediately initiated into the 'knowledge of God' so 
much as one is confronted with the doubt [German - Zweifel] between the two [Zwei] 'faces' of God 
which intensifies into despair [Verzweiflung]. Just as Jacob questioned the identity of his mysterious 
assailant, so "in the absence of faith the Christian is utterly without a clue as to the true nature of the 
deity that assails him. "1051 Humanly speaking, Kierkegaard writes, despair therefore presents itself as 
an understandable response in the absence of faith. 
that God, without removing the trial, will give us strength to resist it. " Niels Thulstrup, `Trial, Test, Tribulation, Temptation', Bibliotheca Kierkegaardina Vol. 16,107 1046 Kierkegaard seems aware of the ultimate governance of God over the devil in Luther when he cites 
approvingly: "In one of Luther's table-talks he tells how he acts when the devil tempts [anfagter] him during the night. He says to him: My good Satan, you must really let me have peace now, for you know it is God's will that man shall work by day and sleep by night. " (JP 3: 2526 / Pap. X3 A 335) 1047 Hinkson, Kierkegaard's Theology: Cross and Grace, Ph. D. diss. University of Chicago, 36-37 1048 'The Gospel for the Sunday After Christmas', Luther's Works, Vol. 52 - Sermons II, 129-130 1049 Marius, Martin Luther, 78 1050 Kierkegaard's Theology: Cross and Grace, 38 1051 Heron, Kierkegaard's Theology: Cross and Grace, 38 
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That the unconditioned can be the divine, that what occasions so much torment and trouble 
can be the divine, cannot be grasped by a man before he has surrendered to it and learned from 
the unconditioned itself that it is the divine. If a man continues with this purely human 
outlook, then the unconditioned is the devil, or God is the evil, as modem French philosophy 
[i. e. Proudhon] maintains, God is the evil in the sense that he is guilty of all man's 
unhappiness; if we could only eliminate the unconditioned, knock all ideals out of our heads, 
everything would go well - but God makes us unhappy, he is the evil. 
'052 
Insofar as the God-relationship causes profound unhappiness and torment, one may feel legitimate in 
fleeing the unconditioned as evil. "To exist before God [or coram deo as Luther would say] may seem 
unendurable", to recall the `fantasised' words of Anti-Climacus. '°53 But the authentic divine nature of 
the unconditioned can only be learned from the unconditioned itself. According to Luther's resolution 
of this unendurable assault, one may flee Anfechtung, but by fleeing in faith one actually flees into the 
arms of God. In the anguish of Anfechtung Luther "instructs us to cling to Christ -fleeing, in effect, 
from the God who is hidden to the God who is revealed. "1054 In fact, Luther's notion of God seems to 
work itself out in the fear and trembling of the dreadful dialectic between the Face of God as 
annihilation and the Face of God as Jesus Christ; between the Deus Absconditus and the Deus 
Revelatus, the Spirit of mortificatio and illuminatio. 1055 As Luther has it, the Face of God becomes the 
`knowledge of God'. Similarly, the `masked' face of God, and the `averted face of God' are answered 
by the `facies Dei revelata' (revealed face of God). 
In Christ is discovered more than our refuge from a wrathful God. In the passion (passio- 
`suffering') of Christ is witnessed the empathic and authentic response to the trials of Anfechtung. As 
such our tribulations are sanctified by Christ's tears of blood insofar as they testify to the presence of 
Anfechtung in a sinless humanity - though that is not to say that our own Anfechtung never relates to 
our sinfulness, or that Christ's tribulations were identical to ours. Nevertheless, Christ's anguish at 
Gethsemane transfigures our own trials through divine solidarity. Christ endured temptations from the 
devil, and yet he also endured the opposition of wills with the Father. So it is only in light of the 
mysterium tremendum that, for Otto, one can comprehend Christ's Agony in the garden. 'Father, let 
this cup pass from me', as Luther interprets: 
Here the will was against the will, yet he turned himself presently according to 
his Father's will and was comforted by an angel. Christ, who in our flesh was 
plagued and tempted, is the best mediator and advocate with God, in our tribulation. 1056 
Similarly, Christ is our solidarity in the sense of desolation which accompanies apparent God- 
forsakenness. Luther's exposition of Christ's cry on the cross - `My God, my god, why have you 
forsaken me? ' - "paints with terrible and sombre realism the horror of `Anfechtung' and sets over 
1052 JP 4: 4911 / Pap. XI' A 516 
1053 SUD, 32 
1054 Heron, Kierkegaard's Theology: Cross and Grace, 37 1055 "Me Creator Spirit comes to mortify, to convict of sin before God. Thus, like the human spirit, it begins in conflict and works through transformation into a new creation... Mortification - to convict of sin - sounds dark and oppressive, but as an act of the Creator Spirit, it is intended to be just the 
osite. " James E. Loder, The Logic of the Spirit, 110 1s `Of Temptation and Tribulation', DCXLVIII, The Table Talk of Martin Luther, 274 
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against it the `angefochtene Christus', the Saviour who trod the whole grim path of `Anfechtung' for 
., 1057 us. 
Insofar as for Luther the Face of God "becomes historically and empirically concrete in the 
person of Jesus Christ", 1059 there is a revelation not solely of the nature of human suffering, but of the 
nature of God. The metanoia inherent in recognising Christ as the Face of God involves a soteriological 
transition from the idea of the Deus absconditus to the Deus revelatus, from wrath to mercy. In his own 
life, "It is in the tower experience that Luther affirms that Jesus Christ is the Face of God, and this 
shifts his understanding from the just God who condemns to the just God who justifies. "1059 However, 
emphasis upon the dualistic nature of this process obscures the integrity of the Spirit at the heart of 
Luther's concept of God: the Spiritus Creator is the one Spirit of both mort ficatio and illuminatio. 
What makes Luther's theology so radical, as Otto explains, is that in overcoming these "gulfs and 
abysses" in the understanding it is "the unapproachable which becomes approachable, the Holy One 
who is pure goodness, that it is `Majesty' which makes itself familiar and intimate". 1060 Once again, in 
striving with Anfechtung the flight for Luther is one from God to God. Tillich describes this well: 
For those who are aware of their estrangement from God, God is the threat of ultimate 
destruction. His face takes on demonic traits. However, those who are reconciled to him 
realise that, although their experience of the wrath of God was genuine, it was not experience 
of a God other than the one to whom they are reconciled... He [Luther] perceives God as the 
God of wrath, rightly so in preliminary terms, wrongly so in ultimate terms. 1061 
"[D]ialectically complicated almost to the point of madness": Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Anfaegtelse 
The most effective means of escaping spiritual trial [Anfcegtelse] is to become spiritless, and 
the sooner the better. 1062 
The presence of the eternal in an individual is indicated by the willingness to freely enter the tomb of 
their resurrection: "Just as one knows that an insect wants to become a butterfly when it begins to spin 
a cocoon. "1063 Yet the danger is that not everyone who enters into this combustible tension between 
humanity and God will emerge transformed by the metamorphosis of spirit. "Spirit is fire", but there is, 
Kierkegaard warns, always a danger in casting oneself to the flames: "not all are burned out to spirit, a 
few are burned out to ashes - that is, they do not become spirit in the fire. i1° 
Spiritual trial is vanishing in modernity. The broad and blithe path of spiritlessness is a route 
sheltered from Anfcegtelse. "Never involve yourself with God so long that any spiritual trial 
[Anfcegtelse] has a chance to begin; if you think about God once a week and bow before him the way 
1057 
Rupp, The Righteousness of God, 238. See W. A., 5.493.27. 1057 Loder, The Logic of the Spirit, 119 1059 Loder, The Logic of the Spirit, 242 1060 The Idea of the Holy, 103 1061 Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. II, 89 1062 CA, 117 
1063 JP 4: 4712 / Pap. XI' A 377 1064 JP 4: 4355 / Pap. XI2 A 41. Bonhoeffer contends "Whether Christ will give himself to the tempted man in grace and faith is always in the balance, therefore temptation [Anfechtung] should never be regarded as a dialectical point of transition on the road to faith... it is the real end of the sinner, his death; that life should grow out of death is the free gift of God to his communion... God can allow man 
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the others do, I guarantee that you will never be subjected to spiritual trials. X1065 In fact, Christendom's 
bourgeois capitulation is reflected in the decline of this particular sickness of the soul. "Because 
religion is not taken seriously nowadays in Christendom, there is never a hint about spiritual trials 
[Anfcegtelser]. Life is just not lived religiously; this can be proved indirectly by the disappearance of 
spiritual trial. "1066 At times Kierkegaard seems determined to shock Christendom back into 
Christianity, whilst remaining anxious that Christianity is not mutated into the madness or nightmare of 
the fantastic. Anfagtelse is not to be forced upon one in the counterfeiting of Lutheran inwardness, nor 
should it, like melancholy, be cultivated in self-mortification. It is for the `common man', the 
individual, whom God will not test beyond his bearing. Anfcegtelse is bound to come, but each believer 
must discover this for oneself. One is not called to be a repetition of Luther. 1067 
In empathy with the notion of imitatio Christi present in Lutheran theology, 1068 Kierkegaard 
was concerned with the voluntary suffering of Christ's passion. As such, Christ's cry of `My God, my 
God, why have you forsaken me? ' signifies "freedom's ultimate spiritual trial [AnfcegtelseJ"1069 It is 
the invitation to a struggle which, following Christ, must be accepted voluntarily by each believer. '070 
"When the voluntary disappears, `spiritual trial' [Anfcegtelse] disappears, and when spiritual trials 
disappear, Christianity disappears - as it has disappeared in Christendom. "' 
071 Despite Kierkegaard's 
often extravagant evocations, Anfcvgtelse must be voluntarily entered into in the daily arena of the 
mundane; not in the cloister, the tower, or the pulpit. "If one puts on the religious for everyday use, the 
spiritual trials [Anfeegtelse] are bound to come. "1072 Or as Johannes Climacus declares, "in the living- 
room must the battle be fought, not fantastically in the church, so that the clergyman is fighting 
windmills and the spectators watch the show. "1°73 As such, it is a struggle which is neither quixotic nor 
theatrical. It is not reserved for the heroic moment in which one buckles one's sword and rides out like 
Don Quixote; rather such a Knight of Faith "looks like a tax-collector". 1074 
to die `of the knowledge of his sin, and can lead him through this death into the communion with 
Christ. " Act and Being, 168-169 1°65 JP 2: 1354 / Pap. VIII' A 77 
1066 JP 4: 4372 / Pap. X' A 22 
1067 "[Kierkegaard] asserts that Luther's personal trial was not the normal one, but something peculiar, for which reason it is also wrong to consider, with 'Protestantism', Luther as the typical Christian living in mortal dread and trial. " (N. Thulstrup, `Trial, Test, Tribulation, Temptation', 117) 
Note, however, that Luther himself seems to appreciate the relativity of Anfechtung: "God can make a 
wisp of straw as heavy as a hundred hundred-weight of corn, so do not despise those who have only 
small temptations., (W. A. 45.397.2) 1068 See Hannay, Kierkegaard: A Biography, 394-95 and 484 n. 26. Such theological heritage included 
the full Danish translation of Thomas A Kempis (1380-1471) De imitatione Christi (the same year Kierkegaard wrote Practice In Christianity), Johann Arndt (1555-1621) and H. A. Brorson (1694- 1764), lines from whose hymn adorns Kierkegaard's memorial. See also Bukdahl, Soren Kierkegaard 
and The Common Man, 130 1069 JP 4: 4611 (continuation of 4610 with double crosshatching over it) / Pap VIII' A 580. Kierkegaard is cautious to qualify that, as only human, one cannot comprehend Christ's own cry of divinity abandoned by divinity; a point he iterates in `The Gospel of Sufferings'. According to Hinkson "it is Luther's presumed failure to have recognised the voluntary nature of Christian suffering which earns S. K. 's sharpest rebuke. " Kierkegaard's Theology: Cross and Grace, 77-78 
1071 JP 4: 4950 / Pap. X3 A 43 1072 JP 4: 4364 / Pap. VIA 2 1073 CUP, 416 
1074 FT 30 
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And yet such a person, whose life is transfigured by faith, is an all too hidden exception: 
"Spiritual trial [Anfeegtelse] is the expression of a concentration upon Christianity as the only object. 
That is why most men have no spiritual trials. "logs As Johannes Climacus writes, it is only in the 
attempt to relate oneself absolutely to the absolute, that one "discovers the limit, and the conflict of 
Anfechtung [Anfcegtelse] becomes an expression of this limit... no one who is not very religious 
[Johannes Climacus includes himself here] will be exposed to Anfechtung, for Anfechtung is precisely 
the reaction to the absolute expression for the absolute relationship. "1076 
Again, as Kierkegaard himself writes, "In the words of the preachers, every man ought to 
relate himself to God in all things, ought to refer everything to God. s1077 Yet the preacher is wrong in 
assuming that such a relation constitutes the resolution of Anfc gtelse - as if the concentration upon 
Christianity actually delivers one from it. In actual fact, the more one refers all things in their 
specificity and finitude to the Infinite and the Absolute, the more one will encounter the collision, the 
nemesis ofAnfczgtelse upon the God-relation. It is this that Johannes Climacus calls "the reaction of the 
limit against the finite individual"; the Anfcegtelse which increases "quite properly in proportion to the 
intensity of the religiosity. "1078 In other words, as religiosity intensifies so, correspondingly, does the 
conflict. Autobiographically Kierkegaard writes: 
Spiritual trial [Anfaegtelse] is the divine repulsion in the quid nimis and can never 
fail to appear if one is to exist religiously, consequently as an actual, definite particular 
man1079 - for example, I, Seren Aabye Kierkegaard, thirty-five years old, of slight build, 
master of arts, brother-in-law of businessman Lund, living on such and such a street - in short, this whole concretion of trivialities, that I dare relate myself to God, refer all 
the affairs of my life to him. No man has ever lived who has truly done this without 
discovering with horror the horror of spiritual trial, that he might be venturing too 
boldly, that the whole thing might really be lunacy. 1080 
The entire endeavour becomes too arduous; the opposition of the Absolute to the individual is 
altogether too intense. The whole thing might really be madness. Yet, this strenuous 
incommensurability between spirit and spiritlessness is "authentic Christian religiousness", as 
Kierkegaard sees it; "whether or not such a person like this is to be found, I do not know; I have never 
seen one. "1081 
Nevertheless, Kierkegaard continues in this entry to refer specifically to how Luther's own 
"Spiritedness" is authenticated by his persecution. "Genuinely spiritual persons are so rare that they can 
be handled appropriately as exceptions. "1082 Is Luther such an exception? His anxious conscience 
certainly needed treatment, according to Kierkegaard. The scrupulant inwardness of Luther and the 
bourgeois complacency of the typically spiritless individual can be read as forming contrasting 
1075 JP 4: 4365 / Pap. VIIP A 47 '°76 CUP4411 
107 JP 4: 4372 / Pap. X' A 22 
1078 CUP, 410 
1079 "It is Christian heroism -a rarity, to be sure - to venture wholly to become oneself, an individual being, this specific individual human being, alone before God, alone in this prodigious strenuousness and this prodigious responsibility; " (SUD, 'Preface', 5) 1080 JP 4: 4372 / Pap. X' A 22 1081 JP 4: 4372 / Pap. X' A 22 1082 JP 4: 4373 / Pap. X1 A 452 n. d., 1849 
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dialectical points for a Kierkegaardian understanding of Anfcegtelse. There is "something dialectical" - 
and therefore in need of temperance as Kierkegaard regards it - between the unwillingness to be spirit, 
and the desire to "to be far too much spirit" and therefore want to "love God more or differently than 
God will tolerate. s1083 Such willing to be completely spirit can either betray a "spiritual pride", or 
reveal one to be a "self-tormentor", or even guilty of "an overstrained dejection which actually 
demands too much of God and of itself. "1084 As such, in the trial of Anfcegtelse there are necessary 
exceptions. As if with the pragmatism characteristic of a monastic treatise on sicknesses of the soul 
Kierkegaard prescribes: 
The norm, therefore, is: in a few exceptional cases recommend diversionary aids, 
but as a rule prescribe aids of the spirit, for men use diversionary aids all too 
promiscuously of their own accord. The exceptions are the sick, for whom diversionary 
aids are prescribed; most people are much too robust, so the operation is precisely to 
make them a little sick, a little weak - by prescribing that they use the aids of the spirit. 
'° 
Here is an apparent instance of a dialectical form of temperance between spiritual sickness and health. 
The sick soul must ground itself in diversion so as to avoid an unrealisable and presumptuous 
insistence upon becoming completely spirit. Similarly as Johannes Climacus describes it, the desire to 
express religiousness infinitely renders the finite incommensurable: the absolute consciousness of God 
ultimately consumes one. 1086 The desire to become spirit absolutely actually betrays a desire to 
transcend suffering: an attempt to violate the infinite difference between humanity and God. 
To bring the relative into relation with God may seem impossible, but yet there is a vital 
divine concession by which no one will be tested beyond what they can bear: 
He strengthens himself perhaps by means of the edifying consideration that God who made 
man must Himself know best of all the many things that may seem impossible to bring into 
connection with the thought of God, all this earthly distress, all the confusion in which he may 
be involved, and the necessity of diversion, of rest, even of sleep. 1097 
The absolute difference is thus expressed in humility; not the monastic flight from the world which, 
according to Johannes Climacus, betrays "an attempt to be superhuman, an enthusiastic, perhaps even a 
devout attempt to resemble God. s1088 And so, lest one dies of the Anfeegtelse in which one is confined 
by the absolute conception of God, one permits measured distraction to come back in as a concession 
for the fact that no one can become spirit absolutely - an expression of the infinite qualitative 
difference. 
Nevertheless, one must not become distracted to the extent of fleeing from the God- 
relationship itself. Such a tactic of confronting Anfcegtelse is apparent in its differentiation from 
temptation [Fristelse] 
. The difference is that Anfcegtelse originates in the God-relationship and so is 
something that must not be evaded. Temptation [Fristelse] is that seduction which one must distract 
oneself from. Hence the relation is clearer in Lowrie's translation of For Self-Examination, where 
1083 JP 4: 4373 / Pap. X' A 452 n. d., 1849 1084 JP 4: 4373 / Pap. X' A 452 n. d., 1849 1085 JP 4: 4373 / Pap. X' A 452 n. d., 1849 1086 CUP, 
1087 CUP437 
1088 CUP, 440 
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Fristelse is translated as "alluring temptations" and Anfcegtelse is comparatively rendered "deterrent 
temptations". One must flee what is alluring (tempting) and confront that which is deterrent 
(AnfcPgtelse). The temptation [Fristelse], which can be identified as coming from the devil, is 
differentiated from the Anfcegtelse which Kierkegaard situates firmly in the battlefield between the 
individual and God. In reference to the words of James 4: 7 `Resist the devil, and he will flee from you', 
Kierkegaard notes: 
This, then, is the tactic. Not the reverse: Flee the devil - this can be the tactic only in 
relation to temptation [Fristelse]. 
Here we see that spiritual trial [Anfcegtelse] lies a whole quality higher than 
temptation... Spiritual trial can be fought only with the rashness of faith, which charges 
head-on. '°89 
Essentially Anfiegtelse occurs in opposition, and yet it is an opposition which must be confronted and 
not evaded: "the temptation [Fristelse] to sin is in accord with inclination, [the temptation] of spiritual 
trial [Anfcegtelse] [is] contrary to inclination"1090 Or, as Johannes Climacus explains, "Anfcegtelse is in 
the sphere of the God-relationship what temptation [Fristelse] is in the ethical sphere... In temptation, 
it is the lower that tempts, in Anfcegtelse it is the higher; in temptation, it is the lower that allures the 
individual, in Anfaegtelse it is the higher that, as if jealous of the individual tries to frighten him 
back. "t°91 In other words, temptation is an enticement towards what one desires which must be evaded, 
while Anfagtelse is a confrontation with that which one fears which must be entered into. The 
difference can be seen exemplified in Christ: the temptations of Christ in the wilderness were at the 
hands of the devil and he turned away from them; the agony in the Garden was an Anfaegtelse which he 
confronted in the battlefield of prayer. 
As in the treatment of acedia through tactical countermeasures, the desert fathers often prescribed the 
countering of temptations by evasion and distraction: by the contemplation of enticement's 
opposite. 1092 Anfcegtelse, on the contrary, is usually tackled head-on through confrontation. However, 
as in the exceptional case (and perhaps Luther was one in Kierkegaard's view) of those who become 
too sick in their self-torment, Kierkegaard is willing to prescribe a moderate use of diversionary tactics 
1089 JP 4: 4378 / Pap. X4 A 95 
1090 JP 4: 4367 / Pap. VIII' A 93 
1091 CUP, 410. Insofar as it entices a fall away from the ethical, "Temptation is in continuity with the 
individual's ethical character, whereas spiritual trial lacks continuity and is a mark of the resistance 
offered by the absolute as it lays down the limit. " Thulstrup, Commentary on Kierkegaard's 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 349 
1092 As Sorabji discusses, for example, the desert Father Evagrius of Pontus (AD c. 345-99) in studying 
the interrelation of emotions, sought an apatheia (freedom from emotion) by `playing one bad thought 
off against another' (See Emotion and Peace of Mind, 360f). Evagrius prescribes: 
"The demon of vanity opposes the demon of fornication... So if either of these two 
approaches and puts you under pressure, imagine in yourself the thoughts of the 
opposite demon [suggesting that such thoughts are humanly, not supernaturally, 
inspired]. And if you are able to knock out the one proverbial nail with another, 
know that you are near the frontiers of apatheia. " 
(Practical Treatise, ch. 58, cited in Sorabji, 361) 
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against selfmortification. 1093 As Evagrius aspired to apatheia as a means of transcending temptation, 
Kierkegaard also recommends the tactic of indifference as a possible means of confronting and 
overcoming the anxiety of Anfaegtelse. 1094 
[T]he most absolute indifference to them ['thoughts that try the spirit' - anfcegtende Tanker] 
is itself the victory. Such thoughts want to make you anxious, want to worry you to the 
point where your spirit is so weak and cowardly that you imagine that you are responsible for 
them... Once they have made you think this, the devil is loose. Therefore be absolutely 
indifferent; be more indifferent to them than you are to a little rumbling in your stomach. Or 
get angry, as angry as you get when someone rings your doorbell at an inopportune time and 
you rush out and say: What kind of an uproar is this! - That is, get angry just short of being 
afraid, for this is precisely what should be avoided. 109S 
Temptation [Fristelse] is best fought by running away, avoiding it. But this does 
not work with thoughts that try the spirit, for they pursue you. Here the tactic must be: 
do not get frightened, remain utterly calm, absolutely indifferent. 1° 
This may appear a slightly confusing prescription. How can indifference be a means of confrontation? 
Is there not a contradiction between the passivity of composed indifference and retaliatory anger? But, 
as Keeley identifies, in this context `Both indifference and anger can be ways to deny responsibility, to 
shift the focal point of responsibility away from the self to another. "1097 And yet to an extent one is 
responsible for, though not thereby guilty of, Anfcegtelse - resulting as it does from the infinite 
qualitative difference. To a degree one must take some responsibility for the conflict between self and 
God; but Kierkegaard is here referring to specific thoughts [anfcegtende Tanker] which try to make one 
anxious, or guilty. Essentially Anfcegtelse must be confronted seriously and temperately, but without 
capitulating through fear into an irremediable guilt. It is such fear which is precisely Anficegtelse's 
moment of death through which, figuratively speaking, the devil is loose and one is anxious to the point 
of imagining that one is guilty because of it. This is "the anxiety of spiritual trial [Anfcegetelse]". 1098 
Once perspective is lost and one becomes guilty or afraid then one will believe that God has abandoned 
one; that God is no consolation in the tension of Anfcegtelse. This apparent God-forsakenness is itself 
1093 However, for many sufferers submission is the only recourse. The attempt to flee from trying 
thoughts in anxiety only serves to exacerbate further anxiety: "In anxiety he flees from them in every 
way; he perhaps strains to the point of despair all his powers of ingenuity and concentration in order to 
avoid not only them but even the remotest contact with anything that could be related to them. It does 
not help; the anxiety becomes even greater. Neither does the usual advice help - to forget, to escape, for that is just what he is doing, but it merely nourishes the anxiety. " (JP 4: 4370 / Pap. IX A 333) 1094 This is, however, not identical with Vigilius Haufniensis's own ironic evasion tactic: " The most 
effective means of escaping spiritual trial [Anfcegtelse] is to become spiritless, and the sooner the better. " (CA, 117) 
1095 This recalls Kierkegaard's previously mentioned reference to Luther's indifference towards the devil for disturbing him at night: "In one of Luther's table-talks he tells how he acts when the devil tempts [anfa gter] him during the night. He says to him: My good Satan, you must really let me have peace now, for you know it is God's will that man shall work by day and sleep by night. " (JP 3: 2526 / Pap. X' A 335). Also Luther talks about his unruffled response to the devil's crashing about in the 
ýöonastery 
late at night. See Oberman, Luther, 105. 
JP4: 4382/Pap. XI2A30 1097 
Spiritual Trial in the Thought of Kierkegaard', 322 1098 JP 4: 4374 / Pap. X' A 477 
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what Kierkegaard ominously calls "the last spiritual trial [Anfagtelse]. s1099 And it is at this point that, 
like Luther, Kierkegaard turns to Christ's own trial. 
The Last Trial 
For Kierkegaard, as for Luther, "The school of spiritual trial [Anfcegtelse] is a frightful school"' 100 It is 
a school that is designed for the spiritual upbringing, the "educational torture", of the believer. 
Nevertheless, the danger of Anfaegtelse resides in the fact that it can be "very painful and excruciating 
and, in addition, dialectically complicated almost to the point of madness; if it may be thought of in this 
way, it is, to define it teleologically, an educational torture which, whatever else, is intended to break 
all self-centred willfulness. "' 101 This "educational torture" must be submitted to in the self-annihilating 
confession that "Before you, 0 God, I am nothing; do with me as you will, let me suffer all this which 
almost drives me to madness; you are still the one to whom wisdom and understanding belong, the 
loving Father... If this agony collides with a passionate self-centred willfulness which cannot become 
nothing before God, it must end up with the sufferer losing his mind. s1 102 
Just as love intensified can mutate into a "revulsion for the beloved", so can over-occupation 
with one's suffering engender a "religious spiritual trial [Anfcegtelse], also found described by older 
writers, in which a disgust for the religious sets ins1103. The sufferer must not lose sight of the God of 
love lest Anfeegtelse capitulates into the despair of God-forsakenness: its own moment of death. In 
terms categorical of Anfaegtelse, Kierkegaard writes, "In a moment of impatience it must seem to him 
as if children torturing a butterfly could not inflict worse torture than he is suffering. " And this is the 
God one must not abandon! "One thing he must do: not despair of the possibility of salvation, not- 
abandon God. People talk of abandoning oneself, but this is rubbish; it is a matter of abandoning God. " 
He must not flee from these thoughts in the self-aggravation of anxiety. Rather, in agonising and 
crucifying contradiction, "his salvation lies right here, in his acquiring the frankness to think these evil 
thoughts together with God before God - in order to dispose of them. "' 
104 
So this suffering is intensified in the collision between the agony of suffering and the thought 
that God is love: the thinking of these apparently incommensurable thoughts together. 
Humanly speaking, a person who is experiencing such suffering is justified in saying: 
The whole thing would be far less agonizing to me if I did not have the idea of God 
1099 JP 4: 4699 / Pap. X5 A 38. Rupp identifies six waves of attack in Luther's notion of Anfechtung: In the first wave the soul experiences its nakedness and shame before creation. In the second wave, all 
creation appears to condemn. In the third wave, scripture is brought to condemn. In the fourth wave, the Gospel adds to the terror of the Law. In the fifth wave, the soul turns from Christ. Finally, the soul believes it is not predestined to damnation (God-forsaken). The Righteousness of God, 238-239 1100 JP 4: 4376 / Pap. X2 A 182. Also, "God is the Teacher" in the "school of sufferings". ('That the School of Sufferings Fits us For Eternity', Gospel of Sufferings, 57). Luther compares Anfechtung to a father thrashing a child (W. A. T. R. 2,2701). As Hinkson writes, "Anfechtung, then, is an expression of fatherly discipline; it is the 'school' through which God puts his children in order that they may come to know themselves, and him. " (Kierkegaard's Theology: Cross and Grace, 38) 1101 JP 4: 4370 / Pap. IX A 333 1 102 JP 4: 4370 / Pap. IX A 333 1103 JP 4: 4377 / Pap. X2 A 590 1104 JP 4: 4377 / Pap. Xz A 590 
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along with it. The pain lies either in being left helpless by God, the omnipotent, who 
could so easily help, or in the crucifixion of one's understanding, that in spite of all 
this God is love and that what happens is for one's own good. ý1 S 
Indeed it requires a faith to reconcile the apparently incompatible love of God with human suffering; a 
faith Johannes de Silentio, for one, confesses is beyond him: 
I have seen the dreadful before my own eyes... I am unable to make the movements of 
faith, I cannot shut my eyes and plunge confidently into the absurd, for me that is an 
impossibility... but I do not boast of it. I am convinced that God is love, this thought 
has for me a primitive lyrical validity. When it is present to me, I am unspeakably 
blissful, when it is absent, I long for it more vehemently than does the lover for his 
object; but I do not believe, this courage I lack. For me the love of God is, both in 
a direct and in an inverse sense, incommensurable with the whole of reality. " 06 
As in the plight of Job, one might say that "Suffering is not the problem; God is. Without a belief in a 
personal God human suffering is simply a part of life, concomitant to the human condition. s1107 Except, 
where Anfcegtelse is concerned, this is a form of suffering that would not even exist if there were no 
infinite qualitative difference, if there were no God! The true Anfcegtelse resides in the appearance that 
"it is as if the God-idea itself intensified one's agony. "' 108 Under such affliction, rather than submit to 
the crucifixion of one's understanding, it is easier to relieve this collision through the collapse into 
despair. "The alleviating aspect of despair is its unmitigated agreement that the suffering is unbearable. 
The strenuousness of the idea of God is to have to understand that not only is the suffering to be 
endured but that it is good, a gift from a God of love. "' 109 
The suffering of the God-relationship can become apparently unbearable insofar as it appears 
that it is the existence of God itself that causes the suffering. "God is spirit and therefore a man (qua 
sensate being) can be involved with him only if he suffers. "' 110 In the struggle of Anfcegtelse one must 
find respite in the love of God without plunging headlong into the irremediable abyss. However, for 
some, the abyss yawns so wide open that relating to the absolute induces nothing but the most dreadful 
vertigo. Keeley describes, "At the prospect of drawing closer to God the person feels so agitated by 
anxiety that he is tempted to abandon his desire for a deeper relationship with God. Moreover, this 
anxiety is so successful in taking root that he wants to give up the spiritual venture and is almost 
convinced that God wants him to go back as well. "' 111 But such a person must not capitulate to the 
desire for despair's surrender. Under such circumstances Kierkegaard advocates that one clings to God 
in faith, no matter how dreadful this may seem. 
Does only the person who has a gracious God and Father have a God and Father? 
I wonder if the person who has, alas, an angry God and Father does not also have 
a God and Father? 0, my friend, if this is your predicament, or if you have been 
spiritually tried [i Anfaegtelse] in this way, continue to cling to this radical consolation; 
only do not let go of God, and you will find that there is help in this. The one danger 
1105 JP 4: 4375 / Pap. X' A 478 1106 
1107 
VF' 25 
Dermot Cox, Man's Anger and God's Silence: The Book ofJob, 11 1108 Ibid. 
1109 Ibid. 
lllo JP 4: 4681 /Pap. X4A481 iI II Keeley, `Spiritual Trial in the Thought of Kierkegaard', 316 
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is to let go of God. Even if his wrath were to hang over you all your life, this still is 
not nearly so dangerous. 
But no doubt a man is seldom spiritually tried as this. 11i2 
While one feels the desolation of God-forsakenness, one must not lose sight of the consolation that, 
despite the apparent absence, God never abandons us. Only Christ knows what this God-forsakenness 
means: "surely no human being has experienced that spiritual trial, the spiritual trial of being 
abandoned by God - but he was tempted in that way. "' 
113 It is in actuality a question of one's forsaking 
God in despair. l l14 One must not let go of, abandon or forsake God, despite the seduction of despair's 
apparent alleviation of the tension of the God-relation. Anti Climacus describes a person who, after 
enduring the greatest horror, wills to collapse into such an irresolvable despair. "At this point, then, 
salvation is, humanly speaking, utterly impossible". "5 But this capitulation into the despair over 
possibility is also an alleviating surrender which abandons God; "but for God everything is possible! 
This is the battle of faith, battling, madly, if you will, for possibility, because possibility is the only 
salvation. """ Salvation, humanly speaking, is an impossibility, and despair consolidates itself by 
collapsing into that thought. But faith has the "antidote for despair - possibility - because for God 
everything is possible at every moment. """ And so the only true resolution is found in the crucifying 
embrace of this absurdity in which faith throws itself on God: "0, but the height of blessedness is to 
agree unconditionally that God is right precisely when, humanly speaking, there seems to be a case 
against him. "' ` In the words of Anti-Climacus, "to believe is indeed to lose the understanding in order 
to gain God. "' 119 
The risk is, however, that the single individual's God-relationship can become diseased, and 
this is itself a dreadful spiritual trial [Anfcegtelse] as Kierkegaard sees it. At such times the God of love 
appears incommensurable with the sublimity of God, intensified by Anfcegtelse, and incapable of 
transcending the abyss which gapes open like an infinitely uncrossable impossibility: 
This kind of spiritual trial [Anfcegtelse] arises because the deep underlying feeling of 
infinite unworthiness basic to every true God-relationship becomes overpowering, is not 
transfigured into a greater joy in God, but oppresses one, so that a person becomes 
momentarily anxious and afraid of ideality and himself - and of God, who seems to be so infinitely sublime that one does not dare think of him at all. It seems as if he must become 
disgusted and tired of listening to one's nonsense and nauseated with one's sins. 
In other words, God appears so sublimely Wholly Other that one reciprocally becomes so 
infinitesimally nothing that one dares not even contemplate God. Yet this Anfcegtelse, in which one's 
1112 JP 2: 1421 /Pap. X3A790 
1113 `The High Priest', `Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays', WA, 121 114 For a further examination of these themes in Kierkegaard see my `The Dark Night of Suffering and the Darkness of God: God-forsakenness or Forsaking God in "The Gospel of Sufferings"', ed. Robert Perkins, International Kierkegaard Commentary: Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits (Mercer 
University Press, forthcoming 2005) 
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1116 SUD, 38 
1117 SUD, 39-40 
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sense of "infinite unworthiness" recommends that one abandons the thought of God, must be fought 
against in the faith and prayer that God is love. 
But a person is not to give in; he is to fight against it, thank God that God has 
commanded that one ought to pray to him, for otherwise it is hardly possible to force one's 
way through the spiritual trial. He is to remember that God is love, the God of patience and 
consolation, and that God is not one who adopts vain titles but is completely different from 
anything I am able to comprehend of what he says himself to be. 1120 
The emphasis is upon God's command that one ought to pray. Here one recalls Luther's words of 
comfort that God "promised to hear us, yes, he commanded us to pray, for the very reason that we 
might know and firmly believe that our petition will be heard. "' 121 Here God's `Wholly Otherness' is 
encountered from the opposite side of the abyss: the God Who seemed too "infinitely sublime" to 
contemplate, now appears as the God of love, and in being revealed as love, God is "completely 
different from anything I am able to comprehend of what he says himself to be" [my emphasis]. The 
`Wholly Other' reveals itself to be the `Holy Other': incomprehensible not solely in the tremendum of 
infinite sublimity, but in the mysterium of love - the fathomless revelation of forgiveness that is itself 
an awe-inspiring revelation of holiness. "That God will forgive my sin unconditionally is the most 
improbable of all possibilities. Therefore, it is in the confrontation by this God, and here only that I feel 
the proper awe... This humbles me as nothing else can. Here alone is true awe before God. " 22 
In response to the mysterium of the impossibility of forgiveness Anti-Climacus advocates 
prayer. So one must fight against spiritual trial [Anfagtelse], like Christ at Gethsemane, with the prayer 
which signifies the faith in divine possibility over human impossibility, thereby resisting despair. The 
fatalist's collapse into despair is, according to Anti Climacus, "a mute capitulation: he is unable to 
pray. "' 123 The fatalist is unable to pray because there is for him no air of possibility in which to breathe 
a word, only despair. He has lost God and his self; but "For prayer there must be a God, a self - and 
possibility - or a self and possibility in a pregnant sense, because the being of God means that 
everything is possible, or that everything is possible means the being of God". ' 124 To pray is to break 
the silence of despair [Indesluttehed] in order to struggle against human impossibility in the name of 
divine possibility. Christ alone has suffered "the last trial" of God-forsakenness and therefore God 
knows what it means to be abandoned by God. "Therefore, you who are tempted, whoever you are, do 
not become silent in despair, as if the temptation were suprahuman and no one could understand it. "' 125 
And so it begins to become apparent how the mortifying infinite qualitative abyss is transcended. But 
this is an infinite qualitative difference which imposes itself upon language, upon the act of speaking 
with God. "God is in heaven and the human being is on earth and therefore they can hardly converse... 
only in much fear and trembling is a human being able to speak with God, in much fear and 
1120 JP 2: 2008 / Pap. IX A 316 1121 `Comfort When Facing Grave Temptations', Luther's Works, volume 42,186 1122 Heinecken, The Moment Before God, 149 1123 SUD, 40 
1124 SUD, 40 
1125 `The High Priest', `Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays', WA, 121 
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trembling. "' 126 And so, just as to see God is to die, to speak is to tremble before God. In which case, 
is 
not prayer itself a fearful task? Who could venture the prayer that might alleviate this dreadful 
Anfxgtelse? "[J]ust as anxiety makes the voice fail physically, so also much fear and trembling make 
speech fall into silence. "' 127 So is prayer defeated by the chasmic distance, the infinite sublimity, of 
that which it would speak to? For Kierkegaard "just as the fear of God is the beginning of wisdom 
[Proverbs 9: 10], so silence is the beginning of the fear of God. s' 
128 And so in praying one falls silent 
because there is nothing which one can say -a silence that is qualitatively different from the silence of 
despair [Indesluttehed] 1129 Instead one listens and learns that, far from being irremediably and 
oppressively infinitely sublime, God is "completely different from anything I am able to comprehend of 
what he says himself to be". And this silence of faith's prayer is a silence of unknowing. 
It is continually tempting to speak to God in despair over salvation, as if one understood the 
chasmic difference - and consequently God's holiness - better even than God in heaven. But this 
despair once again asserts a chasmic distance. As Anti-Climacus puts it: 
When the sinner despairs of the forgiveness of sins, it is almost as if he walked right up to 
God and said, `No, there is no forgiveness of sins, it is impossible, ' and it looks like close 
combat. Yet to be able to do this and for it to be heard, a person must become qualitatively 
distanced from God, and in order to fight cominus [in close combat] he must be eminus [at a 
distance]... In order that the `No, ' which in a way wants to grapple with God, can be heard, a 
person must get as far away from God as possible. The most offensive forwardness is at the 
greatest distance... 30 
1 
If this offensive and combative speech is contrasted with the surrendering intimacy of prayer, it is 
discovered that, unlike the despair which wants to grapple with God but only does so by becoming 
qualitatively distanced, prayer is actually a silent waiting upon God. "And so it is; to pray is not to 
listen to oneself speak but is to become silent and to remain silent, to wait until the one praying hears 
God. "' 131 Prayer is both the speech which breaks the silence of despair [Indesluttehed] in the face of 
human impossibility and also the silence which listens to God when despair would pronounce its 
offence. The silence of prayer for Kierkegaard fulfills that which de Lubac looks for in "a purer 
submission"; it does not struggle at a distance with God in its despairing accusations but rather it 
transcends, as it were, the infinite difference by its submission to faith: 
[P]rayer is the weapon not of one who attacks another or of one who defends himself but of 
one who yields... when there is no praying, God is in heaven and man is on earth, and 
consequently the distance is too great; but when there is praying, they are indeed too close to 
each other, then there is no inbetween that can be marked out as the battleground. ' 132 
1126 `Look at the Birds of the Air, Look at the Lily in the Field', WA, 11 1127 'Look at the Birds of the Air; Look at the Lily in the Field', WA, 11 1128 `Look at the Birds of the Air; Look at the Lily in the Field', WA, 11 1129 See Ettore Rocca, `Soren Kierkegaard on Silence', ed. Houe, Marino and Rossel, Anthropology and Authority: Essays on Seren Kierkegaard, 80 1130 SUD, 114 
1131 `Look at the Birds of the Air; Look at the Lily in the Field', WA, 12 i13z« [I]f a person yields himself completely in prayer, he does not struggle". `One Who Prays Aright Struggles in Prayer and is Victorious - in that God is Victorious', EUD, 383. "The more one comes to realize the difficulty of prayer, the more one realizes that in a sense the only real prayer is that one 
might be enabled to pray, then prayer becomes a silent surrendering of everything to God. " Perry LeFevre, The Prayers of Kierkegaard, 202 
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Prayer is thus the surrendering intimacy that overcomes the infinite abyss which has served as the 
battlefield between God and humanity. Perhaps more intimate than Jacob and the stranger, prayer is the 
struggle which is the cessation of all struggle with God. "How numerous the struggles are, how varied 
the struggle in which the one who prays tries himself with God (since someone who tries himself 
against God does not struggle in prayer). 91133 Prayer is the struggle of faith, not despair, in which the 
abyss [Afgrund] is transcended by the ground [grund] on which one comes to stand before God. 
1133 EUD, 387 
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Chapter Six: The Gaze of the Abyss 
[O]ne must never avoid questions, as one must not turn one's gaze away from the abyss. 1134 
The Optical Motif 
The self s relation to God is to some extent determined by the space that exists between them. The 
endeavour of faith is to stand before the Face of God in the face of an abyss. One stands before God but 
also far away, as in Kierkegaard's discourse on the tax collector who went into the temple to pray: 
`And the tax collector stood far off and would not even lift up his eyes to heaven, but beat his breast 
and said: God, be merciful to me, a sinner! (Luke 18: 13)'. "The tax collector stood far off. What does 
that mean? It means to stand by yourself, alone with yourself before God - then you are far off, far 
away from people, and far away from God, with whom you are still alone. "1135 
The tax collector is alone before God and still a distance exists between them: a distance 
postulated by the consciousness of sin. "What is further away from guilt and sin than God's holiness - 
and then, oneself a sinner, to be alone with this holiness: is this not being infinitely far ofd"1136 And 
this infinite distance disturbs the gaze of the sinner as if it were gazing into the anxious and vertiginous 
abyss. In this distance, the consciousness of sin asserts not the hidden Face of God, but the dizzily 
averted gaze of the sinner: 
And he would not even lift up his eyes to heaven; that is, he cast his eyes down. Well, no 
wonder! Even physically there is something in the infinite that overwhelms a person since 
there is nothing on which he can fix his eyes. This effect is called dizziness; then one must 
shut one's eyes. And the one who, alone with his guilt and his sin, knows that if he opens his 
eyes he will see God's holiness and nothing else, that one surely learns to cast his eyes down; 
or he perhaps looked up and saw God's holiness - and cast his eyes down. He looked down, 
saw his wretchedness; and more heavily than sleep weighs on the eyelids of the exhausted, 
more heavily than the sleep of death, the conception of God's holiness weighed his eyes 
down; like one exhausted, indeed, like one dying, he was unable to lift up his eyes. 1ý 
To see God is to die. The same opposition of the sublime burden of holiness upon the eyes of the sinner 
is arrayed in all its horror in Kierkegaard's following discourse on `The Woman Who Was a Sinner'. 
Here the disclosure of holiness threatens to annihilate the sinner through illumination: 
For example, when one is a sinner, man or woman, to come near to the Holy One, to become 
disclosed before him, that is, in the light of holiness. Ah, the night does not flee more terror- 
stricken before the day, which wants to annihilate it, and if there are ghosts, an apparition is 
not more anxiously startled when day is dawning than the sinner who shrinks from the 
holiness that, like the day, discloses everything. 38 
1134 Elie Wiesel, `Rebbe Barukh of Medzebozh', Four Hasidic Masters and Their Struggle against Melancholy, 59 
1135 `The Tax Collector', `Three Discourses at the Communion on Friday', WA, 128 [according to Kierkegaard "related to the last pseudonym, Anti-Climacus" (JP 6: 6515 / Pap X2A 126) or "parallel to Anti-Climacus" (JP 6: 6519 / Pap X2A 148)] 1136 WA, 129 
1137 WA, 130 
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And yet the woman who was a sinner was able, in her contrition, to anoint the feet of the Holy One 
with her tears; `her many sins are forgiven her, because she loved much' (Luke 7: 47). Likewise the 
humility of the tax collector that dares not look upon holiness is, ironically, the gaze that beholds God. 
"He cast his eyes down, but the downcast gaze sees God, and the downcast gaze is the uplifting of the 
heart. "' 139 This is the gaze of faith; a gaze which "humanly speaking, is blind" in contrast to the `clear- 
sightedness' of reason! 140 It is the presumptuous Pharisee, who like Moses presumes to look upon 
God, who is not permitted to see God. It is he, in presumption against the infinite difference between 
sin and divinity, whose gaze is occluded by the forbidding nemesis of holiness: "the Pharisee, who 
began by proudly lifting up his eyes to heaven, him God opposes, and God's opposition is an 
annihilating pressing downs' 141 
It is in relation to the downcast gaze that the Holy One does not annihilate that which is 
unholy, that which is infinitely different. Recalling Kierkegaard's `SUBDIVISIO', with which this 
thesis began: "If the Divisio [the infinite, radical, qualitative difference] is everything, then God is so 
infinitely sublime [uendelig opheiet] that there is no intrinsic or actual relationship between God and 
the individual human being. "' 142 Here the sublime [opheiet] contains a suggestion of the gaze - the eye 
[eie] - that is overwhelmed by the perception of God's majestas and its own nothingness. The gaze 
itself is engulfed by the infinite qualitative abyss that it beholds. To be grasped by this one may return 
to Isaiah 6 where even the angels cover their eyes before God. No one can see God and live. This is the 
divine vanishing point for the mysterium tremendum and the infinite qualitative difference. Can no eye, 
without averting or covering its gaze, behold the Holy One? 
From the beginning the optical has haunted this entire discussion. Wrestling with the nocturnal shapes 
of anxiety, melancholy, and Anfechtung it may be aptly said that that the gaze of God is such that, in 
Luther's words, "there is no corner or hole in the whole of creation into which a man might creep, not 
even in hell, but he must let himself be exposed to the gaze of the whole creation. " `To see God is to 
die'; or else according to Nietzsche's inversion, "The god who saw everything, even man - this god 
had to die! ": the either/or of the struggle for recognition. There is abundant reason for suggesting that 
such visualisations intolerably evoke the maddening horror of the mysterium horrendum. "`That a 
sparrow can live is comprehensible; it does not know that it exists before God. But to know that one 
exists before God, and then not instantly go mad or sink into nothingness! "91143 This intoxication can 
signify a troubling delirium tremens: an anxious inebriation by the fantastic thought of standing before 
God. And yet, as well as capturing the abyssal anxiety of the endeavour to stand before the Wholly 
Other, the optical remains as the motif which aptly expresses the dialectic of the self authentically 
becoming itself before God. According to "the autopsy [Greek: autos - self; optos - seen] of faith", one 
can only truly know oneself, as it were, before "the mirror of the Word... To stand before the mirror 
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means to stand before 144 It is only post mortem that autopsy is performed, and so it is that one 
must die to oneself in the autopsy of faith. "It is well known that men are afraid to see themselves 
physically, that superstition thought that to see oneself was an omen of death", Kierkegaard explains, 
"And so it is spiritually: to see yourself is to die, to die to all illusions and all hypocrisy - it takes great 
courage to dare look at yourself - something which can only take place in the mirror of the Word. "1145 
Kierkegaard ultimately describes a standing before the gaze of God which does not sink into 
madness or nothingness; there is a gaze of faith which sees God without annihilation - and its enigma 
resides in its unwillingness to gaze upon holiness. Instead it is as if it directs its gaze, in humility, 
towards the infinite qualitative abyss. The irony of the tax collector is that by casting his eyes down he 
sees God; by "standing far off' he stands before God. How then is this Kierkegaardian situating of the 
self before God described as other than continually guarding against the annihilation which constitutes 
its persistent danger? How, in other words, can one gaze into, and finally beyond, the abyss? 
"Faith is: that the self in being itself and in willing to be itself rests transparently in God. "' 146 
Here is the optical crux: faith is related to clear-sightedness, transparency. The self before God is 
determined in relation to the consciousness of sin (the infinite chasmic abyss); and also by how the self 
sees itself in relation to the consciousness of the forgiveness of sins (the reparation of the infinite 
chasmic abyss). It is how the abyss is viewed which is decisive in how the self stands before God. In 
other words, the infinite qualitative difference is sin, and sin is despair; so one might say that despair is 
the gaze of the abyss, or the gaze into the abyss - for, according to Vigilius Haufniensis's much noted 
observation, it is as much in the eye as in the abyss. ' 147 The nature of the self s despair before God can 
be read in terms of how the self gazes into, and is penetrated by, the abyss of sin. 
Before God: Optical Illusions 
Insofar as the gaze is under discussion, the role of imagination emerges once more. Indeed, as the 
delirium tremens of the mysterium horrendum testifies, imagination orients the self s intoxicated 
perception of its standing before God. Nevertheless, while imagination has here become fantastic, 
imagination itself retains a critical existential role in subjectivity's devotion to a life-transforming 
relation - though it is not without danger of the extremities of scrupulosity or madness. Kierkegaard's 
journals illustrate this through an enchanting parable on the eye of imagination. This entry from 1844 
tells of a man who, spying a drowning animal through his field glasses, wades decisively into the water 
to its rescue. Upon discovering that he has rescued something "no bigger than a lady bug" he is 
subjected to the derision of the on-looking crowd and subsequently arrested. "The error", Kierkegaard 
explains, "does not lie in their not being able to understand his compassion (there is no question of this 
at all) but in their inability to perceive that a trifling little thing, through the power of a man's 
imagination etc., can come to occupy him absolutely. "' 48 
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The lesson of an absolute relation is clear - though living `before God' is no "trifling little 
thing". Kierkgaard's encompassing existential category `before God' inevitably recalls the Lutheran 
tradition of coram deo (as distinct from coram hominibus): before the face/presence [panfm] of God. It 
should be remembered that `face' in Greek [prosopon] as in Hebrew [panim] also denotes `presence'. 
The Danish word for ['before'], Eller notes, "can mean `for the sake of as well as `in the sight of, ' and 
undoubtedly both meanings were part of S. K. 's intentions' 149 When it comes to standing before God, 
or "with the conception of God [Forestillingen om Gud]", 1150 M. Jamie Ferreira moreover suggests that 
"the Danish word Forestilling resonates with nuances of imaginative activity. "' 15 1 While the English 
word `conception' "has connotations of abstraction associated with the notions of thought or idea or 
concept", Ferreira maintains that the word Forestilling "calls to mind a very concrete apprehension, 
and the imaginative engagement appropriate to a performance or introduction" .1 
MSZ But Ferreira is not 
claiming that imagination functions freely via Romanticism's expressionistic creation ex nihilo; rather 
that "in my Forestilling of God, I am thereby placed before God; in a presentation of God, I am 
confronted by God. "' 153 Perhaps this sense of performance, introduction or presentation is to some 
extent also present in Kierkegaard's analogy of the actor in the theatre for whom God is "the critical 
spectator": "he is, if I may put it this way, the actor, who in the true sense is acting before God. "" 54 
The self is not concerned with `the crowd' as spectator of the absolute relation. Moreover, George 
Pattison points out, "this is not so much a matter of direct experience (as if we might, one day, feel the 
eyes of God boring through us), but of a critical self-relation in which we actively adopt and take upon 
ourselves a certain understanding of life, a matter of actively and deliberately sustaining a certain kind 
of awareness, of learning to take note of how our thoughts might be bearing witness against us"' 155 It 
is, importantly, the subject's free choice to see itself in this way. ' 156 
Furthermore, Pattison elsewhere suggests that the Kierkegaardian concept `before God' might 
be read as a Kantian "regulative concept" rather than a constitutive or experientialist foundation upon 
which metaphysical and ontological claims can be established. ' 157 The implication for such a reading 
would be that "although believers are to understand their lives 'as if lived 'before God' they are not 
obliged to make any claims as to the actual existence or non-existence of God. "' Sß This inevitably 
incites questions about the ontological and objective reality of God as Wholly Other. Is Kierkegaard 
here vulnerable to the unavoidable claim that "God is not something external. Hence, to stand alone 
before the face of God is not to stand before something external"? 1159 Jerome Gellman supports this 
claim by reference to Anti-Climacus's assertion that "God is not some externality in the sense that a 
149 Kierkegaard and Radical Discipleship, 109 1150 SUD 
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policeman is. "' 160 However, Gellman draws insufficient attention to Anti-Climacus's contextual 
discussion of sin: "The error [of older dogmatics] consisted in considering God as some externality and 
in seeming to assume that only occasionally did one sin against God. But God is not some externality 
in the sense that a policeman is. "A 161 In other words, God should not be conceived as the judicial 
externality that one can escape, nor as the omnipresent voyeur who peeks down upon the sinner from 
his heavenly window. "With his glance", Kierkegaard explains, God "guides the whole world and 
educates these countless human beings. For what is conscience? In the conscience it is God who looks 
upon a human being so that the human being now must look to him in all things. "A 162 God is in our 
hearts, one might say, therefore "every sin is before God, or, more correctly, what really makes human 
guilt into sin is that the guilty one has the consciousness of existing before God [though not as an 
externality]"1163 But the glance of God does not forbid the gaze but actually encourages the human 
being to look to God in reciprocity. Hence one may, as the tax collector, `stand far off' with downcast 
gaze - beholding the infinite difference in humility - and yet still stand before God. 
Before God: The Gaze of Despair 
Alas, it is terrible to see a person rushing headlong to his own downfall; it is terrible to see 
him dancing on the edge of the abyss without suspecting it; but this clarity about himself and 
his own downfall is even more terrible. 1164 
While freedom is at the existential heartbeat of standing 'before God', it is a freedom which discovers 
itself in `looking to God in all things'. There is a discernible differentiation in Kierkegaard's writings 
between an authentic and an inauthentic conception of God and the sense of the infinite qualitative 
difference between humanity and God is decisive in this. The deluded intoxication of "the fantasized 
religious person" has been much observed, but Anti-Climacus also notes that which he deems "poet- 
existence": an existence guilty of "the sin of poeticizing instead of being, of relating to the good and 
the true through the imagination instead of being that- that is existentially striving to be that. "' 165 Such 
a person is characterised by the tendency "to poeticize God as somewhat different from what God is, a 
bit more like the fond father who indulges his child's every wish far too much. "' 166 
Nevertheless, some conception of God is present for poet-existence, albeit one rather unlike 
the absolutely other of Climacean literature. As such, the self is in some measure before God. Every 
creature surely exists as visible to the omniscient gaze of God; but becoming a self `before God' freely 
1160 SUD, 80 
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involves an existential choice in how God is conceived, or received. For the self to truly become the 
self it is destined to become, God is not to be imagined as merely the indulgent father, or the 
occasionally externalised policeman, since "the greater the conception of God, the more self there is; 
the more self, the greater conception of God. "' 167 This self before God is qualitatively contrasted to 
"the human self, or the self whose criterion is man. "' 168 Any self therefore becomes itself in relation to 
that which it stands before: "A cattleman who (if this were possible) is a self directly before his cattle is 
a very low self, and, similarly, a master who is a self directly before his slaves is actually no self - for 
in both cases a criterion is lacking. "' 169 
This latter illustration cannot but implicate Hegel's 'Master-Slave' dialectic and its depiction 
of the mutual struggle for self-recognition. l loo It also recalls Anti-Climacus's anatomisation of "In 
Despair to will to Be Oneself: Defiance". However, in Climacus's examination, it is not so much 
against the other that the self struggles to be itself; instead it is decisively over itself that it wishes to 
become the master. In the despair to will to be oneself the self defiantly wills to be "the infinite self": 
... the most abstract form, the most abstract possibility of the self... severing the self 
from any 
relation to a power that has established it, or severing it from the idea that there is such an 
idea. With the help of this infinite form, the self in despair wants to be master of itself or to 
create itself... in order to fashion out of it a self such as he wants, produced with the help of 
the infinite form of the negative self - and in this way he wills to be himself. 
' 171 
While the terminology recalls Hegel, however, such a Promethean self is in defiance not only of an 
establishing power such as God, but also of any relation to the human other by which it may be 
defined. This self wills to become itself ex nihilo: starting "not at and with the beginning, but `in the 
beginning'. "' 172 The self, "satisfied with paying attention to itself', ' 173 forsakes the gaze of the human 
and divine other in deference to the reflected introversion of Narcissistic self-regard. It seeks to 
transmute itself by the creative act of its self-reflection. Here again can be read an anatomisation of the 
decomposition of the modern self and its ill-fated struggle for self-creating self-authentication: 
The self is its own master, absolutely its own master; and precisely this is the despair, but also 
what it regards as its pleasure and its delight. On closer examination, however, it is easy to see 
that this absolute ruler is a king without a country, actually ruling over nothing; his position, 
his sovereignty, is subordinate to the dialectic that rebellion is legitimate at any moment. 1174 
This diagnosis of self-consciousness determined through the mastery of the self by the infinite self 
could again sound rather Hegelian - except in the severance of this self from the other, the relational 
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dialectic is internalised. 1 175 In the realisation that the master is "a king without a country" it becomes 
evident that the slave - the self that the infinite self believes it has mastered - will reappear 
in the 
failure of the self to actualise the self that it imagines. In the failure to create itself for itself, the finite 
self ("a self acted upon") inevitably undermines the ambition and sovereignty of the infinite self ("the 
acting self') - an unsustainable sovereignty "subordinate to the dialectic that rebellion 
is legitimate at 
any moment. " The self, willing in despair to be itself, transpires as an impenetrable and ungovernable 
abyss - equally as opaque and fluid as the ocean. 
Consequently, the self in despair is always building only castles in the air, is only 
shadowboxing... in the final analysis, what it understands by itself is a riddle; in the very 
moment when it seems that the self is closest to having the building completed, it can 
arbitrarily dissolve the whole thing into nothing. '176 
This self-examination, which fails to fathom what Kant appropriately calls "the scarcely penetrable 
abysses of the human heart", ' 177 is built upon the optical illusion of self-mastery. It cannot reconcile 
itself as its own master since it is essentially master over nothingness - an abyss [Afgrund]. And so it is 
this abyss which itself becomes the master. The despairing "person is freely in the power of an alien 
force, is freely or in freedom slaving under it, or he is freely-unfreely in his own power", as 
Kierkegaard sketches in the final draft of The Sickness Unto Death. "If one calls the alien force the 
master, then the person in despair is free in self-inflicted slavery for this master... he consequently 
slaves for himself, is his own slave. "' 178 The internalised dialectic of master (acting self)-slave (self 
acted upon) has created a self estranged from itself and from its freedom by its efforts to authenticate 
itself. This is actually further reminiscent of Hegel: "the duplication which formerly was divided 
between two individuals, the lord and the bondsman, is now lodged in one... the Unhappy 
Consciousness is the consciousness of self as a dual-natured, merely contradictory being. "' 179 
Such alienated `unhappiness' is inextricable from the self's undermining of itself - or, more 
specifically, the inversion of the mastery of the infinite creating self over the finite self. The `acting 
self becomes `the self acted upon' due to an inherent defect within the self: 
Perhaps such an imaginatively constructing self, which in despair wills to be itself, encounters 
some difficulty or other while provisionally orienting itself to its concrete self, something the 
Christian would call a cross, a basic defect, whatever it may be. The negative self, the infinite 
form of the self, will perhaps reject this completely, pretend that it does not exist, will have 
nothing to do with it. But it does not succeed; its proficiency in imaginary constructing does 
not stretch that far, and not even its proficiency in abstracting does. In a Promethean way, the 
1 175 "Or is not despair [Fortvivlelse] actually double-mindedness [Tvesindethed]... everyone in despair has two wills, one that he futilely wants to follow entirely, and one that he futilely wants to get rid of 
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infinite, negative self feels itself nailed to this servitude. Consequently, it is a self acted 
upon. 1180 
And so the infinite creating self is internally undermined by a fatal flaw from which it is unable to 
abstract itself. It becomes no longer the master but the slave to this flaw which comes to signify the 
inability of the self to create itself. It is this flaw which undermines the Narcissistic effort to fashion, or 
transmute, the self into that which the infinite self imagines it to become. "What, then, are the 
manifestations of this despair that is: in despair to will to be oneself? "' 181 
Such a despairing person, transfixed by this defect, is ultimately "unwilling to hope in the 
possibility that an earthly need, a temporal cross, can come to an end": 
He has convinced himself that this thorn in the flesh gnaws so deeply that he cannot abstract 
himself from it (whether this is actually the case or his passion makes it so to him), and 
therefore he might as well accept it forever, so to speak. He is offended by it, or, more 
correctly, he takes it as an occasion to be offended at all existence... in spite of or in defiance 
of all existence, he wills to be himself with it, takes it along, almost flouting his agony. Hope 
in the possibility of help, especially by virtue of the absurd, that for God everything is possible 
- no, that he does not want... Rather than to seek help, he prefers, if necessary, to be himself 
with all the agonies of hell. ' 182 
He is so enmeshed in his despair to will to be oneself, so mesmerised by the Narcissism of his gazing 
into this thorn in the flesh, that he cannot endure the "giving up being himself' involved in submitting 
to "the `Helper' for whom all things are possible. "' 183 As such, he now feels that he is only 
authentically himself insofar as he is fixated by his defect. It is this thorn in the flesh that has become 
his melancholic philosopher's stone - the secret transforming principle of his Narcissistic 
transmutation. This defect which refused to conform the concrete self to the creativity of the infinite 
self becomes the object of his infinite passion. It is by this cross alone that he now wills to be himself. 
It becomes, as it were, the mark of his authenticity and he has become `demonic' in his devotion to it. 
So now he makes precisely this torment the object of all his passion, and finally it becomes a 
demonic rage. By now, even if God in heaven and all the angels offered to help him out of it - 
no, he does not want that, now it is too late... now he would rather rage against everything 
and be the wronged victim of the whole world and of all life... This eventually becomes such 
a fixation that for an extremely strange reason he is afraid of eternity, afraid that it will 
separate him from his, demonically understood, infinite superiority over other men, his 
justification, demonically understood, for being what he is. - Himself is what he wills to be. He began with the infinite abstraction of the self, and now he has finally become so concrete 
that it would be impossible to become eternal in that sense; nevertheless, he wills in despair to be himself. ' 184 
It would not be exact to say that this self is a self before God; but neither can it be said that this self 
ignored the power that has established it. In willing to be itself, the self has closed itself off from the 
other, in this sense it has demonically closed itself off from salvation. But the flaw, by which he 
becomes what he wills, is also demonically directed against the possibility of God. And so he wages 
war on God with a demonic enmity that surpasses defiance. 
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[N]ot even in defiance does it want to tear itself loose from the power that established it, but 
for spite wants to force itself upon it, to obtrude defiantly upon it, wants to adhere to it out of 
malice... Rebelling against all existence, it feels that it has obtained evidence against it, 
against its goodness. The person in despair believes that he himself is the evidence, and that is 
what he wants to be, and therefore he wants to be himself, himself in his torment, in order to 
protest against all existence with this torment. 1185 
Like Prometheus chained to his rock at the edge of the world, raging against Zeus from the 
periphery of existence, this self attaches itself defiantly to the injustice of his bonds. He gnaws his 
chains and bears them heavily. ' 186 The griffon consumes his liver only for him to endure its incessant 
rebirth. The flame of his sickness is endlessly unto death; his melancholy - which according to certain 
classical physiology is secreted from the liver as black bile - is eternally renewed. The insurrection of 
the self in despair willing to be itself in taking itself to be an icon for the injustice of the creator. 
"Figuratively speaking, " Anti-Climacus describes it as an error which slipped into an author's writing 
and "became conscious of itself as an error... and now this error wants to mutiny against the author, 
out of hatred toward him, forbidding him to correct it and in maniacal defiance saying to him: No, I 
refuse to be erased; I will stand as a witness against you, a witness that you are a second-rate 
author. " '87 Anti-Climacus later observes that the demonic self is similar to the alcoholic "who keeps 
himself in a perpetual state of intoxication out of fear of stopping". "88 In his intoxicated rage he is able 
to maintain himself by an "internal consistency"' 89: a solidifying of the self through the demonic 
coherence of identity. As such, he may believe that there is authenticity in this `refusal to be erased' 
and the defiant rejection of salvation. It is here that he has become himself. "Only in the continuance of 
sin is he himself, only in that does he live and have an impression of himself. "' 190 
Through witnessing the decomposition of the self through its basic defect, and through his 
demonic acknowledgement of sin, however, he may be seen to have actually taken a step towards 
turning to the eternal in order to become himself. But, in despair to will to be oneself, he has closed 
himself off to the other - "severing the self from any relation to a power that has established it, or 
severing it from the idea that there is such an idea"" 191- or else he relates to it only through demonic 
insurrection. But this demonic rage is also a malignant severance from repentance, for repentance 
would mean that the self has contradicted itself, has literally turned away from itself and from its 
bondage to its Promethean rock. "Sin itself is severance from the good, " Anti-Climacus warns, "but 
despair over sin is the second severance. "' 192 
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The Second Severance 
And the abyss calls for another abyss. 1193 
Sin is the infinite chasmic abyss that separates the self from God; despair over sin is, venturing a 
potentially mystifying image, a second and more fatal abyss. Yet it is decisively not a severance that 
has been revealed by God, but an abyss which the self has willed of itself through despairing over the 
abyss of sin. Sin, according to Anti-Climacus, "may be termed the break with the good"; despair over 
sin is the break "with repentance. "' 194 As with the demonic self-willing: 
[D]espair over one's sin indicates that sin has become or wants to be internally consistent. It 
wants nothing to do with the good... it closes itself up within itself, indeed, locks itself inside 
one more inclosure, and protects itself against every attack or pursuit of the good by 
despairing over sin. It is aware of having burned the bridge behind it and of thereby being 
inaccessible to the good and of the good being inaccessible to it, so that if in a weak moment it 
should itself will the good, that would still be impossible. 1195 
This intensified second severance "squeezes the uttermost demonic powers out of sin" by fortifying 
itself against forgiveness, by considering all "repentance and grace not only as empty and meaningless 
but also as its enemy, as something against which a defense must be made most of all". ' 196 And so, 
burning the bridge across the abyss behind it, it bids farewell to penitence - like the fugitive Wandering 
Jew - and throws itself into the arms of despairing exile. 
"Nevertheless, " Anti-Climacus asserts, "despair over sin is conscious particularly of its own 
emptiness, that it has nothing on which to live, not even an idea of its own self. "1197 Hence it must 
maintain itself, like the decadent, through its continual intoxication. The despair over one's sin, in its 
demonic vitality, can thus be considered a form of `in despair to will to be oneself'. But this is a self 
which, in its desire to be internally consistent, loses all relation to grace and therefore to itself. ' 198 Such 
despair may resemble a melancholy brooding over sin. It may even suggest the melancholy sensitivity 
towards sin, that "deep nature" 1199 of the homo religiosus who, with scrupulous self-indictment, 
despairs "I will never forgive myself. s1200 Such self-condemnation may apparently conceal a troubled 
soul captured in the melancholy narrowness [trcengsel] of the consciousness of sin, but it belies an 
implicit hubris towards one's own guilt: a confidence in the potency of self-indictment and 
consequently self-forgiveness. This is a deceptively hubristic piety by which "the wrath within you 
wanted, as it were, to come to the aid of divine wrath so that the punishment might consume you". 1201 
This brooding melancholy may betray an implicit form of `in despair to will to be oneself: that is, a 
self-denunciation which is in reality a grasp at mastery over oneself. In a portrayal reminiscent of the 
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Hegelian terminology of The Sickness unto Death, Bonhoeffer describes this in terms of the conscience 
`In Adam' when, "under the Atlas-burden of a world's creator, in the cold silence of his eternal 
solitude, man begins to fear himself, to shudder in alarm": 
Thereupon, exalting himself to be his own final judge, he proceeds to his own indictment - 
which is couched in the language of conscience... The conscience and remorse of man in 
Adam are his final grasp at himself, the final confirmation and justification of his self-lordly, 
self-masterly attitude. Man makes himself the defendant and exhorts himself upward to his 
better self. But the cry of conscience serves only to dissemble the mute loneliness of his 
desolate isolation [what Kierkegaard calls `inclosing reserve' (Indesluttehed)? ], it sounds 
without echo into the world that is governed and constructed by the self... Conscience can 
torture, can drive to despair, but is unable of itself to kill man, because indeed it is his final 
grasp at himself. 1202 
This internalised gaze of the conscience 'In Adam' is otherwise oriented than the conscience `before 
God' in which God "looks upon a human being so that the human being now must look to him in all 
things. "203 In despairing over sin, such a self is still captured in the internalised Hegelian master-slave 
dialectic of the will to be oneself. One may say, as in Anti-Climacus's portrayal, "I can never forgive 
myself"; but one may be "even more deceptive" in alleging that "God can never forgive him for it. 
Alas, this is just a subterfuge"1204 The same hubris of self-indictment is mutually evident. It is the error 
of believing that the self can itself decide what sin is and the extent of the possible reach of 
forgiveness. The flaw is in conflating what one can forgive oneself with what God can forgive one for: 
the omission of the infinite qualitative difference between human and divine forgiveness. This 
introspective grasp at the self is a denial of the `offensive' truth that one "has to learn what sin is by a 
revelation from God. "1205 It is thus concealed self-willing to prescribe the parameters of forgiveness 
and to assert that one is beyond the reach of salvation. It is the contritio activa of self-willing rather 
than the contritio passiva of faith encountering Christ in the consciousness of sin. In reality, Anti- 
Climacus writes, "this kind of talk is exactly the opposite of the brokenhearted contrition that prays to 
God to forgive". 1206 The heart condemns itself - but God is greater than our hearts. It is the broken 
heart that opens its gaze to the other for forgiveness. 
And yet the encounter with Christ - "a self directly before Christ"1207 - is not immunised 
against its own forms of despair. Specifically, the 'intensified possibility before Christ' is what Anti 
Climacus calls "despair of the forgiveness of sins. " In the context of this discussion, it may manifest 
itself as a form of "in despair to will to be oneself -a sinner - in such a way that there is no 
forgiveness. "1208 This takes the form of a refusal of the divine offer of reconciliation - to regard it as 
nothing but impossible. Recalling the earlier discussion in the previous chapter, "When the sinner 
despairs of the forgiveness of sins, it is almost as if he walked right up to God and said, 'No, there is no 
1202 Act and Being, 157-158 1203 WL, 346 
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forgiveness of sins, it is impossible, ' and it looks like close combat s1209 But the self in despair has 
become far away - severed - from the God against whom it wishes to struggle: "the most offensive 
forwardness towards God is at the greatest distance. 21o This despair is, once again, an expression of 
the most profound enmity between the self and God; and yet this enmity conceals the implicit 
dependence of the self upon God asserted by way of contradiction. Through this insurrection, one 
becomes dialectically "self-important by being the oppositions 211 
In its still more intensified form, such despair becomes "THE SIN OF DISMISSING 
CHRISTIANITY MODO PONENDO [POSITIVELY], OF DECLARING IT TO BE UNTRUTH". 
This Anti-Climacus equates with the unforgivable sin, the sin against the Holy Spirit [Matthew 12: 31- 
32]: "Here the self is at the highest intensity of despair; it not only discards Christianity totally but 
makes it out to be a lie and untruth. "1212 This sin against the Holy Spirit, Kierkegaard suggests 
elsewhere, may be the pride which cannot forgive itself, the hubris which believes that one's sin has 
exhausted the possibilities of divine mercy. 1213 While the despair of the forgiveness of sins may 
desperately deny the possibility of redemption from an apparently melancholy conviction of one's 
wretchedness, in actuality this "intensification is an ascent from the defensive to the offensive... 
Despair of the forgiveness of sins is a definite position over against an offer of God's mercy; sin is not 
solely retreat, not merely defensive action. But the sin of renouncing Christianity as untruth and a lie is 
offensive war. s1214 At its root is a form of `offense' towards the claim to forgive sins, an offense 
towards the truth of the infinite qualitative difference that "there is one way in which man could never 
in all eternity come to be like God: in forgiving sins"1215 It is here that offense mounts its offensive. 
The Dialectic of Offense: "an invention of a mad god" 
The heart of this offense - which in bitter enmity declares the forgiveness of sins to be impossible or 
Christianity to be untruth - is identified by Anti-Climacus as "Sin against the Holy Spirit... the positive 
form of being offended"1216 Earlier Anti-Climacus writes that the imperative qualification "before 
God" contains "Christianity's crucial criterion: the absurd, the paradox, the possibility of o ense. "1217 
What is truly found to be most offensive about Christianity, Anti-Climacus argues, is not eventually its 
gloom or rigour, but the realisation that "it is too high... Because it wants to make man into something 
1209 SUD, 114 
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so extraordinary that he cannot grasp the thought s1218 The real offense resides in the utter absurdity of 
God's teaching that every individual human being, regardless of status, gender, profession, etc., "exists 
before God, may speak with God any time he wants to, assured of being heard by him - in short this 
person is invited to live on the most intimate terms with God! , 1219 Taken at face value, "then 
Christianity - if we call paganism's fiction of the gods human madness - is an invention of a mad 
god. "1220 But more than that, this `mad god' has been born into the world, suffered and died, and all for 
the sake of every single individual. "Truly, if there is anything to lose one's mind over, this is it! "1221 
Yet for this to happen the infinite chasmic abyss of sin must be overcome - an absurdity and 
an impossibility! How is the infinite qualitative distance between self and Wholly Other, which 
Kierkegard's writings strain to evoke with such dread, to be overcome? It has been noted how the 
`death of God' ensues when the aggressive "servile subject tries to master the terror that absolute 
alterity provokes by negating the wholly other". '222 But the terror of absolute alterity is always negated 
in the repudiation of God as wholly other. In one important way, as it happens, Christianity is itself 
inherently `guilty' of bringing humanity and the Wholly Other into closer intimacy than either 
speculative Hegelianism or Feuerbachian anthropology. Indeed, "No teaching on earth has ever really 
brought God and man so close together as Christianity, nor can any do so, for only God himself can do 
that, and any human fabrication remains just a dream, a precarious delusion. , 1223 
Kierkegaard's writings express their own vitriolic offense towards any blurring of humanity 
and divinity which denies the infinite qualitative difference; and yet the (typically Kierkegaardian) 
irony is that the Christianity one finds in these writings is one which itself teaches that God has defied 
that very distance. This divine defiance is identified as being an offense to reason in the highest degree: 
an offense that is at the dialectical heartbeat of the struggle for faith. The Kierkegaardian offense 
towards Feuerbach, Hegel, paganism, Christendom etc., is an offense directed towards human denial of 
the infinite difference. In the face of such denial or omission, the abyss of sin requires assertion. And 
yet, on the other hand, the offense towards Christianity is ironically also an offense towards God's 
transcendence of the infinite difference through forgiveness of sins. Paganism is offensive because it 
represents a human failure to recognise the abyss and therefore an implicit denial of it. Christianity is 
offensive initially because it directs the gaze despairingly towards the abyss; and secondly it is 
offensive because it is the Wholly Other who actually transcends the abyss of otherness. The offense is 
first that God is Wholly Other; and secondly that one may live in paradoxical intimacy 'before God'. 
And still, it must be observed, Christianity perpetually protects itself against any merging 
between humanity and God - "the most dreadful of all blasphemies"1224 - by virtue of the incessant 
possibility of offense itself. "The existence of an infinite qualitative difference between God and man 
1218 SUD, 83 
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constitutes the possibility of offense, which cannot be removed. " 1225 The possibility of offense - "the 
guarantee whereby God protects himself against man's coming too closes1226 - is therefore the 
reminder that God has accomplished `the impossible', something which requires the consent, not of 
human comprehension, but the consent of the will to that which is revealed by God. 1227 As such, as 
long as there is life there remains the danger that the abyss may induce offense - despair - whether at 
the depth and breadth of the abyss or at divinity's claim to have crossed it. Hence the claim to reconcile 
the abyss may elicit a despairing offense more violent than the assertion of the infinite qualitative 
difference itself. The possibility of offence may thus be understood as an undeniable expression of 
human-divine alterity. For one captivated by the despair of the abyss of sin, the intimacy of God as 
Holy Other may actually incite greater enmity and estrangement than the alienation of the Wholly 
Other. Indeed, such offense at the idea that the abyss has been crossed may indicate that one at least 
holds some sense of the breadth of the abyss and the tension of spirit: it takes "singular spiritlessness 
not to be offended at the very idea that sin can be forgiven. s1228 Therefore, it is possible that "despair 
over sin is dialectically understood as pointing toward faith'- something "implied in despair's also 
being the first element in faith. "1229 That is to say that, humanly speaking, a `true' conception of the 
immensity of the abyss may legitimately cause one to think that the claim to transcend the distance is 
absurd, an offense to reason. Human comprehension cannot transcend this distance: "As sinner, man is 
separated from God by the most chasmic qualitative abyss. In turn, of course, God is separated from 
man by the same chasmic abyss when he forgives sins. "123° Here is the soul of a Kierkegaardian sense 
of God as Wholly Other. And here is the sense in which the infinite qualitative abyss is the grief of God 
as well as humanity. 
The Unfathomable Grief of Divine Love 
Precisely this is Christ's grief, that `he cannot do otherwise'... What a rare act of love, what 
unfathomable grief of love, that even God cannot remove the possibility that this act of love 
reverses itself for a person and becomes the most extreme misery - something that in another 
sense God does not want to do, cannot want to do. 1231 
Decisively, it is Christ who, according to Johannes Climacus, suffers from "bearing the possibility of 
the offense of the human race when out of love [he] became its savior! "1232 It is the God-man whose 
unrequited love for humanity suffers at the offense of human reason. "There was a people who had a 
good understanding of the divine; this people believed that to see the god was death. - Who grasps the 
contradiction of this sorrow: not to disclose itself is the death of love; to disclose itself is the death of 
the beloved. "1233 And so God, becoming human in disclosure to the beloved, elicits the sorrowful 
possibility of offence. To see God is to die; and yet, God becomes a servant - "look, behold the man! 
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[Ecce homo! John 19: 5]"1234 - and this look of offense becomes his own death at the hands of the 
beloved. This paradox is a terrifying mysterium to the understanding, potentially more dreadful than the 
numinous in its tremendum: "for it is indeed less terrifying to fall upon one's face while the mountains 
tremble at the god's voice [Exod. 19: 16-19] than to sit with him as his equal, and yet the god's concern 
is precisely to sit this way. "1235 
The incongruity of the God-man draws attention to itself as a contradiction, an offense. Ecce 
homo! Once again, it draws the gaze to itself; but a gaze which, encountering a divine mirror, is 
reflected back to interrogate the self - since it is the self and not God's "unfathomable grief' that we 
can ultimately speak of: 
There is something that makes it impossible not to look - and look, as one is looking one sees 
as in a mirror, one comes to see oneself, or he who is the sign of contradiction looks straight 
into one's heart while one is staring into that contradiction. A contradiction placed squarely in 
front of a person - if one can get him to look at it - is a mirror; as he is forming a judgment, 
what dwells within him must be disclosed. 1236 
And so the decisive question for the self before God is whether this sign of contradiction - which, like 
the abyss, one cannot resist gazing into though it also gazes back - induces despair or faith: "either you 
shall be offended or you shall believe. "1237 This either/or which the mirror asks of us must be answered 
by each "the single individual" to whom it is addressed. 1238 As such, "the possibility of offence", 
Kierkegaard asserts, "unconditionally makes a person first of all and qualitatively an 'individual'. "1239 
It is not humanity in the abstract, the speculative idea, but each single individual who must gaze into 
the contradiction since "The category of sin is the category of individuality. ""240 
The divine concession of the single individual - who carries the inalienable possibility of 
offense, of despairing over the gaze into the abyss - illuminates the risk of atheism inherent within the 
struggle for faith. 1241 It is always conceivable that the gaze of the contradiction who `looks straight into 
one's heart' - evoking the abyss of sin - becomes a disclosing gaze which one may strive to escape, as 
one wishes to flee in terror from one's own reflection, "an omen of death"1242 for the self. This desire to 
escape asserts a different severance between the sinner and the consuming consciousness of sin: 
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Would that there were a border, however narrow, if it still makes a separation between me and 
my sin! Would that on the other side of a chasmic abyss there were a spot, however little, 
where I can stand, while the consciousness of my sin must remain on this side. Would that 
there were a forgiveness, a forgiveness that does not increase my sense of guilt but truly takes 
the guilt from me, also the consciousness of it. Would that there were oblivion. 1243 
The agony of incommensurability is that it is before God that one becomes aware that sin cannot stand 
before holiness. The tension of this difference is asserted as one is disclosed as a sinner before God, 
Anti-Climacus describes: 
[W]hereby the opposites are kept together in a double sense: they are held together 
(continentur), they are not allowed to go away from each other, but by being held together in 
this way the differences show up all the more sharply, just as when two colors are held 
together, oppositajuxta se posits magic illucesunt [the opposites appear more clearly by 
juxtaposition]. 1244 
Once one is before God, then, recalling the spirit of Lutheran Anfecthung, one flees but cannot escape 
the opposition which exposes the crushing contrast of infinity upon the finite. And yet, if one is 
conscious of oneself as a sinner then, according to Anti-Climacus in Practice in Christianity, God will 
not aggravate the tenderised conscience - "he will not break the bruised reed even more" - but rather 
will "raise you up when you accept him; he will not identify you by contrast, by placing you apart from 
himself so that your sin becomes even more terrible". 1245 As such, forgiveness negates the crushing 
juxtaposition of the infinite difference. Perhaps it would be best to say that salvation is an end to the 
infinite abyssal distinction. While difference is perpetually maintained -a difference which is itself 
asserted in the act of forgiveness - it is the act of alienating contrast, or dreadful opposition that is 
overcome. Instead of the conscience restlessly fleeing its own shadow in search of an unobtainable 
hiding place from the light of guilt, God "will grant you a hiding place with himself, and hidden in him 
he will hide your sins. "246 
As such, the gaze of God which discloses the eye of the beholder to itself is a gaze that neither 
interrogates sin with voyeuristic relish, nor annihilates that which it looks upon. It is the gaze of one 
who sits as one's equal. It is a gaze which Pattison has rightly referred to as "the look of love"' 247 -a 
look one might contrast to the crucifying look of offense with which one beholds the God-man (Ecce 
homo). Kierkegaard explains: 
Justice looks judgingly at a person, and the sinner cannot endure its gaze; but love, when it 
looks at him - yes, even if he avoids its gaze, looks down, he nevertheless does perceive that it 
is looking at him, because love penetrates far more inwardly into life, deep inside life, in there 
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whence life emanates, than justice does, which repellingly establishes a chasmic abyss 
between the sinner and itself, whereas love is on his side, does not accuse, 
does not judge, but 
pardons and forgives.... Whither shall I flee from justice? If I take the wings of the morning 
and fly to the nearest sea, it is there. And if I hide myself in the abyss, it is there, and thus 
it is 
everywhere [Psalm 139: 7-12]. Yet, no, there is one place to which I can flee - to 
love. 1248 
The penitent must therefore "stop staring at his guilt'- which, recalling Vigiulius 
Haufniensis, has the 
anxious allure of the serpent's glance. The penitent must "shut his eyes" and `open the eyes of 
faith so 
that he sees purity where he saw guilt and sin! s1249 The penitent then ceases to flee from 
himself - "the 
futile attempt that only leads more deeply to despair or madness"- and flees instead to Christ who will 
"shield me from the eyes of justice". 125° 
Very Lutheranly, one might say, the penitent flees from the wrath of heaven into the mercy of 
Christ. The eyes of justice do not see sin. But this is not the mercy of God deceptively blinding the eyes 
of God's justice. It is as much a problem of the anxious gaze of guilt which will not see sin with the 
eyes of faith. Justice `repellingly establishes a chasmic abyss" into which one cannot lose oneself 
("Would that there were oblivion") since "if I hide myself in the abyss, it is there"; but "love is on his 
side" - his side of the abyss one might say. It is also from these internal eyes of guilt, temptation, and 
accusation that the believer is hidden in God. Haufniensis gives us some idea of the insidious and 
anxious gaze of one who is "a divine prosecutor... in relation to himself' for whom guilt has "the 
fascinating power of the serpent's glance. "1251 Indeed, as Kierkegaard explains in another discourse, it 
is the devil's glance of temptation - "this glittering gaze that looks as if it could penetrate earth and sea 
and the most hidden secrets of the hearts1252 - from which the believer is hidden in God. "He 
is sharp- 
sighted, the evil one whose snare is called temptation and whose prey is called the human soul. " And 
yet, "The temptation does not actually come from him". 1253 It comes from the "ambivalence" of the 
human subject - in some way related to what Hauniensis might call the ambivalence of the fearful 
desire of the gaze of anxiety - on which the glittering gaze catches. "But the person who by 
unconditional obedience [without ambivalence] hides in God is unconditionally secure; from his secure 
hiding place he can see the devil, but the devil cannot see him. "izsa Retaining the optical motif: "That a 
person wants to sit and brood and stare at his sin and is unwilling to have faith that it is forgiven" 
signifies faithlessness, according to Kierkegaard, "a minimizing of what Christ has done. "255 The gaze 
of melancholy reveals our great tragedy to be "that we have no real conception of what sin is in God's 
eyes. 9,1256 
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The Eyes of Faith 
The precarious life of sin, Kierkegaard writes, is a life which "hovers over the abyss and therefore has 
no foothold. "1257 Anti-Climacus thus warns how the gravitation of sin "leads downward so easily.. . as 
easily as when the horse, completely relieved of pulling, cannot, not even with all its strength, stop the 
wagon, which now runs it into the abyss. " Here are both senses of the abyss: its depth [Dyb] and its 
groundlessness [Afgrund]. Reliant solely upon oneself, one cannot extract oneself from the abyss. But, 
Anti-Climacus counsels, one must "not despair over every relapse. s1258 Once anatomised solely from 
guilt, the abyss is fathomed without relation to that which lies beyond its shores. The anatomisation of 
the distance and depth of sin - something surpassing human understanding - cannot be grasped by 
introspection but only by revelation: "that is what you know least of all, how far from perfect you are 
and what sin is. "1259 As with the consciousness of sin, so must forgiveness be received from God. 
Luther, rebuffing the assaults upon his conscience wrought by the devil's manipulation of Scripture, 
appealed to what he aptly called the "alien word", which, as Rupp explains, "is the Gospel, which is 
not `my own, ' but which I must hear spoken `to me. '... a Christian can only be promised absolution, the 
Word of forgiveness, `from outside. 019126° But this `alien word' is the mysterium [alienum] of 
forgiveness that does not offer alienation but reconciliation. As humanity can never fathom the true 
breadth and depth of sin, so humanity, Anti-Climacus asserts, can never know what it is for God to 
forgive sins. Sin is, as Gonzalez describes, "that which man cannot think as a divine thought s1261 Here 
is the "crucifixion of one's understanding". '262 So Otto notes how for the Psalmist, "[w]hen he gazes 
down into the immeasurable, yawning Depth of the divine Wisdom, dizziness comes upon him". 1263 
Here is the real vertigo of the abyss: the fathomless and inexhaustible depths of God's grace. 
Here this thesis returns to its beginning in its conclusion. The infinite difference between 
divinity and humanity is irreducibly "maintained as it is in the paradox and faith, so that God and man 
do not, even more dreadfully than ever in paganism, do not merge in some way, philosophice, poetice, 
etc., into one - in the system. ""Z" But, in forgiveness, this "gulf of qualitative difference between God 
and man1265 becomes an unfathomable abyss free from that `moment of death' which is the danger 
inherent to the dialectics of melancholy, anxiety, Anfcegtelse, and despair. When faith is present, the 
abyssal consciousness of sin - gaping open like an incurable wound - is transfigured into a gulf 
between human and divine forgiveness, between human impossibility and divine possibility. As the 
consciousness of sin cannot be truly grasped without the relational consciousness of forgiveness, so the 
abyss of sin cannot be anatomised without this gulf of forgiveness. The true meaning of the infinite 
qualitative difference is the infinite quality of mercy. 
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`Blessed is the one who is not offended', therefore, since the infinite qualitative difference of 
divine forgiveness is the mysterium by which the Wholly Other arouses the tremendum etfascinans 
expressed most authentically through worship: 
The person who does not take offense worships in faith. But to worship, which is the 
expression of faith, is to express that the infinite, chasmic, qualitative abyss between them is 
confirmed. For in faith the possibility of offense is again the dialectical factor. 1266 
But - and here is the reminder - the possibility of offense can never be removed, just as the thorn in the 
flesh, or the wound of Jacob, remains as the self s enduring memento. And yet the gulf of forgiveness, 
in maintaining this persistent risk of offense, may itself be described as the possible moment of death 
for the self before God, the self confronted by the abyss. The possibility of offense insures that the 
abyss can always gape wide and dark for the gaze which, in its darkest hour, dare not or cannot look 
upon God. One may become, as Kierkegaard describes in a student sermon in 1842, "crushed by the 
thought that you were a nothing and your soul lost in infinite space". 1267 It may appear that in some 
way God has become nothing but the abyss itself - the infinitely forbidding difference between 
humanity and divinity; the holy abyss which overwhelms the eye with dizziness. But God - the Wholly 
Other - is not another name for the abyss. God is the Holy Other who, as it were, stands on the other 
side of the abyss; or rather, the Holy One who, it must be remembered, bestrides the abyss. In this 
thought is "Confidence before God", despite the abyss: 
It sometimes happens that our eyes turn toward heaven, and we are astonished at the infinite 
distance, and the eye cannot find a resting place between heaven and earth - but when the eye 
of the soul seeks God and we feel the infinite distance, then it is a matter of confidence - but here we have a mediator. '268 
In the God-relationship, therefore, "there is a holding-on place in existence, for God has hold of it" 
even in the abyss, and in this standing fast God relieves "the dizziness which is the beginning of 
mutiny. s1269 The self must then choose the loving struggle of Jacob with the stranger over the rage of 
Prometheus's offense against the bonds of Zeus. The self before God is a divine gift - not the fire 
stolen from heaven which only serves to ignite an unquenchable inner flame. 
Seen with the eyes of faith, forgiveness overcomes the distance of the abyss [Dyb] - its 
vertiginous sublimity which overwhelms the eye. The self discovers the confidence to stand on the gift 
of holy ground [grund] before God in the face of the abyss [Afgrund]. It is in worship rather than 
offense that the self discovers the ground on which it stands before God - the Holy Other: an alterity 
confirmed in worship. It is the presence of God in the call `Abraham, Abraham' or `Moses, Moses'. It 
is the ground given to us in which God apparently recedes in order to make room for the 'I' - the 
"infinite concession"- to stand coram deo in its response of `here I am'. It is the ground on which the 
`I' can love God in return. It is the call of Christ to 'come here' given to those "whose residence has 
been assigned among the grave": that is, to the one who is "not buried, yet dead.., belonging neither to 
1266 SUD 129 
1267 JP 4: 3915 / Pap. III C1 
1268 JP 2: 1200 / Pap. II A 326 1269 W, 122 
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life nor to death... you, too, come here, here is rest, and here is life! s1270 It is this that we are able to 
call forgiveness. And as worshipper - loving God in return - one becomes oneself by becoming 
nothing before God. And yet, whilst rejoicing in expressing the infinite difference, Kierkegaard also 
claims that "worship is what makes the human being resemble God... The human being and God do 
not resemble each other directly but inversely; only when God has infinitely become the eternal and 
omnipresent object of worship and the human being always a worshipper, only then do they resemble 
each other. "1271 
'270 PIC, 18 
1271 UDVS, 193 
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Appendix: Postscript On Forgiveness and the Final Question of the Other 
What has been portrayed is for some a posture of heroism: "Christian heroism -a rarity, to be sure - to 
venture wholly to become oneself, an individual human being, this specific human being, alone before 
God". 1272 For many, however, Kierkegaard depiction of the self before God irrevocably strands the 
individual upon a precipice, trembling over a holy abyss, forsaking `the others' in its anguished 
struggle to relate to a Wholly Other by whom it must remain ultimately forsaken. "We, ourselves 
wandering on the narrow ridge, must not shrink from the sight of the jutting rock on which he stands 
over the abyss; nor may we step on it", Buber warns, "We have much to learn from him, but not the 
final lesson. -1273 The final lesson into whose school Buber will not submit himself is a lesson 
undermined by this conspicuous absence of `the other'. As such, Kierkegaardian inwardness, in this 
inscription, is consigned to become a relic of modem melancholy, a fading silhouette of an 
individualised `self whose contours, in the twilight of modernity, have become increasingly uncertain. 
It is, Charles Taylor exhorts, `the ethic of authenticity' that responds to the sense of loss which 
features in our characteristic "malaises of modernity' . 
1274 But in the indeterminate agitation of the 
postmodern what becomes of that passionate modem search for `authenticity' - which according to 
Golomb begins with a confession from Kierkegaard and threatens to be shipwrecked upon the jagged 
rocks of deconstruction? 1275 Nevertheless, the depiction of Kierkegaardian subjectivity as the icon of a 
definitively modem inwardness is itself becoming increasingly dubious. What is becoming clearer is 
that Kierkegaard can be read as transcribing the actual iconoclasm of modem selfhood in order to raise 
up from its ashes a self becoming itself in the openness of relating to God. To exist before God actually 
requires "immense passivity, vulnerability and wounded openness" which, Pattison writes, "calls for an 
orientation of the self that is quite alien to the mainstream of Western philosophical thought about the 
self and is certainly in profound tension with the post-Enlightenment pursuit of autonomy. i1276 And 
neither does this "wounded openness" close itself to the human other. Anti-Climacus's `self before 
God' irredicibly demands a relation that begins in esteeming all individuals as equal before God: a 
valuation which, aspiring to see through the eyes of God, recognises the alterity of every other. 
"God is not the only 'other' to which selves can relate and thereby become selves, " C. 
Stephen Evans clarifies, "though God remains the crucial `other' for selfhood in the highest sense. " 1277 
Anti-Climacus's criteria may thereby recall Luther's distinction between coram deo / coram nobis 
1272 SUD 5 
1273 Buber, `The Question to the Single One', ed. Daniel W. Conway, Soren Kierkegaard: Critical 
Assessments of Leading Philosophers Volume III Philosophy of Religion, 42 1274 The Ethics ofAuthenticity, 1 1275 "The search for authenticity in modem Western thought begins with the desperate journal entry, dated 1 August, 1835, of a 22-year-old Dane: `the thing is to find a truth, which is true for me, to find the idea for which I can live and die. "' In Search ofAuthenticity, 33. "There is today a grave danger that we are facing the death of authenticity. Poststructuralist thought and other currently fashionable 
streams of what is usually called `postmodernism' attempt to dissolve the subjective pathos of 
authenticity which lies at the heart of existentialist concern. " Ibid., 203-204 1276 "`Before God" as a Regulative Concept', 84 ixn C. Stephen Evans, `Who Is the Other in Sickness Unto Death? God and Human Relations in the Constitution of the Self', ed. Niels Jorgen Cappelorn and Hermann Deuser, Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 1997,8 
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(coram hominibus). 1279 In Levinas, however, the `here I am', in which one responds as the single 
individual before God, becomes the authentic primal response to the other. Admittedly Anti-Climacus 
does not fulfil the task which Kierkegaard feels compelled to take up elsewhere. "The desire is to exist 
in the eyes of the mighty", Kierkegaard writes in Works of Love - and once more one might think of 
Hegel; but it is through the eyes of God that one learns "the relationship between man and man ought 
and dare never to be one in which the one worships and the other is worshipped . "1279 The self 
before 
God calls for all to be equally valued as individuals before God. `Before God' is, accordingly, "the 
source and origin of all individuality", but to believe in one's "authentic individuality" means 
concomitantly to: 
... believe in the individuality of every other person; 
for individuality is not mine but is God's 
gift by which he gives me being and gives being to all, gives being to everything. It is simply 
the inexhaustible swell of goodness in the goodness of God that he, the almighty, nevertheless 
gives in such a way that the receiver obtains individuality, that He who created out of nothing 
nevertheless creates individuality, so that creation over against him shall not be nothing, 
although it is taken from nothing and is nothing and yet becomes individuality. 1280 
And so `before God' one speaks not simply of the alterity of `the other' but of the open 
relation to `the neighbour': "The concept of neighbour means a duplicating of one's own self. 
Neighbour is what philosophers would call the other, by which the selfishness in self-love is to be 
tested. "128' And it is in the concept of neighbour that the notion of 'forgiveness' arises once more: a 
notion reawakening the controversies of offense and the infinite difference. Reflection upon 
`forgiveness' and `the other' provokes fastidious questions for any theological anthropology which, in 
asserting the primacy of the self before God and the infinite qualitative difference, one might loosely 
call `Kierkegaardian'. More precisely, it is the infinite difference of forgiveness - upon which much of 
the present conclusion finally rests - that potentially induces an abyss between self and other. Recalling 
Anti-Climacus: "there is one way in which man could never in all eternity come to be like God: in 
forgiving sins. "1282 And yet, Kierkegaard recognises, `Forgive, and you also will be forgiven' [Matt 
6: 12,14-15]: "Your forgiveness of another is your own forgiveness; the forgiveness which you give 
you receive, not contrariwise that you give the forgiveness that you receive. "1283 How can these 
proclamations be related? Is there more to be said here than an apparent pseudonymous incongruity? 
Anti-Climacus, for his part, is evidently asserting that humanity can never, ontologically one might say, 
forgive the sins that God has forgiven; whilst Kierkegaard, in Works of Love, seems to be implying that 
there is some connection between our forgiveness by God and our forgiveness of our neighbour. "Of 
course we are called to forgive each other, " Sponheim writes, "but God's forgiveness is of a wholly 
other order. "1284 A resolution can perhaps be found in an apparently paradoxical journal entry from 
1854: "To forgive sins is divine not only in the sense that no one is able to do it except God, but it is 
1278 See Rupp, The Righteousness of God, 161 1279 WL, 128 
t280 WL, 253 
1281 37 
1282 SUD, 122 
1283 WL, 348 
1284 Sponheim, Paul, `Is Forgiveness Enough? A Kierkegaardian Response', Word and World, Volume XVI, Number 3, Summer 1996,322 
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also divine in another sense so that we must say that no one can do it without God. "' 285 One possible 
reading would be that one learns the meaning of forgiveness from God, though this understanding is 
only faithfully manifest in our forgiving of the other - the giving with which our receiving is 
concomitant. The paradox is such that only with God can one forgive, and yet it is in forgiving the 
other that one receives forgiveness oneself. Here the ostensible collision between infinite difference 
and resemblance occurs once more: "there is not a more exact agreement between the sky above and its 
reflection in the sea, which is just as deep as the distance is high, than there is between forgiveness and 
forgiving. s1286 
Significantly, in Kierkegaard, the question of forgiveness is never far removed from the question of 
offense towards the claim to forgive. This has particular pertinence to the question of suffering, since 
the need for forgiveness implies that someone has suffered. It is, moreover, the offense of suffering 
which begs the question of the relation between human and divine forgiveness -a question which 
returns to the earlier concern with the abyss of the Holocaust. Though this may end on a dark note, it 
would be important to say something about the question of the unforgivable posed by the Holocaust - 
an aporia confronted in the uncompromising writings of Vladimir Jank6l6vitch which have elicited a 
recent response from Derrida. "Forgiveness is impossible... 'Forgiveness, ' says Jankblbvitch, `died in 
the death camps. "'1287 One cannot, indeed must not, forgive the other for the sake of the others who 
died and are thereby not present to grant a forgiveness that is perhaps not even sought after. Here is a 
forgiveness which ultimately, for Jankelevitch, may not be stronger than evil. Jank6l6vitch thus 
capitulates before an "uncrossable barriers1288 - an abyss which threatens to devour the reach of 
forgiveness in the wake of the tremendum, the monstrous [Ungeheur]. And impossibility of forgiveness 
this may be true for God - who has permitted this suffering - as much as for `the other' who has 
wrought it. 
This is effectively a controversy of offense, both against suffering and forgiveness - though 
clearly a controversy Kierkegaard is historically stranded from. But, despite this, could there be any 
point of contact between Kierkegaard and this more contemporary aporia? Recently Hugh Pyper has 
enticingly proposed Kierkegaard's insights on the unforgivable into this debate: "The denial of 
possibility is the unforgivable. "1289 This is true in more than one sense for Kierkegaard. Perhaps to 
deny the possibility of forgiveness is itself unforgivable: "If you cannot bear the offences of men 
against you, how should God be able to bear your sins against him? i1290 Through not forgiving, one 
permits an abyss to swell between self and the other - the neighbour, through forgiving whom, one 
comes to resemble God. "Forgiveness as God's possibility becomes decisive just where there is no 
1285 JP 2: 1224 / Pap. X12 A3 1286 349 
1287 `To Forgive: The Unforgivable and the Imprescriptible', Questioning God, 27 1288 See Derrida, `To Forgive: The Unforgivable and the Imprescriptible', 40 1289 Hugh Pyper, `Forgiving the Unforgivable: Kierkegaard, Derrida and the Scandal of Forgiveness', paper presented at Kierkegaard: Between Ethics and Religion, The 2"d International Conference of the Soren Kierkegaard Society of the United Kingdom, University of Leeds, 8`' July, 2001. I am grateful to Hugh Pyper for providing me with a copy of this paper. 1290 WL, 352 
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human possibility of forgiveness - in the face of the unforgivable. 
"1x91 And yet suffering threatens to 
assert another abyss between human and divine forgiveness: we may never know what it means 
for 
God to forgive us; but can God know what it requires for us to forgive God? Here is an abyss of 
offense: offense against those who forgive; offense against God forgiving, not only oneself as 
Kierkegaard speaks of, but the other whom one does not forgive; even offense against God's allowance 
of suffering, or against those who `forgive' God. 
But what would it mean to `forgive' God? Kierkegaard's infinite difference asserts that it is 
not ontologically possible to forgive sins as our sins are forgiven, to know what it is for God to forgive. 
But perhaps one could adapt another notion from Kierkegard's writings in order to suggest what it 
could mean to `forgive' God in the face of apparent divine darkness -a notion which relates to 
Abraham's trust in the will of God in the face of sacrifice (a faith which often seems to lurk in the 
shadows of all Kierkegaard's writings). This notion of `forgiving' God would be a definition of faith as 
the teleological suspension of offense. In other words, to `forgive' God in the face of inscrutable 
suffering would be to `suspend' offense through the longing for faith - though this teleology of the 
suspension of offense is one which can only be attained through the consummation of faith's telos, 
something which, melancholically one might say, is only attained in eternity. And yet, as Silentio 
recounts, who can understand this Abrahamic leap into the absurd? Either offense or faith. Perhaps the 
demand is ultimately too high, impossible one should say. Perhaps such faith is too sublime to 
accomplish - perhaps even such a faith is more than God deserves - if it were not that this 
faith is, in 
its own way, the gift of God. What I find unavoidable in reading Kierkegaard is that in some sense God 
is the cause of offence and therefore of despair, and here in this "horror religiosus"1292 is found the 
sublimity of a faith which overcomes God through God, as it were. It is at this point that faith as the 
teleological suspension of offense reminds me of Simon Weil's notion of a purifying prayer which 
prays to God "with the thought that God does not exist. "1293 But these are expansive questions for 
which the future may offer some reconciliation. For now, let us seek some inspiration from 
Kierkegaard's own sublime remark that "to love another person means to help him to love God". 1294 
If we love God while thinking that he does not exist, he will manifest his existence. 1295 
But then, you will say, what is left? Is there hope despite everything, despite ourselves? 
Despair, perhaps? Or faith? 
All that is left is the question. 1296 
1291 Pyper, `Forgiving the Unforgivable: Kierkegaard, Derrida and the Scandal of Forgiveness' 1292 Johannes de Silentio aptly applies this phrase to describe his response to the faith of Abraham: "One approaches him with a horror religiosus, as Israel approached Mount Sinai. " (FT, 52). Sylvian Agacinski astutely suggests that Silentio replaces the sublimity of the creator with the sublimity of Abraham's faith. "To say that Abraham is sublime is to say that he has become a stranger to us. We 
tremble before the man of faith just as he trembled before his God. " `We Are Not Sublime', 
Kierkegaard: A Critical Reader, 44. 1293 Gravity and Grace, 19 12% WL, 124. I discuss some of these questions further in my `The Dark Night of Suffering and the Darkness of God: God-forsakenness or Forsaking God in "The Gospel of Sufferings"", ed. Robert Perkins, International Kierkegaard Commentary: Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits (Mercer 
University Press, forthcoming 2005). 295 Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace, 15 129' Elie Wiesel, `To Believe or Not to Believe', From the Kingdom of Memory, 35 
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